











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 


























Thesis	  submitted	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy	  
School	  of	  Law	  
The	  University	  of	  Edinburgh	  
2013	  
	   2	  
ABSTRACT	  
	  
This	  thesis	  is	  about	  so-­‐called	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions:	  transactions	  
to	  which	   all	   parties	   agree	   voluntarily,	   and	  which	   are	   beneficial	   for	   all	   parties,	  
but	  which	   are	   still	  widely	   considered	   exploitative,	   and	   for	   that	   reason	   legally	  
restricted	   in	  many	   countries.	   The	   thesis	   asks	   two	  main	   questions:	   1.	  What	   is	  
wrong	  with	   consensual	   exploitation?	  2.	  What	   implications	  does	   the	   answer	   to	  
this	  question	  have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	  of	   consensual	   transactions	   that	   are	  
regarded	  exploitative	  in	  modern	  liberal	  societies?	  In	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  research	  
question,	  the	  thesis	  starts	  by	  distinguishing	  and	  analysing	  five	  competing	  views	  
of	   the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	   exploitation	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   present-­‐day	  
philosophical	   debate	   on	   exploitation;	   and	   rejects	   all	   five	   answers.	   Next,	   the	  
thesis	   offers	   an	   alternative	   answer,	   which	   is	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	  
exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness—a	  failure	  of	  the	  
virtue	   of	   generosity.	   The	   thesis	   then	   turns	   to	   the	   second	   research	   question:	  
what	  understanding	  exploitation	  as	  greediness	   implies	   for	  the	   legal	  restriction	  
of	  exploitative	  transactions.	  It	  discusses	  and	  rejects	  the	  view	  that	  law	  ought	  only	  
to	  be	  used	  to	  regulate	  ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’	  behaviour,	  and	  not	  to	  promote	  virtues	  
or	  discourage	  vices,	   such	  as	  generosity	  and	  greediness.	  The	   thesis	  argues	   that	  
legal	   restrictions	   on	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	   can	   be	   justified	   as	   a	  
means	   to	   prevent	   greediness,	   and	   to	   promote	   a	   certain	   other-­‐regardingness,	  
and	   illustrates	   this	   argument	   with	   two	   examples	   of	   laws	   that	   regulate	  
consensual	   transactions	   which	   are	   widely	   regarded	   exploitative:	   minimum	  
wage	  laws	  and	  payday	  loan	  laws.	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CHAPTER	   1	   –	   INTRODUCTION:	   CONSENSUAL	   EXPLOITATION	   AND	   LEGAL	  
RESTRICTIONS	  ON	  EXPLOITATIVE	  TRANSACTIONS	  
	  
1.1 Introduction	  and	  research	  questions	  
	  
This	  thesis	  is	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  exploitation.	  There	  are	  many	  different	  types	  
of	   situations	   that	   are	   called	   exploitative.	   In	   some	   of	   them,	   such	   as	   forced	  
prostitution,	  the	  exploited	  person	  is	  coerced.	  In	  others,	  the	  exploited	  person	  is	  
deceived	   or	   tricked,	   such	   as	   when	   someone	   persuades	   a	   person	   with	  
Alzheimer's	  disease	   to	  donate	  a	   large	  sum	  of	  money	   to	  her.	  Yet	   there	  are	  also	  
situations	  that	  are	  widely	  considered	  exploitative,	  in	  which	  the	  exploited	  person	  
actually	  consents	  to	  the	  interaction	  voluntarily	  and	  rationally,	  and	  in	  which	  she	  
benefits	   from	   the	   interaction.	   Think,	   for	   instance,	   of	   sweatshop	   factories	   in	  
developing	  countries	  which	  pay	  their	  employees	  extremely	   low	  wages;	  of	   loan	  
providers	  who	  ask	  exorbitant	  interest	  rates	  to	  people	  who	  are	  in	  urgent	  need	  of	  
money;	  of	  companies	  that	  do	  not	  pay	  any	  salary	  to	  interns	  who	  need	  the	  work	  
experience;	  of	  a	  passerby	  who	  offers	  help	   to	  a	  stranded	  person,	  but	  only	   for	  a	  
high	  price;	  of	  people	  who,	  after	  a	  natural	  disaster,	  go	  to	  the	  affected	  area	  to	  sell	  
essential	  goods	  like	  water,	  food,	  and	  generators,	  for	  many	  times	  the	  usual	  price;	  
of	  taxi	  drivers	  who,	  during	  a	  national	  rail	  or	  bus	  strike,	  triple	  their	  fare;	  and	  of	  
people	   in	   need	   of	   money	   who	   sell	   an	   organ	   or	   other	   body	   part,	   who	   enter	  
prostitution,	   or	  who	   agree	   to	   paid	   surrogacy.	   In	   all	   these	   cases,	   the	   exploited	  
person	   consents,	   we	   can	   assume,	   rationally,	   sufficiently	   informed,	   and	  
voluntarily	   to	   the	   transaction	  that	   is	  deemed	  exploitative.	  However,	  while	   it	   is	  
easy	   to	   see	   why	   exploitation	   that	   involves	   coercion	   or	   deception	   is	   morally	  
wrong,	   it	   is	   not	   immediately	   clear	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   allegedly	   exploitative	  
transactions	  to	  which	  the	  exploited	  person	  consents	  voluntarily.	  After	  all,	  in	  all	  
the	   above	   examples,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   exploited	   people	   would	   be	   worse	   off	  
without	   the	   transaction.	  Moreover,	   in	  many	  of	   the	  examples,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	  
exploiting	  party	  is	  morally	  permitted	  not	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  transaction	  at	  all.	  For	  
instance,	   most	   people	   would	   agree	   that,	   generally	   speaking,	   employers	   are	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morally	  permitted	  to	  choose	  not	  to	  hire	   interns,	  or	   to	  choose	  not	  to	  outsource	  
part	   of	   their	   company	   to	   a	   developing	   country.1	   And	   if	   they	   choose	   not	   to,	  
people	   who	   desperately	   need	   internships,	   or	   people	   in	   developing	   countries	  
who	   desperately	   need	   work,	   are	   worse	   off	   than	   when	   they	   are	   offered,	  
respectively,	   an	   unpaid	   internship,	   or	   work	   in	   a	   sweatshop	   factory.	   Hence,	   it	  
seems	  that	  if	  the	  alleged	  exploiting	  parties	  are	  not	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  enter	  
into	  the	  transaction	  at	  all,	  and	  when	  they	  do,	  the	  transaction	  is	  beneficial	  for	  the	  
exploited	   person	   compared	   to	   no	   transaction,	   the	   alleged	   exploiters	   are	   not	  
harming	  the	  alleged	  exploitees,	  but	  are	  actually	  benefiting	  them.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  consensual	  transactions	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  described	  above	  
are	   widely	   criticized	   as	   being	   exploitative,	   and	   in	   many	   countries,	   this	  
accusation	  of	  exploitation	  is	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  legal	  restriction	  or	  prohibition	  of	  
such	  transactions.	  Think,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  working	  hours,	  
minimum	  wages,2	  maximum	   interest	   rates,3	  maximum	   rent,	   prostitution,	   paid	  
organ	  donation,	  and	  paid	  surrogacy.	  Other	  examples	   include	  legal	  prohibitions	  
on	  price	  gouging	  (increasing	  prices	  of	  essential	  goods	  after	  a	  natural	  disaster),4	  
and	   the	   practice	   of	   courts	   to	   declare	   vastly	   uneven	   contracts	   unconscionable	  
and	  to	  refuse	  to	  enforce	  them.5	  In	  the	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  such	  regulations,	  
the	   charge	   of	   exploitation	   is	   frequently	   used	   as	   though	   it	   is	   self-­‐evident	  what	  
‘exploitation’	  means,	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  it,	  and	  why	  the	  practice	  in	  question	  is	  
exploitative.	   Yet	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   Within	   the	   fields	   of	   moral	   and	   political	  
philosophy,	   there	   are	   several	   competing	   views	   of	   what	   the	   term	   exploitation	  
means	   and	   of	   what	   makes	   it	   wrong,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   consensual	  
transactions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  AD	  Bailey,	  ‘The	  Nonworseness	  Claim	  and	  the	  Moral	  
Permissibility	  of	  Better-­‐Than-­‐Permissible	  Acts’	  (2011)	  39	  Philosophia	  237-­‐250,	  238.	  	  
2	  See	  chapter	  5,	  section	  4.1.	  	  
3	  See	  chapter	  5,	  section	  4.2.	  
4	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  such	  laws	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  for	  discussions	  of	  price	  gouging	  as	  
exploitative	  see	  e.g.	  JC	  Snyder,	  ‘What’s	  the	  Matter	  with	  Price	  Gouging?’	  (2009)	  19(2)	  Business	  
Ethics	  Quarterly	  275-­‐293;	  and	  M	  Zwolinski,	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Price	  Gouging’	  (2008)	  18(3)	  Business	  
Ethics	  Quarterly	  347-­‐378.	  
5	  For	  examples	  of	  courts	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  exploitation	  in	  their	  analysis	  or	  justification	  in	  
contract	  law	  cases	  see	  R	  Bigwood,	  Exploitative	  Contracts	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003)	  
chapters	  6-­‐8,	  with	  chapter	  6	  specifically	  focusing	  on	  unconscionable	  dealings.	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This	   is	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   my	   thesis:	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   charge	   of	  
exploitation	   is	   used	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   a	   number	   of	  
voluntary	   transactions,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   what	   the	   term	  
actually	  means,	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  it,	  and	  thus	  what	  makes	  those	  transactions	  
exploitative.	  Yet	  different	  views	  of	  what	  ‘exploitation’	  means	  may	  have	  different	  
implications	   for	   the	   type	   of	   transactions	   against	   which	   the	   charge	   of	  
exploitation	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  argument,	  and	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  may	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  legal	  limitations	  on	  those	  transactions.	  	  
	   The	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  therefore	  to	  analyse	  the	  question	  of	  what	  makes	  
so-­‐called	   ‘consensual	   exploitation’	   morally	   wrong,	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   the	  
implications	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   question	  may	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	  
certain	   voluntary	   transactions	   which	   are	   deemed	   exploitative	   in	   present-­‐day	  
liberal	  societies.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  project	  has	  two	  main	  research	  questions:	  
	  
1. What	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation?	  
2. What	   implications	   may	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   have	   for	   the	   legal	  
restriction	   of	   certain	   voluntary	   transactions	   that	   are	   regarded	  
exploitative	  in	  present-­‐day	  liberal	  societies?	  
	  
By	  asking	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation,	  I	  do	  not	  
mean	  to	  assume	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  something	  is	  necessarily	  wrong	  with	  it.	   I	  
realize	   that	   there	   are	   many	   people	   who	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   morally	  
wrong	  with	  what	   I	   have	   called	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions,	   and	  who	  
argue	   that	   such	   transactions	   should	   not	   rightly	   be	   called	   exploitative.6	   My	  
approach	  is	  the	  other	  way	  around:	  there	  are	  many	  people	  who	  consider	  certain	  
voluntary	   commercial	   transactions	   morally	   problematic	   because	   exploitative;	  
and	  in	  all	  present-­‐day	  liberal	  societies,	  there	  are	  laws	  or	  calls	  for	  laws	  to	  restrict	  
those	   transactions,	   that	   are	   at	   least	   partly	   based	   on	   claims	   about	   those	  
transactions	  being	  exploitative.	  My	  question	  is:	  given	  that	  these	  claims	  exist,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  A	  well-­‐known	  contemporary	  libertarian	  advocate	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  consensual	  transactions	  such	  
as	  sweatshop	  labour	  and	  price	  gouging	  are	  not	  morally	  wrong	  or	  exploitative	  is	  Matt	  Zwolinski.	  
See	  e.g.	  his	  ‘Sweatshops,	  Choice,	  and	  Exploitation’	  (2007)	  17(4)	  Business	  Ethics	  Quarterly	  689-­‐
727;	  and	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Price	  Gouging’,	  op.cit.	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what	  reason(s),	   if	  any,	  can	  these	  transactions	  be	  said	  to	  be	  exploitative,	  and	  to	  
what	   extent	   can	   those	   reasons	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   such	  
transactions?	  In	  other	  words:	  in	  all	  present-­‐day	  liberal	  societies,	  there	  are	  (calls	  
for)	  laws	  that	  restrict	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions,	  and	  my	  aims	  are:	  (a)	  
to	   analyse	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   such	   transactions—what	   makes	   them	  
exploitative—and	   thereby	   to	   know	   what	   it	   actually	   means	   to	   justify	   legal	  
restrictions	  on	   those	   transactions	  with	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  are	   exploitative;	   and	  
(b)	  to	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  justification	  is	  an	  acceptable	  ground	  for	  legal	  
restrictions	  on	  consensual	  transactions	  in	  a	  liberal	  society.	  	  
	   The	   next	   section	   further	   specifies	   and	   clarifies	   the	   above	   research	  
questions	   and	   its	   central	   terms,	   and	   stresses	   what	   the	   project	   is	   not	   about.	  
Section	  1.3	  provides	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  an	  overview	  
of	  its	  chapters.	  	  
	  
1.2	  Central	  terms	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  project	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  exploitation	  has	  both	  a	  moral	  and	  a	  non-­‐moral	  meaning.	   In	   its	  
non-­‐moral	  meaning,	  it	  simply	  stands	  for	  ‘to	  take	  advantage	  of’	  or	  ‘advantageous	  
use’.	  Think	  of	  the	  exploitation	  of	  an	  oil	  field,	  or	  the	  exploitation	  of	  a	  goalkeeper’s	  
weakness	  in	  order	  to	  score	  a	  goal.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  the	  term	  exploitation	  is	  always	  
used	  in	  its	  moral	  meaning.	  	  
Broadly	   speaking,	   the	   moral	   concept	   of	   exploitation	   means	   ‘taking	  
advantage	  of	  someone	  in	  a	  wrongful	  way’.	  Exactly	  what	  this	  wrongful	  way	  is—
what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation—is	  of	  course	  one	  of	  the	  main	  questions	  of	  the	  
thesis.	  Moreover,	   the	   fact	   that	   exploiting	  means	   taking	  wrongful	   advantage	   of	  
someone,	  entails	   that	  when	  we	  ask	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  we	  at	   the	  
same	   time	   ask	   what	   exploitation	   is,	   and	   which	   transactions	   can	   rightfully	   be	  
called	   exploitative.	   This	   means	   that	   writers	   disagree	   about	   which	   types	   of	  
transactions	   can	   be	   used	   as	   examples	   of	   exploitation.	   For	   instance,	   someone	  
who	  argues	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  distributive	  injustice,	  may	  say	  that	  
the	   earlier	   mentioned	   example	   of	   taxi	   drivers	   who	   triple	   their	   fare	   during	   a	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national	  rail	  strike,	  is	  not	  a	  case	  of	  exploitation	  because	  no	  distributive	  injustice	  
is	   involved,	   while	   someone	   who	   argues	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	  
unfairness	  may	   say	   that	   it	   is	   a	   case	   of	   exploitation.	   Yet	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	  
unavoidable	   to	   refer	   to	   examples	  of	   exploitative	   transactions	  when	  explaining	  
the	   concept	   of	   exploitation.	   This	   is	   because,	   since	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   term	  
exploitation	  is	  contested,	  the	  term	  itself	  offers	  no	  basis	  for	  a	  shared	  discussion	  if	  
we	  do	  not	  at	   least	  have	  an	   idea	  of	  what	  sort	  of	  practices	  we	  are	   talking	  about	  
when	  speaking	  of	  exploitation.	  At	  several	  points	   in	  this	   thesis,	   therefore,	   I	  will	  
refer	   to	   what	   I	   take	   to	   be	   common	   intuitions	   about	   certain	   practices	   being	  
exploitative	  or	  non-­‐exploitative,	  even	  though	  I	  realize	  that	  if	  one	  does	  not	  share	  
these	  intuitions,	  my	  argument	  will	  become	  less	  convincing.	  	  
	   Since,	  when	  we	  ask	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  we	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
ask	  what	  exploitation	  is,	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  exploitation	  cannot	  be	  
given	   here.	   Nevertheless,	   because	   exploitation	   is	   a	   term	   that	   people	   use	   in	  
several	  different	  ways	  and	   to	   condemn	  many	  different	   types	  of	   transactions,	   I	  
do	   wish	   to	   further	   specify	   the	   usages	   of	   the	   term	   that	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   in	   this	  
thesis.	  
	  
1.2.1	  Consensual	  exploitation	  	  
A	   first	   distinction	   that	   should	   be	  made	   is	   between	   what	   may	   be	   called	   ‘non-­‐
consensual	  exploitation’	  and	   ‘consensual	  exploitation’.	  As	  described	  above,	   the	  
term	  exploitation	  is	  used,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  to	  describe	  ways	  of	  advantage	  taking	  
in	   which	   the	   exploitee’s	   consent	   is	   somehow	   impaired,	   such	   as	   coercion,	  
deception,	   or	   taking	   advantage	   of	   a	   mental	   incapacity	   or	   concealment	   of	  
information.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   term	   is	   used	   to	   criticize	   transactions	   to	  
which	  all	  parties	  consent	  voluntarily,	  rationally	  and	  sufficiently	  informed.	  In	  this	  
thesis,	  I	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  second	  type	  of	  exploitation-­‐claim.	  This	  is	  because	  such	  
claims	  seem	  to	  constitute	  the	  most	  challenging	  philosophical	  problem.	  As	  Alan	  
Wertheimer	  put	  it,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  moral	  rocket	  scientists	  to	  know	  why	  it	  
is	   wrong	   for	   someone	   to	   gain	   from	   an	   interaction	   that	   harms,	   deceives,	   or	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coerces	  another.7	  Yet	  it	  is	  much	  less	  clear	  how	  interactions	  can	  be	  wrong	  if	  they	  
are	  voluntary	  and	  beneficial	  for	  all	  parties	  involved.	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  also	  less	  
clear	   whether	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   such	   consensual	  
transactions	  can	  be	  justified.	  Hence,	  wherever	  I	  use	  the	  term	  exploitation	  in	  this	  
thesis,	  it	  always	  refers	  to	  consensual	  exploitation	  and	  thus	  to	  transactions	  that	  
involve	  no	  coercion,	  deception,	  insufficient	  information	  or	  mental	  incapacities.	  	  
	   It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  such	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  coercive	  and	  
non-­‐coercive	  transactions	  cannot	  be	  made.	  It	  may	  be	  thought	  that,	  for	  instance,	  
the	   problem	   with	   people	   who	   agree	   to	   work	   in	   a	   sweatshop	   factory	   for	   an	  
extremely	  low	  wage,	  is	  exactly	  that	  their	  consent	  is	  not	  truly	  voluntary,	  because	  
they	  are	  coerced	  by	  their	  lack	  of	  other	  opportunities.	  This	  is,	  in	  fact,	  one	  of	  the	  
competing	   views	   in	   the	   philosophical	   debate	   on	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
exploitation,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  For	  now	  I	  want	  
to	   maintain	   that	   regardless	   of	   the	   merits	   of	   that	   view,	   we	   can	   at	   least	   see	   a	  
difference	  between	  being	  coerced	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  transaction	  by	  another	  person	  
under	  threat	  of	  force,	  and	  consenting	  to	  a	  transaction	  we	  do	  not	  like	  to	  take	  part	  
in	   because	   it	   is	   in	   our	   harsh	   circumstances	   the	   best	   choice	  we	   have.	   And	   the	  
former	  type	  of	  situation	  is	  not	  dealt	  with	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
By	  saying	  that	  this	  thesis	  only	  focuses	  on	  consensual	  transactions,	  I	  also	  
do	  not	  mean	  to	  deny	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  reasons	  that	  can	  make	  it	  difficult	  to	  
draw	   the	   boundaries	   between	   what	   is	   fully	   and	   not	   fully	   consensual.	   For	  
example,	  it	  will	  not	  always	  be	  clear	  in	  practice	  how	  to	  decide	  whether	  someone	  
was	  sufficiently	   informed,	  sufficiently	  rational,	  or	  unduly	   influenced.	  However,	  
these	  are	  not	   issues	  that	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  in	  my	  thesis.	  My	  thesis	  starts	  with	  
the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  laws,	  and	  calls	  for	  laws,	  to	  restrict	  allegedly	  exploitative	  
transactions	  in	  which	  the	  exploitee’s	  consent	   is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  typically8	  
impaired	  in	  any	  of	  those	  ways.	  My	  question	  is:	  if	  there	  are	  no	  such	  impediments	  
to	  consent,	  what	  can	  then	  make	  a	  transaction	  exploitative?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  A	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  13.	  
8As	  said,	  worries	  about	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  impairments	  to	  consent	  do	  regularly	  underlie	  
(calls	  for)	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  allegedly	  exploitative	  practices.	  This	  is,	  for	  instance,	  the	  case	  
with	  medical	  research	  in	  developing	  countries.	  See	  e.g.	  JS	  Hawkins	  and	  E	  Emanuel	  (eds),	  
Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries:	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Clinical	  Research	  (Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  2008).	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1.2.2	  Uncontroversial	  goods	  	  
A	  second	  distinction	  should	  be	  made	  between	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  term	  
exploitation	  is	  used.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  people	  use	  the	  term	  to	  condemn	  a	  wrong	  
in	  what	  might	  be	   called	   the	   terms	  of	  a	   transaction:	  either	   in	   the	  outcome	  of	  a	  
transaction	  (the	  relative	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  assigned	  to	  the	  parties),	  or	  in	  the	  
negotiation	  process	  leading	  to	  this	  outcome.	  This	  is,	  for	  instance,	  the	  case	  when	  
we	  say	  that	  employers	  exploit	  their	  employees	  if	  they	  pay	  them	  extremely	  low	  
wages,	  or	   that	  moneylenders	  exploit	  borrowers	   if	   they	  ask	  exorbitant	   interest	  
rates.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   term	   exploitation	   is	   also	   used	   to	   condemn	  
transactions	   because	   of	   the	   type	  of	   good	   that	   is	   sold,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   price	  
that	  is	  paid	  for	  this	  good	  or	  the	  negotiation	  process	  resulting	  in	  that	  price.	  This	  
is,	   for	   instance,	   the	   case	   with	   the	   sale	   of	   drugs	   or	   cigarettes,	   but	   also	   with	  
prostitution	  and	  the	  sale	  of	  human	  organs.	  Such	  transactions	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  
exploitative,	  even	  if	  the	  seller	  or	  buyer	  is	  offered	  a	  good	  price.9	  The	  idea	  behind	  
such	  criticism	  is	  that	  certain	  things	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  tradable	  goods	  at	  all,	  
and	  that	  selling	  or	  buying	  them	  is	  inherently	  wrong.	  This	  is	  often	  justified	  with	  
the	  argument	  that	  trading	  in	  such	  goods	  amounts	  to	  wrongful	  commodification	  
or	  objectification,	  that	  it	  is	  degrading	  for	  the	  seller,	  or	  that	  it	  violates	  the	  Kantian	  
maxim	  not	  to	  treat	  another	  as	  a	  mere	  means.10	  	  
	   Sometimes,	   both	   meanings	   of	   the	   term	   exploitation	   are	   involved	   in	  
claims	   that	   a	   certain	   practice	   is	   exploitative.	   Someone	   might,	   for	   example,	  
criticize	  paid	   organ	  donation	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   donors	   are	  not	   paid	   enough	   for	  
what	   they	   sell,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   think	   that	   organs	   should	   not	   be	   sold	   or	  
bought	   at	   all.	   And	   some	   theories	   of	   exploitation	   try	   to	   address	   both	   types	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  exploitation	  in	  this	  meaning	  of	  the	  term,	  see	  JL	  Hill,	  
‘Exploitation’	  (1994)	  79	  (3)	  Cornell	  Law	  Review	  631-­‐699;	  and	  S	  Wilkinson,	  Bodies	  for	  Sale:	  Ethics	  
and	  Exploitation	  in	  the	  Human	  Body	  Trade	  (Routledge,	  2003).	  
10	  See	  e.g.	  MM	  Ertman	  and	  JC	  Williams,	  Rethinking	  Commodification,	  Cases	  and	  Readings	  in	  Law	  
and	  Culture	  (New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  and	  MJ	  Radin,	  Contested	  Commodities	  (Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1996).	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exploitation-­‐claim.11	   Nevertheless,	   I	   will	   only	   focus	   on	   the	   first	   type	   of	  
exploitation-­‐claim,	  referring	  to	  a	  wrong	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  transaction	  instead	  
of	  a	  wrong	  in	  the	  type	  of	  good	  sold.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  two	  types	  
of	   claims,	   and	   the	   arguments	   that	   underlie	   them,	   are	   very	   different.	   Although	  
the	  term	  exploitation	  is	  used	  in	  both	  cases,	  it	  is	  a	  different	  thing	  to	  claim	  that	  it	  
is	  wrong	  to	  sell	  goods	  for	  a	  certain	  price,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  inherently	  wrong	  to	  sell	  
certain	  goods.	  Those	  two	  usages	  of	  the	  term	  exploitation	  therefore	  require	  two	  
largely	  different	  analyses	  when	  trying	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  
with	   exploitation.12	   And	   since	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   exploitation	   might	   be	  
completely	   different	   for	   the	   two	   different	   types	   of	   exploitation-­‐claims,	  
addressing	  both	  types	  of	  claims	  would	  also	  require	  two	  different	  analyses	  when	  
addressing	  my	   second	   research	   question,	   on	   the	   possible	   implications	   for	   the	  
legal	  restriction	  of	  allegedly	  exploitative	  transactions.13	  For	  those	  reasons,	  this	  
thesis	  only	   focuses	  on	  the	  first	   type	  of	  exploitation-­‐claim,	  and	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  
exploitation	   in	   this	   thesis,	   it	   is	   always	   assumed	   that	   the	   good	   that	   is	   being	  
exchanged	  is	  itself	  not	  controversial.	  	  
	   In	  relation	  to	  this,	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  this	  thesis	  the	  example	  
of	  sweatshops	  is	  used	  at	  several	  points.	  The	  term	  sweatshop	  generally	  refers	  to	  
factories	  or	  workshops	  where	  people	  are	  employed	  at	  very	  low	  wages	  for	  long	  
hours,	   often	   under	   poor	   or	   even	   dangerous	   working	   conditions.	   When	   I	   talk	  
about	  sweatshops	  in	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  primarily	  refer	  to	  long	  working	  hours	  and	  
low	  wages,	  instead	  of	  to	  bad	  or	  dangerous	  working	  conditions.	  This	  is	  because	  
calling	  bad	  or	  dangerous	  working	  conditions	  exploitative	  can	  be	  meant	   in	   two	  
different	   ways,	   relating	   to	   the	   two	   meanings	   of	   the	   term	   exploitation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  For	  instance,	  Robert	  Mayer	  (further	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3)	  explains	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
unfairness.	  See	  his	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’	  (2007)	  24(2)	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  
Philosophy	  137-­‐150,	  144-­‐145.	  	  
12	  The	  argument	  that	  trading	  in	  a	  certain	  good	  is	  inherently	  wrong	  depends	  on	  features	  of	  that	  
particular	  good,	  and	  thus	  requires	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  analysis	  of	  all	  different	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  
are	  regarded	  as	  non-­‐tradable.	  For	  example,	  many	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  some	  regard	  the	  trade	  in	  
sexual	  services	  as	  morally	  wrong,	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  reasons	  why	  some	  regard	  the	  
trade	  in	  drugs,	  or	  body	  parts,	  or	  embryos,	  as	  inherently	  wrong,	  Thus,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  while,	  
for	  instance,	  the	  trade	  in	  embryos	  is	  indeed	  inherently	  wrong,	  the	  trade	  in	  sexual	  services	  is	  not	  
(or	  the	  other	  way	  around).	  	  
13	  While	  the	  first	  type	  of	  exploitation	  is	  usually	  regulated	  through	  private	  law	  or	  administrative	  
law,	  the	  second	  type	  of	  transactions	  are,	  in	  many	  countries,	  governed	  by	  criminal	  law.	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distinguished	   in	   this	   section.	   First,	   one	   might	   call	   bad	   or	   dangerous	   working	  
conditions	   exploitative	   in	   the	   ‘terms	   of	   the	   transaction’	   meaning,	   just	   as	   low	  
wages	  are	  called	  exploitative.	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  might	  think	  that	  bad	  working	  
conditions	  and	  low	  wages	  in	  sweatshops	  are	  exploitative,	  but	  might	  think	  that	  if	  
the	  wages	  would	  be	  dramatically	  increased,	  the	  bad	  working	  conditions	  would	  
not	  necessarily	  be	  wrong	  of	  exploitative,	  as	  the	  high	  wages	  would	  compensate	  
for	  them.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   one	   might	   call	   dangerous	   working	   conditions	  
exploitative	  in	  the	  second	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  exploitation.	  That	  is:	  one	  might	  
think	  that	  employers	  should	  never	  ask	  people	  to	  work	  under	  certain	  conditions	  
or	  should	  never	  ask	  them	  to	  endanger	  their	  health	  or	  lives,	  no	  matter	  how	  well	  
they	   pay	   their	   employees.	   I	   think	   that	   this	   second	   idea	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   many	  
claims	   that	   dangerous	   working	   conditions	   in	   sweatshop	   factories	   are	  
exploitative.	   The	   idea	   may	   well	   be	   right	   and	   a	   valid	   objection	   against	   some	  
sweatshops,	  but,	  as	  said,	  this	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  exploitation	  is	  not	  what	  this	  
thesis	  looks	  at.	  It	  should	  therefore	  be	  assumed	  that	  when	  I	  mention	  claims	  that	  
sweatshops	   are	   exploitative	   in	   this	   thesis,	   it	   is	   not	   this	   type	   of	   claim	   that	   is	  
under	  discussion,	  but	  the	  claim	  that	  sweatshops	  are	  exploitative	  even	  if	  they	  do	  
not	  require	  people	  to	  endanger	  their	  own	  health	  or	  lives,	  or	  even	  if	  one	  thinks	  
that	   endangering	   one’s	   own	   health	   or	   live	   is	   something	   that	   an	   employer	   is	  
allowed	  to	  ask	  from	  her	  employees	  in	  a	  consensual	  transaction.	  	  
	   Relatedly,	   while	   the	   term	   sweatshop	   broadly	   refers	   to	   factories	   or	  
workshops	  where	  people	  are	  employed	  at	   very	   low	  wages	   for	   long	  hours,	   the	  
term	  sweatshop	   is	  also	  sometimes	  used	  to	  describe	   factories	  where	  people	  do	  
not	  work	   voluntarily,	   but	   are	   forced	   to	  work,	   and	   receive	   no	  wages.	   Since,	   as	  
explained	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  analyse	  consensual	  
exploitation,	  and	  not	  coercive	  exploitation,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  whenever	  the	  
term	  ‘sweatshop’	  is	  used	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  non-­‐coercive	  meaning	  of	  
the	  term	  sweatshop.	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1.2.3	  Interpersonal	  exploitation	  	  
Arguably	   the	   most	   famous	   account	   of	   exploitation	   is	   Karl	   Marx’s	   theory	   of	  
exploitation.14	  Marx	  used	  the	  term	  for	  situations	  in	  which	  non-­‐producing	  classes	  
receive	  profits	  created	  by	  producing	  classes,	  which	  is	  made	  possible	  in	  capitalist	  
societies	   by	   an	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   the	   means	   of	   production.	   Many	   (neo-­‐
)Marxist	  writers	  after	  him	  have	  used	  the	  term	  in	  a	  similar	  manner,	  and	  argued	  
that	   exploitation	   is	   unjust	   or	   a	   form	   of	   coercion.15	   In	   the	   past	   three	   decades,	  
however,	   the	   concept	   of	   exploitation	   has	   also	   received	   increased	   attention	   by	  
liberal	   thinkers.	   They	   attempt	   to	   explain	   why	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   within	   a	  
liberal	   framework,	   without	   discarding	   basic	   liberal	   principles	   such	   as	   private	  
property	  and	  freedom	  of	  contract.	  They	  thereby	  provide	  a	  theory	  of	  exploitation	  
that	   can	   form	   a	   basis	   for	   legal	   restriction	   of	   exploitative	   transactions	   within	  
modern	  liberal	  societies.	  	  
In	   the	   (neo-­‐)Marxist	   literature,	   exploitation	   is	   generally	   treated	   as	   a	  
systemic	   phenomenon,	   which	   stems	   from	  macro-­‐economic	   relations	   between	  
groups.	   Individual	   members	   of	   an	   exploiting	   group	   might	   actively	   and	  
intentionally	   take	   advantage	   of	   their	   dominant	   position,	   but	   this	   is	   not	  
necessary	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  exploitation.	  (Neo-­‐)Marxist	  writers	  thus	  use	  the	  
term	   exploitation	   to	   condemn	   the	   working	   of	   entire	   systems	   or	   societies.	   In	  
contrast,	   liberal	   theories	   of	   exploitation	   generally	   use	   the	   term	   to	   criticize	  
particular	   individual	   transactions	  within	   such	   systems.	   The	   liberal	   concept	   of	  
exploitation	  thus	  denotes	  a	  relationship	  between	  individuals	  instead	  of	  between	  
groups.	   The	   question	   ‘what	   is	   wrong	   with	   exploitation?’	   on	   the	   liberal	  
conception,	  refers	  to	  how	  particular	  individuals	  act	  wrongly	  when	  they	  exploit	  
other	  individuals.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  K	  Marx,	  Das	  Kapital:	  Kritik	  der	  Politischen	  Ökonomie	  (1867).	  
15	  See	  e.g.	  GA	  Cohen,	  ‘The	  Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  Exploitation’	  (1979)	  8	  
Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  338-­‐360;	  N	  Holmstrom,	  ‘Exploitation’	  (1977)	  7(2)	  Canadian	  
Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  353-­‐369;	  J	  Reiman,	  ‘Exploitation,	  Force,	  and	  the	  Moral	  Assessment	  of	  
Capitalism’	  (1987)	  16	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  3-­‐41;	  and	  J	  Roemer,	  ‘Should	  Marxists	  Be	  
Interested	  in	  Exploitation?’	  in	  J	  Roemer	  (ed),	  Analytical	  Marxism	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  
1986)	  260-­‐282.	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In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  only	  focus	  on	  the	  liberal	  conception	  of	  exploitation—
exploitation	   as	   ‘interpersonal	   exploitation’.16	   This	   is	   because	   the	   aim	   of	   my	  
project	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   concept	   of	   exploitation	   as	   a	   ground	   for	   the	   legal	  
restriction	  of	  private	  transactions	  in	  present-­‐day	  liberal	  societies.	  What	  matters	  
in	   my	   project	   is	   thus	   primarily	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   private	   exploitative	  
transactions,	   and	   not	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   certain	   features	   of	   the	   system	   or	  
society	  in	  which	  those	  transactions	  take	  place.	  After	  all,	  in	  both	  just	  and	  unjust	  
systems	  we	   can	   distinguish	   between	   transactions	   that	  we	   find	  more	   and	   less	  
exploitative.17	   For	   example,	   economic	   relations	   between	   developed	   and	  
developing	  countries	  are	  characterized	  by	  many	   injustices,	  and	  are	  as	  a	  whole	  
often	   considered	   exploitative.	   Still,	   certain	   economic	   exchanges	   within	   this	  
system,	  such	  as	  sweatshop	  labour,	  are	  generally	  seen	  as	  more	  exploitative	  than	  
others,	  such	  as	  fair	  trade	  partnerships.	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   I	   realize	   that	   it	   is	   debatable	   whether	   a	   sharp	   distinction	  
between	   the	   justness	  of	  private	   transactions	  and	   the	   justness	  of	   the	  system	   in	  
which	   those	   transactions	   take	  place	  can	  always	  be	  maintained.	   It	  will	  depend,	  
for	   example,	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   we	   think	   that	   people	   are	   morally	  
responsible	   for	   the	  unintended	  bad	  consequences	   their	   transactions	  may	  have	  
on	  a	  macro	   level,	  or	   for	  compensating	  existing	  macro	   injustices.18	  This	  will	  be	  
addressed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  the	  theories	  of	  exploitation	  that	  
are	  analysed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  
1.2.4	  Commercial	  transactions	  
A	  final	  distinction	  that	  should	  be	  made	  is	  that	  the	  term	  exploitation	  is	  applied	  on	  
the	   one	   hand	   to	   commercial	   transactions,	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   to	   personal	  
interactions.	   All	   the	   examples	   of	   exploitative	   interactions	   I	   have	   given	   so	   far	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Bigwood,	  op.cit.	  3.	  
17	  Although	  this	  would	  probably	  be	  denied	  by	  Marxists	  who	  hold	  that	  if	  a	  system	  is	  unjust,	  all	  
transactions	  that	  are	  contingent	  on	  that	  system	  are	  automatically	  exploitative;	  and	  also	  by	  
classical	  liberals	  or	  libertarians	  who	  hold	  that	  if	  the	  initial	  distribution	  of	  resources	  in	  a	  society	  
is	  just,	  all	  voluntary	  transactions	  within	  it	  are	  automatically	  just.	  This	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  
in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
18	  Hence,	  ‘liberal’	  arguments	  for	  why	  individuals	  act	  wrongly	  when	  exploiting	  others	  sometimes	  
rely	  on	  the	  systematic	  phenomena	  that	  make	  such	  exploitation	  possible.	  Yet	  if	  the	  focus	  of	  such	  
theories	  is	  the	  wrongness	  of	  the	  individual	  transactions,	  they	  can,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  thesis,	  be	  classified	  as	  liberal	  theories	  of	  exploitation.	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(sweatshop	   labour,	   money	   lenders,	   internships,	   etcetera)	   fall	   in	   the	   first	  
category.	   They	   are	   all	   transactions	   of	   essentially	   a	   commercial	   nature:	  
interactions	   between	   relative	   strangers	  who	   do	   not	   initially	   know	   each	   other	  
personally	  and	  only	  enter	  the	  transaction	  and	  start	  a	  ‘relationship’	  for	  personal	  
gain.	  Yet	  people	   in	  personal	  relationships	  of	  a	  non-­‐commercial	  nature	  are	  also	  
sometimes	   accused	   of	   exploitation.	   Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	   following	   two	  
situations.19	  	  
a)	   A	   man	   and	   woman	   in	   a	   romantic	   relationship	   are	   considering	   whether	   to	  
have	   children.	   The	  man	  would	   like	   children,	   but	   prefers	   not	   to	   do	   any	   of	   the	  
childcare	  and	  to	  only	  care	  for	  the	  children	  financially.	  He	  knows	  that	  his	  partner	  
would	   rather	   not	   do	   the	   childcare	   alone,	   but	   that	   she	   dislikes	   even	  more	   the	  
prospect	  of	  not	  having	  children	  at	  all,	  or	  of	  finding	  a	  new	  partner.	  He	  therefore	  
proposes	  to	  have	  children	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  she	  will	  do	  all	  the	  childcare,	  and	  
the	  woman	  agrees.	  	  
b)	  The	  parents	  of	  a	  child	  spend	  all	  their	  savings	  on	  holidays,	  because	  they	  know	  
that	   the	   child’s	   grandparents	   will	   not	   allow	   the	   child	   to	   go	   without	   good	  
education,	  and	  that	  the	  grandparents	  have	  enough	  savings	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  child’s	  
college,	  although	  they	  may	  have	  to	  reduce	  some	  of	  their	  retirement	  activities.	  	  
These	   are	   two	   examples	   of	   what	   may	   be	   called	   ‘exploitation	   between	  
intimates’.20	  Many	  people	  will	  say	  that	  the	  man	  in	  the	  first	  example	  is	  exploiting	  
the	   woman,	   and	   that	   the	   parents	   in	   the	   second	   example	   are	   exploiting	   the	  
grandparents.	   Whether	   or	   not	   this	   is	   so,	   in	   this	   thesis,	   I	   will	   not	   focus	   on	  
exploitation	   in	   intimate	   relationships,	   but	   concentrate	   on	   exploitation	   in	  
commercial	   transactions	   between	   relative	   strangers.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	  
answering	   the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   exploitation	   may	   require	   two	  
rather	   different	   analyses	   for	   the	   two	   types	   of	   exploitation	   claim,	   and	   partly	  
because	  most	   calls	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	  of	   consensual	   exploitation	   concern	  
commercial	   transactions.	   Nevertheless,	   in	   the	   final	   concluding	   chapter	   of	   the	  
thesis,	  I	  will	  reflect	  on	  the	  possible	  similarities	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  exploitation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  These	  examples	  are	  based	  on	  examples	  in	  R	  Sample,	  Exploitation,	  What	  It	  Is	  and	  Why	  It’s	  
Wrong	  (Rowan	  and	  Littlefield,	  2003)	  8-­‐9.	  	  
20	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  9.	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and	   the	   possible	   application	   of	   my	   view	   of	   exploitation	   to	   instances	   of	  
exploitation	  between	  intimates.	  	  
	  
To	   summarise,	   when	   I	   speak	   of	   ‘exploitation’	   or	   ‘exploitative	   transactions’	   in	  
this	  thesis,	  what	  I	  have	  in	  mind	  are	  commercial	  transactions	  that	  are	  consensual	  
and	  concern	  a	  good	  that	  is	  itself	  non-­‐controversial,	  but	  that	  are	  still	  criticized	  as	  
being	   exploitative.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   will	   give	   an	   outline	   of	   the	   thesis’	  
chapters	  and	  a	  summary	  of	  its	  main	  arguments.	  	  
	  
1.3	  Outline	  of	  the	  thesis	  
	  
As	  described	  above,	   this	   thesis	  has	  two	  related	  central	  research	  questions:	  (1)	  
what	   is	   wrong	   with	   consensual	   exploitation?	   (2)	   what	   implications	   may	   the	  
answer	   to	   this	   question	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   certain	   voluntary	  
transactions	   that	   are	   regarded	   exploitative?	   The	   greatest	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   is	  
devoted	  to	  analysing	  the	  first	  question,	  in	  chapters	  2,	  3	  and	  4.	  The	  thesis	  returns	  
to	  the	  second	  question	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
Chapter	   2	   distinguishes	   four	   competing	   views	   of	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
consensual	   exploitation	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   philosophical	   debate	   on	   exploitation.	  
The	   first	   view,	  which	   I	  will	   call	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   says	  
that	   exploitation	   is	  wrong	   if	   and	   because	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	   others’	  
vulnerability.	   The	   second	   view,	   which	   I	   shall	   call	   the	   consent	   account	   of	  
exploitation,	   says	   that	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	   are	   wrong	   if	   and	  
because	   they	  are	  not	   truly	  consensual,	  because	  exploited	  people	  are	   forced	  by	  
their	  circumstances	   to	  consent	   to	   the	  exploitative	  offer.	  According	   to	   the	   third	  
view,	  which	  I	  will	  call	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation,	  consensual	  exploitation	  
is	  wrong	  because	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  people	   in	  need,	  and	  exploiters	  
neglect	  this	  duty,	   instead	  taking	  advantage	  of	  people	   in	  need.	  The	  fourth	  view,	  
which	   I	   call	   the	   injustice	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   says	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	  
exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   injustice,	   because	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	  
existing	   injustices	   or	   exacerbate	   injustice.	   I	   argue	   that	   all	   four	   views	   are	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unsuccessful	   in	   explaining	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation,	   for	   various	   reasons.	  One	  
common	  problem,	  I	  argue,	  is	  that	  the	  four	  accounts	  ultimately	  primarily	  explain	  
moral	   wrongs	   in	   the	   ‘background	   circumstances’	   in	   which	   exploitative	  
transactions	   take	  place,	   instead	  of	   in	   the	   transactions	   themselves.	   I	   argue	   that	  
this	   is	   problematic	   because,	   while	   exploiters	  may	   have	  moral	   duties	   towards	  
people	   with	   whom	   they	   transact	   that	   follow	   from	   shared	   responsibilities	   to	  
alleviate	  grim	  background	  circumstances,	  what	  is	  required	  for	  such	  duties	  is	  not	  
dependent	   on	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   transaction.	   Consequently,	   the	  
requirements	   of	   such	   moral	   duties	   are	   not	   related	   to	   whether	   and	   when	   we	  
regard	  transactions	  as	  exploitative.	  	  
Advocates	   of	   a	   fifth	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   which	   I	   will	   call	   the	  
unfairness	   account,	   seem	   to	   avoid	   this	   problem	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	  wrong	   in	  
exploitative	  transactions	  is	  an	  unfairness	  in	  the	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  that	  each	  
party	  receives.	  This	  account	  is	  currently	  the	  most	  widely	  shared	  view	  of	  what	  is	  
wrong	  with	  exploitation,	   and	   is	   the	   focus	  of	   chapter	  3.	  There,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  
unfairness	  account	  is	  right	  in	  observing	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  lies	  in	  the	  
fact	  that	  exploiters	  receive	  an	  excessive	  benefit,	  and	  that	  this	  account	  gives	  an	  
adequate	  description	  of	  which	  consensual	  transactions	  we	  find	  exploitative,	  but	  
that	   it	   does	   not	   actually	   justify	   why	   such	   transactions	   are	   morally	   wrong.	  
Therefore,	   I	   argue,	   this	   account	   of	   exploitation	   does	   not	   actually	   provide	   an	  
answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  	  
In	   chapter	  4	   I	   put	   forward	  my	  own,	   alternative,	   view	  of	  what	   is	  wrong	  
with	  exploitation.	  I	  argue	  that	  while	  the	  other	  accounts	  of	  exploitation	  all	  argue	  
for	   a	   certain	  moral	   duty	  not	   to	   exploit,	  what	   exploiters	   do	  wrong	   can	  best	   be	  
understood	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   virtue.	   Specifically,	   I	   argue	   that	   exploitation	   is	   a	  
failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity—greediness.	  I	  set	  out	  this	  argument	  in	  detail	  
in	   chapter	  4,	   and	  argue	   that	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  virtue	  of	   generosity	   is	   a	  
certain	  other-­‐regardingness	  and	  perception	  of	  other	  people.	  	  
In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  second	  central	  question	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  ask:	  
if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  a	  failure	  of	  
the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  what	  implications	  may	  this	  have	  for	  the	  legal	  restriction	  
of	   exploitative	   transactions?	   In	   particular,	   I	   ask:	  What	   does	   it	  mean	   to	   justify	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legal	   restrictions	   on	   consensual	   transactions	  with	   the	   argument	   that	   they	   are	  
exploitative?	   And	   to	  what	   extent	   is	   this	   an	   acceptable	   argument	   for	   the	   legal	  
restriction	  of	  consensual	  transactions	  in	  a	  liberal	  society?	  I	  first	  argue	  that	  if	  the	  
wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   greediness,	   laws	   that	   aim	   to	   restrict	   exploitative	  
transactions	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   means	   of	   curbing	   greediness	   and	  
promoting	  a	  certain	  other-­‐regardingness.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
important	   goal	   for	   societies	   on	   many	   different	   political	   theories,	   even	   liberal	  
ones.	   Next	   I	   discuss	   the	   possible	   objection	   that	   while	   curbing	   greediness	   or	  
promoting	   generosity	   may	   be	   a	   worthy	   goal,	   the	   law	   should	   only	   be	   used	   to	  
enforce	   the	   ‘right’,	   and	   not	   to	   promote	   the	   ‘good’—including	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity.	  I	  argue	  against	  this	  objection	  that	  while	  we	  may	  have	  good	  reasons	  
for	   being	   reluctant	   towards	   allowing	   too	  much	   state	   intervention,	   we	   cannot	  
justify	  making	   an	   absolute	   distinction	   between	   ‘arguments	   for	   the	   right’,	   and	  
‘arguments	   for	   the	   good’	   when	   debating	   which	   laws	   are	   desirable.	   The	  
desirability	   of	   certain	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   therefore	   has	   to	   be	   decided	   on	   a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	   comparing	   their	  disadvantages	  with	   the	   goods	   they	   aim	   to	  
achieve.	   I	   conclude	   the	   thesis	   by	   further	   illustrating	   this	   argument,	   and	   my	  
argument	  that	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  means	  of	  curbing	  
greediness	  and	  promoting	  other-­‐regardingness,	  with	  two	  examples	  of	  laws	  that	  
restrict	  consensual	  transactions	  that	  are	  regarded	  exploitative:	  minimum	  wage	  
laws	  and	  payday	  loan	  laws.	  	  
In	   chapter	   6,	   I	   summarize	   the	   main	   findings	   of	   the	   thesis,	   and	   briefly	  
discuss	   some	   possible	   implications	   of	   my	   view	   of	   consensual	   commercial	  
exploitation	  for	  other	  types	  of	  exploitation.	  
	  
The	  main	  original	  contributions	  to	  knowledge	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  a)	   its	  mapping	  
out	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  existing	  arguments	  in	  the	  non-­‐Marxist	  debate	  on	  what	  is	  
wrong	   with	   exploitation;	   and	   b)	   its	   formulation	   of	   a	   new	   account	   of	   what	   is	  
wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  and	  consideration	  of	  the	  possible	  implications	  for	  legal	  
regulation.	   As	   such,	   this	   thesis	   is	   primarily	   a	   theoretical	   investigation	   of	   the	  
concept	  of	  exploitation.	  Nevertheless,	  as	  said	  above,	  the	  concept	  of	  exploitation	  
is	  often	  used	   in	  everyday	  discussions	  and	  topical	  public	  debates	  about	  several	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different	   types	   of	   social	   issues,	   such	   as	   the	   regulation	   of	   minimum	   wages,	  
payday	  loans,	  unpaid	  internships	  and	  extortionate	  rents.	  Therefore,	  the	  hope	  is	  
that	  this	  thesis	  may	  not	  only	  contribute	  to	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  on	  the	  concept	  
of	  exploitation,	  but	  also,	  thereby,	  to	  debates	  on	  such	  real-­‐life	  social	  issues.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	  will	   start	   by	   analysing	   four	   competing	   views	   of	  what	   is	  
wrong	   with	   consensual	   exploitation	   that	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   philosophical	  
debate	  on	  exploitation.	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CHAPTER	  2	  –	  VULNERABILITY,	  CONSENT,	  NEEDS,	  INJUSTICE	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   begin	   my	   analysis	   of	   the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
consensual	   exploitation,	   by	   discussing	   four	   competing	   views	   that	   exist	   in	   the	  
philosophical	   debate	   on	   exploitation.	   The	   first	   view,	   which	   I	   will	   call	   the	  
vulnerability	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	  
exploiters	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  others.	  The	  second	  view,	  which	  
I	   will	   call	   the	   consent	   account,	   holds	   that	   consensual	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	  
because	   it	   is	   not	   really	   consensual.	   The	   third	   view,	   which	   will	   be	   called	   the	  
needs	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   holds	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	  
exploiters	   neglect	   a	   moral	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need.	   The	   fourth	   view,	   the	  
injustice	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	  
exploiters	  take	  advantage	  of	  injustice.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  all	  these	  understandings	  
of	   exploitation	   are	  problematic,	   and	   cannot	   adequately	   explain	  what	   is	  wrong	  
with	  consensual	  exploitation.	  One	  problem	  they	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
ultimately	   only	   able	   to	   explain	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   the	   background	  
circumstances	   of	   exploitative	   transactions,	   instead	   of	   with	   the	   transactions	  
themselves.	  A	  fifth	  view	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  which	  I	  will	  call	  the	  
unfairness	  account,	  appears	  to	  avoid	  this	  problem	  by	  referring	  to	   ‘transaction-­‐
specific	   unfairness’	   to	   explain	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation.	   This	   account	  will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
	   Although	  I	  distinguish	  five	  existing	  accounts	  of	  exploitation,	  there	  is	  the	  
possibility	  that	  some	  of	  the	  answers	  might	  work	  better	  when	  combined	  than	  on	  
their	  own,	  and	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  different	  arguments	  will	  be	  discussed	  
at	  several	  points.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  many	  differences	  in	  the	  
arguments	  given	  by	  writers	  whom	  I	  classify	  under	  the	  same	  account.	  Moreover,	  
some	   theories	   of	   exploitation	   do	   not	   fit	   neatly	   in	   one	   of	   the	   categories	   I	  
distinguish,	   but	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   combination	   of	   two	   different	   accounts.21	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Mikhail	  Valdman’s	  theory,	  for	  example,	  includes	  elements	  of	  both	  the	  unfairness	  account	  and	  
the	  consent	  account	  (M	  Valdman,	  ‘A	  Theory	  of	  Wrongful	  Exploitation’	  (2009)	  9(6)	  Philosophers’	  
Imprint	  1-­‐14),	  while	  Ruth	  Sample	  argues	  both	  for	  the	  argument	  I	  call	  the	  injustice	  account	  and	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Nevertheless,	   I	  do	  consider	   it	  useful	   to	  distinguish	  the	   five	  categories,	  because	  
my	  aim	  is	  to	  analyse	  the	  debate	  on	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  arguments	   featuring	   in	   the	  debate,	  and	  not	   to	  analyse	   the	  work	  of	  specific	  
authors.	   Still,	   I	   will	   discuss	   certain	   authors	   at	   more	   length	   than	   others,	   as	   I	  
regard	   their	   work	   as	   strong	   articulations	   of	   certain	   arguments	   about	  what	   is	  
wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  
	   The	   next	   section	   starts	   by	   analysing	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	  
exploitation.	  Sections	  2.2,	  2.3,	  and	  2.4	  analyse,	  respectively,	  the	  consent	  account,	  
the	  needs	  account,	  and	  the	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  The	  chapter	  ends	  in	  
section	  2.5	  with	  a	  brief	  conclusion.	  	  
	  
2.1	  The	  vulnerability	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
	  
2.1.1	  Vulnerability	  and	  exploitation	  
The	   first	   account	   of	   exploitation	   I	  will	   discuss	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	  wrong	  
because	   exploiters	   use	   other	   people’s	   vulnerability	   for	   their	   own	   gain.	   For	  
example,	   Alan	  Wood,	   who	   is	   probably	   the	  most	   prominent	   proponent	   of	   this	  
argument,	  states:	  
	  
I	   suggest	   that	   the	  moral	   belief	   that	  makes	   exploitation	   objectionable	   is	  
the	   following:	  Proper	  respect	   for	  others	   is	  violated	  when	  we	  treat	   their	  
vulnerabilities	  as	  opportunities	  to	  advance	  our	  own	  interests	  or	  projects.	  
It	   is	   degrading	   to	   have	   your	   weakness	   taken	   advantage	   of,	   and	  
dishonourable	  to	  use	  the	  weakness	  of	  others	  for	  your	  ends.22	  
	  
If	  the	  use	  of	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  explains	  the	  wrongness	  of	  exploitation,	  an	  
important	  question	  is:	  what	  is	  ‘vulnerability’?	  A	  common	  definition	  refers	  to	  the	  
possibility	  of	  being	  harmed,	  either	  physically	  or	  emotionally,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  argument	  I	  call	  the	  needs	  account	  (R	  Sample,	  Exploitation,	  What	  It	  Is	  and	  Why	  It’s	  Wrong	  
(Rowan	  and	  Littlefield,	  2003)).	  
22	  AW	  Wood,	  ‘Exploitation’	  in	  K	  Nielsen	  and	  R	  Ware	  (eds),	  Exploitation	  (Humanities	  Press,	  1997)	  
2-­‐26,	  15.	  For	  a	  similar	  argument	  see	  e.g.	  AL	  Carse	  and	  MO	  Little,	  ‘Exploitation	  and	  the	  Enterprise	  
of	  Medical	  Research’	  in	  JS	  Hawkins	  and	  EJ	  Emanuel,	  Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries:	  The	  
Ethics	  of	  Clinical	  Research	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  206-­‐245.	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protect	   oneself	   from	   such	   harm.23	   In	   this	   sense,	   all	   humans	   are	   naturally	  
vulnerable,24	   because	   all	   humans	   can	   be	   affected	   by	   disease,	   crime,	   hunger,	  
violence,	  loss,	  grief,	  and	  other	  harms,	  and	  no	  one	  can	  completely	  protect	  herself	  
against	   such	   harms.	   Nevertheless,	   although	   all	   humans	   are	   to	   some	   extent	  
vulnerable	  to	  harms	  such	  as	  violence,	  disease	  or	  loss,	  some	  people	  are	  more	  at	  
risk	  of	  suffering	  certain	  harms	  than	  others.	  For	  example,	  on	  average,	  people	  in	  
South	  Africa	  are	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  sexual	  violence	  than	  people	  in	  the	  UK,	  whereas	  
within	  both	  countries,	  women	  are	  more	  at	  risk	  than	  men.	  Similarly,	  some	  people	  
are	   more	   capable	   of	   protecting	   themselves	   against	   harms	   than	   others.	   For	  
instance,	   although	   people	   in	   all	   countries	   can	   contract	   serious	   infectious	  
diseases,	   those	  who	   live	   in	   countries	  with	   childhood	   vaccination	   programmes	  
are,	   on	   average,	  much	   better	   protected	   against	   such	   diseases	   than	   those	  who	  
live	   in	   countries	   without	   such	   programmes.	   And	   in	   the	   latter	   countries,	   rich	  
people	   are,	   generally	   speaking,	  more	   able	   to	   protect	   themselves	   against	   such	  
diseases	  than	  poor	  people.	  Hence,	  although	  all	  humans	  are	  vulnerable	  to	  some	  
extent,	  vulnerability	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree,	  and	  especially	  vulnerable	  are	  people	  
who	  are	  both	  highly	  susceptible	  to	  harms,	  and	  have	  few	  opportunities	  to	  protect	  
themselves	  against	  those	  harms.	  
	   When	  talking	  about	  exploitation,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  discuss	  vulnerability	  in	  
terms	   of	   needs	   and	   desires,	   instead	   of	   harms.	   Thus,	   instead	   of	   saying	   that	  
someone	   is	   vulnerable	   because	   she	   might	   suffer	   the	   harm	   of,	   say,	   hunger,	  
violence,	  or	  loneliness,	  people	  say	  that	  she	  is	  vulnerable	  because	  of	  her	  need	  for	  
food,	   protection,	   or	   companionship.	   Needs,	   or	   potential	   harms,	   make	   people	  
vulnerable	   in	   two	   different	  ways.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   harm	   associated	  with	   the	  
need	  itself:	  the	  harm	  of	  feeling	  hungry,	  being	  attacked,	  or	  being	  lonely.	  Second,	  
those	  needs	  create	  the	  potential	  for	  further	  harm,	  because	  other	  people	  may	  use	  
our	  needs	  to	  abuse	  or	  wrongfully	  take	  advantage	  of	  us.	  For	  example,	  if	  someone	  
is	   in	   desperate	   need	   of	   income,	   she	   may	   more	   easily	   be	   deceived	   by	   human	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  e.g.	  MA	  Fineman,	  ‘The	  Vulnerable	  Subject	  and	  the	  Responsive	  State’	  (2010)	  60	  Emory	  Law	  
Journal	  251-­‐275,	  267;	  D	  Schroeder	  and	  E	  Gefenas,	  ‘Vulnerability:	  Too	  Vague	  and	  Too	  Broad?’	  
(2009)	  18	  Cambridge	  Quarterly	  of	  Healthcare	  Ethics	  113-­‐121,	  117.	  
24	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Butler,	  Precarious	  Life:	  The	  Powers	  of	  Mourning	  and	  Violence	  (Verso,	  2006)	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traffickers	  who	  pretend	  to	  offer	  her	  work	  abroad	  in	  the	  hotel	  industry,	  while	  in	  
reality	  leading	  her	  into	  prostitution.	  	  
	   Assuming	  that	  a	  strict	  division	  between	  needs	  and	  desires	  can	  be	  made,	  
it	   is	   arguable	   that	   not	   only	   needs,	   but	   also	   desires	   can	  make	  us	   vulnerable.	   A	  
desire	  for,	  say,	  a	  new	  car,	  can	  cause	  harm	  in	  the	  two	  senses	  above:	  if	  the	  desire	  
is	  not	  met	  one	  will	  suffer	  simply	  by	  not	  having	  the	  desire	  met,	  and	  having	  this	  
desire	  makes	  it	  possible	  that	  someone	  else	  will	  wrongfully	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  
desire.	  Hence,	  if	  vulnerability	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  harmed,	  and	  the	  ability	  
to	   protect	   oneself	   from	   such	   harm,	   then	   it	   seems	   that	   desires	   make	   us	  
vulnerable	   as	  well.	  Nevertheless,	   the	  dangers	   of	   harm	  associated	  with	  desires	  
are	  likely	  smaller	  than	  the	  dangers	  associated	  with	  more	  serious	  needs,	  such	  as	  
food,	   shelter,	  or	  protection	  against	  violence.	  This	   is	  another	  reason,	   then,	  why	  
vulnerability	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree;	  and	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  serious	  needs	  
make	  us	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  mere	  desires.	  
	   In	   consensual	   transactions,	   it	   may	   not	   be	   our	   absolute	   level	   of	  
vulnerability	   that	   matters,	   but	   our	   relative	   vulnerability	   compared	   with	   the	  
person	  we	  are	  transacting	  with.	  If	  I	  am	  negotiating	  about	  buying	  someone’s	  car,	  
and	   I	  have	  quite	  a	  serious	  need	   for	   the	  car	  and	  do	  not	  know	  many	  alternative	  
sellers,	  but	  I	  know	  that	  the	  seller	  has	  an	  even	  more	  urgent	  need	  for	  income	  or	  
that	  she	  knows	  even	  less	  potential	  buyers,	  the	  seller	   is	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  I	  
am.	   For	   that	   reason,	   vulnerability	   in	   transactions	   is	   sometimes	   described	   in	  
terms	  of	  relative	  bargaining	  positions.	  Wood,	  for	  instance,	  says:	  ‘if	  one	  party	  to	  
an	   exchange	  has	   a	   significantly	   stronger	  bargaining	  position	   than	   the	  other	  …	  
then	   that	  difference	  constitutes	  a	  clear	  case	  of	  vulnerability	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	  
weaker	  party’.	  25	  
The	   argument	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	   exploitation	   is	   that	   in	   all	  
instances	   of	   exploitation,	   the	   exploiter	   takes	   advantage	   of	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  
the	  exploitee,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong.	  Think	  of	  the	  examples	  
of	   typical	  exploitative	   transactions	  mentioned	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	  such	  as	  
sweatshop	  work	  in	  developing	  countries,	  loan	  providers	  who	  charge	  exorbitant	  
interest	  rates	  to	  people	  who	  are	  in	  urgent	  need	  of	  money,	  and	  taxi	  drivers	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	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  op.cit.	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triple	   their	   fare	  during	   a	  national	   rail	   or	  bus	   strike.	   In	   all	   these	   examples,	   the	  
exploitees	  are	  vulnerable,	   in	   the	  sense	   that	   they	  have	  a	  need	   for,	   respectively,	  
income,	   quick	   cash,	   and	   transportation,	   and	   little	   opportunities	   to	  meet	   their	  
need.	  And	   in	   all	   these	   examples,	   the	   exploiters	   use	   this	   vulnerability	   for	   their	  
own	   gain:	   to	   get	   the	   exploitees	   to	   agree	   to	   a	   transaction	   that	   benefits	   the	  
exploiters	  greatly.	  	  
I	   agree	   that	   the	   use	   of	   another’s	   vulnerability	   is	   a	   defining	   feature	   of	  
consensual	  exploitative	  transactions.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  feature	  
cannot	  adequately	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  	  
	  
2.1.2	  Problems	  with	  the	  vulnerability	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   discuss	   two	   key	   problems	   with	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	  
exploitation—the	   theory	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	   exploiters	   use	  
another’s	  vulnerability	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  The	  first	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  unclear	  
which	  type	  of	  vulnerability	  leads	  to	  exploitation.	  The	  second	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  
unclear	  why	  taking	  advantage	  of	  others’	  vulnerability	  is	  necessarily	  wrong.	  	  
	   Concerning	  the	   first	  problem,	  as	  said	  above,	  vulnerability	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  
degree,	  and	  all	  humans	  are	  always	  vulnerable	  to	  some	  extent.	  All	  humans	  also	  
continuously	  use	  other	  people’s	  vulnerability	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  I,	  for	  instance,	  
use	  my	   friends’	   desire	   for	   friendship	   to	   satisfy	  my	   own	   desire	   for	   friendship,	  
while	   bus	   companies,	   discotheques	   and	   bakeries	   use	   my	   desires	   for	  
transportation,	   dancing,	   and	   chocolate	   cake	   as	   a	   means	   to	   earn	   money.	  
Nevertheless,	   most	   people	   do	   not	   find	   these	   transactions	   necessarily	  
exploitative,	   and	  do	  not	   say	   that	   everyone	   is	   continuously	   exploited.	  Hence,	   it	  
seems	  that	  it	  is	  only	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  vulnerability,	  or	  perhaps	  a	  certain	  type	  
of	  vulnerability,	  of	  which	  it	  is	  exploitative	  to	  take	  advantage.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  
by	  Alan	  Wood,	  who	   says	   that	  we	   should	   acknowledge	   the	   difference	   between	  
‘human	   interactions	   that	   play	   on	   genuine	   vulnerabilities’,26	   which	   are	  
exploitative,	  and	  those	  which	  are	  not:	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  op.cit.	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Surely	  it	  would	  be	  implausible	  to	  the	  point	  of	  absurdity	  if	  someone	  were	  
to	  suggest	  that	  any	  need	  or	  desire	  constitutes	  vulnerability.	  To	  suppose	  
this	  would	  be	  to	  make	  exploitation	  virtually	  ubiquitous	  in	  human	  social	  
life	  and	  as	  much	  a	  factor	  in	  quite	  a	  number	  of	  innocent	  human	  relations	  
as	  it	  is	  in	  many	  very	  nasty	  ones.27	  	  
	  
The	   question	   is	   thus:	   how	   are	   we	   to	   decide	   which	   vulnerabilities	   constitute	  
‘genuine’	   vulnerability,	   that	   is,	   exploitable	   vulnerability,	   and	   which	   do	   not?	  
Wood	   acknowledges	   that	   he	   cannot	   answer	   this	   question,28	   but	   others	   have	  
tried	   to	   do	   so.	   One	   possible	   answer	   is	   that	   it	   is	   only	   serious	   needs,	   or	   basic	  
needs,	   that	   can	  make	   one	   truly	   vulnerable.	   Thus,	   if	  we	   are	   in	   need	   of	   food	   or	  
shelter	  we	  are	  truly	  vulnerable,	  but	  if	  we	  want	  to	  dance	  in	  a	  discotheque	  or	  eat	  
chocolate	  cake,	  we	  are	  not.	  This	  answer	  comes	  close	  to	  the	  theories	  that	  will	  be	  
discussed	   in	   section	   2.3	   in	   this	   chapter,	   which	   analyses	   the	   needs	   account	   of	  
exploitation.	  There	   I	  will	  argue	  against	   those	   theories	   that	  we	  can	  also	  exploit	  
people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  any	  serious	  needs	  to	  be	  met,	  by	  exploiting,	  for	  example,	  
their	   desires,	   kindness	   or	   sense	   of	   duty.	   Since,	   as	   I	   will	   argue	   there,	   we	   can	  
exploit	   people	   who	   do	   not	   lack	   any	   basic	   needs,	   defining	   ‘genuine’	  
vulnerabilities	   as	   basic	   needs	   cannot	   be	   a	   satisfactory	  way	   of	   deciding	  which	  
vulnerabilities	  are	  relevant	  for	  exploitation	  and	  which	  not.	  	  
Another	  possible	  way	  of	  defining	  ‘genuine’	  vulnerabilities	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
all	   things	   that	   other	   people	   can	   wrongfully	   take	   advantage	   of,	   such	   as	   need,	  
desire,	   fear,	   kindness	   or	   sense	   of	   duty.	   This	   answer	   recognizes	   that	   focussing	  
exclusively	  on	  (basic)	  needs	  is	  too	  restrictive,	  and	  that	  we	  can	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  
exploitation	  if	  we	  do	  not	  lack	  any	  basic	  needs.	  Yet	  this	  answer	  can	  also	  not	  be	  a	  
satisfactory	  definition	  of	  vulnerability,	  if	  vulnerability	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  
wrong	   with	   exploitation.	   Defining	   (genuine)	   vulnerabilities	   as	   features	   that	  
other	   people	   can	   wrongfully	   take	   advantage	   of,	   is	   similar	   to	   saying	   that	  
vulnerabilities	  are	  features	  that	  other	  people	  can	  exploit—exploitable	  features.	  
Yet	  the	  questions	  the	  vulnerability	  account	  tries	  to	  answer	  are	  what	  exploitation	  
is,	  and	  what	  makes	  it	  wrong.	  It	  answers	  that	  exploitation	  is	  taking	  advantage	  of	  
someone’s	   vulnerability	   for	   one’s	   own	   gain.	   This	   means	   that	   if	   we	   define	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Wood,	  op.cit.	  9.	  
28	  Wood,	  op.cit.	  8.	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vulnerability	  as	  an	  exploitable	  feature,	  we	  are	  saying	  that	  exploitation	  is	  taking	  
advantage	  of	  someone’s	  exploitable	  features.	  Or,	  in	  other	  words:	  to	  exploit	  is	  to	  
take	  advantage	  of	  features	  we	  can	  exploit.	  This	  is	  a	  tautological	  definition,29	  and	  
does	  not	  throw	  any	  light	  on	  what	  exploitation	  is,	  or	  why	  it	  is	  wrong.	  Similarly,	  it	  
does	   not	   illuminate	   what	   vulnerability	   is,	   because	   vulnerability	   becomes	  
anything	  that	  makes	  one	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitation,	  while	  exploitation	  is	  taking	  
advantage	   of	   vulnerability.	   We	   thus	   still	   have	   to	   answer	   the	   questions	   we	  
started	   with:	   what	   are	   the	   features	   we	   can	   exploit,	   that	   is,	   genuine	  
vulnerabilities,	  and	  why	  is	  taking	  advantage	  of	  those	  features	  exploitative,	  that	  
is,	   wrong.	   Thus,	   if	   vulnerability	   is	   to	   explain	  what	  makes	   exploitation	  wrong,	  
this	  method	  of	  defining	  vulnerability	  does	  not	  work,	  because	  we	  cannot	  define	  
vulnerability	   in	   terms	   of	   exploitation,	   if	   we	   define	   exploitation	   in	   terms	   of	  
vulnerability.	  	  
	  
So	   far	   I	   have	   discussed	   one	   problem	   with	   the	   argument	   that	   exploitation	   is	  
wrong	   because	   exploiters	   use	   others’	   vulnerability	   for	   their	   own	   sake:	   the	  
problem	   that	   it	   is	   unclear	   which	   type	   or	   degree	   of	   vulnerability	   can	   lead	   to	  
exploitation,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  what	  ‘vulnerability’	  is	  to	  mean	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
exploitation.	   A	   second	   problem	   is	   that	   even	   if	   we	   could	   agree	   on	   what	  
vulnerability	   means	   in	   the	   context	   of	   exploitation,	   it	   is	   unclear	   why	   taking	  
advantage	  of	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  is	  necessarily	  wrong.	  Wood,	  in	  the	  citation	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  section	  2.1.1,	  says	  that	  taking	  advantage	  of	  vulnerability	  for	  
one’s	   own	   benefit	   is	   wrong	   because	   it	   is	   degrading	   and	   violates	   respect	   for	  
others.	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  ‘degrading’	  is	  perhaps	  as	  vague	  as	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  term	  exploitation,	  as	  many	  have	  remarked.30	  As	  a	  consequence,	  
saying	   that	   using	   another’s	   vulnerability	   for	   one’s	   own	   gain	   is	   degrading	  may	  
not	  bring	  us	  much	   further	   than	   saying	   that	   it	   is	  wrong—we	  still	   do	  not	  know	  
why	   it	   is	   wrong	   or	   degrading.	   Although	   I	   agree	   with	   this	   criticism,	   my	   main	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This	  is	  also	  argued	  in	  T	  Logar,	  ‘Exploitation	  as	  Wrongful	  Use:	  Beyond	  Taking	  Advantage	  of	  
Vulnerabilities’	  (2010)	  25	  Acta	  Analytica	  329-­‐346,	  345.	  	  
30	  JC	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  Exploitation’	  (2008)	  11	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice	  389-­‐405,	  394;	  
Valdman,	  op.cit.	  5;	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  Wertheimer,	  ‘Book	  Review	  Ruth	  J.	  Sample,	  “Exploitation:	  What	  It	  Is	  and	  
Why	  It’s	  Wrong”’	  (2007)	  19	  Utilitas	  259-­‐261,	  259.	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objection	  does	  not	  hinge	  on	  the	  vagueness	  of	  the	  term	  degrading.	  What	  it	  means	  
to	  degrade	  someone	  has	  been	  variously	  described	  as	  using	  someone	  as	  a	  mere	  
means	  or	  instrument;	  or	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  which	  she	  could	  not	  rationally	  consent;	  
or	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  an	  assault	  on	  her	  subjective	  sense	  of	  dignity;	  or	  as	  if	  she	  is	  of	  
less	  value	  than	  other	  people.31	  My	  objection	  is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  one	  of	  
these	  descriptions	  convincingly	  explains	  what	  degrading	  someone	  involves,	  and	  
why	  it	  is	  wrong,	  using	  others’	  vulnerability	  for	  one’s	  own	  gain	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
degrading,	  wrong,	  or	  exploitative.	  	  
Imagine	  that	  there	   is	  only	  one	  grocery	  shop	  in	  a	  remote	  town,	  and	  that	  
the	  next	  closest	  shop	  is	  more	  than	  two	  days	  travelling	  away.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  
owner	  of	  the	  grocery	  shop	  (say,	  A)	  could	  set	  exceptionally	  high	  prices	  for	  most	  
of	   her	   products.	   Suppose,	   however,	   that	   she	   decides	   not	   to	   do	   so	   and	   instead	  
sets	   prices	   similar	   to	   those	   of	  most	   other	   grocery	   shops.	   In	   this	   example,	   the	  
inhabitants	  of	  the	  remote	  town	  seem	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  A,	  even	  according	  to	  a	  
strict	  or	  ‘basic	  needs’	  definition	  of	  vulnerability:	  they	  need	  basic	  goods	  such	  as	  
food,	  drink	  and	  other	  groceries	  that	  only	  A	  can	  reasonably	  provide,	  which	  gives	  
a	  much	   stronger	   bargaining	   position	   to	  A.	   Furthermore,	   A	   uses	   this	   need	   and	  
vulnerability	  for	  her	  own	  gain:	  as	  a	  means	  to	  earn	  money	  by	  selling	  groceries.32	  
Still,	  we	  would	  not	  call	  her	  an	  exploiter.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  people	  take	  advantage	  
of	   others’	   genuine	   vulnerabilities	   all	   the	   time	   without	   necessarily	   exploiting	  
them.	   It	   thus	   appears	   that	   taking	   advantage	   of	   others’	   vulnerability	   is	   not	  
considered	  wrong	  or	  exploitative	  per	  se.	  Therefore,	  although	  taking	  advantage	  
of	   others’	   vulnerability	   for	   one’s	   own	   gain	   may	   be	   a	   feature	   of	   exploitative	  
transactions,	   it	   is	   a	   feature	   that	   does	   not,	   in	   itself,	   explain	  what	  makes	   those	  
transactions	  wrong.	  	  
	  
In	  sum,	  vulnerability	  signals	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  wrongfully	  taken	  advantage	  
of	  (or	  of	  being	  harmed	  in	  another	  way).	  But	  that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  every	  time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  See	  Carse	  and	  Little,	  op.cit.	  209;	  AW	  Siegel,	  ‘Kantian	  Ethics,	  Exploitation,	  and	  Multinational	  
Clinical	  Trials’	  in	  JS	  Hawkins	  and	  EJ	  Emanuel,	  Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries,	  The	  Ethics	  
of	  Clinical	  Research	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  175-­‐205,	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32	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  A	  does	  not	  truly	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  inhabitants’	  vulnerability,	  
because	  she	  does	  not	  make	  her	  prices	  as	  high	  as	  she	  could	  have.	  This	  view	  will	  be	  considered	  in	  
chapter	  3,	  where	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  discussed.	  	  
	   31	  
we	  take	  advantage	  of	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  it	  is	  necessarily	  wrongful,	  or	  that	  
it	   is	   wrongful	   in	   itself	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   vulnerability.	   We	   thus	   need	   a	  
separate	  argument	  to	  show	  why	  taking	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  vulnerability	  in	  a	  
consensual	   transaction	   is	   wrong	   under	   certain	   circumstances,	   in	   certain	  
situations,	  or	  in	  certain	  ways.	  
	   The	   other	   three	   accounts	   of	   exploitation	   that	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   this	  
chapter	   might	   be	   interpreted	   as	   providing	   three	   different	   answers	   to	   this	  
question.	   The	   first	   says	   that	   taking	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability	   in	   a	  
consensual	   transaction	   is	   wrongful	   and	   exploitative	   if	   the	   other’s	   consent	   is	  
invalid;	   the	   second	   that	   it	   is	   wrongful	   if	   the	   other	   lacks	   basic	   needs;	   and	   the	  
third	  that	  it	  is	  wrongful	  if	  her	  vulnerability	  arises	  out	  of	  a	  prior	  injustice.	  I	  will	  
discuss	   the	   first	   argument,	   which	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   as	   the	   consent	   account	   of	  
exploitation,	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
2.2	  The	  consent	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  the	  consent	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  that	  consensual	  exploitation	  is	  
wrong	  because	  it	  is	  not	  really	  consensual.	  If	  someone	  consents	  to	  a	  transaction	  
to	   which	   she	   does	   not	   actually	   want	   to	   consent,	   merely	   because	   her	  
circumstances	   are	   so	   bad	   that	   she	   has	   no	   better	   choice,	   this	   cannot	   be	   called	  
truly	  voluntary,	  the	  argument	  says.	  Instead,	   it	   is	  said,	  such	  a	  person	  is	  coerced	  
by	  her	  circumstances.	  Michael	  Sandel	  says,	  for	  example:	  	  
	  
[M]arket	   exchanges	   are	   not	   necessarily	   as	   voluntary	   as	   market	  
enthusiasts	  suggest.	  A	  peasant	  may	  agree	  to	  sell	  his	  kidney	  or	  cornea	  in	  
order	   to	   feed	   his	   starving	   family,	   but	   this	   agreement	   is	   not	   truly	  
voluntary.	  He	  is	  coerced,	  in	  effect,	  by	  the	  necessities	  of	  his	  situation.33	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  MJ	  Sandel,	  ‘What	  Money	  Can’t	  Buy:	  The	  Moral	  Limits	  of	  Markets’	  (1998)	  The	  Tanner	  Lectures	  
on	  Human	  Values	  94.	  I	  realize	  that	  this	  citation	  is	  about	  selling	  body	  parts,	  whereas	  my	  thesis	  
focuses	  on	  transactions	  in	  which	  the	  good	  sold	  is	  not	  itself	  controversial,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  body	  
parts.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  citation	  is	  illustrative	  of	  an	  argument	  that	  could	  equally	  be	  made	  about	  
exploitative	  transactions	  in	  which	  the	  good	  sold	  is	  not	  itself	  controversial,	  such	  as	  sweatshop	  
labour	  or	  payday	  loans.	  This	  argument	  is	  not	  widely	  supported	  in	  the	  present-­‐day	  liberal	  
philosophical	  debate	  on	  exploitation,	  but	  it	  is	  frequently	  encountered	  in	  non-­‐academic	  debates	  
about	  exploitation.	  It	  is	  also	  prevalent	  in	  Marxist	  discussions	  on	  exploitation:	  see	  e.g.	  N	  
Holmstrom,	  ‘Exploitation’	  (1977)	  7(2)	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  353-­‐369,	  35;	  J	  Reiman,	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To	   avoid	  misunderstanding:	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  ways	   in	  which	   someone’s	  
consent	   can	  be	   impaired.	   Someone	  may,	   for	   instance,	  be	  deceived,	   coerced,	  or	  
insufficiently	   informed,	   or	   have	   insufficient	  mental	   capacities	   to	  make	   a	   truly	  
voluntary	  decision.	  The	  argument	   I	   am	  discussing	   in	   this	   section	  does	  not	   say	  
that	   exploitees’	   consent	   is	   invalid	   because	   of	   any	   of	   those	   situations.	   Taking	  
advantage	  of	  such	  defects	  in	  consent	  can	  certainly	  be	  wrongful	  and	  exploitative,	  
but	  the	  question	  under	  discussion	  is	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation.	  
That	   is:	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	   transactions	   that	   are	   deemed	   exploitative,	   but	   to	  
which	   all	   parties	   agree	   voluntarily,	   sufficiently	   informed,	   and	   with	   sufficient	  
mental	   capabilities.	   The	   argument	   of	   the	   consent	   account	   says	   that	   such	  
transactions	   are	  wrong	  because	   the	   exploitees’	   consent	   is	  not	   truly	   voluntary,	  
because	  the	  exploitees’	  desperate	  circumstances	  leave	  her	  no	  better	  choice	  than	  
to	  consent.	  	  
The	  argument	  of	  the	  consent	  account	  is	  intuitively	  quite	  plausible,	  and	  is	  
a	   frequently	   heard	   complaint	   about	   exploitative	   transactions.	   Consider	   the	  
examples	   of	   typical	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	   mentioned	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   such	   as	   the	   sweatshop	   factory,	   the	   loan	   provider,	   and	   the	  
stranded	   person	   who	   gets	   offered	   help	   for	   an	   exorbitant	   price.	   In	   all	   these	  
examples,	  the	  exploitees	  indeed	  do	  not	  really	  like	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  transactions	  
under	   the	   terms	  specified,	  but	  only	  do	   so	  because	   they	  have	  no	  better	   choice.	  
The	   employees	   in	   the	   sweatshop	   factory	   would	   much	   rather	   have	   fewer	  
working	  hours	  and	  higher	  wages,	  but	  cannot	  get	  any	  other	  or	  better	  job.	  People	  
lending	  money	   from	   loan	   sharks	   really	   do	   not	  want	   to	   pay	   very	   high	   interest	  
rates,	  but	  only	  do	  so	  because	  they	  need	  the	  money	  and	  cannot	  find	  a	  loan	  with	  a	  
cheaper	   interest	   rate.	   And	   stranded	   passengers	   really	   do	   not	   like	   to	   pay	   an	  
exorbitant	  price	   for	  help,	   but	  only	  do	   so	   if	   they	   feel	   their	   circumstances	   leave	  
them	  no	  better	  choice.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Exploitation,	  Force,	  and	  the	  Moral	  Assessment	  of	  Capitalism’	  (1987)	  16	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  
Affairs	  3-­‐41;	  J	  Schwartz,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’	  (1995)	  29(2)	  Noûs	  158-­‐188.	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Despite	   the	   intuitive	   plausibility	   of	   a	   consent-­‐based	   explanation	   of	   the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  invalidity	  of	  exploitees’	  consent	  is	  not	  
what	  makes	   exploitation	  wrong,	   and	   that	   the	   consent	   account	   of	   exploitation	  
cannot	   satisfactory	   explain	  what	   is	   wrong	  with	   exploitation.	   Before	   doing	   so,	  
however,	  I	  like	  to	  forestall	  a	  possible	  objection	  against	  my	  arguments:	  that	  they	  
presuppose	  a	  negative	  conception	  of	  freedom,	  and	  that,	  on	  a	  positive	  conception	  
of	   freedom,	  my	   objections	   to	   the	   consent	   account	   are	   less	   compelling.	   After	   I	  
have	  shown,	  in	  section	  2.2.1,	  why	  I	  think	  positive	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  do	  not	  
reduce	  the	  validity	  of	  my	  objections	  against	   the	  consent	  account,	   I	  will	  set	  out	  
these	  objections	  in	  section	  2.2.2.	  	  
	  
2.2.1	  Positive	  freedom	  and	  consent	  	  
Classical	   liberals	   or	   libertarians	   typically	   hold	   a	   ‘negative’	   conception	   of	  
freedom.	   Simply	   put,	   they	   see	   freedom	   as	   the	   absence	   of	   something:	   of	  
constraints	   imposed	  by	  other	  humans.	  We	  are	   free,	  on	   this	  view,	   if	  we	  are	  not	  
prevented	   by	   anyone	   to	   do	   what	   we	   want	   to	   do.	   ‘Positive’	   conceptions	   of	  
freedom,	  in	  contrast,	  focus	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  something:	  the	  ability	  to	  do	  what	  
we	  want	   to	   do.34	   There	   are	   several	   different	   conceptions	   of	   positive	   freedom	  
that	  have	  different	  views	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  should	  be	  present	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  
freedom.	  As	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  notes,	  rivalling	  the	  negative	  conception	  of	  freedom	  
are	   ‘a	   variety	   of	   “positive”	   directions,	   each	   placing	   stress	   on	   quite	   different	  
philosophical	   themes,	   and	   yielding	   a	   diversity	   of	   non-­‐negative	   conceptions.’35	  
What	  they	  all	  have	  in	  common	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  something	  more	  than	  the	  mere	  
absence	   of	   external	   constraints	   imposed	   by	   other	   humans	   is	   required	   before	  
people	  can	  be	  called	  truly	  free,	  even	  though	  they	  differ	  on	  what	  that	  something	  
is.	  While	   some,	   for	   instance,	   focus	   on	   internal	   factors	   such	   as	   self-­‐mastery	   or	  
rational	  control,36	  others	  focus	  on	  external	  factors	  such	  as	  available	  resources.	  It	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  I	  Carter,	  A	  Measure	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  6.	  	  
35	  J	  Waldron,	  The	  Right	  to	  Private	  Property	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  298-­‐299.	  
36	  The	  best-­‐known	  account	  of	  positive	  freedom	  is	  perhaps	  put	  forward	  by	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  in	  his	  
Two	  Concepts	  of	  Liberty	  (in	  his	  Four	  Essays	  on	  Liberty	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1969)).	  Berlin	  
describes	  positive	  freedom	  as	  being	  self-­‐determined;	  as	  having	  control	  of	  our	  own	  true	  interests	  
and	  destiny	  and	  being	  able	  to	  control	  our	  passions.	  A	  classic	  example	  is	  that	  of	  a	  person	  addicted	  
	   34	  
is	   this	   second	   type	   of	   theories	   of	   positive	   freedom,	   that	   focuses	   on	   external	  
factors	  necessary	  for	  freedom,	  that	  underlies	  many	  of	  the	  claims	  that	  exploitees’	  
consent	  is	  not	  truly	  voluntary.	  
When	  thinking	  about	  which	  external	  factors	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
when	  measuring	   freedom,	  a	   first	  distinction	  that	  should	  be	  made	   is	   that	  while	  
some	   theorists	   take	   all	   constraints	   into	   account,	  most	   theorists	   only	   consider	  
obstacles	  caused	  by	  other	  people.	  They	  do	  not	  regard	  natural	  obstacles,	  such	  as	  
not	   being	   able	   to	   walk	   on	   water,	   as	   reducing	   the	   level	   of	   our	   freedom,	   but	  
merely	   as	   limitations	   of	   our	   options.	   This	   choice	   may	   be	   linked	   to	   another	  
distinction:	   the	   distinction	   between	   non-­‐normative	   freedom	   and	   normative	  
freedom.37	  The	  first	  describes	  an	  empirical	  fact:	  what	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  
do.	  The	  second	  refers	  to	  authoritative	  norms	  (such	  as	  laws	  or	  normative	  rules)	  
and	   asks	   what	   a	   person	   is	   entitled	   to	   do.	   Yet	   even	   if	   we	   would	   agree	   on	   the	  
necessity	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  natural	  and	  social	  obstacles	  to	  freedom,	  it	  is	  
not	   always	   clear	  where	   to	  draw	   the	  boundaries.	  Especially	  disputed	   cases	   are	  
constraints	   influenced	   by	   macro-­‐economic	   forces,	   such	   as	   poverty	   and	  
unemployment:	   do	   they	  merely	   affect	   people’s	   options	   or	   do	   they	  make	   them	  
(more)	  unfree?38	  	  
	   Many	   classical	   liberals	   and	   libertarians	   try	   to	   solve	   this	   problem	   by	  
arguing	   that	   only	   restrictions	   that	   are	   brought	   about	   intentionally	   count	   as	  
restrictions	   of	   freedom.	   Macro-­‐economic	   situations	   that	   are	   generated	  
unintentionally,	   for	  them,	  do	  not	  limit	  people’s	  freedom,	  even	  though	  they	  will	  
limit	   the	  possibilities	   of	  what	  people	   can	  do.	  More	   egalitarian-­‐minded	  writers	  
often	   argue	   that	  we	   should	   also	   consider	   some	   unintended	   social	   restrictions	  
like	   poverty	   as	   affecting	   people’s	   freedom,	   and	   even	   certain	   restrictions	   that	  
could	  be	  seen	  as	  natural	  limitations,	  such	  as	  genetic	  handicaps	  or	  illnesses.	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to	  smoking	  who	  wants	  to	  stop	  smoking	  but	  does	  not,	  even	  though	  it	  negatively	  affects	  many	  
parts	  of	  her	  life.	  Even	  though	  such	  a	  person	  is	  not	  forced	  to	  continue	  smoking,	  this	  choice	  is	  not	  
really	  voluntarily,	  supporters	  of	  this	  account	  of	  freedom	  would	  say,	  because	  it	  is	  brought	  about	  
by	  the	  person’s	  addiction	  and	  irrational	  desire	  and	  does	  not	  serve	  her	  real	  interests.	  Hence,	  on	  
this	  view	  of	  freedom,	  freedom	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	  self-­‐mastery	  and	  rational	  control,	  which	  
are	  said	  to	  affect	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  person	  acts	  autonomously.	  
37	  MH	  Kramer,	  The	  Quality	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003)	  61.	  
38	  I	  Carter,	  ‘Positive	  and	  Negative	  Liberty’	  in	  EN	  Zalta	  (ed),	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  
(Spring	  2013	  Edition)	  11.	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them,	   unfreedom	   is	   brought	   about	   by	   both	   the	   presence	   of	   intentional	  
interference	  by	  other	  people,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  resources	  (in	  a	  broad	  sense	  of	  
the	  term)	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  valuable	  choices.	  Such	  writers	  
generally	  refer	   to	   their	  understanding	  of	   freedom	  as	  positive	   freedom	  or	   ‘real’	  
freedom,39	   and	   it	   is	   this	   version	   of	   positive	   freedom	   that	   is	   mostly	   used	   in	  
arguments	  about	  exploitation.	  	  
	   Amartya	  Sen	  describes	  this	  type	  of	  positive	  freedom	  as	  ‘concentrating	  on	  
what	  a	  person	  can	  choose	   to	  do	  or	  achieve	   rather	   than	  on	   the	  absence	  of	   any	  
particular	   type	   of	   restraint	   that	   prevents	   him	   of	   her	   from	   doing	   one	   thing	   or	  
another.’40	   For	   example,	   he	   says,	   ‘if	   a	   person	   happens	   to	   be	   poor	   and	   hungry	  
because	  of	  low	  real	  wages	  or	  unemployment,	  without	  his	  having	  been	  prevented	  
(by	  the	  state	  or	  by	  some	  strong-­‐armed	  individual	  or	  institution)	  from	  seeking	  a	  
higher	  wage	   or	   finding	   employment,	   then	   the	   person’s	   negative	   freedom	  may	  
not	   have	   been,	   in	   any	   way,	   violated,	   even	   though	   his	   positive	   freedom	   from	  
hunger	  is	  clearly	  compromised	  by	  circumstances.’41	  	  
	   While	  on	  this	  conception	  freedom	  is	  defined	  as	  what	  people	  can	  actually	  
do	   given	   the	   resources	   available	   to	   them,	   there	   are	   different	   views	   on	  which	  
resources	   to	   take	   into	   account	   and	   how	   best	   to	  measure	   them.	   Some	  writers	  
focus	  on	  commodity	  bundles	  or	  income,42	  others	  on	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  certain	  
level	   of	   primary	   goods.	   ‘Capability	   theorists’,	   in	   contrast,	   argue	   that	   these	  
options	  do	  not	  adequately	  reflect	  people’s	  actual	   freedom.	   If,	   for	   instance,	   two	  
persons	  receive	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  income	  or	  primary	  goods	  but	  one	  of	  them	  is	  
blind,	   this	  person	  will	  have	   to	   spend	  a	   large	  part	  of	  her	  money	  on	   services	   to	  
deal	  with	  her	  handicap,	  while	  the	  other	  person	  can	  spend	  much	  more	  on	  other	  
things.	   Capability	   theorists	   therefore	   argue	   for	   measuring	   people’s	   positive	  
freedom	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   ‘capabilities’:	   the	   ‘alternative	   functionings’	   that	   they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  See	  e.g.	  MC	  Nussbaum,	  ‘Nature,	  Function,	  and	  Capability:	  Aristotle	  on	  Political	  Distribution’	  in	  
J	  Annas	  and	  RH	  Grimm,	  Oxford	  Studies	  in	  Ancient	  Philosophy	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1988)	  
145-­‐184,	  183;	  P	  van	  Parijs,	  Real	  Freedom	  for	  All	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  and	  A	  Sen,	  
‘Freedom	  of	  Choice,	  Concept	  and	  Content’	  (1988)	  32	  European	  Economic	  Review	  269-­‐294.	  
40	  Sen,	  op.cit.	  272.	  
41	  Sen,	  op.cit.	  272-­‐273.	  	  
42	  E.g.	  van	  Parijs,	  op.cit.	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are	  able	   to	  achieve.43	  They	  say	   that	   for	  persons	   to	  be	   free	   they	  must	  have	   the	  
relevant	  capacities	  and	  the	  necessary	  opportunities	  to	  employ	  these	  capacities	  
to	  achieve	  certain	  functionings	  they	  have	  reason	  to	  want	  to	  achieve.44	  
As	   said,	   the	   idea	  of	  positive	   freedom	  underlies	  many	  of	   the	   claims	   that	  
consensual	  exploitative	   transactions	  are	  wrong	  because	   the	  exploitees	  are	  not	  
truly	   free	   to	   decide	   whether	   to	   consent	   or	   not.	   It	   may	   be	   thought	   that	   the	  
arguments	   against	   the	   consent	   account	   that	   I	   will	   put	   forward	   in	   the	   next	  
section,	   ignore	   the	   existence	   of	   different	   conceptions	   of	   freedom,	   or	   that	   they	  
favour	  a	  negative	  understanding	  of	   freedom.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	   is	   true.	   In	  
fact,	   I	   am	   sympathetic	   towards	   egalitarian	   theories	   of	   positive	   freedom.	   I	   also	  
think,	  however,	  that	  this	  has	  no	  direct	  implications	  for	  my	  views	  on	  the	  consent	  
account	   of	   exploitation.	   This	   is	   because	   positive	   (and	   negative)	   theories	   of	  
freedom	   are	   essentially	   concerned	   with	   how	   to	   define	   freedom	   or	   how	   to	  
‘measure’	   individuals’	   level	   of	   freedom.	   Yet	   this	   is	   a	   different	   issue	   than	  
questions	  such	  as:	  	  
	  
(a) To	  what	  extent	   should	  a	   state	  be	   concerned	  about	   the	   level	  of	  people’s	  
freedom;	  that	  is,	  to	  what	  extent	  should	  a	  state	  see	  it	  as	  its	  task	  to	  protect	  
or	  promote	  individuals’	  freedom	  (and	  by	  what	  means);	  
(b)	   To	   what	   extent	   should	   individuals	   be	   held	   responsible	   (morally	   or	  
legally)	  for	  choices	  made	  in	  situations	  of	  different	   ‘types’	  or	   ‘degrees’	  of	  
(un)freedom	   (e.g.	   negative	   unfreedom	   caused	   by	   coercion	   and	   positive	  
unfreedom	  caused	  by	  poverty).	  And	  following	  from	  this:	   to	  what	  extent	  
should	  individuals’	  consent	  given	  in	  different	  degrees	  of	  (un)freedom	  be	  
considered	  valid;	  
(c)	   To	   what	   extent	   should	   other	   individuals	   transacting	   with	   persons	   in	  
certain	   degrees	   of	   unfreedom	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	   alleviating	   the	  
causes	  of	  their	  unfreedom.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  A	  Sen,	  Rationality	  and	  Freedom	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002)	  5-­‐9.	  	  
44	  JM	  Alexander,	  Capabilities	  and	  Social	  Justice,	  The	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	  Amartya	  Sen	  and	  
Martha	  Nussbaum	  (Ashgate,	  2008)	  151.	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Questions	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  have	  most	  bearing	  on	  the	  debate	  on	  exploitation	  and	  on	  
my	   assertion	   that	   invalidity	   of	   exploitees’	   consent	   is	   not	   what	   makes	  
exploitation	  wrong.45	  They	  are,	  however,	   to	  a	  certain	  extent	   independent	  from	  
the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  define	  or	  measure	  freedom.	  To	  some	  extent,	  they	  are	  related	  
to	  this	   issue,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	   if	  we	  support	  a	  negative	  view	  of	   freedom,	  there	  
will	   be	   fewer	   situations	   that	   count	   as	   a	   situation	   of	   unfreedom	   for	  which	   the	  
questions	   are	   relevant,	   than	   if	   we	   support	   a	   positive	   view	   of	   freedom.	   For	  
example:	   if	  we	  define	  freedom	  merely	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion,	  the	  question	  
of	   to	   what	   extent	   individuals	   should	   be	   held	   responsible	   for	   alleviating	   the	  
causes	  of	  unfreedom,	  is	  applicable	  to	  a	  much	  narrower	  range	  of	  cases	  than	  if	  we	  
were	  to	  define	  freedom	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  sufficient	  
resources.	  Yet	  the	  above	  questions	  are	  also	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  independent	  from	  
the	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  measure	  someone’s	  level	  of	  freedom.	  To	  start	  with	  question	  
(c),	   even	   if	   we	   agree	   on	   the	   correctness	   of,	   say,	   the	   capability-­‐based	   view	   of	  
freedom,	  this	  itself	  does	  not	  imply	  anything	  about	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  persons	  
who	  engage	  in	  a	  transaction	  with	  others	  (as	  opposed	  to	  society	  at	   large	  or	  the	  
state)	   should	   be	   held	   morally	   or	   legally	   responsible	   for	   compensating	   the	  
other’s	   unfreedom.	  This	   is	   a	   question	   that	   cannot	   be	   answered	   by	   theories	   of	  
freedom	   alone.	   We	   also	   need	   a	   theory	   of	   responsibility	   for	   compensating	  
poverty	  or	  distributive	  injustice	  (or,	  in	  other	  words,	  ‘positive	  unfreedom’).	  Such	  
theories	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   sections	   2.3	   and	   2.4,	   where	   I	   analyse	   the	   needs	  
account	  and	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  
	   The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  question	  (b):	  even	  if	  we	  support	  a	  capability-­‐based	  
view	   of	   freedom,	   this	   does	   not	   automatically	   imply	   that	   consent	   given	   in	   a	  
situation	  of	  limited	  positive	  freedom,	  such	  as	  poverty,	  is	  not	  valid,	  or	  that	  people	  
should	  not	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  consent.	  That	  claim	  requires	  a	  separate	  
argument,	   that	   justifies	   why	   people’s	   consent	   should	   only	   be	   considered	  
voluntary	  or	  valid	  when	  they	  have	  a	  certain	  ‘level’	  of	  positive	  freedom,	  such	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Considering	  question	  (a),	  most	  theories	  of	  freedom	  maintain	  or	  assume	  that	  protecting	  or	  
promoting	  individuals’	  freedom	  is	  important,	  and	  many	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  should	  be	  a	  key	  goal	  
for	  states.	  Yet	  it	  is	  still	  a	  separate	  question	  from	  the	  question	  of	  what	  freedom	  consists	  in,	  and	  
some	  people	  will	  think	  that	  it	  is	  equally	  or	  more	  important	  for	  the	  state	  to	  promote	  other	  values,	  
such	  as	  wealth,	  wellbeing,	  equality,	  or	  economic	  growth.	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certain	  level	  of	  wealth,	  or,	  perhaps,	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  appealing	  choices.	  And	  I	  
will	   argue	   in	   the	   next	   section	   that	   I	   think	   it	   is	   problematic	   to	   make	   this	  
argument.	  	  
	  
2.2.2	  Problems	  with	  the	  consent	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
Proponents	  of	  the	  consent	  account	  of	  exploitation	  say	  that	  when	  someone	  is	  in	  
such	   bad	   circumstances	   that	   she	   has	   no	   better	   choice	   than	   to	   consent	   to	   an	  
exploitative	   transaction,	   her	   consent	   cannot	   be	   called	   truly	   consensual.	   They	  
argue	  that	  such	  a	  person	  is,	  in	  effect,	  forced	  by	  her	  bad	  circumstances,	  because	  
she	  would	  never	  have	  agreed	  to	  the	  (terms	  of	  the)	  transaction	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  
her	  circumstances.	  I	  will	  start	  my	  objection	  to	  this	  account	  of	  exploitation	  with	  
an	  example.	  Suppose	  a	  just-­‐graduated	  legal	  theory	  student	  (W)	  is	  looking	  for	  a	  
job.	  After	  a	  year,	  she	  still	  has	  not	  found	  any	  work	  in	  her	  area	  of	  expertise.	  She	  
cannot	  afford	  to	  pay	  her	  rent	  any	  longer,	  and	  is	  in	  desperate	  need	  of	  an	  income.	  
She	   therefore	   accepts	   employer	   A’s	   offer	   to	   work	   in	   A’s	   shoe	   factory	   for	   an	  
extremely	  low	  wage.	  W	  later	  remarks	  that	  she	  would	  rather	  not	  have	  accepted	  
the	  job,	  but	  that	  her	  circumstances	  coerced	  her	  to	  do	  so.	  But	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  
to	   say	   that	  W’s	   circumstances	   coerced	   her	   to	   accept	   the	   offer?	   And	   does	   that	  
make	  her	  consent	  invalid?	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  W’s	  circumstances	  ‘coerced’	  her	  to	  accept	  the	  offer,	   in	  the	  
sense	  that	  her	  circumstances	  are	  such	  that	  if	  she	  had	  not	  accepted	  the	  job,	  she	  
would	  probably	  be	  worse	  off	   than	   if	   she	  had	  opted	   for	  another	  choice	  (maybe	  
she	  could	  also,	  for	  instance,	  have	  chosen	  to	  become	  homeless	  for	  a	  while,	  or	  to	  
move	  in	  with	  a	  friend	  or	  family,	  which	  she	  apparently	  liked	  less	  than	  accepting	  
the	  job).	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  within	  certain	  circumstances	  one	  of	  our	  options	  
is	  most	  attractive	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  we	  are	  coerced	  to	  choose	  that	  
option.	  This	  is	  so	  for	  at	  least	  two	  reasons.	  
First	  of	  all,	  coercing	  is	  commonly	  defined	  as	  trying	  to	  get	  someone	  to	  do	  
something	   she	   would	   otherwise	   not	   do	   (say,	   X)	   by	   threatening	   to	   make	   her	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worse	  off	  in	  comparison	  with	  some	  baseline	  if	  she	  does	  not	  do	  X.46	  This	  baseline	  
could	   be	   the	   status	   quo,	   but	   also	   some	  moral	   baseline:	   the	   situation	   in	  which	  
people	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	   their	  moral	   duties.	   The	   difference	   between	   the	  
two	   types	   of	   baselines	   is	   famously	   illustrated	   in	   Robert	   Nozick’s	   ‘drowning	  
case’:47	   A	   comes	   upon	   B,	   who	   is	   drowning.	   A	   knows	   that	   there	   are	   no	   other	  
potential	   rescuers	   and	   proposes	   to	   rescue	   B	   if	   B	   agrees	   to	   pay	   A	   $10,000.	   In	  
comparison	  with	  the	  status	  quo	  (B	  is	  drowning),	  A’s	  proposal	  benefits	  B	  and	  is	  
thus	  an	  offer	   instead	  of	  a	   threat.	  Yet	   if	  we	  compare	   the	  proposal	  with	  a	  moral	  
baseline,	  whether	   the	  proposal	   is	  an	  offer	  or	  a	   threat	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  
believe	  that	  A	  has	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  rescue	  B.	  If	  so,	  the	  offer	  is	  coercive,	  because	  it	  
makes	   B	   worse	   off	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   A	   acts	   in	  
accordance	  with	  this	  duty.	  	  
Now	   let	  us	  assume—for	   the	  moment—that	  employer	  A	   in	   the	  previous	  
example	  does	  not	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  W	  to	  find	  a	  better-­‐paying	  job	  or	  to	  offer	  
her	  higher	  wages.	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  A’s	  job	  offer	  proposes	  to	  make	  W	  better	  off	  if	  
she	  accepts	  his	  proposition,	  instead	  of	  threatening	  to	  make	  her	  worse	  off.	  It	  thus	  
actually	  increases	  her	  set	  of	  choices,	  and	  is	  not	  coercive.	  	  
	  
Second,	  if	  we	  hold	  that	  W	  is	  coerced	  to	  consent	  because	  her	  circumstances	  leave	  
her	  no	  better	  choice,	  the	  term	  ‘coercion’	  loses	  all	  its	  moral	  force.	  It	  would	  mean	  
that	   everyone	   is	   always	   coerced	   by	   their	   circumstances,	   because	   everyone	  
always	   chooses	   the	  option	   that	   seems,	   in	   their	   circumstances,	   the	  best	   choice.	  
Suppose,	   for	   example,	   that	   a	   commercial	   law	   student	   (C)	   is	   offered	   five	  
interesting	  and	  well-­‐paid	  jobs	  right	  after	  her	  graduation.	  She	  finds	  all	   five	  jobs	  
appealing,	  but	  likes	  job	  X	  the	  most.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  seems	  very	  strange	  to	  say	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  See	  e.g.	  JS	  Hawkins	  and	  EJ	  Emanuel,	  ‘Clarifying	  Confusions	  About	  Coercion’	  (2005)	  35(5)	  
Hastings	  Center	  Report	  16-­‐19,	  17;	  and	  A	  Wertheimer,	  ‘Coercion’	  in	  LC	  Becker	  and	  CB	  Becker	  
(eds),	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Ethics	  (2nd	  ed,	  Routledge,	  2001)	  245-­‐248,	  247.	  Another	  form	  of	  coercion	  
often	  recognized	  is	  when	  the	  offer	  by	  one	  person	  (A)	  makes	  another	  person	  (B)	  better	  off,	  but	  
the	  reason	  that	  B	  is	  in	  the	  unfortunate	  situation	  where	  A’s	  offer	  will	  make	  her	  better	  off	  is	  
created	  by	  A.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  are	  on	  a	  boat	  and	  I	  push	  you	  overboard,	  and	  subsequently	  offer	  
to	  rescue	  you	  in	  return	  for	  £1,000,	  this	  is	  a	  coercive	  offer.	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Feinberg,	  Harm	  to	  Self:	  The	  
Moral	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law	  (vol	  3,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986)	  244;	  D	  Zimmerman,	  
‘Coercive	  Wage	  Offers’	  (1981)	  10	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  121-­‐145,	  133.	  	  
47	  R	  Nozick,	  ‘Coercion’	  in	  S	  Morgenbesser,	  P	  Suppes	  and	  M	  White	  (eds),	  Philosophy,	  Science	  and	  
Method:	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Ernest	  Nagel	  (St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1969)	  440-­‐472,	  447.	  	  
	   40	  
the	   circumstances	   coerced	   C	   to	   accept	   job	   X	   simply	   because	   within	   her	  
circumstances	   job	   X	   was	   her	   best	   option—if	   ‘coerced’	   is	   meant	   as	   a	   morally	  
relevant	   term.	   Yet	   this	   is	   exactly	  what	  we	   do	   in	   the	   case	   of	   student	  W,	   if	   we	  
accept	  that	  she	  was	  coerced	  by	  her	  circumstances	  to	  choose	  the	  job	  at	  the	  shoe	  
factory.	  	  
It	  may	   be	   objected	   that	   the	   two	   examples	   are	   not	   similar,	   because	   for	  
student	  C	  all	  options	  are	  appealing,	  whereas	  to	  W	  all	  her	  options	  seem	  awful.	  It	  
might	  thus	  be	  thought	  that	  C’s	  choice	  is	  ultimately	  driven	  by	  desire—which	  job	  
she	   likes	  most—while	  W’s	   choice	   is	   driven	   by	   need:	   her	   poverty	   and	   need	   to	  
earn	   an	   income	   as	   soon	   as	   possible.	   I	   accept	   that	   poverty	   and	   need	   might	  
influence	  what	  society	  owes	  to	  W,	  or	  perhaps	  even	  create	  a	  duty	  for	  particular	  
people	  to	  help	  W,	  which	  is	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.3	  on	  the	  
needs	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  Yet	   this	   is	  different	   from	  accepting	   that	   the	   fact	  
that	  W’s	  options	  are	  unappealing	  automatically	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  
her	  to	  make	  a	  valid	  choice	  amongst	  these	  options.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  have	  
to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  the	  content	  of	  someone’s	  set	  
of	   choices	  and	  whether	  someone	   is	   free	  or	  coerced	   to	  choose	  a	  certain	  option	  
from	   within	   this	   set.48	   One	   way	   of	   seeing	   this	   is	   by	   imagining	   that	   the	   shoe	  
factory	   owner	   in	   the	   example	   decides	   to	   fire	  W,	   but	   that,	   luckily,	  W	   suddenly	  
gets	   another	   job	   offer,	   to	   work	   as	   a	   lecturer	   at	   a	   prestigious	   university.	   W’s	  
choices	   are	   still	   as	   limited	   as	   they	   were	   before:	   before,	   she	   had	   to	   choose	  
between	  becoming	  homeless	  and	  working	  in	  the	  shoe	  factory;	  now	  her	  choice	  is	  
between	  becoming	  homeless	  and	  working	  as	  a	  university	   lecturer.	  W	  does	  not	  
feel	  any	  doubt	  or	  grievance	  about	   this	   though,	  because	  she	  very	  much	   likes	   to	  
work	  as	  a	  lecturer.	  Would	  we	  say	  that	  her	  consent	  to	  become	  a	  lecturer	  instead	  
of	  becoming	  homeless	   is	   in	   some	  way	   invalid	  or	  not	   truly	  voluntary?	   I	  do	  not	  
think	  so.	  Yet	  her	  situation	  is	  almost	  the	  same	  as	  before:	  she	  desperately	  needs	  a	  
job	   and	   has	   only	   one	   job	   offer.	   It	   therefore	   seems	   that	   when	   we	   say	   that	  
someone	   is	   forced	   by	   her	   circumstances	   to	   consent	   to	   a	   certain	   transaction,	  
what	   we	   really	   mean	   is	   that	   the	   options	   someone	   can	   choose	   from	   are	  
unappealing	  or	  horrible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  for	  a	  similar	  argument	  Hawkins	  and	  Emanuel,	  op.cit.	  16-­‐19.	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It	  might	   be	   that	   there	   is	   something	  wrong	  with	   the	   unappealing	   offers	  
someone	  receives;	  in	  the	  above	  example,	  there	  might	  be	  something	  wrong	  with	  
the	  extremely	  low	  wage	  offered	  by	  the	  shoe	  factory	  owner.	  And	  it	  might	  be	  that	  
there	  is	  something	  morally	  problematic	  about	  the	  reason	  that	  someone	  only	  has	  
unappealing	   offers	   to	   choose	   from.	   Or,	   in	   other	   words,	   something	   may	   be	  
morally	  problematic	  about	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  people	  make	  choices.	  For	  
example,	  perhaps	  the	  reason	  W	  cannot	  easily	  find	  a	  job	  is	  that	  people	  of	  her	  skin	  
colour	   or	   gender	   are	   discriminated	   against.	   It	  might	   also	   be	   that	   the	   state	   or	  
certain	   individuals	   are	   under	   a	   moral	   obligation	   to	   rectify	   these	   issues.	   Yet	  
whatever	   is	  wrong	  about	   such	   cases	  of	   consensual	   exploitation,	   I	   believe,	   it	   is	  
not	  a	  lack	  of	  valid	  consent.	  	  
To	   give	   another	   example,	   consider	   one	   of	   the	   typical	   instances	   of	  
exploitation	  discussed	  before:	  sweatshop	  labour.	  The	  consent	  account	  says	  that	  
sweatshop	   labour	   is	   exploitative	   because	   of	   the	   coercion	   or	   involuntariness	  
involved:	   because	   the	   employees’	   bleak	   circumstances	   leave	   them	   no	   better	  
choice	   than	   to	  consent	   to	  working	   in	  a	  sweatshop.	  But	  now	  consider	  a	  second	  
example:	  a	  fair	  trade	  organization	  decides	  to	  set	  up	  a	  factory	  in	  an	  impoverished	  
region	  in	  a	  developing	  country,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  people	  in	  the	  region	  with	  a	  
stable	   source	  of	   income.	  The	  organization	  provides	  all	  workers	  with	  generous	  
wages	  and	  safe	  working	  conditions,	  plus	  free	  healthcare	  and	  free	  education	  for	  
their	  children.	  Even	  in	  this	  second	  example,	  the	  employees	  may	  have	  no	  better	  
choice	  than	  to	  work	  in	  the	  factory,	  or	  no	  other	  employment	  opportunity	  at	  all,	  
and	   they	  may	   have	   lived	   in	   conditions	   of	   terrible	   poverty	   before	   they	   started	  
working	  for	  the	  company.	  They	  are	  thus,	  following	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  consent	  
account,	  coerced	  by	  their	  dreadful	  circumstances	  to	  work	  in	  the	  factory.	  Hence,	  
if	  we	   follow	   the	   argument	   of	   the	   consent	   account—that	   the	   fact	   that	   people’s	  
circumstances	   leave	   them	   no	   better	   choice	   than	   to	   consent	   to	   working	  
somewhere	   is	   what	   makes	   the	   employees’	   consent	   invalid—we	   should	   also	  
think	   that	  people’s	   choice	   to	  work	   for	   the	   fair	   trade	  organization	   is	  not	   really	  
voluntary.	  Yet	  I	  think	  that	  not	  many	  people	  would	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  	  
Still,	  one	  might	  insist	  that	  it	  is	  the	  case;	  that	  employees’	  consent	  to	  work	  
for	   the	   fair	   trade	   factory	   is	   also	   not	   truly	   voluntary.	   However,	   if	   so,	   the	   term	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‘voluntary’	   becomes	  morally	  meaningless	   in	   the	   context	  of	   exploitation,	   in	   the	  
sense	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  distinguish	  transactions	  in	  which	  the	  offer	  of	  one	  
of	  the	  parties	  is	  morally	  problematic	  or	  exploitative,	  from	  transactions	  in	  which	  
no	  morally	  problematic	  or	  exploitative	  offer	  is	  made.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  contend	  that	  
the	  consent	  account	  is	  mistaken,	  both	  in	  its	  idea	  that	  circumstances	  can	  coerce,	  
and	  in	  its	  view	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  
	  
I	  will	  finish	  this	  section	  by	  returning	  to	  the	  possible	  objection	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
previous	   section,	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   positive	   freedom.	   Recall	   that	   positive	  
accounts	   of	   freedom	   measure	   and	   define	   freedom	   not	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   what	  
others	  prevent	  us	  from	  doing,	  but	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  we	  can	  actually	  choose	  to	  
do,	  given	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  us.	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  this	  section	  that	  
what	  we	  can	  actually	  choose	  to	  do—the	  options	  available	   to	  us—is	  a	  different	  
matter	  than	  whether	  we	  can	  validly	  consent	  to	  the	  options	  that	  are	  available	  to	  
us.	   Moreover,	   whether	   we	   are	   coerced,	   or	   can	   validly	   consent	   to	   the	   options	  
available	  to	  us,	  is	  a	  different	  matter	  than	  whether	  we	  find	  the	  options	  available	  
to	   us	   appealing.	   In	   the	   above	   example	   of	   W	   and	   employer	   A,	   W’s	   positive	  
freedom	   might	   be	   considered	   rather	   limited:	   she	   is	   poor,	   unemployed,	   and	  
although	   she	   has	   a	   good	   education,	   she	   cannot	  manage	   to	   find	   any	   job,	   apart	  
from	  working	  in	  A’s	  shoe	  factory.	  Still,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  her	  consent	  to	  
work	   in	   the	   shoe	   factory	   is	   not	   therefore	   necessarily	   involuntary	   or	   invalid.	   I	  
gave	  a	  second	  example,	  in	  which	  W	  is	  not	  offered	  a	  job	  in	  a	  shoe	  factory,	  but	  is	  
offered	  a	  lectureship	  at	  a	  prestigious	  university;	  a	  job	  she	  very	  much	  likes	  to	  do.	  
I	  doubt	   that	  many	  would	   consider	  W’s	   consent	   to	  accept	   the	   lecturer	  position	  
involuntary,	  or	  the	  job	  offer	  necessarily	  exploitative.	  Yet	  her	  positive	  freedom	  is	  
as	   limited	  as	   it	  was	  before:	  she	  is	  still	  equally	  poor,	  unemployed,	  and	  can	  only	  
find	  one	  job.	  The	  sole	  difference	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  job	  W	  actually	  likes	  to	  do.	  It	  is	  thus	  
not	   the	  validity	  of	  W’s	  consent	   that	   is	  morally	  problematic	   in	   the	  shoe	   factory	  
example,	  but	  something	  about	  A’s	  unappealing	  offer.	  This	  might	  be	  construed	  in	  
terms	  of	  positive	   freedom.	   It	  might	  be	  thought,	   for	  example,	   that	  society	  has	  a	  
moral	  duty	  to	  help	  alleviate	  W’s	  poverty	  and	  so	  to	  meet	  her	  needs	  and	  increase	  
her	  level	  of	  positive	  freedom	  and	  the	  options	  available	  to	  her.	  It	  might	  even	  be	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thought	  that	  employer	  A	  has	  an	  individual	  duty	  to	  help	  W,	  by	  offering	  her	  higher	  
wages.	   Yet	   we	   should	   not	   conflate	   questions	   of	   positive	   freedom—which	  
options	  are	  actually	  available	   to	  people—with	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  people	  
are	  coerced	  or	  can	  voluntarily	  and	  validly	  choose	  between	  the	  options	  available	  
to	  them.	  	  
A	   similar	   view	   is	   put	   forward	   by	   a	   number	   of	   proponents	   of	   other	  
accounts	   of	   exploitation.49	   Some	   of	   them	   argue	   that	   the	   consent	   account	  
confuses	  the	  (in)justice	  of	  a	  transaction	  with	  the	  (in)justice	  of	  the	  ‘background	  
circumstances’	   in	   which	   that	   transaction	   takes	   place.	   Even	   though	   the	  
circumstances	   in	  which	   someone	   consents	   to	   a	   transaction	   are	   dreadful,	   they	  
argue,	   this	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   every	   transaction	   within	   such	  
circumstances	  is	  wrong,	  just	  like,	  conversely,	  not	  every	  transaction	  within	  a	  just	  
background	  system	  is	  automatically	   just.	  Moreover,	  conflating	  problems	  in	  the	  
background	  situation	  of	  a	  transaction	  with	  problems	  of	  the	  exploitee’s	  consent	  
may	   not	   only	   be	   flawed,	   it	   might	   also	   be	   considered	   insulting	   for	   people	   in	  
dreadful	   circumstances	   to	   claim	   that	   they	   cannot	  make	   valid	   decisions,	   while	  
other	  people	  can.	  As	  Wertheimer	  puts	  it:	  ‘if	  we	  are	  to	  show	  appropriate	  respect	  
for	  individual	  autonomy,	  then	  we	  must	  show	  respect	  for	  the	  choices	  that	  people	  
make	  within	  their	  situations,	  bad	  though	  those	  situations	  may	  be’.50	  
	  
Still,	  an	  important	  possible	  objection	  remains.	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section,	  I	  
said	   that	   coercion	   is	   commonly	   defined	   as	   trying	   to	   get	   someone	   to	   do	  
something	  she	  would	  otherwise	  not	  do,	  by	  threatening	  to	  make	  her	  worse	  off	  in	  
comparison	  with	  some	  baseline.	   I	  also	  said	  that	  this	  baseline	  can	  be	  the	  status	  
quo,	   but	   also	   some	   moral	   baseline:	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   people	   act	   in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  moral	  duties.	  Hence,	  if	  someone	  has	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  
another	   in	   need	   (say,	   a	   drowning	   person),	   but	  makes	   the	   help	   conditional	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  See	  e.g.	  JS	  Hawkins,	  ‘Research	  Ethics,	  Developing	  Countries,	  and	  Exploitation:	  A	  Primer’	  in	  JS	  
Hawkins	  and	  EJ	  Emanuel,	  Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Clinical	  Research	  
(Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  21-­‐54;	  A	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation	  (Princeton	  University	  
Press,	  1996)	  270.	  
50	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  271.	  For	  similar	  arguments	  see	  e.g.	  TL	  Beauchamp,	  
‘Autonomy	  and	  Consent’	  in	  F	  Miller	  and	  A	  Wertheimer	  (eds),	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Consent,	  Theory	  and	  
Practice	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  55-­‐78;	  and	  R	  Bigwood,	  Exploitative	  Contracts	  (Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2003)	  65.	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some	  offer	   (say,	   paying	  £10,000),	   the	   consent	   to	   this	   offer	   is	  not	   truly	   free	  or	  
valid.	  This	  is	  a	  compelling	  possible	  objection,	  and	  I	  will	  therefore	  moderate	  my	  
earlier	  statement	  about	  the	  need	  to	  separate	  issues	  with	  people’s	  consent	  from	  
issues	  in	  the	  ‘background	  circumstances’	  in	  which	  they	  make	  their	  consent.	  In	  a	  
situation	  where	  A	  offers	   to	  help	  B	  but	  only	  on	  a	  certain	  condition,	  we	  can	  say	  
that	  if	  the	  background	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  offer	  is	  made	  give	  A	  the	  moral	  
duty	  to	  help	  B	  without	  further	  conditions,	  then	  A’s	  offer	  may	  well	  be	  coercive,	  or	  
B’s	   consent	   invalid.	   In	   other	  words:	   if	  we	   think	   there	   is	   a	  moral	   duty	   to	   save	  
drowning	  people	  without	  further	  conditions,	  then	  asking	  £10,000	  to	  a	  drowning	  
person	  may	  be	  called	  coercive.	  Whether	  someone’s	  circumstances	  influence	  the	  
validity	  of	  her	  consent,	  thus	  depend	  on	  whether	  these	  circumstances	  give	  rise	  to	  
a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  help	  the	  other	  without	  further	  conditions.	  The	  existence	  of	  
this	   duty	  may	  be	   relatively	   uncontroversial	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   drowning	  person.	  
But	  do	  we	  also	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  when	  the	  need	  is	  less	  
immediate	   and	   urgent?	   If	   so,	   this	   objection	   can	   be	   raised	   against	   my	   earlier	  
examples.	  
For	   instance,	   in	   the	  example	  of	   student	  W	  and	  shoe	   factory	  owner	  A,	   it	  
might	  be	  objected	  that	  in	  determining	  whether	  W	  is	  being	  coerced,	  I	  should	  not	  
have	   compared	   A’s	   offer	   with	  W’s	   status	   quo,	   but	   with	   a	  moral	   baseline:	   the	  
situation	  in	  which	  A	  would	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  her	  moral	  duties.	  And	  it	  might	  
be	   argued	   that	   one	   such	   duty	   is	   to	   help	   people	   in	   serious	   need,	   like	  W,	   or	   to	  
compensate	   for	   distributive	   injustices,	   or	   to	   offer	   people	   fair	   wages.	   In	   other	  
words:	  while	  I	  assumed	  in	  the	  example	  that	  employer	  A	  does	  not	  have	  a	  moral	  
duty	  to	  offer	  higher	  wages,	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  A	  does	  have	  this	  moral	  duty.	  
The	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  duty	  is	  what	  is	  contended	  by	  the	  three	  other	  accounts	  of	  
exploitation	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  and	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
Hence,	  it	  might	  be	  said	  that	  if	  one	  of	  them	  is	  true,	  in	  a	  sense	  the	  consent	  account	  
of	  exploitation	  is	  also	  true,	  because	  it	  would	  mean	  that	  exploiters’	  offers	  make	  
exploitees	  worse	  off,	  compared	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  exploiters	  act	  in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  moral	  duty.	  I	  will	  argue,	  however,	  that	  the	  other	  accounts	  
are	   not	   true.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   begin	   by	   discussing	   the	   needs	   account	   of	  
exploitation.	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2.3	  The	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
	  
Proponents	  of	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  argue	  that	  exploitation	  is	  wrong	  
because	   exploiters	   neglect	   a	   moral	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need.	   Exploiters	  
typically	   interact	  with	   people	   in	   need,	   but	   instead	   of	   helping	   them,	   they	   take	  
advantage	  of	  their	  need	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  Different	  authors	  advancing	  this	  
view	  offer	   different	   justifications	   for	   the	   existence	  of	   a	   duty	   to	  help	  people	   in	  
need.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   two	  most	   prevalent	   justifications.	   The	  
first	  one	   is	  based	  on	  a	  Kantian	  duty	  of	  beneficence	   (section	  2.3.1),	   the	   second	  
one	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  dependency	  creates	  special	  obligations	  (section	  2.3.2).	  I	  will	  
argue	   that	   both	   these	   arguments	   are	  problematic,	   and	   that	   the	  needs	   account	  
cannot	  adequately	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation	  (section	  
2.3.3).	  	  
It	  should	  first	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  when	  talking	  about	  people	  in	  need,	  
the	  discussion	  is	  generally	  not	  about	  people	  who	  are	  nearby	  and	  whose	  life	  is	  in	  
imminent	   danger,	   such	   as	   the	   earlier	   example	   of	   a	   person	   coming	   across	  
someone	  who	  is	  drowning.	  That	  people	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  in	  such	  
a	   situation	   is	   relatively	  widely	   accepted,	   as	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   trying	   to	   exploit	  
someone	   in	   such	   a	   situation	   is	   morally	   wrong	   (say,	   by	   offering	   to	   rescue	  
someone	   who	   is	   drowning	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   she	   pays	   £10,000).	   Such	  
exploitation	   is	   generally	   not	   seen	   as	   consensual	   exploitation,	   but	   as	   a	   form	  of	  
coercive	  exploitation,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  type	  
of	   transaction	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   in	   this	   section,	   and	   in	   this	   thesis;	   and	   most	  
discussions	   about	   consensual	   exploitation	   do	   not	   focus	   on	   this	   type	   of	   case	  
either,	   but	   on	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   allegedly	   exploited	   person	   is	   either	  
physically	  far	  away	  from	  us,	  or	  has	  a	  need	  less	  serious	  than	  imminent	  danger	  of	  
death.	   (Potential)	   sweatshop	   employees,	   for	   example,	   are	   typically	   far	   away	  
from	   the	   company	   or	   person	   who	   is	   considering	   opening	   a	   factory	   in	   a	  
developing	  country.	  Their	  lives	  are	  also	  typically	  not	  in	  immediate	  danger,	  and	  
they	   frequently	   do	   have	   other	   options	   to	   stay	   alive,	   such	   as	   subsistence	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agriculture,	   day	   labour,	   or	   scavenging,51	   although	   these	   options	   are	   often	  
considered	  worse	   than	  working	   in	  a	   sweatshop.	  Proponents	  of	  what	   I	   call	   the	  
needs	   account	   of	   exploitation	   try	   to	   show	   how	   in	   such	   situations,	   where	  
someone’s	  life	  is	  not	  in	  immediate	  danger,	  or	  someone	  is	  not	  initially	  physically	  
nearby,	  alleged	  exploiters	  still	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  to	  meet	  people’s	  needs.	  	  
	  
2.3.1	  Duty	  of	  beneficence	  	  
One	  argument	  underlying	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  refers	  to	  a	  Kantian	  
duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need;	  a	  duty	  of	  beneficence.	  Kant	  argued	  that	  you	  have	  to	  
act	  so	  that	  ‘you	  use	  humanity,	  whether	  in	  your	  own	  person	  or	  in	  the	  person	  of	  
any	  other,	  always	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  an	  end,	  never	  merely	  as	  a	  means.’52	  This	  is	  
usually	   interpreted	   as	   giving	   rise	   to	   duties	   of	   non-­‐interference	   with	   other	  
people’s	  autonomy.	  If	  we	  coerce	  or	  deceive	  someone,	  we	  are	  using	  her	  will	  for	  
our	  own	  ends,	   instead	  of	   respecting	  her	  as	  an	  autonomous	  person.	  Yet	  on	   the	  
view	   discussed	   in	   this	   section,	   the	   requirement	   to	   treat	   others	   as	   ends	   in	  
themselves	  is	  seen	  as	  also	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  positive	  duty	  to	  enable	  others	  to	  act	  
autonomously.	   Humans	   have	   certain	   basic	   needs,	   such	   as	   food,	   drink,	   and	  
shelter,	  and	  if	  these	  needs	  are	  not	  met,	  it	  is	  argued,	  this	  will	  impede	  their	  ability	  
to	  truly	  act	  autonomously,	  and	  flourish	  as	  a	  human	  being.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  said,	  if	  
we	   fail	   to	  help	  others	   to	  meet	   their	  basic	  needs,	  we	   fail	   to	   adequately	   respect	  
them	  as	  persons.	  And	  this,	  proponents	  of	   the	  needs	  account	  argue,53	   is	  exactly	  
what	   exploiters	   do:	   they	   engage	   in	   a	   transaction	   with	   people	   who	   have	  
difficulties	   in	   meeting	   some	   basic	   need,	   but	   instead	   of	   helping	   them	   to	   meet	  
their	  needs,	  they	  take	  advantage	  of	  them.	  Think	  of	  some	  of	  the	  classic	  examples	  
of	   exploitation	   mentioned	   earlier:	   sweatshop	   factories,	   loan	   sharks,	   and	  
passersby	  who	  offer	  help	  to	  stranded	  people	   for	  a	  very	  high	  price.	   In	  all	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  R	  Mayer,	  ‘Sweatshops,	  Exploitation,	  and	  Moral	  Responsibility’	  (2007)	  38(4)	  Journal	  of	  Social	  
Philosophy	  605-­‐619,	  609.	  
52	  I	  Kant,	  Groundwork	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  (1785),	  translated	  by	  MJ	  Gregor	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1998)	  36.	  	  
53	  See	  e.g.	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  57;	  Siegel,	  op.cit.	  175-­‐205;	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  389-­‐405,	  
and	  JC	  Snyder	  ‘Exploitation	  and	  Sweatshop	  Labor:	  Perspectives	  and	  Issues’	  (2010)	  20(2)	  
Business	  Ethics	  Quarterly	  187-­‐213.	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situations,	  the	  exploitees	  are	  in	  need	  of	  help	  or	  money	  to	  meet	  some	  basic	  need,	  
and	  the	  exploiters	  take	  advantage	  of	  that	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  	  
	   ‘Basic	   needs’	   can,	   of	   course,	   be	   interpreted	   in	   different	   ways.	   I	   have	  
mentioned	   food,	   drink	   and	   shelter,	   but	   most	   authors	   use	   a	   broader	  
interpretation,	   such	   as	   ‘minimum	   welfare’;	   both	   biological	   and	   psychological	  
needs;54	   or	   ‘not	   only	   those	   objects	   necessary	   for	   physical	   survival,	   but	   also	  
conditions	  of	   purposeful	   employment,	   the	  prerequisites	   of	   psychological	  well-­‐
being,	   and	   constraints	   on	   interaction	   that	   are	   necessary	   for	   self-­‐respect.’55	  
Nevertheless,	  however	  ‘basic	  needs’	  is	  interpreted,	  the	  idea	  is	  the	  same:	  we	  have	  
a	   moral	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   who	   cannot	   meet	   their	   basic	   needs,	   and	   what	  
exploiters	  do	  wrong	  is	  taking	  advantage	  of	  such	  people	  instead	  of	  helping	  them.	  
	   	  	  
One	  question	  for	  this	  understanding	  of	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is:	  if	  we	  have	  a	  
moral	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need,	   why	   is	   this	   dependent	   on	   whether	   we	  
transact	  with	  someone?	  It	  seems	  that	  if	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need,	  to	  
whom	  we	  should	  direct	  our	  help	  is	  dependent	  on	  who	  cannot	  meet	  their	  basic	  
needs,	   and	   not	   on	   with	   whom	   we	   transact.	   Hence,	   we	   would	   have	   this	   duty	  
towards	   everyone	   who	   (we	   know)	   is	   in	   need.	   The	   needs-­‐based	   argument	  
therefore	   seems	   problematic	   in	   explaining	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation,	   because	  
while	  exploiters	  may	   indeed	   fail	   to	  meet	   the	  needs	  of	  people	  with	  whom	  they	  
transact,	   they	  may	   equally	   fail	   to	  meet	   the	   needs	   of	   all	   other	   people	   in	   need.	  
And,	  likewise,	  other	  affluent	  people	  who	  do	  not	  transact	  with	  someone	  in	  need	  
may	  be	  equally	  violating	  the	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need.	  Hence,	  a	  general	  duty	  
to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  seems	  unable	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  about	  exploitation	  
in	  particular.	  Rather	  than	  basing	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  on	  a	  general	  duty	  to	  
help	   people	   in	   need,	   authors	   advancing	   this	   view	   therefore	   generally	   try	   to	  
argue	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   special	   obligations	   towards	   people	   with	   whom	  we	  
interact.	  
One	  way	  of	  doing	  this	  is	  arguing,	  as	  Kant	  did,	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  
in	   need	   is	   an	   ‘imperfect	   duty’.	   Imperfect	   duties	   are	   not	   duties	   to	   perform	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  395.	  
55	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  74.	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certain	  act,	  but	  duties	  to	  adopt	  a	  certain	  maxim.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  
to	  adopt	  the	  general	  goal	  or	  rule	  to	  help	  others	  in	  need,	  but	  that	  we	  have	  some	  
leeway	  in	  deciding	  exactly	  when	  and	  how	  to	  accomplish	  this	  goal.	  Hence,	  we	  do	  
not	  have	  to	  sacrifice	  all	  of	  our	   interests	   in	  order	  to	  help	  everyone	  in	  need,	  but	  
we	  do	  need	   to	  adopt	   the	  general	  goal	  of	  helping	  others	   in	  need	  when	  we	  can.	  
This	   idea	   of	   an	   imperfect	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   is	   used	   to	   explain	   the	  wrong	   in	  
exploitation,	   because	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   although	   we	   have	   leeway	   in	   deciding	  
exactly	   how	   and	  when	   to	   use	   our	   resources	   to	   help	   others	   in	   need,	  when	  we	  
directly	   engage	   in	   a	   transaction	   with	   someone	   who	   is	   in	   need,	   we	   cannot	  
possibly	  refuse	   to	  help	  her	  and	  still	   claim	  that	  we	  have	  adopted	   the	  maxim	  to	  
help	  others	  in	  need.	  Ruth	  Sample,	  for	  instance,	  says:	  	  
	  
‘When	  I	  am	  considering	  interaction	  with	  a	  person	  that	  would	  benefit	  her	  
to	   some	   degree	   but	   nonetheless	   would	   ignore	   her	   basic	   needs,	   then	   I	  
must	   ask	   whether	   the	   maxim	   of	   my	   action	   would	   pass	   the	   test	   of	   the	  
categorical	   imperative.	  …	  No	  one	  could	  plausibly	  claim	  to	  have	  adopted	  
the	  maxim	  of	  beneficence	  if	  he	  interacted	  with	  vulnerable	  others	  on	  the	  
terms	   just	   described.	   Such	   interaction	   would	   call	   into	   question	   one’s	  
commitment	   to	   the	   principle	   for	   respect	   for	   persons	  more	   than	  would	  
simple	  noninteraction.’56	  	  
	  
The	  appeal	  to	  imperfect	  duties	  does	  appear	  to	  explain	  better	  what	  is	  specifically	  
wrong	   about	   exploitation	   than	   a	   general	   duty	   of	   beneficence.	   Yet	   it	   also	   gives	  
rise	  to	  a	  new	  question.	  If	  we	  are	  not	  required	  to	  always	  help	  people	  in	  need	  and	  
have	   some	   leeway	   in	   deciding	  who	   and	  when	   to	   help,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   justified	  
why	   we	   ought	   to	   do	   so	   when	   we	   engage	   in	   a	   commercial	   transaction	   with	  
someone.	   In	   other	   words:	   why	   the	   imperfect	   duty	   turns	   into	   a	   perfect	   duty.	  
Sample	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  because	  we	  cannot	  claim	  to	  have	  genuinely	  adopted	  
the	  maxim	  of	  helping	  people	   in	  need	   if	  we,	  when	  transacting	  with	  someone	   in	  
need,	  refuse	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	  so,	  she	  says,	  because	  even	  though	  we	  have	  leeway	  
in	   deciding	   who	   and	   when	   to	   help,	   failing	   to	   help	   someone	   with	   whom	   we	  
interact	   calls	   into	   question	   our	   commitment	   to	   helping	   others	   more	   than	  
choosing	   not	   to	   interact,	   and	   (apparently)	   than	   choosing	   not	   to	   help	   others	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  70-­‐72.	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whom	  we	   know	   are	   in	   need,	   but	   do	   not	   transact	   with.	   This	   argument	   is	   not	  
unproblematic,	   however.	   As	   said,	   if	   we	   indeed	   have	   a	   moral	   duty	   to	   strive	  
towards	   helping	   people	   in	   need,	   and	   indeed	   have	   some	   leeway	   in	   choosing	  
whom	  to	  help,	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  logically	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  wrong	  with,	  say,	  
choosing	   to	   help	   five	   people	   in	   a	   community	   to	   meet	   their	   basic	   needs,	   and	  
engage	  in	  a	  commercial	  transaction	  with	  a	  sixth	  person,	  while	  not	  helping	  her	  to	  
meet	  her	  needs.	  Sample	  responds	  to	  this	  objection	  that	  ‘flouting	  a	  requirement	  
seems	  worse	  than	  neglecting	  it’	  because	  ‘[i]t	  is	  easier	  to	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  value	  of	  
other	  valuable	  beings	  when	  we	  do	  not	  interact	  with	  them’.57	  Yet,	  as	  Wertheimer	  
rightly	  objects,	  ‘out	  of	  sight,	  out	  of	  mind’	  is	  not	  a	  moral	  argument:58	  the	  fact	  that	  
we	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   value	  of	   others	  when	  we	  neglect	   them	  
does	  not	   itself	   show	  that	   flouting	  a	   requirement	   is	  worse	   than	  neglecting	  one.	  
Trying	   to	   justify	   a	   perfect	   duty	   not	   to	   exploit	   with	   an	   imperfect	   duty	   of	  
beneficence	   can	   therefore	   lead	   to	   counterintuitive	   results,	   as	   Jeremy	   Snyder	  
points	  out:	  	  
	  
It	   runs	   contrary	   to	   the	   ordinary	   use	   of	   'exploitation'	   to	   think	   that,	  
because	   an	   employer	   makes	   an	   unrelated	   donation	   to	   a	   charity	   or	  
engages	   in	   other	   unrelated	   charitable	   acts,	   that	   she	  would	   be	   excused,	  
morally,	   for	   offering	   her	   employees	  wages	   insufficient	   to	   support	   their	  
distinctly	   human	   capacities.	   That	   is,	   these	   unrelated,	   beneficent	   acts	  
would	   seem	   to	   do	   little	   to	   assuage	   the	   intuition	   that	   the	   employer	   is	  
improperly	   using	   or	   taking	   advantage	   of	   these	   workers	   specifically,	  
especially	  if	  she	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  offer	  a	  higher	  wage.59	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   other	   problems	   with	   this	   version	   of	   the	   needs	   account	   of	  
exploitation.	   I	   will	   discuss	   these	   in	   section	   2.3.3.	   First,	   I	   will	   discuss	   another	  
justification	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  special	  obligations	  towards	  people	  with	  whom	  
we	   transact,	   and	   thus	   for	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation.	  This	   is	   the	  argument	   that	  
our	  obligation	  to	  help	  others	  is	  determined	  by	  other	  people’s	  dependency	  on	  us.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  68.	  
58	  Wertheimer,	  ‘Book	  Review	  Ruth	  J.	  Sample’,	  op.cit.	  260.	  	  
59	  JC	  Snyder,	  ‘Exploitation	  and	  Sweatshop	  Labor:	  Perspectives	  and	  Issues’	  (2010)	  20(2)	  Business	  
Ethics	  Quarterly	  187-­‐213,	  198.	  Snyder	  does	  follow	  Sample’s	  argument	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  
however.	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2.3.2	  Dependency	  	  
The	   idea	   that	   our	   obligation	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	   is	   contingent	   on	   their	  
dependency	   on	   us	   is	   sometimes	   combined	   with	   the	   Kantian	   notion	   of	   an	  
imperfect	  duty	  of	  beneficence,	  and	  sometimes	  not.	  	  
A	  prominent	  example	  of	   the	   latter	   is	  Robert	  Goodin’s	  argument	   that	  all	  
special	  obligations	  we	  have	  towards	  certain	  others	  flow	  from	  their	  dependency	  
on	   us,	   instead	   of	   from	   promises,	   contracts	   or	   other	   voluntary	   choices.60	   For	  
example,	   according	   to	   Goodin,	   the	   obligations	   parents	   have	   towards	   their	  
children	  do	  not	   follow	   (partly)	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   chose	   to	  have	   children,	  
but	   from	  the	   fact	   that	  children	  are	  particularly	  dependent	  on	  their	  parents	   for	  
meeting	  their	  needs.	  The	  dependency	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  obligations	  is,	  according	  
to	  Goodin,	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  special	  need	  of	  one	  party,	  and	  a	  special	  ability	  to	  
help	   of	   another	   party.61	   The	   ground	   of	   moral	   obligations	   towards	   particular	  
people	  in	  need	  is	  thus	  according	  to	  him	  being	  in	  a	  particularly	  good	  position	  to	  
help	   them.	   Goodin	   also	   emphasizes	   that	   dependency	   only	   occurs	   when	  
something	  is	  truly	  needed,	  and	  not	  merely	  desired.62	  He	  uses	  this	  general	  theory	  
of	   obligations	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   his	   theory	   of	   exploitation.	   Exploitees	   are	  
dependent	  on	  exploiters	  in	  the	  sense	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  exploitees	  have	  
some	  need,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  exploiters	  are	  in	  a	  particularly	  good	  position	  to	  
help	   them	   to	  meet	   this	   need.	   Exploiters	   therefore	  have	   a	   special	   obligation	   to	  
help	  the	  person	   in	  need	  who	  is	  dependent	  on	  them,	  yet	   they	  violate	  that	  duty,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  See	  R	  Goodin,	  Protecting	  the	  Vulnerable:	  A	  Reanalysis	  of	  our	  Social	  Responsibilities	  (University	  
of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1985)	  and	  R	  Goodin,	  ‘Exploiting	  a	  Situation	  and	  Exploiting	  a	  Person’	  in	  A	  Reeve	  
(ed),	  Modern	  Theories	  of	  Exploitation	  (Sage,	  1987)	  166-­‐200.	  
61	  Goodin,	  Protecting	  the	  Vulnerable,	  op.cit.	  34.	  Although	  Goodin’s	  work	  is	  called	  ‘Protecting	  the	  
Vulnerable’,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Goodin	  means	  something	  slightly	  different	  with	  
‘vulnerability’	  than	  the	  argument	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  People’s	  
vulnerability,	  on	  Goodin’s	  theory,	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  others	  can	  take	  advantage	  of	  
them	  (although	  that	  may	  also	  be	  the	  case),	  but	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  others	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  
them.	  I	  therefore	  eschew	  using	  the	  term	  ‘vulnerability’	  in	  describing	  Goodin’s	  theory,	  in	  order	  to	  
avoid	  confusion	  with	  the	  argument	  discussed	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter.	  Goodin	  uses	  the	  
terms	  ‘dependency’	  and	  ‘vulnerability’	  interchangeably,	  both	  meaning	  that	  a)	  a	  person	  has	  some	  
serious	  need,	  and	  b)	  another	  person	  is	  especially	  well	  placed	  to	  help	  her.	  Consequently,	  as	  
Sample	  notes	  (op.cit.	  37),	  the	  title	  of	  his	  book	  is	  misleading	  because,	  on	  his	  theory,	  we	  do	  not	  
merely	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  vulnerable,	  but	  also	  to	  provide	  for	  them	  insofar	  as	  they	  
are	  unable	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  needs.	  	  	  
62	  Goodin,	  ‘Exploiting	  a	  Situation	  and	  Exploiting	  a	  Person’,	  op.cit.	  199.	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instead	   ‘playing	   for	   advantage’.63	   The	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   therefore	  
according	   to	   Goodin	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	   who	   are	  
dependent	  on	  us	  for	  meeting	  their	  needs.	  	  
	   Jeremy	   Snyder,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   follows	   Sample	   in	   appealing	   to	   the	  
notion	  of	  an	  imperfect	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need,	  but	  combines	  this	  with	  the	  
idea	  that	  our	  obligations	  towards	  others	  are	  contingent	  on	  their	  dependency	  on	  
us.	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   imperfect	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	   as	   described	   by	  
Sample,	  should	  be	  limited	  by	  two	  factors.	  These	  are,	  first,	  what	  is	  possible	  while	  
still	  remaining	  competitive	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  employers,	  which	   is	  his	  main	   focus)	  
and	  while	  still	  earning	  enough	  to	   live	  a	   flourishing	   life	  oneself;	  and	  second,	  by	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  someone	  is	  dependent	  on	  another:	  	  
	  
The	   perfect	   form	   of	   the	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   relies,	   I	   am	   claiming,	   on	  
connections	   to	   particular	   others	   through	   our	   roles	   and	   relationships,	  
where	   a	   general	   disregard	   for	   the	   needs	   of	   humanity	   becomes	   a	  
disregard	  for	  the	  needs	  of	  particular	  others.	  …	  We	  can	  limit	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  an	  interaction	  must	  benefit	  another	  by	  certain	  measures	  of	  what	  it	  
is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  from	  the	  relationship.	  The	  first	  measure	  relevant	  
to	   determining	   reasonability,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   argue,	   is	   the	   prospective	  
dependence	  of	  person	  B	  on	  A	  for	  some	  need	  X.	  …	  This	  dependence	  will	  be	  
determined	   in	   large	   part	   by	   the	   kind	   and	   duration	   of	   the	   relationship	  
within	   its	   contextual	   setting.	   For	   example,	   Carl	  might	  provide	   for	   all	   of	  
Diana’s	  material	   needs	   through	   the	   relationship	   (e.g.	   Carl	   is	   a	   full-­‐time	  
employer	   where	   the	   state	   provides	   no	   support),	   share	   provision	   with	  
others	  (e.g.	  Carl	  is	  a	  part-­‐time	  employer),	  or	  provide	  no	  direct	  provision	  
(e.g.	  Carl	   is	  an	  employer	  where	   the	  state	  meets	  all	  basic	  needs	   through	  
corporate	  taxes).64	  
	  
I	   will	   not	   go	   into	   issues	   to	   do	   with	   the	   general	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   mentioned	  
dependency	   theories,	   such	  as	  whether,	   as	  Goodin	   says,	   all	   our	  obligations	   can	  
really	   be	   based	   on	   dependency,65	   or	   why	   exactly,	   on	   Snyder’s	   theory,	  
dependency	   is	  morally	  relevant.	   Instead,	   I	  want	   to	  argue	  that	  even	   if	  we	  grant	  
that	   dependencies	   create	   special	   obligations	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	   who	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Goodin,	  ‘Exploiting	  a	  Situation	  and	  Exploiting	  a	  Person’,	  op.cit.	  184.	  
64	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  396-­‐397.	  	  
65	  But	  for	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  and	  criticism	  see	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  2.	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dependent	  on	  us,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  number	  of	  other	  problems	  with	  explaining	  the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation	  with	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need.	  
	  
2.3.3	  Problems	  with	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  discuss	  some	  problems	  that	  I	  think	  affect	  both	  versions	  of	  
the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation	   (the	   first	   based	   on	   a	   Kantian	   duty	   of	  
beneficence,	  the	  second	  on	  dependency).	  I	  will	  argue	  that,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  this	  
account	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation.	  	  
	   The	  first	  potential	  problem	  is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  
people	   to	  meet	   their	  basic	  needs,	   this	  does	  not	  exclude	   the	  possibility	   that	  we	  
exploit	  someone	  while	  also	  helping	  her	  to	  meet	  her	  basic	  needs.	  For	  example,	  if	  
a	  man	  is	  in	  desperate	  need	  of	  an	  income,	  and	  an	  employer	  offers	  him	  a	  job	  with	  
extremely	  long	  working	  hours	  and	  a	  very	  low	  wage,	  this	  employer	  may	  still	  be	  
helping	  him	  just	  enough	  to	  meet	  his	  basic	  needs.	  Yet	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  classic	  
instance	  of	  exploitation.	  Likewise,	  if	  a	  student	  is	  in	  need	  of	  accommodation,	  and	  
a	   landlord	   offers	   her	   a	   very	   small	   room	   for	   a	   very	   high	   rent,	   he	   may	   be	  
exploiting	  her	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  meeting	  her	  need	  for	  accommodation.66	  
	   Second,	   on	   the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation	   people	   can	   only	   be	  
exploited	  when	   they	   lack	   a	  basic	  need,	   because	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	  
failure	   to	  meet	   someone’s	  needs.	  As	  Ruth	  Sample	   says:	   ‘A	  person	  whose	  basic	  
needs	   are	  met,	   and	  who	  nonetheless	   chooses	   to	   transact	   in	   a	  way	   that	  would	  
violate	  a	  putative	  restriction	  on	  exchange,	  is	  not	  exploited.’67	  I	  believe,	  however,	  
that	   people	   can	   also	   be	   exploited	   even	   when	   their	   basic	   needs	   are	   met.	   For	  
example,	  in	  one	  of	  the	  examples	  mentioned	  earlier,	  in	  which	  a	  passerby	  offers	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  this	  depends	  on	  how	  one	  defines	  ‘needs’.	  For	  instance,	  instead	  of	  
saying	  that	  the	  man	  has	  a	  basic	  need	  for	  income	  or	  employment,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  he	  has	  a	  basic	  
need	  for	  employment	  that	  offers	  reasonable	  working	  hours	  and	  income.	  And	  instead	  of	  saying	  
that	  the	  student	  has	  a	  basic	  need	  for	  accommodation,	  we	  could	  say	  that	  she	  has	  a	  basic	  need	  for	  
reasonably	  priced	  accommodation.	  However,	  this	  reply	  ultimately	  defines	  ‘basic	  needs’	  as	  
whatever	  one	  considers	  non-­‐exploitative:	  what	  we	  would	  actually	  be	  saying	  is	  that	  the	  man	  has	  
a	  basic	  need	  for	  non-­‐exploitative	  employment,	  and	  the	  student	  has	  a	  basic	  need	  for	  non-­‐
exploitative	  accommodation.	  This	  would	  make	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  
exploitation	  circular,	  because	  one	  would	  be	  defining	  exploitation	  as	  taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  basic	  
need,	  while	  defining	  basic	  needs	  in	  terms	  of	  not	  being	  exploited.	  
67	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  83.	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give	  a	  stranded	  person	  a	  lift	   for	  £1,000,	  the	  stranded	  person	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
lacking	  in	  her	  basic	  needs.	  She	  may	  have	  sufficient	  income,	  food,	  and	  drink;	  she	  
may	  be	  very	  able	  to	  afford	  paying	  the	  £1,000;	  and	  we	  could	  assume	  that	  if	  she	  
refuses	  the	  offer	  she	  will	  not	  suffer	  serious	  harm,	  but	  merely	  need	  to	  walk	  for	  
many	   hours.	   In	   my	   view,	   however,	   that	   would	   not	   change	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
passerby	   making	   the	   offer	   is	   trying	   to	   exploit	   her.	   I	   think	   that	   most	   people	  
would	  agree,	   and	   that	   the	   common	  use	  of	   the	   term	  exploitation	   includes	   such	  
transactions.	  Hence,	   it	  appears	   that	  people	  cannot	  merely	  exploit	  others’	  basic	  
needs,	   but	   also	   their	   less	   urgent	   needs	   or	   desires,	   however	   the	   distinction	  
between	  basic	  needs,	  non-­‐basic	  needs,	  and	  desires	  is	  made.68	  	  
Proponents	  of	   the	  needs	  account	  could	  reply	   that	   the	  above	  example	   is	  
not	  exploitative.	  They	  could	  say	  that	   if	  people	   intuitively	  or	  commonly	  do	   find	  
such	  a	  transaction	  exploitative,	  their	  intuitions	  or	  the	  common	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
exploitation	   is	  simply	  mistaken.	  They	  could	   insist	   that	  we	  can	  only	  wrongfully	  
exploit	  people’s	  needs,	  and	  cannot	  explain	  why	  transactions	   in	  which	  no	  basic	  
needs	  are	  being	  neglected	  are	  wrong.	  I	  disagree,	  and	  think	  that	  the	  common	  use	  
of	  the	  term	  exploitation	  is	  right,	  and	  that	  we	  can	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  in	  this	  
type	  of	   transactions,	  as	   I	  will	  show	  in	  chapter	  4.	   It	   therefore	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  
limiting	  which	   types	  of	   transactions	  can	  rightfully	  be	  called	  exploitative	   in	   the	  
way	  the	  needs	  account	  does,	  unnecessarily	  leads	  to	  a	  counterintuitive	  theory	  of	  
exploitation.	  	  
	   A	  third	  problem	  with	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  
counterintuitive	  results	  about	  what	  it	  does	  see	  as	  exploitative	  transactions.	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  It	  might	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  we	  can	  exploit	  not	  merely	  people’s	  needs,	  desires,	  or	  unfortunate	  
circumstances,	  but	  also,	  amongst	  others,	  their	  generosity	  or	  sense	  of	  moral	  duty.	  For	  example,	  
Tea	  Logar	  describes	  the	  following	  situation:	  ‘John’s	  uncle	  has	  promised	  his	  sister—John’s	  
mother—on	  her	  deathbed	  to	  make	  sure	  John	  never	  ends	  up	  on	  the	  street.	  John	  has	  now	  
graduated	  from	  college,	  but	  does	  not	  have	  a	  job	  or	  a	  place	  to	  stay.	  His	  uncle	  offers	  for	  John	  to	  
move	  in	  with	  him.	  John	  accepts	  the	  offer,	  and	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  looking	  for	  a	  job	  any	  longer.	  
Despite	  feeling	  used,	  John’s	  uncle	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  his	  moral	  duty	  to	  keep	  his	  promise,	  as	  well	  as	  
to	  make	  sure	  none	  of	  his	  relatives	  end	  up	  on	  the	  street;	  he	  therefore	  keeps	  financially	  
supporting	  John.’	  (T	  Logar,	  ‘Exploitation	  as	  Wrongful	  Use:	  Beyond	  Taking	  Advantage	  of	  
Vulnerabilities’	  (2010)	  25	  Acta	  Analytica	  329-­‐346,	  341.)	  In	  this	  example,	  John’s	  uncle	  is	  not	  
lacking	  any	  basic	  needs,	  and	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  John	  is	  violating	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  someone	  in	  need.	  
What	  John	  is	  exploiting	  is	  his	  uncle’s	  sense	  of	  duty,	  not	  his	  uncle’s	  needs.	  However,	  exploiting	  
someone’s	  sense	  of	  duty	  or	  generosity	  typically	  happens	  in	  exploitation	  in	  personal	  interactions	  
instead	  of	  in	  commercial	  transactions,	  which	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	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is	   because	   intuitively,	   it	   seems	   possible	   to	   engage	   in	   non-­‐exploitative	  
transactions	   with	   someone	   in	   need	   without	   meeting	   her	   needs.	   Suppose,	   for	  
example,	  that	  a	  wealthy	  tourist	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  buys	  a	  drink	  from	  a	  very	  
poor	  orphan	  who	  sells	  drinks	  for	  a	  living.	  The	  child	  asks	  $1	  for	  a	  drink,	  but	  the	  
tourist	  feels	  sorry	  for	  the	  child	  and	  decides	  to	  give	  her	  $100	  instead	  to	  help	  her	  
a	  little.	  Would	  this	  transaction,	  on	  the	  needs	  account,	  still	  be	  exploitative	  if	  the	  
child	   needs	   more	   than	   $100	   to	   cover	   her	   basic	   needs?	   I	   doubt	   that	   even	  
proponents	   of	   the	   needs	   account	   would	   want	   to	   say	   so.	   Yet	   if	   what	   makes	   a	  
transaction	   exploitative	   is	   the	   neglect	   of	   a	   duty	   to	   help	   others	   to	   satisfy	   their	  
basic	  needs,	   it	  seems	  to	   follow	  that	  the	  extent	  of	   this	  duty	  depends	  on	  what	   is	  
necessary	  to	  help	  others,	  and	  not	  on	  something	  as	  ‘arbitrary’	  as	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
goods	  transacted.	  This	  objection	  applies	  as	  well	  to	  Goodin’s	  view,	  according	  to	  
which	  our	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  is	  contingent	  on	  their	  dependency	  on	  us	  
for	   meeting	   their	   needs.	   If,	   for	   example,	   the	   orphan	   has	   no	   other	   source	   of	  
income	   or	   support,	   and	   hardly	   any	   customers,	   she	   clearly	   is	   to	   a	   large	   extent	  
dependent	  on	  the	  tourist	  to	  meet	  her	  needs.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  counterintuitive	  to	  say	  
that	  the	  tourist	  is	  exploiting	  the	  child.	  
	   On	   Snyders’	   version	   of	   the	   needs	   account,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   my	  
objection	  seems	  not	  to	  hold.	  As	  described	  above,	  Snyder	  argues	  that	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  we	  ought	  to	  help	  another	  to	  meet	  her	  needs	  is	   limited	  by	  the	  level	  of	  
her	  dependence	  on	  us,	  such	  as	  whether	  a	  transaction	  is	  a	  one-­‐off	  transaction,	  a	  
part-­‐time	   employment,	   or	   a	   full-­‐time	   employment;	   in	   addition	   to	  whether	  we	  
can	  reasonably	  help	  another	  without	  harming	  our	  own	  flourishing	  or	  becoming	  
uncompetitive.	   Thus	  on	   Snyder’s	   theory,	   the	   tourist	  would	  not	   have	   a	   duty	   to	  
meet	  all	   the	  child’s	  basic	  needs,	  because	  they	  are	  merely	  engaging	   in	  a	  one-­‐off	  
transaction.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   think	   the	   objection	   may	   be	   applied	   to	   Snyder’s	  
theory	  as	  well.	  	  	  
	   To	  illustrate	  this,	  imagine	  a	  hotel	  owner,	  person	  A,	  with	  many	  employees.	  
One	   of	   those	   employees	   is	   a	   part-­‐time	   worker,	   B,	   whose	   job	   is	   to	   clean	   the	  
swimming	  pool,	  for	  which	  she	  has	  a	  contract	  of	  10	  hours	  per	  week.	  This	  is	  not	  
enough	  for	  B	  to	  meet	  her	  basic	  needs,	  but	  she	  cannot	  get	  a	   job	  anywhere	  else,	  
and	  A	   cannot	   give	   her	  more	   hours	   or	   another	   job	  without	  making	   one	   of	   the	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other	   employees	   redundant.	   A	   feels	   sorry	   for	   B,	   however,	   and	   pays	   her	   very	  
generously,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  20	  hours	  of	  work,	  although	  this	  is	  still	  not	  enough	  
to	  meet	  all	  of	  B’s	  basic	  needs.	  The	  hotel	  owner	  in	  this	  example	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  
be	  exploiting	  B.	  Yet	  she	  may	  meet	  all	  of	  Snyder’s	  criteria:	  First,	  we	  could	  assume	  
that	   the	  hotel	  owner	   is	  making	  enough	  money	   to	  be	  able	   to	  pay	   the	  employee	  
more	   without	   making	   a	   loss,	   or	   without	   harming	   her	   own	   flourishing,	   in	   the	  
same	  way	  as	   that	   she	  could	  give	  an	  amount	   to	  a	   charity	  every	  month	  without	  
making	  a	  loss.	  And	  second,	  the	  employee	  is	  fully	  dependent	  on	  the	  hotel	  owner	  
for	  meeting	  her	  needs	  even	   though	  she	  only	  has	  a	  part-­‐time	  contract,	  because	  
she	  has	  no	  other	  possible	  source	  of	  income.	  
	   	  This	   example	   and	   the	   earlier	   example	   above	   show	   two	   things.	   First,	  
whether	  someone	  is	  dependent	  on	  us	  to	  meet	  her	  needs	  does	  not	  only	  depend	  
on	   the	   duration	   or	   intensity	   of	   our	   transaction—on	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   one-­‐off	  
transaction,	  a	  part-­‐time	  employment,	  or	  a	  full-­‐time	  employment—but	  depends	  
to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  what	  her	  other	  options	  are.	  Someone	  may	  transact	  with	  us	  
only	  once,	  but	  still	  be	  completely	  dependent	  on	  our	  help	   to	  meet	  her	  needs,	   if	  
she	  has	  absolutely	  no	  other	  options.	  	  
Second,	   the	   above	   examples	   illustrate	   that	   the	   requirements	   of	   others’	  
needs	  or	  dependency	  are	  unrelated	  to	  the	  ‘size’	  of	  the	  transaction.	  If	  we	  have	  a	  
moral	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  in	  meeting	  their	  basic	  needs,	  or	  to	  help	  those	  who	  are	  
dependent	   on	   us	   to	   meet	   their	   needs,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   extent	   of	   this	   duty	  
depends	  on	  what	  is	  necessary	  to	  help	  others,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  
or	   services	   transacted,	   or	   the	   duration	   of	   our	   contract	   with	   them.	   In	   other	  
words:	  it	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  transaction	  we	  engage	  in.	  
Yet	   when	   criticizing	   a	   transaction	   as	   exploitative,	   we	   do	   want	   to	   criticize	  
something	  about	  that	  particular	  transaction.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  using	  a	  duty	  to	  
help	  people	  in	  need	  as	  the	  explanation	  for	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  can	  
lead	  to	  counterintuitive	  results,	  such	  as	  the	  claim	  that	  a	  tourist	  who	  gives	  $100	  
to	  a	  child	  for	  a	  drink	  is	  exploiting	  her.	  I	  am	  not	  denying	  that	  we	  may	  indeed	  have	  
a	  moral	  duty	  to	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  people	  in	  need.	  We	  may	  even	  want	  to	  say	  that	  
the	  tourist	  in	  the	  above	  example	  ought	  to	  give	  more	  than	  $100	  so	  the	  child	  can	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meet	  her	  basic	  needs.	  Yet	  we	  cannot	  rightly	  say	  that	  the	  tourist	  is	  exploiting	  the	  
child	  in	  that	  transaction.	  	  
	   To	  avoid	  misunderstanding,	   I	  want	   to	  emphasize	  which	  argument	   I	   am	  
not	  making.	  A	  common	  objection	  to	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  that	  the	  
duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  is	  a	  duty	  shared	  by	  all	  affluent	  members	  of	  societies,	  
and	  that	  we	  should	  not	  hold	  people	  who	  engage	  in	  transactions	  with	  people	  in	  
need	   disproportionately	   responsible	   for	   what	   is	   a	   shared	   responsibility	   of	  
society	   as	   a	   whole,	   or	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   society	   as	   a	   whole	   does	   not	  meet	   the	  
demands	  of	  a	  shared	  duty.	  My	  argument	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  this	  objection,	  and	  
a	  valid	  reply	  to	  this	  objection	  might	  be	  that	  even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  duties	  to	  help	  
others	  in	  needs	  are	  shared	  by	  many	  people,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  discharge	  
individuals	  of	  the	  duty.	  	  
Some	  writers69	  argue	  that	  if	  other	  people	  in	  society	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  
the	  demands	   of	   a	   certain	  duty	   of	   beneficence,	   every	  member	   of	   society	   is	   left	  
with	   an	   individual	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   of	   the	   level	   that	   they	   would	   need	   to	  
contribute	  if	  everyone	  was	  complying.	  Thus,	  imagine	  a	  group	  of	  eleven	  people,	  
ten	   of	   whom	   are	   equally	   affluent,	   and	   one	   of	   them,	   person	   B,	   who	   is	   much	  
poorer	   and	   in	   serious	   need.	   In	   order	   to	   sufficiently	   help	   person	   B,	   the	   ten	  
affluent	  people	   all	   need	   to	   contribute	  £100,	   giving	  B	   £1,000	   in	   total.	   Suppose,	  
however,	   that	   five	   people	   refuse	   to	   contribute	   the	   £100.	   According	   to	   the	  
writers	  discussed	  here,	  the	  remaining	  five	  people	  would	  still	  be	  under	  a	  moral	  
obligation	  to	  each	  contribute	  ‘their’	  £100.	  The	  fact	  that	  some	  people	  fail	  to	  take	  
up	  their	  part	  in	  a	  shared	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  does	  not	  make	  it	  acceptable	  
for	  others	  to	  do	  so	  as	  well,	  they	  argue.	  Yet	  it	  also	  does	  not	  increase	  the	  amount	  
that	  the	  remaining	  people	  morally	  ought	  to	  contribute,	  because	  asking	  them	  to	  
also	  pay	  for	  others’	  share	  would	  be	  unfair.	  	  
Other	  writers,	  in	  contrast,	  argue	  that	  if	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  other	  people	  in	  
society	  are	  not	  doing	  their	  part	  in	  a	  shared	  obligation	  to	  help	  others,	  the	  moral	  
burden	  on	  everyone	  else	  who	  has	  the	  power	  to	  help	  becomes	  larger,	  because	  if	  
we	   are	   able	   to	   help	   people	   to	   meet	   their	   needs	   without	   thereby	   sacrificing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  See	  e.g.	  KA	  Appiah,	  Cosmopolitanism	  (Norton,	  2006);	  LB	  Murphy,	  Moral	  Demands	  in	  Nonideal	  
Theory	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	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something	   of	   equal	   importance	   to	   us,	   we	   ought	   to	   help	   them	   as	   much	   as	   is	  
necessary.70	  Thus,	   in	  the	  above	  example,	  these	  writers	  would	  argue	  that	   if	   five	  
people	  refuse	  to	  contribute	  their	  £100,	  the	  remaining	  five	  people	  ought,	  morally,	  
to	  pay	  £200	  each	  instead	  of	  £100,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  person	  B	  with	  her	  needed	  
£1,000.	   And	   if	   nine	   people	   refuse	   to	   pay	   their	   £100,	   the	   tenth	   person	   will,	  
morally,	  have	  to	  pay	  the	  needed	  £1,000	  all	  by	  herself.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  while	  the	  
fact	  that	  other	  people	  fail	  to	  pay	  their	  share	  is	  bad,	  and	  while	  it	  may	  be	  unfair	  for	  
us	   if	  we	  have	   to	   contribute	  more,	   this	  does	  not	   change	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  are	  
people	   in	   serious	   need,	   and	   this	   fact	   is	   more	   important	   than	   whether	   we	  
contribute	  our	  fair	  share.	  
I	  sympathize	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  even	  if	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  in	  need	  
is	  a	  shared	  duty,	  and	  even	   if	   society	  as	  a	  whole	   is	  not	  adequately	   fulfilling	   the	  
duty,	   this	   does	   not	   discharge	   individuals	   from	   the	   duty.	   My	   argument	   is	  
therefore	  not	  based	  on	   the	  objection	   that	   the	  duty	   to	  help	  people	   in	  need	   is	  a	  
shared	  duty.	  My	  point	  is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  admit	  that	  we	  have	  an	  individual	  duty	  to	  
help	  people	  in	  need,	  this	  duty	  is	  unrelated	  to	  whether	  we	  want	  to	  call	  a	  specific	  
transaction	  exploitative.	  It	  seems	  that	   if	  we	  give	  $100	  to	  a	  child	  for	  a	  drink,	  or	  
generously	   pay	   a	   20-­‐hours	   salary	   to	   an	   employee	   who	   only	   works	   10	   hours,	  
these	  are	  not	   exploitative	   transactions,	   even	   though	  we	  may	  also,	   at	   the	   same	  
time,	   have	   an	   individual	   obligation	   to	   contribute	   to	   meeting	   those	   people’s	  
needs.	  	  
	  
To	  conclude,	  while	  we	  may	  have	  a	  shared	  duty	  to	  help	  people	   in	  need,	  or	  may	  
even	  have	  an	  individual	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need,	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  this	  
section	  that	  what	  such	  a	  duty	  would	  demand	  from	  us	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  we	  can	  help	  others	  to	  meet	  their	  needs,	  and	  not	  on	  whether	  and	  what	  we	  
transact	  with	  them.	  Therefore,	  I	  have	  argued,	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitative	   transactions,	  and	  
we	   can	  engage	   in	   exploitative	   transactions	  with	  people	   in	  need	  while	  meeting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  See	  e.g.	  RJ	  Arneson,	  ‘Moral	  Limits	  on	  the	  Demands	  of	  Beneficence?’	  in	  DK	  Chatterjee	  (ed),	  The	  
Ethics	  of	  Assistance:	  Morality	  and	  the	  Distant	  Needy	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  33-­‐58,	  
35-­‐39;	  and	  P	  Singer,	  The	  Life	  You	  Can	  Save:	  Acting	  Now	  to	  End	  World	  Poverty	  (Random	  House,	  
2009).	  	  
	   58	  
their	  needs;	  engage	  in	  exploitative	  transactions	  with	  people	  who	  do	  not	  lack	  any	  
basic	   needs;	   and	   engage	   in	   non-­‐exploitative	   transactions	  with	   people	  who	   do	  
lack	  basic	  needs,	  without	  meeting	  those	  needs.	  
Nevertheless,	   I	   do	   share	   an	   intuition	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   needs	  
account	   of	   exploitation,	   which	   is	   that	   exploiting	   someone	   is	   worse	   when	   she	  
cannot	  meet	  her	  basic	  needs.	  I	  will	  explain	  this	  in	  chapter	  4,	   in	  which	  I	  set	  out	  
my	  own	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  There,	  I	  will	  
also	  show	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  imperfect	  duties	  that	  I	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  bears	  
some	  resemblance	  to	  my	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  however,	  I	  
will	  discuss	  another	  understanding	  of	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation,	  the	  last	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  which	  I	  call	  the	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  
	  
2.4	  The	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
	  
Proponents	   of	   the	   injustice	   account	   of	   exploitation	   argue	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	  
consensual	  exploitative	  transactions	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  injustice.	  The	  simple	  version	  
of	  this	  argument	  is	  as	  follows.	  The	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  opportunities,	  
or	  means	  of	  production	   that	  exists	   in	  many	  societies	   is	  unjust.	  This	  difference	  
enables	  people	  who	  are	  better	  off	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  people	  who	  are	  less	  well	  
off,	  by	  extracting	  large	  profits	  from	  them.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  classical	  examples	  
of	   exploitation,	   such	   as	   the	   practices	   of	   sweatshop	   factories	   and	   loan	   sharks.	  
Since	   the	   difference	   in	   wealth	   that	   enables	   such	   exploitation	   is	   unjust,	   the	  
exploitation	  is	  unjust	  as	  well.	  	  
	   Although	   this	   idea	   may	   adequately	   describe	   the	   general	   working	   of	  
economic	  systems,	  or	  how	  societal	  injustices	  enable	  exploitation,	  it	  seems	  unfit	  
to	  explain	  what	  makes	   individual	  exploitative	   transactions	  wrong.	  Distributive	  
justice	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  a	  macro-­‐principle,	  and	  a	  responsibility	  of	  society	  as	  a	  
whole.	   The	   argument	   that	   individual	   transactions	   are	   wrong	   because	   of	   a	  
societal	   injustice	   is	   therefore	   criticized	   for	   making	   particular	   individuals	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responsible	   for	   something	   that	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   societal	   responsibility.71	  
Consequently,	   as	   mentioned	   before,	   many	   agree	   that	   we	   should	   distinguish	  
between	   the	   injustice	  of	   the	  background	  circumstances	   in	  which	  a	   transaction	  
takes	  place,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  transaction	  itself	  is	  unjust	  or	  exploitative.	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   there	   are	   some	   less	   simple	   versions	   of	   the	   injustice	  
argument	   that	   aim	   to	   explain	   how	   individual	   exploitative	   transactions	   are	  
wrong	   because	   of	   injustice.	   I	   will	   discuss	   two	   related	   but	   slightly	   different	  
arguments.	   The	   first	   says	   that	   principles	   of	   justice	   should	   also	   be	   applied	   to	  
private	  transactions,	  and	  that	  exploitation	  is	  wrong	  because	  exploiters	  fail	  to	  do	  
so.	   The	   second	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	   exploiters	   take	  
advantage	  of	   prior	   rights	   violations	   or	   injustices.	   In	   sections	  2.4.1	   and	  2.4.2,	   I	  
will	   discuss,	   respectively,	   the	   first	   argument,	   and	   why	   the	   first	   argument	   is	  
problematic.	  In	  sections	  2.4.3	  and	  2.4.4,	  I	  discuss	  the	  second	  argument	  and	  why	  
I	  think	  this	  argument	  does	  not	  work	  either,	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  injustice	  account	  
of	  exploitation	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation.	  
	  
2.4.1	  Distributive	  justice	  in	  private	  transactions	  
The	  first	  argument	  I	  will	  discuss	  says	  that	  advancing	  distributive	   justice	   is	  not	  
only	   a	   task	   for	   society	   as	   a	  whole,	   to	   be	   carried	   out	  with	   institutions	   such	   as	  
redistributive	  taxation,	  but	  also	  something	  that	  individuals	  should	  implement	  in	  
their	  private	  transactions.	   If	   this	   is	  true,	   it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  what	  exploiters	  
do	   wrong	   is	   violating	   the	   requirements	   of	   distributive	   justice	   in	   their	  
transactions	  with	  disadvantaged	  people.	  	  
	   Gerald	   Cohen	   is	   possibly	   the	   best-­‐known	   proponent	   of	   this	   view	   of	  
distributive	   justice.	  He	   criticizes	   John	  Rawls’	   distinction	   between	   the	   coercive	  
‘basic	   structure’	   of	   societies,	   and	   the	   private	   economic	   life	   of	   individuals,	   and	  
criticizes	  Rawls’	  contention	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice,	   including	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  See	  e.g.	  B	  Powell	  and	  M	  Zwolinski,	  ‘The	  Ethical	  and	  Economic	  Case	  Against	  Sweatshop	  Labor:	  
A	  Critical	  Assessment’	  (2011)	  107(4)	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Ethics	  449-­‐472,	  467-­‐468;	  and	  
Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  216.	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the	  difference	  principle,72	  apply	  to	  the	  basic	  structure	  only.	  Cohen	  objects	  that	  
there	   is	   an	   inconsistency	   in	   this	   view:	   if	   people	   truly	   want	   to	   choose	   a	   just	  
society,	  they	  will	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  justice	  criteria	  to	  the	  
basic	   structure,	   as	   Rawls	   does,	   because	   societies	   will	   be	   more	   just	   when	  
individuals	   also	   apply	   those	   criteria	   in	   their	   private	   choices.	   Cohen	   therefore	  
argues	   that	   ‘justice	  cannot	  be	  a	  matter	  only	  of	   the	  state-­‐legislated	  structure	   in	  
which	   people	   act	   but	   is	   also	   a	   matter	   of	   the	   acts	   they	   choose	   within	   that	  
structure,	  the	  personal	  choices	  within	  their	  daily	  lives.’73	  A	  just	  society,	  he	  says,	  
requires	  not	  merely	   just	   rules,	  but	  also	   that	   its	  members	  possess	  an	   ‘ethos’	  of	  
justice	   that	   informs	   their	  choices.	   ‘In	   the	  absence	  of	   such	  an	  ethos,’	  he	  argues,	  
‘inequalities	  will	  obtain	  that	  are	  not	  necessary	  to	  enhance	  the	  condition	  of	   the	  
worst	  off:	   the	  required	  ethos	  promotes	  a	  distribution	  more	   just	   than	  what	   the	  
rules	  of	  the	  economic	  game	  by	  themselves	  can	  secure.’74	  
Hence,	   Cohen	   holds	   that	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   a	   society’s	   basic	  
structure	   is	   just,	   individuals	   should	   also	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	   distributive	  
justice	   in	   their	   individual	   economic	   choices.	   What	   are	   the	   principles	   of	  
distributive	   justice?	   Cohen	   says	   that	   injustice	   in	   distribution	   exists	   if	   an	  
inequality	  of	  goods	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  people’s	  preferences	  and	  
choices	  with	  respect	  to	  income	  and	  leisure,	  or	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  arduousness	  of	  
people’s	   labours,	   but	   the	   result	   of	   differences	   in	   lucky	   and	   unlucky	  
circumstances.75	   He	   also	   says	   that	   the	   difference	   principle—differences	   in	  
wealth	   should	   benefit	   the	   least	   well-­‐off—ought	   to	   be	   adopted	   in	   individual	  
economic	  decisions:	   ‘In	   such	  a	   society	   [a	   just	   society],	   the	  difference	  principle	  
affects	  the	  motivation	  of	  citizens	  in	  economic	  life.	  It	  controls	  their	  expectations	  
about	   remuneration,	   that	   is,	   what	   they	   will	   regard	   as	   acceptable	   pay	   for	   the	  
posts	   they	  are	   invited	  to	   fill.	  …	  [I]n	  a	  society	  of	  whole-­‐hearted	  commitment	   to	  
the	   principle,	   there	   cannot	   be	   so	   stark	   a	   contrast	   between	   public	   and	   private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  ‘Social	  and	  economic	  inequalities	  …	  are	  to	  be	  to	  the	  greatest	  benefit	  of	  the	  least	  advantaged	  
members	  of	  society.’	  J	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1993)	  6.	  	  
73	  GA	  Cohen,	  If	  You’re	  an	  Egalitarian,	  How	  Come	  You’re	  So	  Rich?	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2001)	  
122.	  
74	  Cohen,	  op.cit.	  128.	  
75	  Cohen,	  op.cit.	  130.	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choice.	   Instead,	   citizens	   want	   their	   own	   economic	   behavior	   to	   satisfy	   the	  
principle’.76	  	  
This	  requirement	  is	  limited,	  Cohen	  notes,	  by	  a	  ‘personal	  prerogative’	  that	  
people	  have	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  aims	  and	  projects,	  because	  people	  do	  have	  the	  
right	  to	  lead	  their	  own	  lives	  and	  be	  something	  other	  than	  an	  ‘engine’	  for	  other	  
people’s	  welfare.77	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   they	   can	   ignore	   the	   principles	   of	  
justice	   in	   their	   everyday	   lives,	   but	   means	   that	   they	   have	   to	   strike	   a	   balance	  
between	  the	  claims	  of	  justice	  and	  their	  own	  legitimate	  concerns.78	  	  
Cohen	   is	   not	   alone	   in	   the	   idea	   that	   principles	   of	   distributive	   justice	  
should	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  individuals’	  private	  economic	  choices.79	  And	  this	  idea	  
may	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitative	  transactions.	  Consider	  
the	   example	   of	   sweatshop	   work.	   The	   difference	   in	   wealth	   between	   Western	  
owners	   of	   sweatshop	   factories	   and	   the	   people	   working	   in	   their	   factories	   is	  
probably	  at	  least	  partly	  the	  result	  of	  global	  distributive	  injustices.	  According	  to	  
Cohen’s	   theory,	   the	   sweatshop	   owners	   thus	   have	   to	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	  
justice	  when	  they	  form	  contracts	  with	  their	  employees,	   instead	  of	  ignoring	  the	  
employees’	   unjust	   disadvantage	   and	   offering	   them	   very	   little	   pay	   for	   long	  
working	   hours.	   However,	   I	  will	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   some	   problems	  with	   the	  
claim	   that	   principles	   of	   distributive	   justice	   should	   be	   applied	   to	   private	  
transactions,	   and	   even	   more	   problems	   with	   using	   this	   claim	   to	   explain	   why	  
exploitation	  is	  wrong.	  	  
	  
2.4.2	  Problems	  with	  distributive	  justice	  in	  private	  transactions	  
A	   first	   difficulty	   with	   the	   idea	   of	   applying	   the	   principles	   of	   justice	   in	   one’s	  
private	   transactions	   is	   that	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   what	   this	   involves.	   As	   mentioned	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  GA	  Cohen,	  Rescuing	  Justice	  and	  Equality	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  69-­‐70.	  
77	  Cohen,	  Rescuing	  Justice	  and	  Equality,	  op.cit.	  10.	  
78	  Cohen,	  Rescuing	  Justice	  and	  Equality,	  op.cit.	  10.	  
79	  See	  e.g.	  RJ	  Arneson,	  ‘Justice	  is	  not	  Equality’	  (2008)	  21	  Ratio	  371-­‐391,	  372.	  It	  might	  even	  be	  
argued	  that	  Rawls	  himself	  thought	  that	  individuals’	  choices	  ought	  to	  be	  informed	  by	  principles	  
of	  distributive	  justice.	  For	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Rawls	  along	  these	  lines,	  and	  a	  criticism	  of	  Cohen’s	  
interpretation	  of	  Rawls,	  see	  S	  Scheffler,	  ‘Is	  the	  Basic	  Structure	  Basic?’	  in	  C	  Sypnowich,	  The	  
Egalitarian	  Conscience:	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  of	  G.	  A.	  Cohen	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  102-­‐129.	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above,	  Cohen	  says	  two	  things	  about	  what	  distributive	  justice	  requires.	  First,	  that	  
differences	  in	  wealth	  are	  only	  just	  if	  they	  result	  from	  differences	  in	  choice,	  fault	  
or	   desert	   and	   not	   from	   (un)lucky	   circumstances.	   Second,	   that	   differences	   in	  
wealth	  are	  only	  just	  if	  they	  correspond	  to	  the	  difference	  principle;	  that	  is,	  if	  they	  
benefit	   the	  worst-­‐off	  members	   of	   society.	   Cohen	   says	   very	   little,	   however,	   on	  
how	  these	  principles	  ought	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  people’s	  private	  economic	  choices;	  
on	   how	   to	   determine	   whether	   someone’s	   choices	   indeed	   correspond	   to	   the	  
principles	  of	  justice.	  	  
One	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  the	  above	  two	  principles	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
lead	   to	   the	   same	   conclusions	   about	   the	   justness	   of	   particular	   situations.	   An	  
existing	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  can	  benefit	  the	  worst-­‐off	  (i.e.:	  correspond	  to	  the	  
difference	  principle),	  while	  not	  resulting	  merely	  from	  different	  choices	  or	  merit,	  
but	  also	  partly	  from	  luck.	  And	  vice	  versa:	  an	  existing	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  may	  
not	   benefit	   the	  worst-­‐off,	  while	   it	   does	   result	   only	   from	  differences	   in	   choice,	  
fault	  or	  desert	  instead	  of	  luck.	  	  
I	   will	   focus,	   however,	   on	   a	   for	   my	   purposes	   more	   important	   possible	  
problem	  with	  applying	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  private	  economic	  choices.	  This	  is	  
not,	  as	  Cohen	  himself	  recognizes,80	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  balance	  in	  a	  particular	  
case	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice	  with	  people’s	  personal	  prerogative	  to	  advance	  
their	   own	   legitimate	   interests.	   Nor	   is	   it	   the	   problem	   that	   in	   real-­‐life	   private	  
interactions,	   it	   is	  very	  hard	   to	  determine	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  relative	  wealth	  of	  
the	  persons	   involved	   is	   the	   consequence	   of	  merit	   or	   luck.	   Instead,	   there	   is	   an	  
even	  larger	  possible	  problem:	  that	  applying	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  to	  
private	  choices	  may	  be	  in	  violation	  with	  those	  principles.	  	  
Cohen	  argues	  that	  if	  people	  truly	  want	  a	  just	  society,	  they	  have	  no	  reason	  
to	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  justice	  criteria	  to	  the	  basic	  structure,	  because	  societies	  
will	   be	   more	   just	   when	   individuals	   also	   apply	   those	   criteria	   in	   their	   private	  
choices.	  Rawls,	  by	  not	  wanting	  to	  apply	  the	  principles	  of	   justice	  to	   individuals’	  
choices,	   seems	   to	   favour	  motives	  of	   liberty	  or	   economic	  productivity	  over	   the	  
possibility	  of	  maximizing	  justice.	  It	  might	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  if	  we	  want	  a	  
just	   society,	  we	  may	   have	   very	   good	   reasons	   for	   not	   applying	   Cohen’s	   justice	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criteria	   to	   individual	   economic	   choices.	   And	   these	   reasons	   are	   not	   based	   on	  
motives	   of	   liberty	   or	   economic	   productivity,	   but	   on	   Cohen’s	   criteria	   of	  
distributive	  justice	  themselves.	  	  
	   Assuming	   that	   justice	  means,	   as	   Cohen	   says,	   that	   differences	   in	  wealth	  
are	  only	  just	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  result	  from	  differences	  in	  choice	  or	  desert	  
instead	  of	  from	  (un)lucky	  circumstances,	  or	  that	  differences	  are	  only	  just	  to	  the	  
extent	   that	   they	   benefit	   the	   worst-­‐off,	   what	   would	   this	   mean	   if	   applied	   to	  
individual	   transactions?	   Suppose	   two	   people,	   Anna	   and	   Barbara,	  meet	   to	   talk	  
about	  selling	  Barbara’s	  bike	  to	  Anna.	  Barbara	   is	  much	  less	  wealthy	  than	  Anna,	  
through	  no	  real	  fault	  or	  choice	  of	  either	  of	  them,	  but	  mainly	  because	  Anna	  has	  
grown	  up	   in	  much	  more	   ‘lucky’	   circumstances.	  They	   agree	   that	  Anna	  will	   pay	  
£50	   for	   the	   bike.	   What	   would	   it	   mean	   for	   Anna	   to	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	  
distributive	   justice	   in	   this	   transaction?	   If	   justice	   implies	   that	   Barbara	   should	  
have	  as	  much	  opportunities	  as	  Anna	  and	  that	  this	  difference	  in	  wealth	  should	  be	  
compensated	   by	   transferring	   some	   wealth	   from	   Anna	   to	   Barbara,	   does	   that	  
mean	  that	  Anna	  should	  pay,	  say,	  £50,000	  for	  the	  bike	  instead	  of	  £50?	  	  
As	  this	  rather	  odd	  conclusion	  shows,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  amount	  
we	   owe	   to	   others	   according	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	   distributive	   justice	   is	  
dependent	  on	  whether	  we	  transact	  with	  someone	  or	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  
we	  buy	  from	  or	  sell	  to	  them.	  It	  might	  be,	  in	  the	  above	  example,	  that	  Anna	  indeed	  
ought	  to	  give	  Barbara	  £50,000	  according	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice,	  but	  that	  
will	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  wants	  to	  buy	  Barbara’s	  bike.	  There	  
is	   also	   no	   reason	   why	   the	   question	   of	   who	   ought	   to	   give	   wealth	   to	   whom,	  
according	   to	   the	   requirements	  of	  distributive	   justice,	   is	   related	   to	   the	   issue	  of	  
with	  whom	  we	  engage	  in	  a	  transaction.	  It	  may	  be,	  for	  example,	  that	  even	  though	  
Barbara	  has	  much	  less	  wealth	  and	  opportunities	  than	  Anna,	  she	  does	  have	  much	  
more	  wealth	  and	  opportunities	  than	  most	  other	  people	  in	  society.	   In	  that	  case,	  
the	   principles	   of	   justice	   would	   not	   require	   Anna	   to	   give	   Barbara	   anything	   to	  
compensate	  her	  unjust	  level	  of	  wealth,	  but	  instead	  require	  both	  of	  them	  to	  give	  
to	  other,	  less	  well-­‐off,	  people	  in	  society.	  	  
	   In	  short:	  the	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  are	  about	  a	  just	  distribution	  
of	   benefits	   and	   burdens.	   And	   as	   these	   examples	   show,	   placing	   the	   burden	   of	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correcting	  differences	  in	  wealth	  on	  whichever	  person	  happens	  to	  transact	  with	  
another,	   would	   not	   necessarily	   make	   for	   a	   just	   distribution	   of	   benefits	   and	  
burdens	  at	  all.	  
	  
There	   are	   some	  possible	   objections	   to	   this	   argument.	  One	   is	   that	  what	   Cohen	  
and	  others	  have	  in	  mind	  when	  saying	  that	  people	  should	  apply	  the	  principles	  of	  
justice	   to	   their	   private	   economic	   transactions	   is	   not	   that	   Anna,	   when	   buying	  
something	   from	   Barbara,	   should	   completely	   compensate	   for	   Barbara’s	  
disadvantaged	  position,	   but	   something	  much	   less	   demanding:	   that	   she	   should	  
pay	  a	  reasonably	  good	  price.	  So	  if,	  for	  example,	  £200	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  normal	  
or	  good	  price	  for	  the	  bike,	  Anna	  ought	  to	  offer	  Barbara	  £200,	  and	  not	  £50,	  but	  
also	  not	  £50,000.	  
This	  seems	  a	  more	  reasonable	  demand,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  this	  demand	  
follows	   from	   applying	   the	   principles	   of	   justice.	   If	   justice	   requires	   that	   we	  
compensate	  inequality	  in	  wealth	  that	  results	  from	  differences	  in	  luck	  instead	  of	  
from	  choice	  or	  desert,	  how	  does	  this	  lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Anna	  ought	  to	  
pay	  a	  good	  price	  for	  a	  bike?	  According	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  justice,	  if	  differences	  
in	   wealth	   are	   unjust,	   they	   need	   to	   be	   compensated	   for.	   And	   the	   amount	   of	  
wealth	   one	   person	   ought	   to	   give	   to	   others	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   size	   of	   their	  
(unjust)	  difference	  in	  wealth.	  Saying	  that	  Anna	  ought	  to	  give	  Barbara	  £200	  for	  
the	  bike	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  this	  but	  seems,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  justice,	  a	  
completely	  arbitrary	  sum.	  	  
Another	   way	   to	   look	   at	   this	   is	   by	   reversing	   the	   situation:	   suppose	  
Barbara,	  being	  much	  less	  wealthy	  than	  Anna,	  buys	  a	  bike	  from	  Anna	  instead	  of	  
the	   other	   way	   around.	  What	   would	   a	   ‘good’	   or	   non-­‐exploitative	   price	   for	   the	  
bike	  be	  in	  this	  situation?	  £50?	  Or	  £5?	  Or	  should	  Anna	  give	  Barbara	  the	  bike	  for	  
free	  and	  add	  £150	  on	  top,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  transaction	  to	  be	  non-­‐exploitative?	  It	  
might	   be	   that,	   all	   things	   considered,	   Anna	   indeed	   ought	   to	   give	   Barbara	   (and	  
perhaps	   all	   other	   badly-­‐off	   people)	   £150,	   according	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	  
justice.	  Yet	  this	  would	  also	  be	  the	  case	  if	  she	  was	  selling	  or	  buying	  a	  pair	  of	  socks	  
instead	  of	  a	  bike,	  or	  if	  she	  was	  buying	  nothing	  at	  all.	  What	  we	  find	  a	  reasonable	  
or	  a	  non-­‐exploitative	  price	  for	  a	  good,	  is	  thus	  unconnected	  to	  the	  requirements	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of	   distributive	   justice.	   It	   might	   be	   replied	   that	   the	   requirement	   to	   apply	   the	  
principles	   of	   justice	   in	  private	   transactions	  means	   that	  we	   should	   at	   least	   not	  
increase	  already	  existing	   justice.	  Thus,	   if	  we	  meet	  a	  poor	  person	  who	  sells	  her	  
bike	   because	   she	   desperately	   needs	  money,	  we	   should	   not	   take	   advantage	   of	  
this	   situation	  by	  offering	  a	   low	  price,	   thereby	  making	   the	  difference	   in	  wealth	  
between	  us	  even	  larger.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  objection	  in	  section	  2.4.4	  below.	  	  
	   A	   related	  possible	   objection	   to	  my	  view	   is	   that	  what	  Cohen	  and	  others	  
have	  in	  mind	  when	  saying	  that	  people	  should	  apply	  the	  principles	  of	   justice	  to	  
their	  private	  transactions	  is	  that	  people	  should	  pay	  a	  fair	  price.	  This	  would	  lead	  
to	  a	  similar	  problem,	  however.	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  that	  when	  we	  say	  
that	  people	  need	  to	  pay	  a	   fair	  price,	  we	  do	  not	  only	  need	  to	  determine	  what	  a	  
fair	  price	  is,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  we	  make	  a	  moral	  statement:	  we	  say	  that	  it	  is	  
morally	  wrong	  to	  pay	  a	  lower	  or	  ask	  a	  higher	  price.	  We	  thus	  need	  to	  explain	  why	  
it	  is	  wrong	  to	  pay	  a	  lower	  price	  than	  the	  price	  we	  have	  specified	  as	  the	  fair	  price.	  
Assumedly,	   this	   might	   be	   done	   by	   appealing	   to	   the	   principles	   of	   justice:	   we	  
should	   not	   pay	   a	   lower	   price	   because	   this	   is	   unjust;	   that	   is,	   because	   justice	  
requires	  us	  to	  compensate	  for	  unjust	  differences	  in	  wealth.	  Yet	  with	  this	  step	  we	  
encounter	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  before:	  if	  justice	  requires	  us	  to	  compensate	  for	  
unjust	  differences	  in	  wealth,	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  requirement	  is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  
value	  of	   the	  goods	  we	  buy	  or	   sell.	  What	   is	   a	   ‘fair’	  price	   for	  a	   certain	  good	  can	  
thus	  not	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice.	  
A	   third	   possible	   objection	   to	   my	   arguments	   is	   that	   in	   making	   these	  
arguments,	  I	  am	  again	  seeing	  distributive	  justice	  as	  a	  macro	  principle,	  that	  looks	  
at	   the	   distribution	   of	  wealth	   in	   society	   as	   a	  whole,	  whereas	   Cohen’s	   idea	  was	  
that	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  should	  also	  apply	  to	  individual	  choices.	  Hence,	  even	  
though	  when	   looking	   at	   society	   as	   a	  whole,	   Barbara’s	   disadvantaged	   position	  
should	   be	   compensated	   by	   all	   affluent	   members	   of	   society,	   and	   not	   by	   Anna	  
alone,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  if	  this	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  happen,	  Barbara	  should	  also	  
apply	   them	   to	   her	   private	   transactions.	   The	   idea	   could	   be	   that	   even	   though	  
justice	   will	   be	   better	   served	   if	   all	   affluent	   people	   equally	   contribute	   to	  
compensating	   all	   disadvantaged	   people,	   given	   that	   this	   does	   not	   happen,	   it	   is	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still	  better	  if	  at	  least	  the	  difference	  in	  wealth	  between	  Anna	  and	  Barbara	  is	  made	  
smaller	  (and	  between	  everyone	  else	  who	  happen	  to	  transact	  together).	  	  
By	  making	   this	  objection,	  however,	   the	  principles	  of	  distributive	   justice	  
seem	  to	  collapse	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  duty	  of	  beneficence,	  as	  discussed	  in	  section	  2.3	  on	  
the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation.	   It	   amounts	   to	   saying	   that	   everyone	   has	   an	  
individual	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   whose	   level	   of	   wealth	   is	   unjustly	   low,	   even	   if	  
others	   fail	   to	   contribute	   to	   this.	   This	   might	   be	   a	   very	   demanding	   duty	   of	  
beneficence	   in	   the	   sense	   proposed	   by	   Singer81	   (see	   section	   2.3.3),	   which	  
requires	  us	  to	  benefit	  people	  as	  much	  as	  needed	  to	  compensate	  their	  injustice,	  
insofar	  as	  possible	  for	  us	  without	  sacrificing	  something	  of	  equal	  importance.	  Or	  
it	   might	   be	   a	   less	   demanding	   duty	   in	   the	   sense	   advocated	   by	   Murphy82	   and	  
Appiah83	  (see	  section	  2.3.3),	  which	  requires	  us	  to	  help	  people	  with	  an	  unjustly	  
low	  level	  of	  wealth	  only	  up	  to	  what	   is	  our	   ‘fair’	  share	  of	  the	  shared	  obligation:	  
the	   amount	  with	  which,	   if	   everyone	  would	   contribute	   the	   same	   amount,	   their	  
injustice	  would	  be	  compensated.	  
	  In	   both	   cases,	   the	   duty	   may	   go	   much	   further	   than	   the	   duties	   of	  
beneficence	   described	   in	   section	   2.3,	   because	   those	   duties	   only	   applied	   to	  
people	   who	   could	   not	   meet	   their	   basic	   needs,	   and	   only	   required	   to	   benefit	  
people	   as	  much	   as	  was	   necessary	   to	   provide	   them	  with	   their	   basic	   needs.	   In	  
contrast,	   the	   ‘individual	   duty	   of	   justice’	   described	   here,	   means	   that	   we	   are	  
required	   to	   provide	   people	   with	   as	   much	   as	   is	   necessary	   to	   remove	   unjust	  
differences	  in	  wealth;	  if	  necessary	  perhaps	  even	  up	  to	  the	  point	  where	  our	  own	  
level	  of	  wealth	  becomes	  the	  same	  as	  theirs.	  	  
Hence,	   this	   move	   would	   make	   the	   requirements	   of	   justice	   highly	  
demanding.	   That	   does	   not	   necessarily	   make	   it	   wrong,	   and	   it	   is	   not	   my	   main	  
objection	   to	   it.	   More	   problematic	   is	   that,	   as	   with	   the	   duties	   of	   beneficence	  
discussed	  in	  section	  2.3,	  it	  is	  still	  the	  case	  that	  what	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice	  
ask	  us	  to	  give	  to	  others	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  what	  we	  are	  transacting.	  And	  this	  is	  
so	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  justice	  themselves:	  if	  those	  terms	  applied	  to	  individuals	  mean	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that	  we	  morally	  ought	   to	  compensate	  people	  whose	   level	  of	  wealth	   is	  unjustly	  
lower	  than	  ours,	  then	  what	  determines	  whether	  and	  how	  much	  we	  ought	  to	  give	  
to	   them	   is	   how	  much	  others	   are	   (unjustly)	   less	  wealthy	   than	  we	   are,	   and	  not	  
what	  we	   are	   selling	   to	   or	   buying	   from	   them.	  Hence,	   the	   objection	   behind	   the	  
above	   example	   of	   Anna	   buying	   Barbara’s	   bike	   still	   stands:	   even	   if	   we	   would	  
agree	   that	  Anna	  has	   an	   individual	  duty	  of	   justice	   to	   compensate	   for	  Barbara’s	  
lack	  of	  wealth,	   this	   is	  not	  related	  to	  what	   is	  a	  non-­‐exploitative	  price	  to	  pay	  for	  
the	  bike.	  Thus,	  similarly	  to	  the	  argument	   in	  section	  2.3,	  we	  could	   imagine	  that	  
Anna	  feels	  sorry	  for	  Barbara	  and	  generously	  offers	  her	  £500	  for	  the	  bike,	  which	  
normally	  only	  costs	  £200.	  And	  we	  can	  imagine	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  according	  
to	  the	  requirements	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  Anna	  actually	  ought	  to	  give	  Barbara	  
£50,000.	  Hence,	   it	  could	  be	  that	  Anna	   is	  violating	  her	   individual	  moral	  duty	  of	  
justice,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  buying	  Barbara’s	  bike	  for	  a	  generous	  price.	  Does	  that	  
mean	   that	   the	   transaction	   is	  exploitative?	   If	  we	   say	   that	   a	   failure	   to	   apply	   the	  
principles	  of	  distributive	  injustice	  is	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong,	  this	  seems	  
to	  be	  the	  case.	  Yet	  it	  seems	  mistaken,	  and	  counter-­‐intuitive,	  to	  call	  a	  transaction	  
in	   which	   someone	   voluntarily	   gives	   a	   very	   generous	   price	   for	   a	   good	  
exploitative.	  Consequently,	  even	  if	  we	  would	  grant	  that	  there	  can	  be	  such	  a	  thing	  
as	   an	   individual	   duty	   to	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	   justice,	   how	   much	   this	   duty	  
requires	  us	  to	  give	  is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  value	  of	  what	  we	  are	  transacting,	  and	  to	  
the	  price	  at	  which	  we	   find	  a	   transaction	  exploitative.	  We	  can	   thus	  violate	   this	  
duty	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  engaging	  in	  non-­‐exploitative	  transactions,	  which	  is	  
why	   this	   argument	   seems	   problematic	   as	   an	   explanation	   of	   why	   exploitative	  
transactions	  are	  morally	  wrong.	  	  
	   There	  are	  some	  further	  problems	  with	  this	  injustice-­‐based	  argument	  for	  
the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation.	   But	   they	   also	   apply	   to	   another	   injustice-­‐based	  
argument	  that	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  and	  I	  will	  therefore	  discuss	  
those	  problems	  later,	  in	  section	  2.4.4.	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2.4.3	  Exploitation	  as	  prior	  injustice	  
A	  related	  but	  different	  argument	  that	  appeals	  to	  injustice	  to	  explain	  the	  wrong	  
in	   exploitative	   transactions	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	  wrong	  because	   exploiters	  
take	  advantage	  of	  a	  prior	  injustice	  or	  rights	  violation.	  A	  well-­‐known	  version	  of	  
this	   argument	   is	   put	   forward	   by	  Hillel	   Steiner.	   His	   aim	   is	   to	   provide	   a	   liberal	  
theory	  of	  exploitation:	  a	  theory	  that	  can	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  
exploitation,	   while	   eschewing	   any	   conception	   of	   objective	   value	   or	   human	  
needs,84	  and	  while	  confining	  oneself	  ‘to	  classical	  liberalism’s	  psychologically	  and	  
sociologically	  ‘thin’	  framework	  of	  discourse’,85	  which	  focuses	  on	  property	  rights.	  	  
Steiner	   asks	   us	   to	   imagine	   an	   auction,	   in	   which	   Red	   tries	   to	   sell	   her	  
week’s	   labour,	   and	   the	   winning	   bid	   of	   $80	   comes	   from	   Blue.86	   A	   third	   party,	  
White,	  would	  have	  bid	  $90,	  but	  did	  not.	  Whether	  the	  transaction	  between	  Red	  
and	  Blue	   is	  exploitative,	  Steiner	  argues,	  depends	  on	  the	  reason	  why	  White	  did	  
not	   make	   his	   $90	   bid.	   If	   the	   reason	   is	   an	   injustice	   suffered	   by	   White,	   the	  
transaction	  between	  Red	  and	  Blue	  is	  exploitative.	  White	  may,	  for	  instance,	  have	  
been	   robbed	   just	  before	   the	  auction,	  or	  he	  may	  have	  been	   forcefully	   excluded	  
from	   the	   auction,	   or	   an	   $80	   ceiling	   may	   have	   been	   forcibly	   imposed	   on	   the	  
bidding	   for	   Red’s	   labour.	   Exploitation,	   according	   to	   Steiner,	   thus	   involves	   an	  
exchange	  of	  goods	   for	  a	  value	  higher	  or	   lower	   than	   it	   could	  have	  been,	  where	  
that	   value	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	   preceding	   injustice	   or	   rights	   violation.	   Two	  
notable	   features	  of	  Steiner’s	  model	  are	   that	  exploitation	  always	   involves	   three	  
parties,87	  and	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  exploitee’s	  rights	  that	  are	  violated,	  but	  the	  rights	  
of	  a	  third	  party.	  These	  features	  have	  been	  criticized	  by	  a	  number	  of	  writers,	  who	  
argue	  that	  exploitative	  transactions	  can,	  and	  often	  do,	  only	  involve	  two	  parties;	  
that	   often	   the	   exploitee’s	   rights	   are	   being	   violated	   instead	   of	   a	   third	   party’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  H	  Steiner,	  ‘A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Exploitation’	  (1984)	  94(2)	  Ethics	  225-­‐241,	  225.	  
85	  H	  Steiner,	  ‘Exploitation:	  A	  Liberal	  Theory	  Amended,	  Defended,	  and	  Extended’	  in	  A	  Reeve	  (ed),	  
Modern	  Theories	  of	  Exploitation	  (Sage,	  1987)	  132-­‐148,	  132.	  
86	  H	  Steiner,	  ‘Exploitation	  Takes	  Time’	  in	  PA	  Samuelson	  and	  others	  (eds),	  Economic	  Theory	  and	  
Economic	  Thought:	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  of	  Ian	  Steedman	  (Routledge,	  2010)	  20-­‐29,	  23.	  See	  also	  for	  
the	  original	  example	  Steiner,	  ‘A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  231.	  
87	  Steiner,	  ‘A	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  234.	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rights;	   and	   that	   it	   is	  odd	   to	   see	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation	  as	   the	  violation	  of	  a	  
third	  party’s	  rights,	  instead	  of	  as	  something	  inflicted	  on	  the	  exploitee.88	  	  
In	   later	   years,	   therefore,	   Steiner	   adapted	   his	   model	   and	   accepted	   that	  
liberal	  exploitation	  can	  also	  occur	  when	  there	  are	  just	  two	  parties,	  and	  because	  
the	  exploitee’s	  rights	  have	  been	  violated:	  	  
	  
Suppose	   that,	   prior	   to	   the	   auction	   for	   Red’s	   labour,	   she	   suffered	   an	  
involuntary	   reduction	   of	   her	   endowment	   by	   having	   been	   robbed.	   The	  
consequent	   lowering	   of	   her	   budget	   constraint	   may	   well	   be	   such	   as	   to	  
entail	   a	   reduction	   in	   her	   reservation	   price	   for	   a	  week	   of	   her	   labour.	  ….	  
Under	   these	   circumstances,	   do	   we	   have	   sufficient	   reason	   to	   see	   a	  
winning	   bid	   of	   $70	   from	  Blue	   as	   exploitative?	   The	   answer	   is	   ‘Yes’.	   For	  
had	  she	  not	  been	  robbed,	  she	  would	  simply	  not	  have	  sold	  her	  labour	  for	  
less	  than	  her	  pre-­‐robbery	  reservation	  price	  of	  $75’.89	  
	  
Steiner’s	  model	  of	  exploitation	  based	  on	  prior	   injustice	  can	  be	  used	   to	  explain	  
certain	   instances	   of	   exploitation	   in	   the	  market,	   such	   as	   exploitation	  of	   certain	  
types	   of	   monopoly	   power,	   insufficient	   information,	   corruption,	   and	   theft	   of	  
resources.	  His	  model	  might	  also	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  exploitation	  where	  the	  prior	  
injustice	   is	   distributive	   injustice.	   Steiner	   notes	   that	   exactly	  which	   restrictions	  
actually	   constitute	   injustices,	   depends	   on	   which	   rights	   are	   assigned	   to	  
individuals	  by	  a	  theory	  of	  distributive	  justice.90	  So	  we	  can	  imagine	  an	  argument	  
that	  says,	  for	  instance,	  that	  workers	  in	  sweatshop	  factories	  are	  being	  exploited	  
because	  the	  distributive	  injustice	  in	  their	  country	  prevents	  many	  other	  potential	  
employers	  to	  start	  businesses	  and	  offer	  them	  higher	  wages	  than	  the	  sweatshops	  
do,	   and/or	   because	   the	   workers’	   unjust	   poverty	   lowers	   their	   reservation	  
price—the	  price	  for	  which	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  sell	  their	  labour.	  	  
	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  that	  on	  this	  model,	  the	  exploiter	  need	  not	  be	  the	  
one	   who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   injustice	   that	   enabled	   exploitation.	   Blue,	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  See	  e.g.	  A	  Carling,	  ‘Exploitation,	  Extortion	  and	  Oppression’	  (1987)	  35(2)	  Political	  Studies	  173-­‐
188,	  184;	  K	  Hyams,	  ‘Rights,	  Exploitation	  and	  Third-­‐Party	  Harms:	  Why	  Background	  Injustice	  
Matters	  to	  Consensual	  Exchange’	  (2012)	  43(2)	  Journal	  of	  Social	  Philosophy	  113-­‐124;	  S	  Walt,	  
‘Comment	  on	  Steiner’s	  Liberal	  Theory	  of	  Exploitation’	  (1984)	  94	  Ethics	  242-­‐247.	  
89	  Steiner,	  ‘Exploitation	  Takes	  Time’,	  op.cit.	  26.	  
90	  Steiner,	  ‘Exploitation	  Takes	  Time’,	  op.cit.	  25.	  Steiner	  himself	  follows	  Nozick	  in	  arguing	  that	  
questions	  of	  distributive	  justice	  are	  best	  approached	  by	  looking	  at	  whether	  initial	  distributions	  
are	  just,	  instead	  of	  by	  focussing	  on	  end-­‐state	  distributions.	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Steiner’s	   auction	   example,	   might	   not	   even	   have	   realized	   that	   White	   was	  
prevented	   from	   bidding	   at	   the	   auction	   because	   he	   was	   robbed.	   Steiner’s	  
argument	   is	  merely	   that	   transactions	   in	  which	   the	   value	   for	  which	   goods	   are	  
exchanged	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  prior	  injustice,	  are	  themselves	  unjust.	  	  
	   Other	  writers	   have	   put	   forward	   comparable	   arguments.91	   Aditi	   Bagchi,	  
for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  although	  distributive	  justice	  is	  a	  shared	  responsibility	  
of	   societies,	   and	   although	   it	   would	   be	   unfair	   to	   burden	   particular	   individuals	  
with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  raising	  particular	  others	  to	  the	  socioeconomic	  status	  
they	  would	  occupy	  in	  a	  just	  society,	  it	  is	  not	  unfair	  or	  arbitrary	  to	  disallow	  them	  
from	   benefitting	   from	   their	   unjust	   advantage	   or	   from	   others’	   unjust	  
disadvantage.92	  Bagchi,	   like	  Steiner,	  uses	  a	  theft	  analogy:	   ‘It	   is	  one	  thing	  to	  say	  
that	  one	  in	  a	  group	  of	  thieves	  should	  restore	  all	  that	  the	  group	  has	  stolen;	  it	  is	  
another	  thing	  to	  maintain	  that	  the	  most	  audacious	  thief	  should	  retain	  his	  extra	  
winnings	  because	  his	  colleagues	  have	  not	  been	  apprehended.’93	  She	  argues	  that	  
if	   distributive	   injustice	   is	   wrong,	   transactions	   that	   are	   contingent	   upon	   and	  
exacerbate	   the	   injustice	   are	   wrong	   as	   well.94	   And	   this,	   it	   might	   be	   argued,	   is	  
exactly	   what	   happens	   in	   exploitation:	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	   existing	  
distributive	   injustice,	   and	   of	   their	   advantageous	   bargaining	   position	   resulting	  
from	   this	   injustice,	   in	   order	   to	   extract	   as	   much	   benefit	   as	   possible	   from	   the	  
person	  with	  whom	  they	  are	  transacting.	  The	  wrong	  in	  exploitation,	  it	  might	  be	  
argued,	  is	  thus	  that	  exploiters	  take	  advantage	  of	  an	  existing	  injustice.	  In	  the	  next	  
section,	  I	  will	  argue	  against	  this	  argument.	  
	  
2.4.4	  Problems	  with	  exploitation	  as	  prior	  injustice	  	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   will	   point	   out	   some	   problems	   with	   the	   argument	   that	  
exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	   a	   prior	   injustice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  See	  for	  similar	  arguments	  e.g.	  A	  Bagchi,	  ‘Distributive	  Justice	  and	  Private	  Law’	  (2008)	  60	  
Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  105-­‐149;	  Hyams,	  op.cit.;	  and	  Sample,	  op.cit.	  82.	  (Sample	  was	  also	  
mentioned	  in	  section	  2.3	  on	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  In	  fact,	  she	  proposes	  three	  
different	  reasons	  why	  exploitation	  can	  be	  wrong:	  because	  of	  needs,	  because	  of	  injustice,	  and	  
because	  the	  good	  traded	  should	  not	  be	  commodified.)	  
92	  Bagchi,	  op.cit.	  126.	  
93	  Bagchi,	  op.cit.	  126.	  
94	  Bagchi,	  op.cit.	  125.	  	  
	   71	  
Nevertheless,	  most	  of	  these	  arguments	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  version	  of	  the	  injustice	  
account	  discussed	  in	  sections	  2.4.1	  and	  2.4.2.	  
A	   first,	   ‘practical’,	   problem	   is	   that	   it	   is	   often	   hard,	   if	   not	   impossible,	   to	  
know	  what	  the	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  require	  in	  a	  particular	  situation,	  
or	   to	   know	   to	   what	   extent	   someone’s	   disadvantaged	   position	   is	   indeed	   the	  
result	   of	   a	   prior	   injustice.	   Of	   course,	   we	   first	   need	   to	   agree	   on	   a	   view	   of	  
distributive	   justice.	   On,	   say,	   a	   libertarian	   view,	   many	   transactions	   between	  
people	  with	  unequal	  wealth	  and	  opportunities	  will	  be	  considered	  just	  that	  will	  
be	   considered	   unjust	   according	   to	   more	   egalitarian	   theories.	   But	   even	   if	   we	  
agree	  on	  an	  egalitarian	  view	  that	  states,	   for	   instance,	   that	   justice	  requires	  that	  
differences	   in	  wealth	   and	   opportunities	   are	   the	   result	   of	   differences	   in	   effort	  
and	  choices	  instead	  of	  luck,	  it	  is	  still	  extremely	  hard	  to	  determine	  in	  particular	  
cases	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  parties’	  difference	  in	  wealth	  is	  unjust.	  Suppose	  that	  an	  
employer	   and	   an	   employee	   have	  made	   an	   employment	   contract,	   and	   that	   the	  
employee	  is	  much	  poorer	  than	  the	  employer,	  and	  has	  a	  much	  weaker	  bargaining	  
position	   because	   she	   cannot	   find	   any	   other	   job,	   whereas	   the	   employer	   does	  
know	   plenty	   of	   other	   candidates	   for	   the	   job.	   How	   do	   we	   know	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	   the	   employee’s	   weak	   position	   is	   the	   result	   of	   her	   choices	   and	   effort	  
(perhaps	  she	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  improve	  her	  perspectives	  on	  the	  labour	  market	  
but	  dropped	  out	  of	  secondary	  school),	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  her	  weak	  position	  is	  
the	   result	   of	   luck	   or	   background	   conditions?	  Moreover,	   how	   do	  we	   decide	   to	  
what	   extent	   her	   choices	   and	   efforts	   are	   themselves	   the	   result	   of	   unlucky	  
background	  conditions?	  (Perhaps	  a	  reason	  she	  did	  not	  finish	  secondary	  school	  
is	  that	  she	  had	  to	  care	  for	  her	  sick	  parents,	  or	  that	  her	  parents	  never	  taught	  her	  
the	   importance	   of	   education.)	   Even	   if	   someone’s	   disadvantaged	   position	   does	  
seem	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  the	  consequence	  of	  her	  own	  efforts	  and	  choices,	  the	  exact	  
causes	   of	   people’s	   situation	   are	   often	   more	   complex	   than	   it	   seems,	   and	   may	  
involve	   more	   remote	   factors	   such	   as	   gender	   or	   racial	   discrimination,	  
international	   trade	   regimes,	   barriers	   for	   new	   businesses	   to	   enter,	   or,	   more	  
generally	   speaking,	   the	   presence	   or	   absence	   of	   ‘the	   delicate	   combination	   of	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social,	   political,	   geographic,	   and	   other	   factors	   needed	   for	   the	   production	   of	  
wealth	  and	  economic	  development’.95	  	  
Nevertheless,	   although	   it	   may	   be	   hard	   or	   impossible	   to	   determine	   the	  
exact	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  disadvantage	  is	  the	  result	  of	  injustice,	  we	  may	  still	  agree	  
that	   in	   certain	   cases,	   such	   as	   Western	   sweatshops	   in	   developing	   countries,	  
injustice	  is	  very	  likely	  an	  important	  factor.	  A	  more	  serious	  problem	  that	  applies	  
to	  all	  discussed	  versions	  of	  the	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation,	  is	  therefore	  the	  
fact	   that	   they	   can	   only	   explain	   exploitative	   transactions	   that	   result	   from	  
injustice,	   while	   there	   can	   arguably	   be	   exploitative	   transactions	   that	   do	   not	  
originate	   in	   injustice.	  For	  example,	   if	   I	  am	  stranded	  with	  my	  car	   in	   the	  desert,	  
and	  a	  passerby	  offers	  to	  give	  me	  a	  lift,	  but	  only	  if	  I	  give	  her	  £1,000,	  this	  seems	  a	  
classical	   example	   of	   exploitation,	   even	   if	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   am	   stranded	   is	   not	   a	  
matter	  of	  injustice.	  Yet	  Steiner	  and	  Bagchi	  deny	  that	  situations	  such	  as	  these	  are	  
exploitative,	   because	  my	  disadvantaged	  position	   is	   not	   the	   result	   of	   any	  prior	  
violation	  of	  a	  right	  or	  injustice.96	  	  
	   Moreover,	   the	   reason	   why	   I	   did	   get	   stranded	   with	   my	   car	   is	   not	  
necessarily	   relevant	   to	   whether	   the	   passerby’s	   offer	   is	   exploitative.	   Even	   if	   I	  
knew	  that	  my	  car	  was	  likely	  to	  break	  down	  soon,	  and	  should	  not	  have	  taken	  the	  
risk	  of	  driving	  in	  the	  desert,	  it	  seems	  still	  exploitative	  if	  someone	  who	  happens	  
to	  come	  by	  offers	  a	  lift	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  I	  pay	  £1,000.	  In	  my	  view,	  then,	  the	  
earlier	   discussion	   about	   how	   to	   decide	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   a	   disadvantage	   is	  
unjust	  or	  the	  result	  of	  effort	  or	  choice,	  is	  not	  truly	  relevant	  for	  exploitation.	  Even	  
if	   an	   employee’s	   bad	   bargaining	   position	   is	   not	   the	   result	   of	   injustice,	   but	  
entirely	  the	  result	  of	  her	  own	  lack	  of	  effort	  or	  her	  own	  wrong	  choices,	  it	  seems	  
still	  exploitative	  if	  an	  employer	  takes	  advantage	  of	  that	  bad	  bargaining	  position	  
by	   offering	   a	   terribly	   low	  wage	   for	   extremely	   long	   working	   hours,	   while	   she	  
could	  easily	  have	  offered	  better	  wages	  and	  working	  hours	  and	  still	  make	  large	  
profits.	  Hence,	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  that	  it	  can	  
only	   explain	   transactions	   in	   which	   someone’s	   disadvantaged	   bargaining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Powell	  and	  Zwolinski,	  op.cit.	  467-­‐468.	  
96	  Steiner,	  ‘Exploitation:	  A	  Liberal	  Theory	  Amended,	  Defended,	  and	  Extended’,	  op.cit.	  144;	  
Bagchi,	  op.cit.	  127.	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position	  arises	  out	  of	   injustice,	  whereas	  we	  can	  also	  exploit	  people	  whose	  bad	  
bargaining	  position	  has	  another	  cause.	  
Nonetheless,	  it	  could	  still	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  theories	  can	  satisfactorily	  
explain	   the	   wrong	   in	   some	   types	   of	   exploitative	   transactions:	   transactions	   in	  
which	   the	   exploitation	  does	   result	   from	   injustice.	   I	   believe	   that	   they	   cannot.	   I	  
have	   argued	   in	   section	   2.4.2	   why	   an	   argument	   based	   on	   Cohen’s	   idea	   that	  
principles	  of	  justice	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  individual	  transactions	  does	  not	  work.	  
I	  now	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  theories	  that	  say	  that	  exploiters	  act	  wrongly	  because	  
they	   take	   advantage	   of	   previous	   injustices	   do	  not	  work	   either.	   These	   theories	  
say	  that,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  wrong	  for	  anyone	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  stolen	  goods,	  it	  is	  
wrong	  for	  exploiters	  to	  benefit	  from	  an	  injustice	  by	  using	  it	  to	  strike	  a	  profitable	  
bargain.	   The	   theft	   analogy	   is	   not	   correct	   however.	  When	   goods	   are	   stolen,	   all	  
benefits	  from	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  goods	  are	  considered	  unjust,	  even	  if	  those	  benefits	  
are	   very	   small.	   Yet	   in	   the	   case	   of	   exploitative	   transactions,	   it	   is	   only	   the	  
extraction	   of	   relatively	   large	   benefits	   from	   prior	   injustices	   that	   is	   considered	  
exploitative.	   Imagine,	   for	   example,	   that	   vandals	   have	   scratched	   your	   car	   and	  
that	   you	   need	   to	   have	   it	   repainted.	   The	   scratching	   of	   your	   car	   is	   clearly	   an	  
injustice,	  but	  does	  this	  mean	  that	  the	  car	  painter	  is	  necessarily	  exploiting	  you?	  
Most	   people	   will	   agree	   that	   the	   painter	   is	   not	   exploiting	   you	   if	   she	   asks	   a	  
reasonable	   price	   for	   the	   painting,	   even	   though	   she	   benefits	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  
your	  car	  has	  been	  scratched	  because	  it	  gives	  her	  an	  income.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  
cases	  of	  distributive	  injustice.	  Suppose	  that	  person	  A	  and	  B	  live	  in	  a	  society	  with	  
large	  differences	  in	  wealth	  and	  almost	  no	  social	  security,	  and	  that,	  according	  to	  
an	   agreed	   theory	   of	   distributive	   justice,	   it	   is	   unjust	   that	   person	   B,	   like	  many	  
other	  people,	  has	   fewer	  opportunities	  and	   is	  much	  poorer	  than	  person	  A.	  As	  a	  
result,	  B	  has	  a	  rather	  monotonous	  job	  in	  A’s	  paper	  clip	  factory.	  A	  is	  a	  generous	  
employer	  though,	  and	  pays	  B,	  and	  all	  other	  employees,	  a	  salary	  much	  above	  the	  
minimum	  wage	  and/or	  above	  the	  wage	  usually	  paid	  by	  other	  employers	  for	  that	  
type	   of	  work.	   A	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   exploiting	  B,	   even	   though	   she	   benefits	  
from	   B’s	   unjust	   background	   circumstances,	   because	   they	   have	   influenced	   B’s	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decision	  to	  accept	  the	  job	  in	  A’s	  factory,	  and	  thus	  help	  A	  to	  make	  a	  profit.97	  What	  
these	   examples	   show	   is	   that	   we	   do	   not	   consider	   taking	   advantage	   of	   prior	  
injustice	   wrong	   in	   itself,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   only	   when	   gaining	   a	   large	   amount	   of	  
benefit	  from	  prior	  injustice,	  that	  we	  find	  transactions	  exploitative.	  Hence,	  taking	  
advantage	  of	  prior	  injustice	  cannot,	  itself,	  be	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong.	  	  
	   	  
It	  might	   be	   objected	   that	   exploiters	   do	   not	  merely	   take	   advantage	   of	   existing	  
injustices,	  but	  actually	  make	  them	  worse.	  For	  instance,	  Bagchi,	  in	  the	  citation	  in	  
the	   previous	   section,	   calls	   transactions	   unjust	   that	   are	   contingent	   upon	   and	  
exacerbate	   distributive	   justice.	   Do	   exploiters	   indeed	   make	   existing	   injustice	  
worse?	   They	   certainly	   characteristically	   benefit	   a	   lot	   from	   the	   exploitative	  
transaction,	   while	   the	   exploitees	   seemingly	   benefit	   much	   less.	   Sweatshop	  
owners,	  for	  instance,	  usually	  receive	  a	  much	  larger	  profit	  from	  the	  production	  in	  
their	   factories	   than	   their	   employees,	   while	   the	   employees	   typically	   do	   much	  
more	   or	   much	   tougher	   work.	   The	   arrangement	   thereby	   makes	   sweatshop	  
owners	   considerably	   richer,	   whereas	   it	   gives	   only	   a	   small	   income	   to	   the	  
employees.	  It	  might	  be	  argued,	  then,	  that	  this	  is	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong:	  
exploiters	  actually	   increase	   injustice,	  because	   they	  make	  the	  people	  who	  were	  
already	   rich	   even	   more	   rich,	   while	   benefiting	   the	   people	   who	   were	   already	  
poorer	  considerably	  less.	  	  
Whether	  exploiters	   indeed	  aggravate	  existing	   injustices	  depends	  on	  the	  
way	  we	   look	   at	   it.	   If	   we	   think	   of	   it	   in	   terms	   of	   people’s	   subjective	   wealth	   or	  
wellbeing,	   exploitative	   transactions	   can	   actually	   lessen	   unjust	   differences	   in	  
wealth	   or	   wellbeing,	   compared	   to	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   there	   would	   be	   no	  
transaction.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   exploitees	   often	   gain	   much	   more	   from	  
exploitative	   transactions	   than	   the	   exploiters,	   since	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   have	   so	  
much	   to	   lose	   is	   exactly	   what	   makes	   them	   vulnerable	   to	   exploitation.	   If	   I	   am	  
drowning	   in	  a	  pond,	  and	  a	  passerby	  offers	  to	  rescue	  me	  for	  £1,000,	   I	  will	  gain	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Or	  consider	  another	  example:	  Bob,	  because	  he	  is	  (unjustly)	  relatively	  poor,	  cannot	  afford	  to	  
spend	  much	  money	  on	  travelling,	  and	  therefore	  always	  travels	  with	  cheap	  but	  less	  comfortable	  
low-­‐cost	  airlines.	  This	  means	  that	  low-­‐cost	  airlines	  are	  benefiting	  from	  the	  unjust	  relative	  
poverty	  of	  Bob	  and	  people	  like	  Bob.	  Still,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  mistaken,	  and	  counter-­‐intuitive,	  to	  say	  that	  
low-­‐cost	  airlines	  are	  for	  that	  reason	  necessarily	  exploiting	  people	  like	  Bob.	  (They	  might	  engage	  
in	  other	  problematic	  or	  exploitative	  practices,	  such	  as	  expensive	  help-­‐desk	  policies.)	  	  
	   75	  
my	  life	  by	  accepting	  the	  offer,	  which	  is	  worth	  much	  more	  to	  me	  than	  the	  £1,000	  
the	  passerby	   gains.	   (If	   it	  would	  be	  worth	   less	   to	  me	   than	  £1,000,	   I	  would	  not	  
accept	   the	   offer.)	   The	   same	   is	   likely	   true	   for	   some	   instances	   of	   sweatshop	  
labour.	  Someone	  who	  is	  poor,	  has	  a	  family	  to	  take	  care	  of,	  and	  lives	  in	  a	  country	  
with	  very	  little	  social	  security,	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  lose	  if	  she	  does	  not	  manage	  to	  secure	  
an	  income:	  the	  health	  and	  wellbeing	  of	  her	  entire	  family.	   If	  a	  sweatshop	  offers	  
her	  an	  income,	  even	  if	  very	  low,	  it	  will	  thus	  benefit	  her	  greatly,	  even	  though	  the	  
sweatshop	  owner	  benefits	  greatly	  from	  the	  transaction	  as	  well,	  and	  could	  easily	  
pay	   a	   higher	  wage.	   Compared	  with	   the	   alternative—having	  no	   employment—
sweatshop	  workers	  may	  thus	  benefit	  more	  from	  the	  transaction	  than	  sweatshop	  
owners,	  because	  their	  alternative	  situation	  is	  so	  harsh.	  Moreover,	  since	  we	  are	  
talking	   about	   justice	   and	   distribution	   of	  wealth,	   we	   should	   not	   only	   compare	  
sweatshop	   workers’	   gain	   with	   the	   employers’	   gain,	   but	   with	   the	   general	  
distribution	  of	  wealth.	  And	  compared	  with	  other	  people	  in	  the	  community	  who	  
also	  want	  to	  work	  for	  a	  sweatshop	  factory	  but	  cannot	  find	  such	  a	  job,	  sweatshop	  
workers’	  wealth	  is	  certainly	  increased.	  Hence,	  compared	  with	  the	  status	  quo,	  or	  
no-­‐transaction-­‐baseline,	   we	   cannot	   say	   that	   exploiters	   necessarily	   always	  
exacerbate	   injustice,	   because,	   counter-­‐intuitive	   as	   it	   may	   seem,	   exploitative	  
transactions	  may	  actually	  lessen	  the	  difference	  in	  wellbeing	  or	  wealth	  between	  
two	  people,	  and	  between	  the	  wealth	  of	  the	  exploited	  person	  and	  other	  people.	  	  
Two	   objections	   might	   be	   raised	   to	   this.	   First,	   perhaps	   we	   should	   not	  
compare	  people’s	  relative	  gains	  from	  a	  transaction	  in	  terms	  of	  subjective	  wealth	  
or	  wellbeing,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  much	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  transaction	  each	  gain	  in	  
an	   objectively	   measurable	   value.	   Second,	   perhaps	   we	   should	   not	   compare	  
people’s	   relative	   gains	   from	   a	   transaction	   with	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   no	  
transaction	  takes	  place.	  	  
Concerning	   the	   first	   objection,	   recall	   the	   example	   of	   Barbara,	   who	   is	  
relatively	   poor,	   who	   tries	   to	   sell	   her	   bike	   to	   Anna,	   who	   is	   relatively	   well	   off.	  
Imagine	   that	   Anna	   knows	   that	   Barbara	   is	   desperate	   for	   money,	   and	   that	   she	  
uses	   this	   knowledge	   to	  make	  Barbara	   sell	   her	   bike	   for	   only	   £50,	   even	   though	  
Anna	  knows	  that	  the	  bike	  is	  probably	  worth	  much	  more;	  say	  £200.	  It	  might	  be	  
argued	   that	   in	   this	   situation	  Barbara	   gains	   £50,	   and	  Anna	   gains	   a	   bike	  worth	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£200,	  meaning	  that	   the	  difference	   in	  wealth	  between	  the	  two	  has	   increased	   in	  
terms	  of	   absolute	   value,	   even	   if	   the	   £50	   actually	   benefits	  Barbara	  much	  more	  
than	  the	  £200	  bike	  benefits	  Anna	  in	  terms	  of	  subjective	  value.	  The	  example	  of	  a	  
passerby	   offering	   to	   rescue	   me	   for	   £1,000	   while	   I	   am	   drowning	   can	   also	   be	  
recast	  in	  this	  light.	  Although	  I	  value	  my	  life	  at	  more	  than	  £1,000	  and	  thus	  gain	  
something	  worth	  more	   than	  £1,000	  by	  being	   rescued,	   it	  might	  be	  argued	   that	  
the	   objective	   value	   of	   a	   rescue-­‐service	   (say,	  making	   one’s	   clothes	  wet	   and	   an	  
hour’s	  worth	  of	  ‘work’)	  is	  much	  less	  than	  £1,000.	  The	  passerby	  therefore	  gains	  
£1,000	  while	  I	  gain	  a	  service	  that	  is	  worth	  much	  less	  than	  £1,000.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  
be	   argued,	   we	   should	   not	   say	   that	   the	   exploitee	   often	   gains	   more	   from	   the	  
transaction	   than	   the	   exploiter,	   because	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   if	  we	   look	   at	   it	   in	  
terms	  of	   the	  objective	  value	  of	   the	  goods	  or	  services	  exchanged.	  However,	   the	  
strength	  of	  this	  objection	  depends	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  possible	  
to	  determine	  an	  objective	  value	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  
argue	  against	  this	  assumption.	  I	  will	  therefore	  leave	  this	  objection	  until	  the	  next	  
chapter.98	  	  
	   A	   second	   objection	   to	   my	   claim	   that	   exploitees	   frequently	   gain	   more	  
from	  an	  exploitative	  transaction	  than	  exploiters,	  is	  that	  we	  should	  not	  compare	  
people’s	   relative	   gains	   from	   a	   transaction	   with	   the	   situation	   in	   which	   no	  
transaction	  takes	  place.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  compared	  with	  what	  exploiters	  could	  or	  
perhaps	  should	  have	  offered,	  their	  wealth	  or	  wellbeing	  is	  much	  more	  increased	  
by	   exploitative	   transactions	   than	   that	   of	   the	   exploitee,	   and,	   consequently,	   the	  
existing	   difference	   in	   wealth	   between	   them	   is	   further	   increased.	   Sweatshop	  
owners,	  for	  instance,	  could	  presumably	  offer	  better	  wages	  and	  working	  hours	  to	  
their	   employees,	   while	   still	   keeping	   enough	   profit	   for	   themselves.	   Compared	  
with	   that	   baseline,	   the	   sweatshop	   owners	   certainly	   gain	   a	   lot	   more	   than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  Though	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  this	  objection	  seems	  to	  have	  more	  strength	  in	  certain	  
cases	  of	  exploitation,	  such	  as	  sweatshop	  labour.	  There,	  it	  may	  be	  relatively	  straightforward	  to	  
find	  out	  that	  the	  net	  profit	  added	  to	  a	  company	  by	  each	  additional	  employee	  is,	  say,	  £100,	  and	  
that	  £90	  of	  this	  profit	  goes	  to	  the	  sweatshop	  owners	  and	  £10	  to	  the	  employees.	  In	  that	  case,	  we	  
can	  thus	  in	  some	  way	  objectively	  measure	  the	  increase	  in	  wealth	  going	  to	  the	  alleged	  exploiter	  
and	  the	  increase	  in	  wealth	  going	  to	  the	  alleged	  exploitee,	  even	  though	  this	  says	  nothing	  about	  
their	  subjective	  increase	  in	  wellbeing.	  Still,	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  true	  for	  all	  instances	  of	  
exploitation,	  and	  I	  would	  therefore	  still	  contend	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  ‘objective’	  unjust	  differences	  
in	  wealth	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  exploitative	  transactions.	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sweatshop	  workers.	   Yet	   if	   we	  want	   to	  make	   this	   argument,	   and	   compare	   the	  
relative	  benefits	  of	  a	  transaction	  not	  with	  the	  no-­‐transaction	  baseline,	  but	  with	  
the	  situation	  in	  which	  people	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  moral	  duty,	  we	  need	  
to	  make	   clear	  why	   such	   a	  moral	   duty	   exists.	   That	   is:	  why	   passersby	   ought	   to	  
rescue	  drowning	  people	  for	  no	  more	  than	  a	  reasonable	  compensation,	  and	  why	  
employers	  ought	  to	  offer	  reasonable	  wages.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  justifying	  the	  
existence	  of	  such	  a	  duty	  might	  not	  be	  too	  hard	  in	  the	  former	  case.	  Yet	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  employers	  and	  possible	  employees	  whose	  life	  is	  not	  necessarily	  in	  immediate	  
danger,	   this	   is	   not	   so	   straightforward,	   as	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   in	   the	  different	  
sections	  of	   this	  chapter.	  The	  accounts	  of	  exploitation	  discussed	   in	   this	  chapter	  
and	   in	   the	  next	   try	   to	   justify	  exactly	   such	  a	  duty	   to	  offer	   reasonable	  wages	  or	  
prices—a	  duty	  not	  to	  exploit—whether	  based	  on	  consent,	  vulnerability,	  needs,	  
justice,	  or	  fairness.	  And	  my	  main	  argument	  of	  this	  chapter,	  and	  the	  next	  chapter	  
on	  fairness,	  is	  that	  all	  these	  accounts	  are	  unsuccessful	  in	  justifying	  such	  a	  moral	  
duty.	  Yet	  if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  we	  cannot	  justify	  a	  duty	  to	  offer	  reasonable	  or	   ‘fair’	  
wages	   or	   prices,	   we	   can	   also	   not	   decide	  whether	   a	   transaction	   has	   increased	  
existing	   injustices	   by	   comparing	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   transaction	   with	   the	  
baseline	  ‘reasonable	  price’	  or	  ‘fair	  price’.	  Hence,	  the	  argument	  that	  exploitative	  
transactions	   are	  wrong	   because	   they	   increase	  unjust	   differences	   in	  wealth	   or	  
wellbeing	   is	   problematic,	   because	   exploitative	   transactions	   often	   actually	  
improve	   exploitees’	   relative	   wealth	   or	   wellbeing	   compared	   with	   the	   no-­‐
transaction	  baseline,	  and	  if	  we	  want	  to	  compare	  them	  with	  a	  moral	  baseline,	  we	  
have	   to	   justify	   why	   there	   is	   a	   moral	   duty	   to	   offer	   reasonable	   or	   ‘fair’	   prices,	  
which,	  I	  have	  argued	  and	  will	  further	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  is	  problematic.	  	  
A	   final	   problem	  with	   the	   argument	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	  
exploiters	  increase	  injustice,	  is	  that,	  as	  said	  before,	  people	  can	  also	  be	  exploited	  
if	   they	   have	   not	   suffered	   injustice.	   Recall	   the	   example	   of	   the	   stranded	   person	  
and	   the	   passerby	   offering	   help	   for	   £1,000.	   The	   stranded	   person	   might	   be	  
considerably	  richer	  than	  the	  passerby,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  payment	  of	  £1,000	  may	  
actually	   reduce	   the	   overall	   unjust	   distribution	   of	   resources.	   Still,	  many	  people	  
would	   consider	   this	   an	   exploitative	   offer.	   Hence,	   this	   shows	   that	  whether	  we	  
consider	   a	   transaction	   (non-­‐)exploitative,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   same	   as	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whether	  we	   think	   that	   the	   injustice	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   resources	   has	   been	  
increased.	  
	  
A	  related	  possible	  objection	  to	  my	  rejection	  of	  the	  injustice	  account	   is	  that	  the	  
theories	  I	  described	  do	  not	  mean	  that	  benefitting	  from	  injustice	  is	  always	  unjust,	  
but	   that	   it	   is	  unjust	   to	  positively	  use	  an	  existing	   injustice	  to	  get	  as	  beneficial	  a	  
price	  as	  possible.	  Or	  in	  other	  words:	  to	  get	  others	  to	  agree	  on	  a	  price	  that	  they	  
would	  not	  have	  agreed	  on	  if	   the	   injustice	  had	  not	  existed.	  Following	  this	  view,	  
we	  can	  avoid	  exploiting	  people	  who	  are	   in	  an	  unjustly	  disadvantaged	  position	  
by	  offering	  the	  price	  they	  would	  have	  accepted	  if	  the	  injustice	  did	  not	  exist.	  	  
Note	   that	   by	   making	   this	   argument,	   we	   are	   no	   longer	   saying	   that	  
benefiting	   from	  a	  prior	   injustice	   is	  wrong	   in	   itself,	  but	  only	  benefitting	   from	  a	  
prior	  injustice	  by	  a	  certain	  amount:	  the	  amount	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  injustice.	  
This	  is	  an	  argument	  made	  also	  by	  some	  proponents	  of	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  
exploitation,	   who	   say	   that	   taking	   an	   unfairly	   large	   advantage	   is	   what	   makes	  
exploitation	  wrong,	   and	  will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   For	   now,	   I	  will	  
merely	  point	  out	  that	  calculating	  which	  price	  would	  be	  agreed	  upon	  if	  someone	  
had	  not	  suffered	  an	  injustice	  is	  often	  impossible,	  because	  in	  many	  cases,	  if	  there	  
had	  been	  no	  prior	  injustice,	  there	  would	  have	  been	  no	  transaction	  at	  all.	  Think,	  
for	  instance,	  of	  the	  earlier	  mentioned	  example	  of	  person	  B	  who	  works	  in	  person	  
A’s	   paper	   clip	   factory,	   because	   she—unjustly—has	   fewer	   opportunities	   and	  
wealth	  than	  A	  and	  many	  others.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  imagine	  away	  this	  injustice,	  and	  
imagine	  that	  B	  has	  equal	  opportunities	  and	  is	  equally	  wealthy	  as	  everyone	  else	  
in	  society,	  it	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  she	  would	  still	  choose	  the	  monotonous	  job	  in	  
A’s	  paper	  clip	  factory	  and	  would	  not	  choose	  to	  pursue	  a	  more	  interesting	  career.	  	  
Moreover,	  if	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  should	  imagine	  the	  price	  that	  would	  
be	  agreed	  upon	  if	  the	  transaction	  would	  take	  place	  if	  there	  were	  no	  injustice,	  the	  
requirement	  for	  a	  price	  to	  be	  non-­‐exploitative	  seems	  far	  too	  demanding.	  For	  B	  
to	   be	   willing	   to	   work	   in	   A’s	   paper	   clip	   factory	   when	   she	   has	   equally	   good	  
opportunities	   to	   pursue	   a	  more	   interesting	   career	   as	   everyone	   else,	   A	   would	  
likely	   have	   to	   offer	   B	   an	   extraordinary	   high	   wage	   to	   make	   up	   for	   the	  
monotonous	   work;	   a	   wage	   higher	   than	   the	   wage	   for	   jobs	   B	   finds	   more	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appealing,	  such	  as	  an	  airplane	  pilot	  or	  a	  lawyer.	  Still,	  in	  the	  original	  situation,	  in	  
which	  B	  does	  have	  a	  disadvantaged	  position,	  and	  she	  does	  work	  in	  A’s	  paperclip	  
factory,	   I	   doubt	   that	   we	   would	   find	   any	   wage	   that	   is	   lower	   than	   an	  
extraordinarily	   high	   wage	   exploitative.	   If	   A	   offers	   B	   a	   good	   wage,	   not	   higher	  
than	   the	   wage	   of	   an	   airplane	   pilot,	   but	   nonetheless	   a	   generous	   wage	   for	  
reasonable	  working	  hours	  in	  good	  working	  conditions,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  we	  would	  
consider	  this	  exploitative.	  	  
Snyder	  makes	  a	  similar	  comment	  about	  a	  classical	  example	  of	  consensual	  
exploitation—sweatshop	  factories:	  ‘If	  a	  particular	  worker	  were	  given	  the	  wider	  
array	  of	  opportunities	  and	  resources	  that,	  arguably,	  would	  be	  available	  to	  her	  in	  
a	   fully	   just	   world,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   she	   would	   be	   willing	   to	   engage	   in	   fairly	  
monotonous	   and	   unrewarding	   factory	   labour	   for	   anything	   less	   than	   an	  
exceptionally	  high	  wage	  and	  in	  particularly	  enjoyable	  working	  conditions.’99	  Yet	  
going	  as	  far	  as	  offering	  an	  ‘exceptionally	  high	  wage’	  and	  ‘particularly	  enjoyable	  
working	   conditions’	   for	   factory	   labour	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   being	  
considered	  exploitative.	   If	   factory	  owners	  offer	   their	  employees	  good	  working	  
conditions	  and	  good	  wages,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  exploitative,	  even	  if	  the	  wages	  are	  
not	   exceptionally	   high	   or	   the	  working	   conditions	   not	   exceptionally	   enjoyable.	  
Hence,	   my	   point	   here	   is	   not	   that	   the	   low	  wages	   and	   bad	  working	   conditions	  
offered	  by	  sweatshop	  factories	  are	  not	  exploitative,	  nor	  that	  there	  is	  no	  criterion	  
to	  decide	  whether	  an	  offer	  is	  exploitative.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  hypothetical	  
price	  that	  people	  would	  accept	   if	   it	  were	  not	   for	   their	  unjust	  circumstances,	   is	  
not	  a	  good	  criterion	  to	  decide	  this,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  price	  at	  
which	  we	  start	  finding	  transactions	  non-­‐exploitative.	  
Consequently,	   it	   thus	   seems,	   again,	   that	   the	   price	   at	   which	   we	   find	   a	  
certain	   offer	   exploitative	   or	   non-­‐exploitative,	   is	   not	   necessarily	   related	   to	   the	  
background	   injustice	   of	   the	   transaction.	   And	   it	   seems	   again	   that	   it	   is	   not	   so	  
much	   the	   taking	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   unjust	   circumstances	   that	   makes	   a	  
transaction	   exploitative,	   but	   doing	   so	   in	   an	   excessive	   way.	   When	   we	  
acknowledge	   that,	   and	   allow	   that,	   for	   instance,	   factory	   owner	   A	   is	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  393.	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exploiting	  B	   if	  she	   takes	  advantage	  of	  B’s	  background	   injustice	   in	  an	  excessive	  
way—by	  paying	  her	  very	   little,	  or	  asking	  very	  much	  of	  her—the	  argument	  we	  
are	  making	  about	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  no	  longer	  about	  injustice.	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  amount	  with	  which	  A	  has	  to	  benefit	  B	  in	  order	  for	  the	  transaction	  
not	  to	  be	  exploitative,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  related	  to	  B’s	  injustice—neither	  to	  what	  
is	  necessary	  to	  compensate	  for	  B’s	  injustice,	  nor	  to	  what	  B	  would	  have	  accepted	  
if	   she	   would	   not	   have	   been	   in	   her	   unjust	   situation.	   A	   more	   promising	  
understanding	  of	  exploitation	  seems	  therefore	  the	  argument	  that	  exploitation	  is	  
wrong	   because	   exploiters	   take	   an	   unfairly	   large	   advantage,	   which	   will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
	  
To	   conclude,	   in	   this	   section,	   I	   have	   discussed	   the	   idea	   that	   exploitative	  
transactions	   are	   wrong	   because	   of	   injustice.	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   why	   this	  
account	   of	   exploitation	   cannot	   adequately	   explain	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
exploitation,	   both	  when	  based	   on	   the	   argument	   that	   principles	   of	   distributive	  
justice	   should	   be	   applied	   to	   individual	   transactions,	   and	   when	   based	   on	   the	  
argument	  that	  benefiting	  from	  prior	  injustices	  is	  itself	  unjust.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  
distributive	   justice	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   a	   just	  division	  of	  both	  benefits	   and	  burdens,	  
and	   that,	   therefore,	   making	   particular	   individuals	   disproportionately	  
responsible	   for	   correcting	   background	   injustices,	   seems	   to	   go	   against	   the	  
demands	  of	   justice.	   I	  have	  argued	   that	  even	   if	  we	  deny	   the	   importance	  of	   this	  
and	  grant	  that	  particular	  individuals	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  compensating	  
background	   or	   prior	   injustices,	   there	   are	   the	   further	   problems	   that	   taking	  
advantage	   of	   someone’s	   background	   injustice	   is	   not	   wrong	   in	   itself;	   that	  
exploiters	   do	   not	   necessarily	   increase	   injustice,	   that	   the	   amount	   that	   we	   are	  
required	  to	  give	  or	  ask	  to	  compensate	  for	  existing	  injustices	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  
value	   of	   what	   is	   being	   transacted;	   and	   that,	   consequently,	   this	   amount	   is	  
unrelated	  to	  the	  amount	  at	  which	  we	  find	  a	  transaction	  exploitative.	  Moreover,	  I	  
have	   argued	   that	   we	   cannot	   only	   exploit	   people	   who	   are	   in	   unjust	  
circumstances,	  but	  people	  in	  just	  circumstances	  as	  well.	  	  
	   In	  other	  words,	   I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  we	  can	  engage	   in	  exploitative	  
transactions	  without	   taking	  advantage	  of	   injustice,	   that	  we	  can	  engage	   in	  non-­‐
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exploitative	   transactions	   while	   taking	   advantage	   of	   people’s	   unjust	  
circumstances,	   and	   that	  when	  we	   do	   engage	   in	   exploitative	   transactions	  with	  
people	   who	   are	   in	   unjust	   circumstances,	   what	   is	   required	   to	   make	   the	  
transaction	  non-­‐exploitative	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  this	  injustice.	  This	  is	  why	  the	  
injustice	   account	   of	   exploitation	   cannot	   satisfactorily	   explain	   what	   is	   wrong	  
with	  consensual	  exploitation.	  
	  
2.5	  Taking	  stock:	  The	  problem	  of	  consensual	  exploitation	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter,	   I	  have	  discussed	  four	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  why	  
consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	   are	  wrong,	   and	   pointed	   out	   a	   number	   of	  
problems	   with	   each	   of	   these	   answers.	   In	   short,	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	  
exploitation	  is	  problematic	  because,	  even	  though	  using	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  
for	   one’s	   own	   gain	   is	   a	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   exploitative	   transactions,	   this	  
feature	  does	  not	  itself	  explain	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong,	  because	  we	  can	  
also	   use	   people’s	   vulnerability	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   not	   exploitative.	   The	   main	  
problem	  with	  the	  consent	  account,	  needs	  account,	  and	  injustice	  account,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	   is	   that	   they	  ultimately	   cannot	   escape	   conflating	   the	  wrongness	  or	  
injustice	   of	   a	   certain	   transaction	   and	   the	   wrongness	   or	   injustice	   of	   the	  
circumstances	   or	   system	   in	   which	   that	   transaction	   takes	   place.	   This	   is	  
problematic	   because,	   although	   exploiters	   might	   have	   individual	   moral	   duties	  
towards	   people	   with	   whom	   they	   transact	   that	   follow	   from	   shared	  
responsibilities	  to	  help	  people	  in	  grim	  circumstances,	  what	  is	  required	  for	  such	  
duties	   is	   not	   dependent	   on	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   transaction,	   such	   as	   the	  
value	   of	   the	   goods	   transacted.	   Consequently,	   the	   requirements	   of	   such	   duties	  
are	  not	  related	  to	  whether	  and	  when	  we	  regard	  transactions	  as	  exploitative.	  	  
It	   thus	   appears	   that	   in	   order	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   consensual	  
exploitation,	  the	  wrongness	  of	  exploitative	  transactions	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  
appealing	   to	   something	   in	   the	   ‘background	   circumstances’	   of	   the	   transaction,	  
such	  as	  societal	  distributive	  injustices	  or	  the	  dire	  situation	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  
parties	  finds	  herself,	  and	  with	  a	  corresponding	  duty	  to	  compensate	  distributive	  
	   82	  
injustices	   or	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need.	   Since	   such	   duties	   are	   based	   on	  
characteristics	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to	  the	  transaction,	  such	  as	  desert,	  dependency	  
or	   need,	   they	  will	   give	   rise	   to	   duties	   that	   are	   unrelated	   to	   the	   transaction	   as	  
well—and	   hence	   unrelated	   to	   whether	   we	   find	   a	   particular	   transaction	  
exploitative.	  	  
The	   ‘unfairness	  account’	  of	  exploitation	  seems	   to	  solve	   this	  problem	  by	  
locating	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitative	   transactions	   not	   in	   something	   in	   the	  
background	  circumstances	  of	  transactions,	  but	  in	  the	  transactions	  themselves:	  it	  
says	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  unfairness	  in	  the	  division	  of	  benefits	  and	  
burdens	  in	  the	  transaction.	  This	  argument,	  which	  is	  currently	  probably	  the	  most	  
common	  understanding	  of	  exploitation,	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  3	  –	  UNFAIRNESS	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  discussed	  four	  competing	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
is	  wrong	  with	   consensual	   exploitation,	   and	   tried	   to	   show	  why	   all	   of	   them	  are	  
unsuccessful	   in	   explaining	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation.	  This	   chapter	  discusses	   a	  
fifth	  answer,	  which	  says	  that	  exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  unfairness,	  and	  which	  I	  
will	  call	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  The	  first	  section	  gives	  an	  outline	  
of	  this	  account,	  and	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  fairness.	  The	  following	  six	  sections	  discuss	  
the	  three	  most	  common	  views	  of	  how	  to	  determine	  when	  consensual	  exchanges	  
are	  fair	  or	  unfair,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  justifications	  for	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  all	  these	  views	  and	  justifications	  are	  problematic,	  and	  in	  section	  3.8,	  I	  
will	   conclude	   that	   while	   the	   unfairness	   account	   may	   give	   an	   accurate	  
description	  of	  which	  transactions	  we	  find	  exploitative,	  it	  cannot	  justify	  why	  they	  
are	  morally	  wrong.	  	  
	  
3.1	  The	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
	  
The	   canonical	   expression	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation	   is	   Alan	  
Wertheimer’s	  1996	  Exploitation.	  Wertheimer	  argues	  that	  examples	  of	  intuitively	  
exploitative	   transactions	   do	   not	   strike	   us	   as	   exploitative	   anymore	   once	   we	  
remove	  the	  unfair	  division	  of	  benefits	  in	  those	  transactions,	  and	  vice	  versa:	  we	  
do	  find	  transactions	  exploitative	  if	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  receives	  an	  unfair	  share	  of	  
benefits	   or	   burdens.	   Recall,	   for	   instance,	   the	   case	   described	   in	   chapter	   2	   of	   a	  
grocery	  store	  owner	  in	  a	  remote	  town,	  who	  could	  ask	  exceptionally	  high	  prices	  
for	   her	   goods	   because	   of	   her	   monopoly	   position.	   If	   she	   does	   so,	  Wertheimer	  
would	  argue,	   it	  would	  strike	  us	  as	  exploitative.	  Yet	   if	  she	  decides	  not	  to	  do	  so,	  
but	   to	   ask	   prices	   similar	   to	   most	   other	   grocery	   stores,	   we	   would	   not	   find	   it	  
exploitative,	   even	   though	   all	   other	   circumstances	   are	   the	   same:	   she	   still	   uses	  
people’s	  needs	  or	  vulnerability	  for	  her	  own	  gain,	  and	  people	  still	  have	  no	  better	  
alternative	  than	  to	  buy	  their	  groceries	  in	  her	  shop.	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After	  Wertheimer,	  many	  other	  writers100	  have	  expressed	  the	  same	  view:	  
the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  unfairness,	  and	  we	  can	  avoid	  exploiting	  
others	   by	   asking	   or	   offering	   a	   fair	   price	  when	  we	   transact	  with	   them.	   In	   line	  
with	  the	  criticism	  on	  the	  other	  accounts	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  we	  
should	   note	   that	   when	   talking	   about	   ‘fairness’	   these	   writers	   often	   refer	   to	  
‘transaction-­‐specific	  fairness’,101	  and	  not	  to	  something	  unfair	  in	  the	  background	  
circumstances	  of	  the	  transaction.	  As	  Wertheimer	  remarks:	  
	  
I	  believe	  […]	  that	  we	  should	  distinguish	  between	  fairness	  as	  a	  principle	  
for	   the	   distribution	   of	   social	   resources	   and	   fairness	   as	   a	   principle	   for	  
transactions	   and	   that	   principles	   of	   fair	   transactions	   should	   bracket	  
information	   that	   might	   be	   relevant	   to	   other	   moral	   purposes,	   such	   as	  
justifying	   aid	   or	   redistribution.	   So	   […]	   we	   deliberately	   abstract	   from	  
certain	   elements	   in	   their	   background	   situations,	   such	   as	   the	   parties’	  
overall	  welfare.102	  
	  
If	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitative	   transactions	   is	  unfairness,	   the	  crucial	  question	   for	  
this	   understanding	   of	   exploitation	   is:	   what	   makes	   a	   consensual	   exchange	  
(un)fair?	  	  
	   Perhaps	  surprisingly,	  several	  writers	  advocating	  the	  unfairness	  account	  
of	  exploitation	  do	  not	  address	  this	  question,	  or	  answer	  it	  by	  saying	  that	  whether	  
a	  transaction	  is	  fair	  depends	  on	  the	  circumstances	  or	  on	  which	  view	  of	  fairness	  
one	  holds	  as	  true.103	  This	  may	  reflect	  a	  more	  general	  lack	  of	  attention	  in	  the	  field	  
of	   moral	   philosophy	   to	   analysing	   the	   concept	   of	   fairness	   and	   understanding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  See	  e.g.	  RJ	  Arneson,	  ‘Exploitation’	  in	  LC	  Becker	  and	  CB	  Becker	  (eds),	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Ethics	  
(2nd	  ed,	  Routledge,	  2001)	  515-­‐517;	  TL	  Beauchamp,	  ‘Autonomy	  and	  Consent’	  in	  F	  Miller	  and	  A	  
Wertheimer	  (eds),	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Consent,	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  
55-­‐78;	  E	  Emanuel,	  ‘Addressing	  Exploitation:	  Reasonable	  Availability	  v	  Fair	  Benefits’	  in	  JS	  
Hawkins	  and	  E	  Emanuel	  (eds),	  Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries:	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Clinical	  
Research	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  286-­‐314;	  S	  Gbadegesin	  and	  D	  Wendler,	  ‘Protecting	  
Communities	  in	  Health	  Research	  from	  Exploitation’	  (2006)	  20(5)	  Bioethics	  248-­‐253;	  R	  Mayer,	  
‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’	  (2007)	  24(2)	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Philosophy	  137-­‐150;	  C	  
Meyers,	  ‘Wrongful	  Beneficence:	  Exploitation	  and	  Third	  World	  Sweatshops’	  (2004)	  35(3)	  Journal	  
of	  Social	  Philosophy	  319-­‐333;	  and	  DB	  Resnik,	  ‘Exploitation	  in	  Biomedical	  Research’	  (2003)	  24	  
Theoretical	  Medicine	  233-­‐259.	  
101	  A	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  216.	  
102	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  216.	  
103	  See	  e.g.	  RJ	  Arneson,	  ‘Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  515-­‐517;	  JS	  Hawkins,	  ‘Exploitation	  and	  Placebo	  
Controls’	  in	  JS	  Hawkins	  and	  EJ	  Emanuel,	  Exploitation	  and	  Developing	  Countries,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  
Clinical	  Research	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  246-­‐285;	  and	  Gbadegesin	  and	  Wendler,	  
op.cit.	  248-­‐253.	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what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   fair,104	   even	   though	   the	   concept	   of	   fairness	   does	   play	   a	  
significant	  role	  in	  our	  moral	  thinking,	  and	  has	  been	  widely	  used	  in	  theories	  of,	  
for	  instance,	  political	  obligation105	  and	  justice.106	  
	   In	   general	   terms,	   fairness	   refers	   to	   the	   correct	   ordering	   of	   the	  
distribution	   of	   benefits	   and	   burdens	   (such	   as	   goods,	   effort,	   income,	  
punishments,	   rights,	   and	   victory),107	   and	   a	   fair	   transaction	   is	   a	   transaction	   in	  
which	   every	   party	   gets	   their	   ‘due	   share’.108	   Which	   division	   of	   benefits	   and	  
burdens	   is	   fair	   thus	  depends	  on	  what	  share	  one	   is	  due.	   John	  Broome,	  who	  has	  
set	   out	   what	   is	   perhaps	   the	   best-­‐known	   theory	   of	   fairness,	   describes	   this	   in	  
terms	  of	  claims	  that	  the	  respective	  parties	  have	  to	  a	  good.109	  These	  claims	  may	  
be	  based	  on	  many	  different	  principles,	  such	  as	  equality	  (e.g.	  both	  parties	  should	  
receive	   an	   equal	   share);	   desert	   (one	   party	   has	  made	  more	   effort	   towards	   the	  
good	   and	   thus	   should	   receive	   a	   larger	   share,	   in	   proportion	   to	   her	   effort);	  
agreements	  (if	  a	  party	  has	  been	  promised	  a	  certain	  share	  of	  benefits	  or	  burdens,	  
fairness	   requires	   that	   this	   agreement	   should	   be	   honoured);	   rights	   (one	   party	  
has	  a	  right	  to	  the	  good	  and	  thus	  fairness	  requires	  that	  she	  can	  decide	  whether	  
and	  how	  to	  divide	  the	  good);	  or	  needs	  (one	  party	  has	  more	  need	   for	   the	  good	  
and	   fairness	   requires	   that	   the	   good	   will	   be	   distributed	   according	   to	   need).	  
People	   will	   frequently	   disagree,	   though,	   about	   which	   principles	   can	   ground	  
valid	  fairness	  claims,	  about	  which	  principle(s)	  to	  apply	  in	  particular	  situations,	  
and/or	   about	   which	   principle	   takes	   precedence	   in	   particular	   situations.	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   people	   will	   disagree	   on	   what	   fairness	   means	   or	   requires	   in	  
specific	  situations.	  
	   Confusion	   may	   also	   arise	   because	   like	   the	   concept	   of	   exploitation,	   the	  
concept	  of	   fairness	   is	  used	   in	  both	  a	  non-­‐moral	  and	  a	  moral	   sense.	   In	   its	  non-­‐
moral	  sense,	  the	  word	  ‘fair’	  is	  used,	  for	  example,	  to	  indicate	  that	  some	  action	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  CL	  Carr,	  On	  Fairness	  (Ashgate,	  2000)	  1;	  B	  Saunders,	  ‘Fairness	  Between	  Competing	  Claims’	  
(2010)	  16	  Res	  Publica	  41-­‐55,	  42;	  MM	  Pillutla	  and	  JK	  Murnighan,	  ‘Fairness	  in	  Bargaining’	  (2003)	  
16(3)	  Social	  Justice	  Research	  241-­‐262,	  242;	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  218.	  
105	  See	  e.g.	  DA	  Richards,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Reasons	  for	  Action	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1971).	  	  
106	  E.g.	  J	  Rawls,	  ‘Justice	  as	  Fairness:	  A	  Restatement’	  (1958)	  67	  Philosophical	  Review	  164-­‐194.	  	  
107	  AJ	  Simmons,	  ‘Fairness’	  in	  LC	  Becker	  and	  CB	  Becker	  (eds),	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Ethics	  (2nd	  ed,	  
Routledge,	  2001)	  520-­‐522,	  521.	  
108	  N	  Rescher,	  Fairness,	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  of	  Distributive	  Justice	  (Transaction	  Publishers,	  2002)	  
xii.	  
109	  J	  Broome,	  ‘Fairness’	  (1991)	  91	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society	  87-­‐101,	  92.	  
	   86	  
appropriate	   or	   understandable	   (‘fair	   enough’),	   or	   to	   indicate	   the	   absence	   of	  
blemish	  (‘fair	  weather’,	  ‘fair	  skin’).110	  In	  its	  moral	  sense,	  in	  contrast,	  to	  say	  that	  
something	   is	   fair	   indicates	  a	  moral	  approval,	   and	  entails	   saying	   that	   there	  are	  
moral	  reasons	  why	  things	  should	  be	  like	  that.	  Conversely,	  to	  say	  that	  something,	  
in	  particular	  a	  distribution,	  is	  unfair,	  means	  to	  utter	  a	  moral	  condemnation	  and	  
to	  say	  that,	  for	  some	  moral	  reason,	  the	  distribution	  ought	  to	  be	  different.	  	  
	   When	   proponents	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   say	   that	   exploitation	   is	  
wrong	  because	  it	  involves	  the	  unfair	  division	  of	  benefits	  and	  burdens,	  they	  use	  
the	  concept	  of	   fairness	   in	   its	  moral	  sense.	  After	  all,	   they	   invoke	  the	  concept	  of	  
(un)fairness	  to	  explain	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  morally	  wrong.	  For	  that	  reason,	  
it	  seems	  surprising	  that,	  as	  said	  before,	  several	  writers	  who	  propose	  a	  version	  of	  
the	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation	   do	   not	   address	   the	   question	   of	   what	  
makes	  a	  consensual	  transaction	  unfair.	  This	  is	  because	  if,	  as	  they	  do,	  we	  say	  that	  
exploitative	   transactions	   are	   wrong	   because	   they	   are	   unfair,	   specifying	   when	  
and	   why	   transactions	   are	   unfair	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   further	   elaboration	   or	  
application	  of	  a	   fairness	   theory	  of	  exploitation,	  but	   is	   its	   ‘moral	   core’:	   it	   is	   the	  
part	  that	  actually	  answers	  the	  question	  ‘what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation?’.	  If	  we	  
say	  that	  exploitative	  transactions	  are	  wrong	  because	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  
and	   burdens	   in	   those	   transactions	   are	   unfair,	   we	   say	   that	   the	   distribution	   of	  
benefits	  and	  burdens	  ought,	  for	  some	  moral	  reason,	  to	  be	  different.	  Conversely,	  
if	   we	   say	   that	   a	   certain	   distribution	   of	   benefits	   and	   burdens—say,	   a	   certain	  
price—is	   fair	   and	  non-­‐exploitative,	  we	   say	   that	   one	  morally	   ought	   to	   pay	   this	  
price.	  We	  then	  thus	  have	  to	  explain	  why	  one	  morally	  ought	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  why	  it	  
would	  be	  wrong	  to	  offer	  or	  ask	  a	  lower	  or	  higher	  price.	  If	  one	  does	  not	  explain	  
this,	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  exploitation	  is	  
morally	  wrong,	  but	  merely	  describes	  what	  exploitation	   is	   in	  different	   terms.	   It	  
says	  that	  exploitation	  is	  taking	  advantage	  in	  an	  unfair	  manner	  and	  that	  whether	  
taking	   advantage	   is	   unfair	   depends	   on	   one’s	   view	   of	   unfair	   exchanges,	   which	  
brings	   us	   not	   much	   further	   than	   where	   we	   started:	   exploitation	   is	   taking	  
advantage	   in	   a	   wrongful	   manner,	   but	   exactly	   which	   wrongful	   manner	   is	  
debated.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  See	  Carr,	  op.cit.	  8.	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   To	   avoid	  misunderstanding:	   I	   do	   not	  mean	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   can	   be	  
only	   one	   standard	   of	   fairness,	   and	   one	   justification	   for	   this	   standard,	   that	  
applies	   to	   all	   instances	   of	   exploitation.	   It	   might	   be	   that	   in	   certain	   situations,	  
fairness	  requires	  that	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  are	  divided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  certain	  
principle,	  and	  in	  other	  situations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  another	  principle.	  But	  the	  fact	  
that	  we	  might	  need	  different	  explanations	   for	   the	  requirements	  of	   fairness	   for	  
different	  situations,	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  need	  such	  explanations	  
if	  we	  use	  the	  term	  ‘unfair’	  to	  explain	  the	  moral	  wrong	  in	  exploitation.	  
	   Consequently,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  needs	  
to	  answer	  two	  questions:	  1.	  When	  is	  a	  consensual	  exchange	  (un)fair?	  (and	  thus	  
(non-­‐)exploitative);	  and	  2.	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  That	  is:	  Why	  is	  it	  morally	  wrong	  for	  
us	  to	  ask	  a	  higher	  or	  pay	  a	  lower	  price,	  especially	  if	  the	  other	  is	  willing	  to	  accept	  
this	  price?	  The	  answers	  to	  these	  two	  questions	  are	  of	  course	  often	  based	  on	  the	  
same	  principles,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  so,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  
the	  following	  sections,	  I	  will	  set	  out	  the	  three	  most	  common	  answers	  to	  the	  first	  
question	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  exploitation.	  In	  explaining	  when	  
exchanges	   are	   fair,	   and	   thus	   non-­‐exploitative,	   these	   three	   answers	   refer,	  
respectively,	   to	   production	   costs	   (section	   3.2),	   to	   competitive	   market	   prices	  
(section	  3.4)	  and	   to	  bargaining	  disadvantages	   (section	  3.6).	  As	   I	  will	   show,	  all	  
three	  theories	  are	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  the	  first	  question:	  how	  to	  determine	  
when	  a	  transaction	  is	  fair.	  They	  give	  much	  less	  attention	  to	  the	  second	  question:	  
why	   is	   this	   so;	   that	   is,	   why	   is	   it	   morally	   wrong	   not	   to	   offer	   this	   price.	  
Nevertheless,	   I	  will	   distinguish	   some	  possible	   answers	   to	   the	   second	  question	  
for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  theories.	  For	  the	  fairness	  theory	  based	  on	  production	  costs,	  
I	   discuss	   two	   possible	   answers,	   one	   based	   on	   productivity,	   and	   one	   based	   on	  
needs	  (in	  section	  3.3).	  For	  the	  fairness	  theory	  based	  on	  the	  competitive	  market	  
price,	   I	  discuss	  a	  possible	   justification	  based	  on	  consent	   (section	  3.5).	  And	   for	  
the	   fairness	   theory	  based	  on	  bargaining	  disadvantages,	   I	   discuss	   two	  possible	  
justifications,	   one	   based	   on	   vulnerability	   and	   one	   based	   on	   injustice	   (section	  
3.7).	  Although	  I	  discuss	  each	  possible	  justification	  for	  why	  a	  certain	  price	  is	  fair	  
in	   relation	   to	   a	  particular	  view	  of	  when	  a	  price	   is	   fair,	  with	  which	   it	   fits	  most	  
logically,	   some	   of	   the	   justifications	  may	   perhaps	   also	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   other	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views	  of	  when	  a	  price	  is	  fair.	  For	  instance,	  the	  argument	  about	  vulnerability	  that	  
I	  will	  discuss	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  fairness	  theory	  based	  on	  bargaining	  advantages,	  
might	   perhaps	   also	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   the	   fairness	   theory	   based	   on	   the	  
competitive	   market	   price.	   This,	   I	   think,	   is	   not	   of	   great	   importance	   for	   my	  
argument,	   because	   I	   will	   eventually	   argue	   both	   that	   the	   three	   methods	   of	  
determining	   the	   fair	   price	   are	   problematic,	   and	   that	   all	   five	   possible	  
justifications	  are	  problematic,	  for	  whichever	  of	  the	  three	  methods	  they	  are	  used.	  	  
	  
3.2	  Fairness	  and	  production	  costs	  
	  
One	  reason	  why	  liberal	  theorists	  have	  problems	  in	  explaining	  why	  exploitation	  
is	  wrong,	  or	  unfair,	  is	  that	  they	  typically	  deny	  that	  all	  goods	  have	  an	  objective	  or	  
intrinsic	   value.	   In	   their	   view,	   goods	   have	   a	   use-­‐value,	  which	   depends	   on	   how	  
much	   benefit	   or	   usefulness	   a	   good	   has	   for	   a	   particular	   person	   and	   which	  
therefore	   differs	   from	   person	   to	   person;	   and	   goods	   have	   a	   market	   value	   or	  
exchange	  value,	  which	  depends	  on	  how	  much	  people	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  
good,	   which	   in	   turn	   depends	   on	   the	   good’s	   use	   value,	   and	   the	   supply	   and	  
demand	  for	  the	  good.	  They	  generally	  do	  not	  think	  that	  goods	  have	  an	  intrinsic	  
or	   objective	   value	   that	   is	   distinct	   from	   their	   use	   or	  market	   value,	   and	   can	   be	  
independently	  measured.	  This	  view	  seems	  to	  make	  sense,	  when	  we	  think	  of	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  the	  value	  that	  people	  attach	  to	  certain	  goods	  differs	  over	  time,	  and	  
differs	  from	  person	  to	  person.	  For	  example,	  when	  Apple	  released	  its	  Iphone	  5,	  
and	  priced	  it	  at	  £529,	  many	  people	  were	  willing	  to	  buy	  the	  Iphone	  for	  this	  price,	  
so	   apparently,	   the	   Iphone	   5	  was	  worth	   at	   least	   £529	   for	   those	   people.	   Other	  
people,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  were	  not	  willing	   to	   pay	   this,	   even	   if	   they	  did	   have	  
£529	   to	   spare,	   so	   apparently	   the	   Iphone	   5	   was	   not	   worth	   £529	   for	   them.	  
Similarly,	   if	   you	   have	   an	   Iphone	   5	   and	   look	   at	   the	   common	   price	   for	   which	  
second-­‐hand	  Iphone	  5s	  are	  sold	  on	  the	  internet,	  then	  you	  might	  find	  out	  that	  the	  
market-­‐value	   of	   your	   (second-­‐hand)	   Iphone	   5	   is	   around	   £400,	   but	   if	   Apple	  
tomorrow	   announces	   the	   release	   of	   an	   Iphone	   6,	   you	   will	   probably	   see	   the	  
market-­‐value	  of	  your	  Iphone	  5	  decreasing,	  even	  though	  its	  use	  value	  is	  still	  the	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same	  for	  you.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  someone	  were	  to	  give	  you	  an	  Iphone	  6	  as	  a	  
birthday	  present,	  the	  use-­‐value	  that	  your	  Iphone	  5	  has	  for	  you	  might	  decrease	  
to	  almost	  zero.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  seems	  strange	  to	  say	  that	  your	  Iphone	  5	  has	  
an	  intrinsic	  value,	  because	  the	  value	  that	  both	  you	  and	  other	  people	  attach	  to	  it,	  
can	  vary	  considerably	  with	  different	  circumstances.	  The	  same	  seems	  true	  for	  all	  
goods	  and	  services.	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  is	  a	  subjective	  quality	  is	  widespread,	  but	  
it	  makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  explain	  how	  exploitative	  transactions	  can	  be	  unfair.	  
This	   is	  because,	   as	  mentioned	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   if	  we	   think	   in	   terms	  of	  
use-­‐value,	  the	  exploited	  party	  in	  a	  transaction	  typically	  receives	  as	  much	  value	  
as,	  or	  even	  more	  value	  than,	  the	  exploiting	  party,	  because	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  has	  
so	  much	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  transaction,	  is	  exactly	  what	  makes	  her	  susceptible	  to	  
exploitation.	   And	   if	   we	   think	   of	   the	   value	   of	   goods	   in	   terms	   of	  market	   value,	  
there	   are	   numerous	   examples	   of	   transactions	   in	   which	   one	   of	   the	   parties	  
receives	  the	  market	  value	  for	  the	  good	  or	  service	  she	  provides,	  but	  in	  which	  she	  
is	   nonetheless	   exploited.	   Think	   for	   example	   of	   many	   instances	   of	   sweatshop	  
labour.	  	  
	   The	   first	   possible	   version	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   that	   I	   will	   discuss	  
solves	  this	  problem	  by	  arguing	  that	  goods	  do	  have	  an	  objective	  value	  that	  can	  be	  
measured,	  and	  by	  saying	  that	   it	   is	  unfair	   if,	   in	  a	   transaction	  between	  person	  A	  
and	  B,	  the	  value	  that	  is	  given	  by	  A	  to	  B	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  value	  given	  by	  B	  to	  A.	  
In	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   transaction	   is	   fair	   and	  non-­‐exploitative,	  we	   thus,	   on	  
this	  view,	  have	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  goods	  or	  services	  that	  one	  party	  
receives,	  does	  not	  outweigh	  the	  value	  of	   the	  goods	  or	  services	   the	  other	  party	  
receives.	   A	   key	   question	   is	   therefore:	   if	   goods	   and	   services	   have	   an	   objective	  
value,	   how	   can	   it	   be	   determined	   or	  measured?	   Although	   other	   options	  might	  
exist,111	   the	   most	   feasible	   answer	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   exploitation	   is	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  One	  option	  might	  be	  to	  argue	  that	  goods	  have	  an	  objective	  value	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  they	  contribute	  to	  a	  valuable	  life,	  according	  to	  some	  objective	  conception	  of	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  live	  a	  valuable	  life.	  Thus,	  a	  Louis	  Vuitton	  key	  ring,	  on	  such	  a	  view,	  will	  be	  thought	  to	  
have	  very	  little	  objective	  value	  (and	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  costs	  £300	  may	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  unfair),	  
whereas	  goods	  such	  as	  healthy	  food,	  education,	  and	  books,	  will	  be	  thought	  to	  have	  a	  high	  
objective	  value.	  However,	  such	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  would	  not	  be	  suitable	  to	  
justify	  a	  theory	  of	  exploitation	  as	  unfairness,	  because	  it	  leads	  to	  counterintuitive	  conclusions,	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objective	   value	   of	   goods	   can	   be	  measured	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   costs	   that	  were	  
needed	  to	  produce	  the	  good.	  	  
	  
3.2.1	  Production	  costs-­‐based	  theories	  of	  value	  
Probably	  the	  best-­‐known	  version	  of	  production	  costs-­‐based	  theories	  of	  value	  is	  
Karl	  Marx’s	  labour	  theory	  of	  value.112	  Simply	  put,	  this	  theory	  says	  that	  the	  value	  
of	  goods	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  labour	  time,	  or	  labour	  power,	  socially	  necessary	  
to	  produce	  them.	  The	  value	  of	  labour	  power	  itself,	  in	  turn,	  also	  is	  determined	  by	  
what	   is	   required	   to	   produce	   it,	   and	   this	   is	   identical	   with	  what	   is	   required	   to	  
produce	  the	  means	  of	  subsistence	  of	  the	  worker,	  because	  the	  worker’s	  labour	  is	  
only	   produced	   if	   the	   worker	   herself	   is	   ‘produced’.113	   Although	   Marx	   did	   not	  
express	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   in	   terms	   of	   unfairness,114	   and	   his	   theory	   is	  
primarily	   concerned	  with	  exploitation	  as	  a	   systematic	  phenomenon,	  occurring	  
on	   a	   societal	   level	   between	   a	   capitalist	   class	   and	   a	   working	   class,	   one	   might	  
want	  to	  use	  the	  labour	  theory	  of	  value	  to	  specify	  the	  requirements	  of	  fairness	  in	  
individual	   exchanges	   as	   well.	   If	   so,	   an	   exchange	   would	   be	   fair	   and	   non-­‐
exploitative,	  if	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service	  exchanged	  (which	  depends	  on	  the	  
socially	  necessary	  labour	  time	  to	  produce	  it)	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  value	  of	  the	  good	  or	  
service	  received	  in	  return,	  or	  the	  price	  paid	  for	  that	  good.	  	  
	   The	   labour	   theory	   of	   value	   has,	   however,	   several	   flaws,	   and	   is	   widely	  
rejected	  both	  as	  an	  economic	  and	  as	  a	  moral	  thesis,	  even	  by	  many	  (neo-­‐)Marxist	  
theorists.115	  One	  problem	  is	  that,	  quite	  obviously,	  labour	  is	  usually	  not	  the	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
such	  as	  that	  it	  is	  fair	  (that	  is:	  corresponding	  to	  the	  good’s	  intrinsic	  value)	  to	  ask	  a	  very	  high	  price	  
for	  life’s	  most	  essential	  needs,	  such	  as	  food	  and	  shelter.	  In	  other	  words,	  accusations	  of	  
exploitation	  often	  involve	  people	  who	  need	  goods	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  them	  living	  a	  valuable	  
life,	  because	  their	  need	  of	  something	  important	  is	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  them	  more	  easily	  
exploitable.	  Yet	  on	  this	  conception	  of	  objective	  value,	  such	  essential	  goods	  are	  exactly	  the	  type	  of	  
goods	  that	  would	  have	  a	  high	  objective	  value,	  and	  thus	  the	  type	  of	  goods	  for	  which	  we	  would	  be	  
allowed	  to	  ask	  a	  high	  price.	  
112	  See	  K	  Marx,	  Das	  Kapital:	  Kritik	  der	  Politischen	  Ökonomie	  (vol	  1,	  1867).	  
113	  Marx,	  op.cit.	  139.	  
114	  In	  fact,	  Marx	  did	  not	  explicitly	  state	  that	  exploitation	  is	  morally	  wrong	  at	  all.	  The	  explicit	  
discussion	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  type	  of	  wrong	  only	  started	  after	  Marx.	  
115	  See	  e.g.	  GA	  Cohen,	  ‘The	  Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  Exploitation’	  (1979)	  8	  
Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  338-­‐360;	  MW	  Macy,	  ‘Value	  Theory	  and	  the	  "Golden	  Eggs":	  
Appropriating	  the	  Magic	  of	  Accumulation’	  (1988)	  6(2)	  Sociological	  Theory	  131-­‐152;	  JE	  Roemer,	  
‘R.	  P.	  Wolff’s	  Reinterpretation	  of	  Marx’s	  Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value:	  Comment’	  (1983)	  12(1)	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factor	   that	   contributes	   to	   the	   production	   of	   goods	   an	   thus	   to	   their	   value.	   For	  
instance,	   machinery,	   risk	   taking,	   research,	   land,	   storage,	   transportation,	  
marketing,	  and	  finance,	  all	  add	  to	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  as	  well	  (although	  some	  of	  
these	  might	   be	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   labour	   power).	  Marxist	   theorists	  might	  
respond	   that	   this	   is	   true,	   but	   that	   capitalist	   property	   of	  means	   of	   production	  
such	   as	   machinery	   and	   land	   is	   itself	   theft,	   so	   that	   this	   contribution	   to	   the	  
production	  is	  something	  that	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  into	  account.116	  Nevertheless,	  
there	   are	   few	   people	   who	   would	   maintain	   that	   for	   all	   goods	   that	   are	   being	  
produced	   and	   transacted,	   labour	   is	   the	   only	   legitimate	   factor	   that	   has	  
contributed	  to	  their	  value.	  
	   There	   are	   several	   other	   problems	  with	   the	   labour	   theory	   of	   value	   that	  
are	  worth	  mentioning,	  yet	  I	  will	  first	  set	  out	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	  value	  that	  is	  
based	   on	   production	   costs,	   because	   I	   believe	   both	   theories	   face	   some	   of	   the	  
same	   problems.	   This	   alternative	   theory	   takes	   into	   account	   all	   costs	   of	  
production,	  instead	  of	  only	  labour	  costs,	  to	  determine	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  and	  the	  
fair	  price.	  A	  recent	  and	  extensive	  articulation	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  put	  forward	  by	  
Mark	   Reiff,117	   and	   in	   what	   follows	   I	   will	   primarily	   focus	   on	   his	   theory.	   Reiff	  
distinguishes	  between	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  and	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  good:	  	  
	  
Value	   is	   something	   that	   is	   intrinsic	   to	   whatever	   is	   being	   valued,	  
determined	  by	  whatever	  properties	   it	  has	  and	  how	  these	  were	  created,	  
preserved,	  and	  transferred.	  Utility,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  nature	  
of	   these	  properties,	   their	   level	  of	   scarcity	  under	  current	  conditions,	   the	  
needs,	   wants,	   and	   desires	   they	   can	   satisfy	   (what	   economists	   call	   their	  
“use	  value”),	  and	  the	  needs,	  wants,	  and	  desires	  of	  particular	  persons.	  …	  
Utility	   is	   forward-­‐looking,	   focusing	   on	   use	   value,	   supply,	   and	   demand;	  
whereas	   value	   (meaning	   just	   exchange	   value)	   is	   inherently	   backward	  
looking,	   focusing	  on	  what	   something	   is	   and	  how	   it	   came	   to	  be.	  Used	   in	  
this	  sense,	  then,	  value	  is	  an	  historical,	  objective	  measure,	  whereas	  utility	  
is	  a	  subjective,	  predictive	  one.118	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs	  70-­‐83;	  J	  Schwartz,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’	  (1995)	  29(2)	  
Noûs	  158-­‐188;	  RP	  Wolff,	  ‘A	  Critique	  and	  Reinterpretation	  of	  Marx's	  Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value’	  
(1981)	  10	  (2)	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  89-­‐120.	  
116	  See	  GA	  Cohen,	  History,	  Labour	  and	  Freedom:	  Themes	  from	  Marx	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  1988)	  227.	  	  
117	  MR	  Reiff,	  Exploitation	  and	  Economic	  Justice	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Capitalist	  State	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2013).	  	  
118	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  102.	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Reiff	   criticizes	   the	   common	   view	   of	   the	   just	   price	   as	   based	   on	  market	   value,	  
saying	  that	  while	  the	  market	  price	  may	  be	  an	  accurate	  measure	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  
good,	   it	   is	   not	   a	   good	  measure	   of	   its	   value,	   and	   it	   is	   value	   that	   the	   just	   price	  
should	  measure:	  
	  
[M]arket	   price	   is	   not	  dispositive	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   determining	   the	   just	  
price,	   it	   is	  merely	   suggestive	  of	   the	   just	   price,	   and	   how	   suggestive	   it	   is	  
depends	   very	   much	   on	   the	   surrounding	   circumstances.	   When	   these	  
circumstances	  indicate	  that	  the	  market	  price	  does	  not	  accurately	  reflect	  
costs	   the	   seller	   has	   actually	   incurred,	   we	   are	   unwilling	   to	   pay	   it.	   …	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  people	  purport	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  market	  forces	  of	  
supply	  and	  demand	  to	  determine	  the	  just	  price,	  the	  true	  measure	  of	  the	  
just	  price	  is	  and	  really	  always	  has	  been	  the	  cost	  of	  production.119	  	  
	  
If	  production	  costs	  determine	  the	  true	  value	  of	  goods	  and	  thus	  the	  just,	  or	  fair,	  
price	   of	   goods,	   what	   are	   the	   relevant	   production	   costs?	   Reiff	   argues	   that	   we	  
should	   take	   into	   account	   not	   only	   labour	   costs,	   but	   all	   types	   of	   production	  
factors,	   and	   says	   that	   a	   price	   is	   just	   only	   when	   it	   is	   equivalent	   to	   the	   fully	  
allocated	  social	  cost	  (also	  called	  the	  average	  total	  social	  cost)	  of	  production	  of	  a	  
specific	  good.120	  How	  are	  the	  fully	  allocated	  social	  costs	  to	  be	  calculated?	  Reiff	  
does	  not	  address	  this	  for	  all	  production	  factors,	  such	  as	  machinery	  or	  risk,	  but	  
only	   describes	   how	   to	   calculate	   the	   fully	   allocated	   social	   costs	   of	   individual	  
labour.	  These	  costs	  are	  comprised	  of	  several	  elements,	  he	  says,	  such	  as	  the	  costs	  
of	   education	   and	   training,	   of	   acquiring	   and	   developing	   a	   reputation,	   of	  
networking,121	   and	   the	   costs	   of	   healthcare	   and	   of	   raising	   a	   family,	   because	  
‘[c]apitalism	  can	  only	  succeed	  when	  there	  is	  a	  steady	  supply	  of	  able	  and	  willing	  
workers,	  and	  such	  a	  supply	  can	  exist	  only	  if	  workers	  are	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	  
health	  and	  reproduce’.122	  However,	  the	  most	  important	  element	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  
individual	  labour	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  subsistence	  of	  the	  worker,	  because	  if	  the	  worker	  
did	  not	   exist,	   her	   labour	  would	  not	   exist	   either.	  This	   cost	  of	   subsistence,	  Reiff	  
argues,	  is	  not	  the	  absolute	  minimum	  to	  keep	  workers	  alive	  and	  able	  to	  work,	  but	  
‘an	   amount	   that	   will	   enable	   them	   to	   be	   both	   physically	   and	   psychologically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  107.	  
120	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  4.	  
121	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  127.	  
122	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  128-­‐129.	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capable	   of	   working	   to	   the	   best	   of	   their	   abilities,	   for	   that	   is	   what	   a	   capitalist	  
economy	   wants	   and	   needs	   from	   its	   workers	   if	   it	   is	   to	   be	   maximally	  
productive’.123	  To	  enable	  people	  to	  work	  as	  productively	  as	  they	  can,	  Reiff	  says,	  
they	  must	   feel	   that	   they	   are	   a	   valued	   part	   of	   their	   society,	   which	  means	   that	  
their	  wages	  must	  do	  more	  than	  merely	  satisfying	  their	  basic	  needs.	  
Hence,	  on	  this	  view,	  if	  we	  buy	  or	  sell	  a	  good	  or	  service	  and	  want	  to	  know	  
what	  the	   just	  or	  fair	  price	   is,	  we	  have	  to	   look	  at	  the	   fully	  allocated	  social	  costs	  
required	   for	   the	   production	   of	   that	   good,	   which	   exists	   of	   the	   costs	   for	   all	  
production	   factors,	   including	  a	  decent	  wage	   for	   the	   labour	   that	   contributed	   to	  
the	  production.	  And	  if	  labour	  itself	  is	  the	  good	  that	  is	  sold,	  and	  we	  want	  to	  know	  
what	  constitutes	  a	  fair	  wage,	  we	  have	  to	  look	  at	  which	  wage	  level	   is	  needed	  to	  
cover	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  decent	  living	  standard,	  raising	  a	  family,	  education,	  etcetera.	  	  
The	   production	   costs	   theory	   of	   value	   has	   a	   clear	   advantage	   over	   the	  
labour	  theory	  of	  value	  in	  that	  it	  more	  accurately	  describes	  all	  factors	  that	  might	  
add	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   goods	   and	   of	   their	   value.	   Reiff’s	   theory,	   like	  Marx’s,	   is	  
mainly	  concerned	  with	  describing	  fair	  exchanges	  in	  the	  labour	  market,	  between	  
employers	  and	  employees,	  but	  it	  seems	  also	  suited	  to	  explain	  other	  examples	  of	  
exploitation	   that	   I	  have	  discussed,	   such	  as	   loan	  sharks	  or	  passersby	  who	  offer	  
stranded	   passengers	   a	   lift	   for	   an	   exorbitant	   price.	   The	   costs	   which	   the	   loan	  
sharks	   and	  passersby	   incur	   are	   clearly	  much	   less	   than	   the	  prices	   they	   ask	   for	  
their	   services,	   which	   makes	   a	   production	   costs-­‐based	   theory	   of	   value	   and	  
fairness	   seem	   well-­‐matched	   to	   our	   intuitions	   of	   what	   makes	   exploitative	  
transactions	   unfair.	   Nevertheless,	   any	   view	   that	   bases	   the	   value	   of	   goods	   on	  
production	   costs—whether	   on	   all	   production	   costs	   or	   solely	   on	   labour—faces	  
some	  serious	  problems,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
3.2.2	  Problems	  with	  production	  costs-­‐based	  theories	  of	  value	  and	  fairness	  
One	   problem	  with	   basing	   the	   value	   of	   goods	   or	   services	   on	   their	   production	  
costs	  is	  that	  not	  everything	  that	  adds	  costs	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service,	  
also	  adds	  value	  to	  it.	  For	  example,	  it	  seems	  strange	  to	  say	  that	  we	  can	  increase	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  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  128.	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the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service	  by	  producing	  it	  less	  efficiently,	  with	  more	  labour	  
costs	   or	   other	   costs,	   unless	   producing	   the	   good	   less	   efficiently	   increases	   its	  
quality.	  Likewise,	   it	  seems	  wrong	  to	  say	  that	  the	   fair	  price	  to	  ask	  for	  a	  good	  is	  
higher	  the	  more	  inefficiently	  we	  produce	  it,	  even	  if	  its	  quality	  does	  not	  change.	  If	  
fairness	   requires	   that	   goods	   exchanged	   are	   of	   equal	   value,	   it	   seems	  wrong—
unfair,	  in	  fact—if	  a	  buyer	  has	  to	  pay	  more	  because	  the	  seller	  added	  extra	  costs	  
to	  the	  good’s	  production	  which	  added	  nothing	  to	  the	  quality	  or	  usefulness	  of	  the	  
good.124	  	  
	   It	  might	  be	  responded	  that	  this	  objection	  is	  only	  valid	  when	  we	  see	  the	  
production	  costs	  theory	  of	  value	  (or	  labour	  theory	  of	  value)	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  
actual	   costs	  made	   at	   the	   time	   a	   good	  was	   produced.	   It	  might	   be	   said	   that	  we	  
should,	   instead,	  see	   the	   theory	  as	  referring	   to	   the	  average	  costs	   that	  would	  be	  
necessary	  to	  produce	  a	  good	  at	  the	  time	  of	  measuring	  its	  value.	  Thus,	  according	  
to	   this	   response,	   if	   a	   vacuum	   cleaner	   was	   produced	   two	   months	   ago,	   but	   a	  
technical	   innovation	   last	  month	   enabled	  much	   cheaper	   production	   of	   vacuum	  
cleaners	   from	  that	  moment	  on,	  and	  we	  now	  want	   to	  measure	   the	  value	  of	   the	  
vacuum	   cleaner	   that	   was	   produced	   two	   months	   ago,	   we	   should	   look	   at	   the	  
production	   costs	   for	   making	   the	   vacuum	   cleaner	   now,	   after	   the	   technical	  
innovation,	  and	  not	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  making.	  Hence,	  according	  to	  this	  response,	  
the	  value	  of	   the	  original	   vacuum	  cleaner	  would	  be	  decreased	  by	   the	   technical	  
innovation,	  even	  though	  it	  cost	  more	  to	  produce	  than	  similar	  vacuum	  cleaners	  
produced	   after	   the	   innovation.	   To	   give	   another	   example,	   suppose	   the	  
production	  costs	  for	  handmade	  chocolate	  cakes	  are	  typically	  around	  £20	  (taking	  
into	   account	   a	   reasonable	   hourly	   wage),	   but	   one	   baker	   is	   very	   slow	   or	  
frequently	  drops	  cakes	  on	  the	  floor.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  would	  be	  argued,	  we	  should	  
not	   determine	   the	   value	   of	   the	   baker’s	   cakes	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   actual	   costs,	  
pricing	  them	  at,	  say,	  £50,	  but	  by	  ignoring	  the	  extra	  costs	  created	  by	  the	  baker’s	  
incompetence,	  and	   looking	  at	   the	   typical	   costs	  necessary	   to	  make	  a	  cake:	  £20.	  
The	   labour	   theory	  of	  value	  has	  been	   interpreted	   to	  mean	  both	   things:	   that	  we	  
should	   look	   at	   the	   actual	   costs	   incurred	   to	   create	   a	   good	   at	   the	   time	   it	   was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  See	  for	  an	  argument	  along	  these	  lines	  JM	  Elegido,	  ‘The	  Just	  Price:	  Three	  Insights	  from	  the	  
Salamanca	  School’	  (2009)	  90	  Journal	  of	  Business	  Ethics	  29-­‐46,	  34.	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produced,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  look	  at	  the	  costs	  we	  would	  typically	  need	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  measuring	  the	  value.125	  As	  far	  as	  the	  broader	  production	  theory	  of	  value	  
is	  concerned,	  it	  seems	  that	  Reiff	  means	  the	  former;126	  that	  we	  should	  look	  at	  the	  
actual	  costs	  made	  to	  produce	  a	  good,	  but	  one	  might	  try	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  latter,	  in	  
order	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems	  the	  former	  view	  causes.	  	  
	   However,	  calculating	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  typical	  costs	  
necessary	   to	  produce	  a	   good	   is	  problematic	   as	  well.	   For	  one	   thing,	  we	   can	  no	  
longer	   say	   that	   production	   costs	   create	   the	   value	   of	   goods,	   and,	   as	  Reiff	   does,	  
that	  value	  is	  objective	  and	  backward	  looking,	  and	  ‘something	  that	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  
whatever	   is	   being	   valued,	   determined	   by	  whatever	   properties	   it	   has	   and	  how	  
these	   were	   created,	   preserved,	   and	   transferred’.127	   The	   value	   of	   a	   good	   is	   no	  
longer	  an	  intrinsic	  characteristic	  of	  the	  good,	  but	  instead	  merely	  an	  indicator	  of	  
the	   average	   or	   common	   production	   costs	   at	   a	   given	   point	   in	   time.	   And	   if	   the	  
value	   of	   a	   good	   is	   not	   an	   intrinsic	   value,	   depending	   on	   the	   specific	   good	   in	  
question,	  but	  merely	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  average	  production	  costs	  of	  a	  good	  at	  a	  
certain	  time,	  other	  problems	  arise	  as	  well.	  
	   For	  instance,	  one	  point	  that	  becomes	  problematic	  is	  Reiff’s	  requirement,	  
a	  version	  of	  which	  is	  also	  present	  in	  Marx’s	  theory	  of	  value,	  that	  wages	  need	  to	  
be	   sufficient	   to	   enable	   workers	   to	   have	   a	   decent	   standard	   of	   living.	   This	  
requirement	   is	   independent	   of	   the	   productivity	   of	  workers,	   or	   of	  which	   good	  
they	  are	  producing.	  This,	  however,	  is	  arguably	  unfair	  to	  the	  employer,	  who	  may	  
have	  to	  pay	  her	  employees	  more	  than	  they	  actually	  produce	  in	  value	  and	  profit,	  
and	  thus	  make	  a	  loss.	  It	  could	  be	  objected	  that,	  on	  a	  production	  costs	  theory	  of	  
value,	   it	   is	   impossible	   that	   employers	  have	   to	  pay	   their	   employees	  more	   than	  
what	   the	   employees	   create	   in	   value,	   because	   on	   such	   a	   theory	   the	   value	   of	  
products	  depends	  on	  their	  production	  costs.	  This	  means	  that	  if	  wages	  and	  thus	  
production	  costs	  rise,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  produced	  goods	  also	  rises.	  Yet	  if,	  as	  said	  
above,	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  and	  the	  fair	  price	  cannot	  be	  calculated	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  two	  meanings,	  and	  a	  criticism	  on	  each	  of	  them,	  see	  Cohen,	  ‘The	  
Labor	  Theory	  of	  Value	  and	  the	  Concept	  of	  Exploitation’,	  op.cit.	  338-­‐360.	  
126	  This	  is	  implied	  by	  his	  earlier	  cited	  claim	  that	  the	  value	  of	  a	  good	  is	  inherently	  backward	  
looking	  and	  ‘determined	  by	  whatever	  properties	  it	  has	  and	  how	  these	  were	  created,	  preserved,	  
and	  transferred’	  (emphasis	  added).	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  102.	  
127	  Reiff,	  op.cit.	  102,	  emphasis	  added.	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the	  actual	   costs	   incurred	   to	  produce	  a	  good,	  but	   should	  be	  determined	  by	   the	  
common	   costs	   necessary	   to	   make	   that	   product,	   the	   fair	   price	   of	   a	   product	   is	  
more	  or	  less	  fixed	  if	  there	  are	  numerous	  producers,	  and	  any	  particular	  producer	  
will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   increase	   the	   price	   if	   she	   incurs	   extra	   costs	   by	   having	   an	  
inefficient	  employee.	  Hence,	   if	   such	  an	  employer	   is	  under	  an	  obligation	   to	  pay	  
good	  wages,	  no	  matter	  the	  productivity	  of	  her	  employees,	  this	  will	  force	  her	  to	  
make	   a	   loss,	   which	   is	   arguably	   unfair	   on	   her.	   A	   further	   and	   related	   possible	  
objection,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   a	   production	   costs	   theory	   of	   fairness	   that	  
incorporates	  a	  requirement	  of	  a	  certain	  wage	  level,	  may	  not	  leave	  enough	  room	  
for	   rewarding	   effort	   and	   penalizing	   laziness,	   while	   rewarding	   people	   at	   least	  
partially	   in	   proportion	   to	   their	   efforts	   may	   be	   considered	   important	   for	   fair	  
distributions.	  
It	  might	  be	  replied	  that	  although	  Reiff’s	  version	  of	   the	  production	  costs	  
theory	  of	  value	  may	  be	  problematic,	  we	  could	  also	  determine	  the	  value	  of	  goods	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  actual	  production	  costs	  instead	  of	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ‘fully	  
allocated	   social	   costs’	   that	   include	   a	   considerable	   wage	   for	   all	   labour.	   This,	  
however,	   would	   not	   avoid	   some	   of	   the	   further	   problems	   discussed	   below.	  
Moreover,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  we	  would	  then	  decide	  what	  constitutes	  a	  fair	  price	  
for	   labour.	   If	   fair	   wages	   are	   to	   be	   decided	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   actual	   costs	   of	  
labour,	  this	  makes	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  fairness	  that	  says	  that	  fair	  wages	  are	  whatever	  
actual	  wages	  people	  receive.	  Such	  a	  theory	  would	  consequently	  not	  be	  suitable	  
to	   justify	  a	  number	  of	   claims	  of	  unfairness	  and	  exploitation,	   such	  as	   the	  claim	  
that	   it	   is	  unfair	  and	  exploitative	   that	  some	  workers	  work	  very	   long	  hours	  and	  
receive	  very	  low	  wages.	  	  
	  
Another	   possible	   objection	   to	   production	   costs-­‐based	   theories	   of	   value	   is	  
illustrated	   in	   an	   example	   by	   Juan	   Manuel	   Elegido.	   He	   tells	   us	   to	   imagine	   a	  
person	  who	  finds	  a	  coin	  worth	  $1	  million	  on	  the	  market,	  and	  wants	  to	  sell	  it.	  The	  
fair	  price	  to	  sell	  the	  coin,	  according	  to	  a	  production	  cost	  theory	  of	  value,	  is	  not	  
$1	  million,	  but,	  say,	  $20.	  But	  what,	  Elegido	  asks,	   if	   the	  buyer	  of	   the	  coin	   is	  Bill	  
Gates?	  It	  seems	  weird	  to	  say	  that	  Bill	  Gates,	  who	  certainly	  does	  not	  need	  a	  gift	  of	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$999,980,	   has	  more	   right	   to	   this	   added	   value	   than	   the	   person	  who	   found	   the	  
coin.128	  	  
	   A	  possible	  response	  may	  be	  that	  according	  to	  a	  production	  costs	  theory	  
of	  value,	  the	  coin	  really	  is	  only	  worth	  the	  production	  costs	  ($20	  in	  this	  case),	  and	  
should	  not	  be	  worth	  $1	  million	  on	  the	  market,	  and	  that,	   thus,	  Bill	  Gates	  would	  
not	   receive	   a	   gift	   of	   $999,980,	   because	  he	  would	  not	  be	   able	   to	   sell	   it	   for	   any	  
more	  than	  $20.	  This	  response	   ignores	  the	   fact	   that	   in	   the	  actual	  world,	  people	  
are	  frequently	  willing	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  certain	  goods	  than	  their	  production	  costs,	  
and	  that	  someone	  will	  receive	  this	  added	  value.	  And	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  a	  
theory	   of	   fairness	   should	   specify	   to	   whom	   such	   added	   value	   ought	   to	   be	  
allocated.	  We	  may	  also	  wonder	  how	  we	  would	  calculate	  the	  production	  costs	  of	  
finding	  the	  coin,	  which	  in	  this	  example	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  $20.	  Determining	  the	  
production	  costs	  may	  be	  easy	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  actual	  costs	  the	  person	  incurred	  
to	  find	  the	  coin,	  but	  if,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  this	  is	  a	  problematic	  conception	  of	  the	  
production	  costs	  theory	  of	  value,	  and	  we	  should	  look	  instead	  at	  the	  average	  or	  
typical	  costs,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  for	  rare	  goods	  such	  as	  the	  coin.	  	  
	   Another	  response	  to	  the	  Bill	  Gates	  example	  could	  be	  that	  while	  it	  indeed	  
seems	  unreasonable	  to	  say	  that	  fairness	  requires	  that	  Bill	  Gates	  receives	  a	  gift	  of	  
$999,980,	  it	  is	  a	  very	  improbable	  hypothetical	  example,	  and	  the	  only	  reason	  that	  
the	  example	  works	  is	  that	  Bill	  Gates	  is	  extremely	  rich.	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  
many	  other	  situations	  in	  which	  people	  ‘find’	  something	  that	  can	  be	  sold	  on	  the	  
market	  for	  a	  price	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  production	  costs,	  we	  indeed	  think	  that	  
doing	  so	  is	  unfair.	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  argued,	  if	  a	  pharmaceutical	  company	  
invents	  a	  life-­‐saving	  drug,	  patents	  it,	  and	  sells	  it	  for	  a	  price	  much	  higher	  than	  the	  
costs	   of	   production	   and	   research,	   this	   seems	  unfair.	   This	   possible	   response	   is	  
correct,	   I	   think,	   in	   saying	   that	  many	  examples	  of	   selling	   above	   the	  production	  
costs	  appear	  unfair,	  and	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  the	  Bill	  Gates	  example	  does	  
not	  seem	  unfair	  is	  that	  Bill	  Gates	  is	  much	  richer	  than	  the	  person	  who	  found	  the	  
coin.	  Yet	  what	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  production	  costs	  alone	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  
explaining	  when	  a	  transaction	  is	  considered	  fair,	  and	  that	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  
people’s	  relative	  needs	  and	  affluence	  also	  play	  a	  role.	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   Finally,	  if	  a	  just	  transaction	  is	  a	  transaction	  in	  which	  goods	  of	  equal	  value	  
are	   exchanged,	  where	   their	   value	   is	   dependent	  on	   their	  production	   costs,	   this	  
may	   lead	   to	   counterintuitive	   results	   about	   which	   transactions	   are	   unfair	   for	  
another	  reason	  as	  well.	  Suppose	  that	  I	  collect	  books	  about	  the	  North	  Pole,	  and	  I	  
have	  an	  acquaintance	  who	  collects	  books	  about	  rabbits.	  I	  happen	  to	  have	  a	  19th	  
century	   book	   about	   rabbits,	   and	   my	   acquaintance	   happens	   to	   have	   a	   19th	  
century	  book	  about	  the	  North	  Pole,	  and	  I	  offer	  to	  swap	  the	  books.	  The	  books	  are	  
equal	  in	  quality	  and	  length,	  and	  both	  not	  very	  rare,	  and	  not	  at	  all	  valuable	  on	  the	  
market.	  Yet	   the	  production	  costs	  of	   the	  book	  about	  the	  North	  Pole	  were	  much	  
higher	  than	  the	  production	  costs	  of	  the	  book	  about	  rabbits,	  and	  even	  if	  someone	  
were	  to	  write	  the	  book	  again	  in	  this	  century,	  the	  costs	  of	  writing	  the	  North	  Pole	  
book	  would	   be	  much	   higher.	  My	   acquaintance	   and	   I	   are	   both	   happy	  with	   the	  
exchange,	   though,	  because	   I	  do	  not	  care	   for	  books	  about	   rabbits	  and	  she	  does	  
not	  care	  for	  books	  about	  the	  North	  Pole,	  and	  we	  both	  could	  not	  sell	   the	  books	  
for	  much	  money	   to	   anyone	   else.	   In	   sum,	  we	  both	   think	  our	   exchange	   is	   a	   fair	  
exchange,	  which	  leaves	  us	  both	  equally	  satisfied.	  Yet	  according	  to	  a	  production	  
costs	   theory	   of	   value,	   the	  North	  Pole	   book	   is	  worth	  much	  more,	   and	   thus	   the	  
exchange	  is	  unfair.	  	  
	   It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  this	  exchange	  is	  not	  unfair	  even	  on	  a	  production	  
costs	  theory	  of	  value,	  because	  both	  parties	  voluntary	  choose	  to	  swap	  the	  books	  
that	  are	  really	  of	  different	  value.	  Yet	  a	  proponent	  of	  production	  costs	  theories	  of	  
value	   could	   not	   make	   this	   reply,	   because	   it	   would	   mean	   that	   she	   is	  
acknowledging	   that	   the	   fairness	   of	   transactions	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   some	  
objective	  value	  of	   the	  goods,	  but	  on	   the	  use-­‐value	   that	   the	  goods	  have	   for	   the	  
parties	   and	   the	   voluntariness	   of	   the	   exchange—which	   is	  what	   the	   production	  
costs	  view	  of	  fairness	  is	  trying	  to	  deny.	  	  
	  
In	   sum,	   I	   believe	   that	   any	   theory	   of	   value	   that	   is	   based	   on	   production	   costs	  
cannot	   adequately	   explain	  when	   exchanges	   or	   prices	   are	   fair	   because,	   on	   the	  
one	   hand,	   production	   costs	   do	   not	   create	   the	   intrinsic	   value	   of	   goods,	   if	   this	  
exists	  at	  all,	  but	  are	  at	  most	  an	  indicator	  of	  their	  value;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
even	  as	  an	   indicator	  of	   the	  value	  of	  goods	  and	   the	   fair	  price,	  production	  costs	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are	  a	  problematic	  measure	  that	  can	   lead	  to	  counterintuitive	  conclusions	  about	  
which	  exchanges	  are	  fair	  and	  unfair.	  
	  
3.3	  Why	  do	  production	  costs	  make	  for	  a	  fair	  price?	  	  
	  
In	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   chapter	   I	   distinguished	   two	   questions	   that	   are	  
important	  for	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  First,	  when	  is	  an	  exchange	  
unfair?	  Second,	  why	  is	  this	  so?	  That	  is:	  why	  should	  we,	  morally,	  pay	  this	  price,	  
and	  why	  is	  it	  morally	  wrong	  for	  us	  to	  ask	  a	  higher	  or	  pay	  a	  lower	  price?	  So	  far,	  I	  
have	  only	  discussed	  what	  fairness	  theories	  based	  on	  production	  costs	  say	  about	  
the	  first	  question.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  discuss	  what	  they	  may	  say	  about	  the	  second	  
question:	  why	  is	  it	  morally	  wrong	  not	  to	  offer	  a	  price	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  value	  of	  
a	   good’s	   (socially	   allocated)	  production	   costs,	   taking	  particular	   account	   of	   the	  
fact	  that	  these	  costs	  include	  wages	  that	  are	  high	  enough	  to	  enable	  people	  to	  lead	  
a	   reasonably	   good	   life.	   This	   I	  will	   split	   into	   two	   different	   questions.	   The	   first	  
question	   is	   the	  general	  question	  of	  why	  people	  who	  sell	   (or	  buy)	  goods	  ought	  
not	  to	  ask	  a	  price	  for	  their	  goods	  that	  is	  higher	  (or	  lower)	  than	  the	  production	  
costs.	  The	  second	  question	  is	  why	  employers	  should	  always	  pay	  wages	  that	  are	  
high	  enough	  to	  enable	  people	  to	  lead	  a	  reasonably	  good	  life.	  I	  will	  start	  with	  the	  
second	  question,	  and	  discuss	   two	  arguments	   for	   it,	  one	  based	  on	  productivity,	  
and	  one	  based	  on	  needs.	  
	  
3.3.1	  Productivity	  and	  fair	  wages	  
As	   discussed	   in	   section	   3.2,	   Reiff	   justifies	   why	   employers	   ought	   to	   pay	   living	  
wages	   by	   saying	   that	   this	   is	   what	   the	   capitalist	   economy	   wants	   and	   needs,	  
because	  only	  with	  decent	  wages	  can	  people	  be	  capable	  and	  motivated	  enough	  to	  
work	   as	   productively	   as	   possible.	   Similarly,	   only	   when	   people	   have	   enough	  
money	   to	   have	   children	   and	   raise	   and	   educate	   them,	   will	   there	   be	   enough	  
people	  to	  work	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
What	  a	  capitalist	  system	  or	  companies	  in	  that	  system	  need	  to	  operate	  as	  
productively	  as	  possible	  seems,	  however,	  a	  problematic	  moral	   justification	   for	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why	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  not	  to	  pay	  a	  certain	  wage	  level.	  For	  one	  thing,	  if	  what	  a	  
capitalist	   system	  needs	   to	  work	  as	  productively	  as	  possible	   is	  what	  ultimately	  
justifies	  why	  paying	  a	  certain	  wage	  is	  morally	  required,	  we	  need	  a	  justification	  
of	   why	   it	   is	   morally	   important	   that	   the	   capitalist	   system	   produces	   as	  
productively	   as	   possible.	   And	   arguably,	   although	   it	  may	   be	   desirable	   that	   the	  
capitalist	  economy	  works	  productively	  enough	  to	  bring	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  wealth	  
to	   a	   society,	   it	   is	   not	   morally	   pivotal	   that	   the	   capitalist	   economy	   works	   as	  
productively	  as	  possible.	  
Secondly,	  even	  if	  we	  would	  admit	  that	  what	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  needs	  
to	  work	  as	  productively	  as	  possible	  is	  of	  moral	  importance,	  it	  is	  not	  at	  all	  clear	  
that	   this	   necessarily	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   employers	   ought	   to	   pay	   all	  
employees	  considerable	  wages.	  Suppose	  that	  in	  a	  certain	  economic	  system	  most	  
employees	   would	   still	   work	   quite	   productively	   and	  motivated	   if	   they	   receive	  
very	   low	  wages,	  because	   they	  are	  afraid	   to	   lose	   their	   job,	   since	  not	  many	   jobs	  
are	  available.	  And	  suppose	  that	  companies	  could,	  all	  things	  considered,	  produce	  
more	   cost-­‐effectively	   by	   giving	   their	   employees	   very	   low	  wages	   in	   return	   for	  
work	  that	  is	  only	  slightly	  less	  productive	  than	  if	  the	  employees	  were	  to	  receive	  
much	   higher	   wages,	   because	   it	   enables	   them	   to	   hire	   more	   employees.	   If	   the	  
productiveness	  of	  a	  capitalist	  economy	  is	  what	  determines	  why	  a	  certain	  wage	  
level	  is	  fair,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  such	  low	  wages	  would	  also	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  
fair.	   Moreover,	   this	   is	   not	   merely	   an	   unrealistic	   hypothetical	   example.	   The	  
current	  global	  economic	  system,	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  many	  sweatshop	  factories	  
in	  developing	  countries	  which	  offer	  their	  employees	  very	   low	  wages,	   indicates	  
that	   such	   companies	   and	   the	   global	   economy	  might	   indeed	   function	  all	   things	  
considered	   as	   productively	   and	   cost-­‐effectively	   as	   possible	   by	   offering	   low	  
wages,	  especially	  given	  the	  large	  number	  of	  impoverished	  people	  with	  no	  better	  
alternative	   than	   to	  work	   in	   a	   sweatshop	   factory.	   Hence,	   even	   if	  we	   could	   use	  
“what	  the	  capitalist	  economy	  needs	  or	  wants”	  as	  a	  moral	  justification	  for	  why	  a	  
certain	  wage	  level	  is	  required,	  it	  does	  not	  automatically	  lead	  to	  the	  considerable	  
wage	  level	  that	  Reiff	  is	  advocating.	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3.3.2	  Needs	  and	  fair	  wages	  
Although	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   Reiff’s	   justification	   for	   the	   requirement	   that	  
employers	  offer	  substantial	   living	  wages	  to	  all	  employees	  is	  problematic,	  there	  
may	  be	  other	  reasons	  for	  why	  this	  is	  morally	  required.	  One	  possible	  reason	  that	  
readily	  comes	  to	  mind	  is	  that	  employers	  ought	  to	  offer	  substantial	  living	  wages	  
because	   they	   ought	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	  with	  whom	   they	   interact	   to	  meet	  
their	  needs	  and	  to	  live	  a	  meaningful	  life.	  	  
Note	   that	   by	   making	   this	   argument,	   we	   are	   back	   at	   the	   argument	  
discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   section	   3,	   on	   the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation.	   That	  
account	   argues	   that	   in	   all	   exploitative	   transactions	   one	   party	   in	   the	   exchange	  
has	  a	  serious	  need	  to	  be	  met,	  and	  the	  other	  party,	  who	  is	  much	  better	  off,	  has	  a	  
moral	   duty	   to	   help	   her	   in	   meeting	   her	   needs.	   The	   wrong	   in	   exploitation,	  
according	  to	  that	  account,	  is	  that	  the	  exploiting	  party	  violates	  the	  moral	  duty	  to	  
help	   the	   other	   to	  meet	   her	   needs,	   and	   instead	   takes	   advantage	   of	   the	   other’s	  
situation.	   In	   chapter	   2,	   I	   tried	   to	   show	   that	   this	   needs	   argument	   cannot	  
adequately	   explain	   why	   exploitative	   transactions	   are	   wrong.	   One	   reason	   for	  
this,	  it	  was	  argued,	  are	  problems	  in	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  
all	  individuals	  with	  whom	  we	  transact	  to	  fully	  meet	  their	  needs;	  whether	  based	  
on	   a	   Kantian	   duty	   of	   beneficence	   or	   on	   the	   moral	   importance	   of	   people’s	  
dependency	  on	  us.	  The	  same	  problems	  would	  resurface	  if	  we	  were	  to	  argue	  for	  
the	  claim	  that	  fair	  wages	  are	  generous	  living	  wages,	  and	  that	  employers	  ought	  to	  
pay	  them	  because	  they	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  their	  employees	  to	  meet	  their	  
needs	   and	   live	   a	   decent	   life.	   This	   seems	   too	   demanding	   a	   requirement	   for	  
particular	   employers,	   especially	   if	   we	   think	   of	   situations	   in	   which	   a	   certain	  
employee	   does	   not	   work	   enough,	   or	   efficiently	   enough,	   to	   actually	   earn	   back	  
such	  a	  wage,	  which	  would	  mean	   that	  we	  are	  obliging	   the	  employer	   to	  make	  a	  
loss.	  	  
Moreover,	  as	  was	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2,	  even	  if	  we	  would	  deny	  that	  this	  is	  
too	   demanding,	   and	   argue	   that	   employers,	   like	   everyone	   else,	   do	   have	   an	  
individual	   moral	   duty	   to	   benefit	   people	   in	   this	   way	   if	   they	   are	   able	   to,	   that	  
requirement	   is	   not	   related	   to	   whether	   we	   consider	   a	   particular	   transaction	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exploitative,	  or	  unfair.	  For	  example,	  suppose,	  as	  was	  said	   in	  chapter	  2,	   that	  an	  
employer	  voluntarily	  pays	  a	  very	  generous	  wage	  to	  an	  employee.	  This	  wage	  is	  
much	   higher	   than	  what	   is	   commonly	   paid	   for	  work	   of	   that	   type,	   and	   actually	  
brings	   a	   loss	   to	   the	   employer,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   this	   wage	   still	   does	   not	  
amount	   to	   a	   full	   living	  wage.	   I	   do	  not	   think	   that	  many	  would	   consider	   such	   a	  
wage	  unfairly	  low,	  or	  exploitative,	  even	  if	  we,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  may	  think	  that	  
the	  employer,	  like	  all	  other	  affluent	  people,	  has	  an	  individual	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  
to	  meet	  the	  employee’s	  needs	  and	  enable	  her	  to	  live	  a	  decent	  life.	  Hence,	  even	  if	  
affluent	  people	  do	  have	  an	   individual	  moral	  duty	   to	  help	  others	   to	  meet	   their	  
needs,	   or	   to	   benefit	   others	   in	   order	   to	   help	   them	   to	   live	   a	   decent	   life,	   the	  
requirements	   of	   this	   duty	   are	   not	   related	   to	   whether	   we	   find	   a	   particular	  
transaction	  in	  which	  someone	  is	  engaged	  exploitative	  or	  unfair.	  Therefore,	  such	  
a	  moral	  duty	  cannot	  explain	  why	  certain	  transactions	  are	  exploitative	  or	  unfair.	  
Likewise,	   it	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   why	   a	   certain	   wage	   level	   is	   unfair	   and	  
exploitative,	  as	  the	  transaction	  costs	  theory	  of	  fairness	  argues.	  	  
There	  may	  be	  other	  arguments	  to	  justify	  the	  claim	  that	  employers	  ought	  
to	   offer	  wages	   that	   provide	   a	   decent	   standard	   of	   living	   to	   all	   employees,	   and	  
why	  it	  is	  unfair	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  Perhaps	  we	  can	  base	  this	  claim	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  
justice,	  for	  instance.	  The	  justice-­‐based	  argument	  for	  fairness	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  
section	   3.7.2,	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   unfair	   prices	   should	   be	  
calculated	  by	   referring	   to	  bargaining	  disadvantages,	   but	   that	  discussion	  might	  
be	   seen	   as	   a	   possible	   justification	   for	   the	   production	   costs-­‐based	   view	   of	  
fairness	   as	   well.	   However,	   in	   section	   3.7.2	   I	   will	   argue	   against	   justice-­‐based	  
arguments	  for	  why	  we	  ought	  to	  pay	  the	  fair	  price,	  on	  whatever	  view	  of	  what	  the	  
fair	  price	  involves.	  
	  
3.3.3	  Production	  costs	  and	  fair	  prices	  
So	  far	  I	  have	  only	  discussed	  possible	  arguments	  for	  why	  we	  ought	  to	  calculate	  
the	  costs	  of	  labour	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  substantial	  living	  wages,	  and	  why	  employers	  
ought	   to	   pay	   such	  wages	   to	   all	   their	   employees.	   I	   will	   now	   turn	   to	   the	  more	  
general	  argument	  of	  production	  costs-­‐based	   theories	  of	   fairness,	  which	   is	   that	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fair	  prices	  are	  prices	   that	   reflect	   the	  production	  costs	  of	  goods,	  and	   that	   if	  we	  
sell	  or	  buy	  a	  good,	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  offer	  prices	  that	  are	  much	  higher	  or	   lower	  
than	   the	   costs	   incurred	   to	   produce	   the	   good	   (including	   a	   decent	  wage).	  What	  
could	  be	  an	  argument	  for	  this	  claim?	  Why	  ought	  we,	  morally,	  not	  to	  ask	  prices	  
that	   are	   much	   higher	   than	   the	   production	   costs?	   As	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   in	  
section	   3.2,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   assume	   that	   production	   costs	   create	   the	  
‘inherent’	  or	  ‘objective’	  value	  of	  goods,	  if	  such	  a	  value	  exists.	  Why	  then,	  would	  it	  
be	   morally	   wrong	   to	   ask	   a	   price	   for	   a	   good	   that	   is	   much	   higher	   than	   its	  
production	  costs?	  Presumably,	  this	  is	  because	  it	  means	  that	  the	  seller	  would	  be	  
making	   a	   lot	   of	   profit,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   buyer,	  who	   is	   paying	   a	   lot	  more	  
money	  than	  she	  could	  have.	  Why,	  then,	  is	  this	  always	  morally	  wrong?	  And	  is	  it	  
always	  exploitative?	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  in	  which	  I	  set	  out	  my	  own	  view	  of	  what	  
is	   wrong	   with	   exploitation,	   I	   will	   explain	   that,	   in	   my	   view,	   this	   is	   frequently	  
morally	  wrong	  if	  and	  because	  it	  is	  greedy.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  always	  morally	  wrong,	  or	  
greedy,	   and	   it	   is	   certainly	   not	   always	   exploitative.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   earlier	  
example	  of	  a	  person	  who	  finds	  a	  rare	  coin	  worth	  $1	  million	  on	  the	  market,	  who	  
tries	   to	   sell	   this	   coin	   to	   Bill	   Gates	   for	   $1	  million,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   the	   person	   is	  
acting	  wrongly,	   greedily,	   or	   exploitatively	   towards	   Bill	   Gates.	   This	   is	   amongst	  
other	  things	  because	  Bill	  Gates	  is	  assumedly	  much	  richer	  than	  the	  person,	  and	  
does	  not	  seriously	  need	  the	  coin,	  or	  the	  $1	  million.	  Likewise,	  if	  someone	  makes	  a	  
living	   by	   creating	   paintings,	   or	   poems,	   or	   computer	   games,	   and	   making	   a	  
painting,	   poem,	   or	   game	   costs	   her	   almost	   nothing	   in	   terms	  of	  materials,	   time,	  
and	  effort,	  it	  seems	  not	  necessarily	  wrong	  or	  exploitative	  if	  she	  asks	  a	  price	  that	  
is	  much	  higher	  than	  her	  production	  costs,	  or	  a	  price	  that	  would	  give	  her	  a	  higher	  
income	  than	  a	  basic	  living	  wage.	  Hence,	  asking	  more	  than	  the	  production	  costs,	  
and	  making	  a	  substantial	  profit	  is	  not	  necessarily	  always	  wrong	  or	  exploitative,	  
and	   the	   fact	   that	   someone	  makes	   a	   large	   profit	   can	   thus	   not	   in	   itself	   explain	  
when	  and	  why	  a	  consensual	  transaction	  is	  unfair	  and	  exploitative.	  	  
	  
In	   sum,	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   argue	   in	   this	   section	   and	   the	   previous	   section	   why	  
production	  costs-­‐based	  theories	  of	  value	  cannot	  fully	  satisfactorily	  explain	  how	  
to	  decide	  when	  transactions	  are	  fair,	  or	  why	  this	  is	  so—why	  we	  should	  ask	  and	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offer	  prices	  that	  correspond	  to	  the	  production	  costs.	  Such	  theories	  can	  therefore	  
not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  view	  that	  exploitation	  is	  wrong	  because	  it	  is	  unfair.	  
In	  the	  next	  two	  sections	  I	  will	  discuss	  two	  alternative	  versions	  of	  the	  unfairness	  
account	  of	  exploitation.	  In	  contrast	  with	  production	  costs	  theories	  of	  value,	  both	  
assume	  that	  goods	  do	  not	  have	  an	  objective	  value,	  and	  try	  to	  explain	  in	  another	  
way	  how	  consensual	  transactions	  can	  be	  unfair.	  The	  first	  argument,	  which	  I	  will	  
discuss	   in	   the	  next	   two	   sections,	   says	   that	  we	   can	  determine	   the	   fairness	  of	   a	  
price	   in	   consensual	   transactions	  by	   comparing	   it	  with	   the	   competitive	  market	  
price.	  	  
	  
3.4	  Fairness	  and	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  
	  
3.4.1	  The	  fair	  price	  as	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  
A	  popular	  view	  of	  what	  fairness	  requires	  in	  consensual	  commercial	  transactions	  
sees	  the	  just	  or	  fair	  price	  as	  some	  form	  of	  the	  ‘common	  market	  price’,	  a	  notion	  
that	  goes	  back	  at	   least	   to	  Aristotle,	  and	   is	  also	   famously	  discussed	  by	  Aquinas	  
and	   other	   Scholastics.129	   According	   to	   them,	   a	   price	   is	   just	   if	   it	   broadly	  
corresponds	   to	   the	   price	   at	   which	   an	   article	   is	   commonly	   sold	   on	   an	   open	  
market	  with	  no	  fraud,	  deceit,	  or	  coercion.	  More	  recently,	  Wertheimer	  proposed	  
a	  similar	  view	  of	  the	  fair	  price	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  exploitation.	  He	  says	  that	  a	  price	  
is	  fair	  and	  non-­‐exploitative	  if	  it	  corresponds	  to	  the	  ‘competitive	  market	  price’	  or	  
the	   ‘hypothetical	   market	   price’:130	   the	   price	   upon	  which	   a	   well-­‐informed	   and	  
unpressured	   buyer	   and	   seller	   would	   agree	   if	   the	   transaction	   took	   place	   in	   a	  
competitive	   market	   with	   multiple	   buyers	   and	   sellers.	   Thus,	   imagine	   that	   the	  
common	  market	   price	   for	   a	   taxi	   ride	   to	   a	   certain	   destination	   is	   £20,	   but	   that	  
there	   is	   a	   national	   rail	   and	  bus	   strike,	  which	   enables	   taxi	   drivers	   to	   ask	   £100	  
instead.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  is	  argued,	  we	  can	  calculate	  what	  the	  fair	  and	  non-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  V.8,	  1132b33-­‐1133b29;	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica	  
II-­‐II	  Q7.	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  just	  price	  theory	  in	  Aristotelian	  and	  Scholastic	  thinking	  JB	  
Murphy,	  ‘Equality	  in	  Exchange’	  (2002)	  47	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  Jurisprudence	  85-­‐121,	  90;	  ES	  
Noel,	  ‘Bargaining,	  Consent	  and	  the	  Just	  Wage	  in	  the	  Sources	  of	  Scholastic	  Economic	  Thought’	  
(1998)	  20(4)	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Economic	  Thought	  467-­‐478,	  467.	  	  
130	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  230.	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exploitative	   price	   is	   by	   imagining	   the	   price	   that	   would	   be	   agreed	   upon	   in	   a	  
competitive	  market—a	  market	   in	  which	  many	   other	   taxi	   drivers	  would	   enter	  
the	  market	  to	  cater	  for	  the	  increased	  demand	  for	  taxis—which	  would	  likely	  be	  
£20.	  	  
	   A	  fairly	  similar	  conception	  of	  what	  makes	  transactions	  fair	  can	  be	  found	  
in	   Mikhail	   Valdman’s	   theory	   of	   exploitation.	   Valdman	   argues	   that	   ‘a	   non-­‐
exploitative	   price	   is	   one	   that	   an	   informed	   buyer	  would	   get	   from	   an	   informed	  
seller	   in	   a	   competitive	   market	   if	   either	   could	   reasonably	   refuse	   the	   other’s	  
offer.’131	  On	  this	  view,	  if	  I	  desperately	  need	  a	  taxi	  during	  the	  strike,	  and	  the	  only	  
available	  taxi	  driver	  asks	  £100,	  we	  can	  determine	  what	  price	  would	  be	   fair	  by	  
considering	   on	   what	   price	   we	   would	   agree	   in	   a	   competitive	   market,	   where	   I	  
could	  refuse	  the	  taxi	  driver’s	  offer	  because	  I	  could	  find	  other	  taxi	  drivers,	  which	  
would	  also	  probably	  be	  £20.	  	  
This	   view	   of	   how	   to	   determine	   when	   a	   price	   is	   unfair	   and	   non-­‐
exploitative	   matches	   quite	   well,	   I	   think,	   with	   common	   intuitions	   about	   when	  
transactions	  are	  unfair.	  If	  taxi	  drivers	  in	  a	  competitive	  market	  always	  ask	  £20	  to	  
go	  to	  a	  certain	  destination,	  it	  seems	  that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  establish	  what	  would	  be	  a	  
non-­‐exploitative	   price	   in	   temporary	   situations	   in	   which	   they	   are	   able	   to	   ask	  
much	  more,	  looking	  at	  what	  they	  normally	  ask	  will	  indeed	  lead	  to	  a	  price	  that	  is	  
non-­‐exploitative.	  Nevertheless,	   I	  will	  discuss	   two	  problems	  with	   the	  view	   that	  
we	  can	  determine	  the	  fair	  price	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  competitive	  market	  price.	  In	  
section	  3.5,	  I	  will	  next	  show	  that	  this	  view	  also	  faces	  problems	  in	  answering	  the	  
second	   question	   I	   distinguished:	   why	   not	   offering	   or	   asking	   the	   competitive	  
market	  price	  is	  morally	  wrong.	  
	  
3.4.2	  Problems	  with	  the	  fair	  price	  as	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  	  
A	   first	   potential	   problem	   with	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   fair	   price	   is	   equal	   to	   the	  
competitive	  market	  price	  is	  that	  this	  method	  cannot	  tell	  us	  what	  the	  fair	  price	  is	  
when	  there	  is	  no	  common	  market	  price	  for	  a	  good,	  and	  we	  cannot	  imagine	  what	  
the	  hypothetical	  market	  price	  would	  be.	  This	  can	  be	  the	  case,	  for	  instance,	  with	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  Valdman,	  ‘A	  Theory	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  Exploitation’	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newly	  invented	  products	  and	  rare	  works	  of	  art.132	  When,	  for	  example,	  the	  first	  
mobile	  phone	  was	  invented,	  there	  was	  no	  competitive	  market	  price	  on	  basis	  of	  
which	  to	  determine	  what	  would	  be	  a	  fair	  price,	  and	  we	  could	  not	  imagine	  what	  
the	  hypothetical	  competitive	  market	  price	  would	  be.	  	  
A	   second	   and	   more	   serious	   problem	   is	   that	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   a	  
competitive	   market	   price	   is	   necessarily	   fair,	   because	   there	   are	   situations	   in	  
which	   the	  competitive	  market	  price	   seems,	   intuitively,	  unfair	  and	  exploitative.	  
For	   instance,	   the	   extremely	   low	   wages	   in	   sweatshop	   factories	   in	   developing	  
countries	  may	  well	  equal	  the	  competitive	  market	  wages	  in	  those	  countries.	  Yet	  
far	  from	  seeing	  these	  wages	  as	  fair	  and	  non-­‐exploitative,	  many	  people	  consider	  
sweatshop	   labour	   a	   classic	   example	   of	   unfairness,	   and	   of	   exploitation.	   Hence,	  
while	   the	  competitive	  market	  price	   is	  perhaps	  able	   to	  account	   for	  exploitative	  
transactions	  where	  the	  exploitation	  results	  from	  a	  monopoly	  position,	  it	  seems	  
unable	  to	  account	  for	  some	  other	  types	  of	  transactions	  that	  are	  typically	  thought	  
to	  be	  unfair	  and	  exploitative.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising,	  because	  competitive	  market	  
prices	   are	   constituted	   by	  morally	   neutral	   factors	   such	   as	   supply	   and	  demand.	  
And	  while	   the	  market	   prices	   that	   flow	   from	   these	   factors	  may	   be	   an	   efficient	  
mechanism	   for	   allocating	   resources	   or	   resolving	   price	   negotiations,	   there	   is	  
nothing	  intrinsically	  fair	  about	  them.133	  Why	  then,	  could	  the	  competitive	  market	  
price	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  fair?	  	  
	  
3.5	  Why	  is	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  fair?	  	  
	  
The	  ‘competitive	  market	  price	  version’	  of	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
says	  that	  we	  can	  determine	  whether	  a	  transaction	  is	  unfair	  and	  exploitative	  by	  
comparing	  the	  price	  of	  the	  good	  transacted	  with	  the	  price	  of	  the	  (hypothetical)	  
competitive	  market	  price.	  Why	  is	  such	  a	  competitive	  market	  price	  said	  to	  be	  fair,	  
and	  why	  is	  not	  offering	  or	  asking	  this	  price	  unfair?	  That	  is:	  why	  is	  it	  thought	  to	  
be	  morally	  wrong	  not	  to	  offer	  or	  ask	  this	  price?	  Wertheimer	  says:	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  Wertheimer	  recognizes	  this	  himself	  as	  well.	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  234.	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  See	  for	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	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  ‘Whoever	  Said	  That	  Markets	  Were	  
Fair?’	  (2000)	  Negotiation	  Journal	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[E]ven	   though	   a	   competitive	   market	   price	   does	   not	   reflect	   a	   deep	  
principle	   of	   justice,	   it	   does	   reflect	   a	   crucial	   moral	   dimension	   of	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   parties	   to	   the	   transaction.	   The	   competitive	  
market	   price	   is	   a	   price	   at	   which	   neither	   party	   takes	   special	   unfair	  
advantage	   of	   particular	   defects	   in	   the	   other	   party’s	   decision-­‐making	  
capacity	  or	  special	  vulnerabilities	  in	  the	  other	  party’s	  situation.	  …	  It	  may	  
or	  may	  not	  be	  a	   “just	  price,”	  all	   things	  considered,	  but	   it	  may	  well	  be	  a	  
non-­‐exploitative	   price,	   for	   neither	   party	   takes	   unfair	   advantage	   of	   the	  
other	  party.134	  	  
	  
Hence,	  Wertheimer	   argues	   that	   the	   competitive	  market	   price	   is	   fair,	   and	  non-­‐
exploitative,	  because	  neither	  party	  takes	  ‘special’	  unfair	  advantage	  of	  particular	  
defects	   in	   the	   other	   party’s	   decision-­‐making	   capacity,	   or	   of	   special	  
vulnerabilities	   in	   the	   other	   party’s	   situation.	   What	   taking	   ‘special’	   unfair	  
advantage	   means,	   Wertheimer	   does	   not	   explain,	   nor	   what	   he	   means	   with	  
‘particular	  defects	  in	  the	  other	  party’s	  decision-­‐making	  capacity’	  or	  with	  ‘special	  
vulnerabilities’.	   The	   ‘particular	   defects	   in	   the	   other	   party’s	   decision-­‐making	  
capacity’	  presumably	  refer	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  sufficient	   information,	  rational	  capacity	  
or	   other	   factors	   that	   might	   impair	   someone’s	   consent.	   The	   ‘special	  
vulnerabilities’	  refer,	  I	  think,	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  better	  alternatives	  on	  behalf	  of	  one	  of	  
the	   parties.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   competitive	   market	   price	   is	   the	   hypothetical	  
price	   that	   ‘imagines	   away’	   the	  bargaining	   advantage	   that	  monopoly	   situations	  
can	  create,	  so	  the	  special	  vulnerabilities	  that	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  does	  
not	  take	  advantage	  of,	  is	  arguably	  the	  lack	  of	  alternatives	  created	  by	  a	  monopoly	  
situation	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  weak	  bargaining	  position.	  This	  also	  corresponds	  
to	  what	  Valdman	  says,	  since	  for	  him,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  a	  fair	  price	  is	  a	  price	  
that	   would	   be	   agreed	   upon	   in	   a	   competitive	   market	   if	   both	   parties	   could	  
reasonably	   refuse	   the	   other’s	   offer.	   ‘Being	   wrongly	   exploited’	   he	   says,	   ‘is	  
something	   that	   happens	   to	   you	   when	   you	   have	   your	   back	   to	   the	   wall,	   so	   to	  
speak,	  or	  when	  you	  have	  little	  control	  over	  your	  actions	  and	  choices.’135	  	  
	   Why,	   then,	   is	   it	   morally	   wrong	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   another’s	   lack	   of	  
better	  options	  by	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  good	  price	  for	  oneself,	  if	  the	  other	  agrees	  to	  this	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  op.cit.	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transaction	   and	   actually	   benefits	   from	   it?	   Neither	   Wertheimer	   nor	   Valdman	  
explicitly	  addresses	  this	  question,	  but	  presumably,	  there	  may	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  
something	  morally	  problematic	  about	  the	  exploitees’	  consent	  in	  such	  situations.	  
That	   is,	   presumably	   it	   is	   thought	   that	   in	   such	   monopoly	   situations	   in	   which	  
people	  are	  ‘with	  their	  back	  to	  the	  wall’	  and	  have	  few	  or	  no	  better	  choices	  than	  to	  
accept	  the	  exploiter’s	  offer,	  they	  are	  not	  truly	  free	  to	  reject	  or	  accept	  the	  offer,	  
and	  are,	  as	  it	  were,	  coerced.	  
However,	   this	   explanation	   for	  why	  we	  morally	   ought	   to	  pay	  or	   ask	   the	  
competitive	  market	  price	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  consent	  account	  
of	  exploitation,	  which	  I	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  section	  2.	  That	  account	  sees	  the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  exploitee’s	  consent	   is	  not	  truly	  valid,	  
because	   she	   is	   forced	   by	   her	   circumstances	   to	   accept	   the	   exploiter’s	   offer.	   I	  
argued	  in	  chapter	  2	  that	  this	  argument	  for	  exploitation	  is	  highly	  problematic.	  I	  
showed	  that	  coercion	  means	  trying	  to	  get	  someone	  to	  do	  something	  she	  would	  
otherwise	   not	   do	   by	   threatening	   to	   make	   her	   worse	   off,	   in	   comparison	   with	  
some	   baseline,	  whereas	   exploiters	   actually	   offer	   to	  make	   people	   better	   off,	   at	  
least	   in	  comparison	  with	  the	  status	  quo.	   I	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  within	  
certain	   circumstances	   one	   of	   our	   options	   is	   the	   most	   attractive,	   does	   not	  
necessarily	  mean	  that	  our	  choice	  for	  that	  option	  is	  coerced	  or	  in	  any	  other	  way	  
invalid,	   because	   that	   would	   mean	   that	   our	   choices	   are	   always	   invalid,	   since	  
everyone	  always	  chooses	  the	  options	  that	  seem	  in	  their	  circumstances	  the	  best	  
ones.	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  have	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  
the	   content	   of	   someone’s	   options,	   and	   whether	   she	   is	   free	   to	   make	   a	   valid	  
decision	  between	  those	  choices.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  that	  I	  desperately	  need	  a	  
taxi	  and	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  taxi	  driver	  available	  who	  asks	  £100	  for	  a	  ride	  that	  
usually	  costs	  £20.	  If	  we	  argue	  that	  my	  choice	  to	  accept	  the	  driver’s	  offer	  is	  not	  
truly	   valid	   because	   I	   had	   no	   better	   choice	   than	   to	   accept	   his	   expensive	   price,	  
then	  we	   should	   say	   the	   same	   about	   situations	   in	  which	   there	   is	   only	   one	   taxi	  
available,	  but	  the	  taxi	  driver	  asks	  the	  market	  price,	  £20.	  This	   is	  because	  in	  the	  
latter	  situation,	  I	  would	  equally	  have	  no	  better	  choice	  than	  to	  accept	  the	  driver’s	  
offer.	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Consequently,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   unfairness	   account	   cannot	   appeal	   to	  
problems	  in	  consent	  to	  explain	  when	  and	  why	  paying	  or	  asking	  a	  certain	  price	  is	  
(un)fair.	  In	  other	  words:	  if	  one	  agrees	  (as	  Wertheimer	  himself	  does136),	  that	  lack	  
of	  valid	  consent	  cannot	  explain	  why	  exploitation	  is	  wrong,	  and	  if	  one	  says	  that	  
the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	   instead	  a	  matter	  of	  unfairness,	  one	  cannot	  explain	  
when	  and	  why	  a	  transactions	  is	  unfair,	  by	  referring	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  valid	  consent.	  	  
	   	  It	   might	   be	   objected	   that	   in	   exploitative	   transactions,	   people’s	  
alternatives	  are	  often	  so	  dreadful	   that	   they	  really	  do,	  as	  Valdman	  puts	   it,	  have	  
their	  back	  to	  the	  wall.	  And,	  as	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  since	  coercion	  means	  
to	   try	   to	   get	   someone	   to	   do	   something	   she	   would	   not	   otherwise	   do	   by	  
threatening	  to	  make	  her	  worse	  off	  in	  comparison	  with	  some	  baseline,	  one	  might	  
say	   that	   exploitative	   offers	   are	   coercive,	   because,	   in	   comparison	  with	   a	  moral	  
baseline,	  they	  are	  making	  people	  worse	  off.	  That	  is:	  compared	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  
which	   the	   exploiter	   acts	   in	   accordance	   with	   her	   moral	   duties,	   the	   exploiter’s	  
offer	  makes	   the	  exploitee	  worse	  off.	  What	   could	   this	  moral	  baseline,	   or	  moral	  
duty,	  be?	  
	   One	  possibility	   is	   that	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  who	  are	   in	  such	  a	  
dreadful	  situation	  that	  they	  are	  with	  their	  back	  to	  the	  wall,	  and	  have	  no	  better	  
alternative	  than	  to	  consent	  to	  an	  exploiter’s	  offer	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  their	  needs.	  
Hence,	   it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	   if,	   for	  example,	  people	   in	  developing	  countries	  
have	  serious	  needs	  to	  be	  met	  and	  have	  no	  better	  alternative	  than	  to	  work	  in	  a	  
sweatshop	   factory	   in	  order	   to	  meet	   their	  needs,	  we	  have	  a	  duty	   to	  help	   them.	  
This	  argument,	  however,	  would	  yet	  again	  bring	  us	  back	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  
needs	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   that	   was	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   and	   above	   in	  
section	  3.3.2.	  This	  argument	  says	   that	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation	   is	  a	   failure	   to	  
meet	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  or	  benefit	  people	  in	  need,	  but,	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown,	  it	  does	  
not	  work	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitative	   transactions,	   and	   can	  
also	  not	  be	  used	  as	  a	  valid	   justification	   for	  why	  we	  ought	   to	  pay	  a	  certain	   fair	  
price.137	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Wertheimer,	  Exploitation,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  8.	  
137	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  exploiters	  sometimes	  really	  do	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  people.	  
Think	  for	  instance	  of	  the	  already	  mentioned	  example	  of	  someone	  passing	  by	  a	  lake	  and	  seeing	  a	  
person	  drowning.	  It	  is	  relatively	  uncontroversial	  that	  the	  passerby	  in	  this	  situation	  does	  have	  a	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   Another	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   moral	   baseline,	   the	   duty	   exploiters	   are	  
ignoring,	  is	  not	  as	  demanding	  as	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  to	  meet	  their	  needs,	  but	  a	  
less	  demanding	  moral	  duty	  such	  as	   ‘do	  not	   take	  advantage	  of	  people	  with	   few	  
options	  by	  offering	  an	  unfairly	  high	  or	  low	  price’,	  or	  ‘do	  not	  offer	  an	  unfair	  price	  
when	  engaging	  in	  a	  transaction	  with	  people	  who	  have	  no	  better	  option	  than	  to	  
consent’.	  If	  we	  have	  such	  a	  moral	  duty,	  then	  exploiters	  are	  clearly	  violating	  this	  
duty,	  and	  thus,	  compared	  with	  the	  moral	  baseline	  in	  which	  exploiters	  would	  not	  
violate	  this	  duty,	  they	  are	  making	  a	  coercive	  offer.	  Yet	  this	  solution	  would	  make	  
the	  argument	   circular.	  What	  we	  are	   looking	   for	   is	   a	  way	  of	   justifying	  why	  not	  
offering	  a	  competitive	  market	  price	  to	  people	  who	  have	  few	  alternative	  options	  
is	  unfair,	   that	   is:	  why	  it	   is	  somehow	  morally	  wrong	  not	  to	  offer	  this	  price.	  The	  
possible	   justification	   under	   discussion	   now	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   competitive	  
market	  price	  avoids	  taking	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  lack	  of	  better	  options,	  and	  that	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  lack	  of	  better	  options	  is	  morally	  wrong	  because	  it	  
amounts	  to	  a	  form	  of	  coercion,	  since,	  compared	  with	  a	  moral	  baseline,	  we	  offer	  
to	  make	  people	  worse	  off.	  This	  moral	  baseline,	  we	  are	  now	  considering,	  may	  be	  
a	  moral	  duty	  to	  offer	  fair	  prices	  to	  people	  with	  few	  options.	  Yet	  the	  existence	  of	  
this	   duty	   is	   exactly	  what	  we	   are	   trying	   to	   justify—a	   duty	   to	   offer	   a	   fair	   price	  
(seen	  as	  the	  competitive	  market	  price)	  to	  people	  with	  few	  options.	  	  
	   Finally,	   it	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  as	  the	  fair	  
price	  can	  also	  be	  justified	  by	  referring	  to	  injustice:	  that	  the	  competitive	  market	  
price	  does	  at	   least	  not	  take	  advantage	  of	  or	  exacerbate	   injustice.	  The	   idea	  that	  
justice	   can	   explain	   why	   a	   certain	   price	   is	   fair	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	  
section.	  For	  now,	  I	  will	  merely	  point	  out	  that	  the	  competitive	  market	  price	  is	  not	  
incompatible	   with	   injustice.	   For	   example,	   as	   said,	   sweatshop	   factories	   in	  
developing	  countries	  may	  pay	  competitive	  market	  wages,	  but	  still	  be	  thought	  to	  
exploit	  workers	  and	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  unjust	  circumstances.	  	  
To	  sum	  up,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  a	  competitive	  market	  price	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  
valid	  method	   for	   determining	  when	   a	   price	   is	   fair	   and	   non-­‐exploitive.	   This	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
moral	  duty	  to	  rescue	  the	  drowning	  person,	  and	  that,	  if	  she	  makes	  her	  rescue	  conditional	  on	  the	  
payment	  of,	  say,	  $10,000,	  this	  is	  a	  coercive	  offer.	  This	  is	  therefore	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  not	  an	  
instance	  of	  consensual	  exploitation,	  which	  is	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  of	  coercion,	  as	  was	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	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both	  because	   there	  are	   situations	   in	  which	   the	   competitive	  market	  price	  does	  
appear	  unfair	  and	  exploitative,	  and	  because	  it	  seems	  problematic	  to	  justify	  why	  
it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  not	  to	  offer	  the	  competitive	  market	  price,	  without	  appealing	  
to	   the	   arguments	   of	   either	   the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation	   or	   the	   consent	  
account	  of	  exploitation,	  which	  were	  rejected	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  In	  the	  next	  
two	  sections,	  I	  will	  discuss	  a	  third	  and	  final	  method	  of	  determining	  when	  a	  price	  
is	  fair,	  which	  refers	  to	  bargaining	  disadvantages.	  	  
	  
3.6	  Fairness	  and	  bargaining	  disadvantages	  
	  
This	   section	   discusses	   a	   method	   of	   how	   to	   decide	   which	   price	   is	   fair	   that	   is	  
structurally	   similar	   to	   the	   competitive	   market	   price	   method	   discussed	   in	   the	  
previous	  section,	  because	  it	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  price	  that	  would	  have	  been	  agreed	  
upon	   if	   the	   exploitee	   did	   not	   have	   a	   certain	   disadvantage	   that	   makes	   her	  
exploitable.	   Yet	  whereas	   the	   competitive	  market	   price	  method	   only	   considers	  
monopoly	  power	  as	  a	  relative	  disadvantage	  that	  should	  be	  ‘imagined	  away’,	  the	  
method	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   takes	   a	   broader	   view	   of	   what	   counts	   as	  
relevant	  disadvantages.	  This	  version	  of	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  
proposed	  by	  Robert	  Mayer,	  who	  defines	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  
benefit	  others	  as	  fairness	  requires,138	  and	  argues	  that	  what	  fairness	  requires	  in	  
commercial	  consensual	  exchanges	  can	  be	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Some	   initial	   disadvantage	   renders	   an	   agent	   exploitable.	   To	  
calculate	   the	   just	   price	   in	   any	   given	   case,	  we	   simply	   imagine	   the	  
same	  transaction	  without	  the	  initial	  disadvantage.	  The	  just	  price	  is	  
thus	   the	   price	   which	   a	   nondisadvantaged	   party	  would	   accept	   or	  
pay.	   […]	   Just	   imagine	   a	   counterfactual	   transaction	   in	   which	   the	  
relevant	  disadvantage	  is	  removed	  and	  we	  will	  know	  what	  the	  just	  
or	  nonexploitative	  price	  of	  a	  good	  or	  service	  is.139	  
	  
On	  this	  view,	  the	  disadvantage	  that	  makes	  someone	  exploitable	  may	  be	  a	  lack	  
of	  competition,	  but	  it	  may	  also	  be	  something	  else,	  such	  as	  poverty	  or	  pressing	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  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  142.	  	  
139	  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  145.	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needs.	  Mayer	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  fair	  trade	  coffee,	  for	  which	  the	  just	  price	  is	  
measured	  by	  calculating	  the	  price	  that	  buyers	  should	  pay	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  a	  
decent	   standard	   of	   living	   for	   agricultural	   labourers,	   because,	   he	   argues,	   the	  
disadvantage	  that	  makes	  those	  people	  vulnerable	  to	  exploitation	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  
decent	   standard	   of	   living.140	   By	   taking	   into	   account	   a	   broader	   range	   of	  
disadvantages	   than	   the	   competitive	   market	   price	   method	   discussed	   in	   the	  
previous	  section,	  this	  argument	  avoids	  that	  method’s	  problem	  of	  seeing	  as	  fair	  
certain	   exchanges	   that	   are	   generally	   thought	   of	   as	   unfair,	   such	   as	   sweatshop	  
labour.	   The	   ‘bargaining	   disadvantages	   method’	   of	   determining	   the	   fair	   price	  
also	  matches	  well,	   I	   think,	  with	  common	   intuitions	  about	  what	   is	  a	   fair	  price,	  
what	  constitutes	  exploitation,	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  avoided.	  	  
In	  section	  3.7,	   I	  will	  discuss	  possible	  answers	   to	   the	  second	  question	   I	  
distinguished	  in	  section	  3.1:	  why	  this	  method	  of	  calculating	  the	  fair	  price	  is	  fair.	  
In	  other	  words:	  why	  it	  is	  morally	  wrong	  to	  ask	  a	  higher	  or	  offer	  a	  lower	  price	  
than	  the	  price	  which	  a	  non-­‐disadvantaged	  party	  would	  accept	  or	  pay.	  There	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  even	  though	  this	  method	  seems	  intuitively	  plausible,	  it	  contains	  
a	  circularity,	  and	  consequently	  gives	  no	  real	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  
wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  For	  now,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  point	  out	  a	  problem	  with	  this	  
method’s	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  question	  I	  distinguished:	  how	  to	  calculate	  when	  a	  
transaction	  or	  price	  is	  fair.	  This	  problem	  is	  identical	  to	  a	  problem	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  discussion	  of	  the	  injustice	  account	  of	  exploitation	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  
If	  we	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  calculate	  the	  fair	  and	  non-­‐exploitative	  price	  of	  a	  
good	   by	   imagining	   a	   counterfactual	   transaction	   in	   which	   the	   relevant	  
disadvantage	   is	   removed	   and	   thereby	   finding	   out	   the	   price	   that	   a	   non-­‐
disadvantaged	   party	   would	   accept	   or	   pay,	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   often,	   if	   the	  
disadvantage	  did	  not	  exist,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  transaction	  at	  all.	  If,	  for	  example,	  
sweatshop	   workers	   in	   developing	   countries	   would	   not	   have	   had	   the	  
disadvantage	   of	   poverty,	   limited	   alternative	   employment	   options,	   and/or	  
limited	   education,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   they	   would	   have	   chosen	   a	   more	  
interesting	   career,	   and	   would	   not	   have	   accepted	   to	   do	   monotonous	   and	  
possibly	  unhealthy	  or	  dangerous	  sweatshop	  work,	  even	  if	  they	  were	  offered	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140	  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  145.	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good	  wage.	  Moreover,	  as	  was	  said	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   if	   the	  argument	   is	  
that	  we	  should	  imagine	  the	  price	  that	  would	  be	  agreed	  upon	  if	  the	  transaction	  
would	  take	  place	  if	  the	  relative	  disadvantages	  did	  not	  exist,	  the	  requirement	  for	  
a	  price	  to	  be	  fair	  and	  non-­‐exploitative	  seems	  far	  too	  demanding.	  For	  example,	  
for	   people	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   accept	   the	   monotonous	   and	   uninteresting	   work	  
typical	   of	   sweatshop	   factories	   if	   they	   are	   equally	   wealthy	   and	   have	   equal	  
choices	   as	   the	   factory	   owners,	   the	   factory	   owners	  would	   likely	   have	   to	   offer	  
them	  an	  extremely	  high	  wage.	  That	   is:	  a	  wage	  higher	   than	  what	  people	  could	  
earn	   in	   careers	   that	   they	  would	   find	  more	   appealing,	   such	   as	  being	   a	   factory	  
owner	   themselves.	   Still,	   in	   the	   actual	   situation,	   in	   which	   factory	   workers	   in	  
developing	   countries	   do	   have	   a	   disadvantaged	   position	   in	   many	   different	  
respects,	  I	  doubt	  that	  we	  would	  find	  any	  wage	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  an	  extremely	  
high	  wage	  exploitative.	  For	  instance,	  if	  factory	  owners	  in	  developing	  countries	  
offer	   their	   workers	   good	   working	   conditions,	   free	   healthcare	   and	   education,	  
and	  wages	  that	  enable	  them	  and	  their	  families	  to	  live	  a	  good	  life,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  
many	   people	   would	   consider	   this	   exploitative	   or	   unfair,	   even	   if	   the	   wage	   is	  
lower	   than	   what	   the	   factory	   workers	   would	   have	   accepted	   if	   their	   relative	  
disadvantages	  had	  not	  existed.	  	  
Hence,	   imagining	   the	   price	   that	   a	   disadvantaged	   party	   would	   have	  
accepted	   without	   the	   disadvantage,	   is	   a	   problematic	   method	   to	   determine	  
when	  a	  price	  is	  unfair	  or	  exploitative.	  I	  also	  believe	  that	  this	  approach	  cannot	  
give	  an	  adequate	  moral	  justification	  for	  why	  this	  method	  leads	  to	  fair	  prices,	  as	  
I	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
3.7	  Why	  does	  the	  bargaining	  disadvantages	  method	  constitute	  a	  fair	  price?	  	  
	  
The	   bargaining	   disadvantages	   method	   says	   that	   the	   price	   in	   a	   voluntary	  
exchange	   is	   fair	   if	   it	   corresponds	   to	   the	   price	   that	   a	   non-­‐disadvantaged	   party	  
would	  accept	  or	  pay.	  Why	  is	  this	  so?	  Why	  is	   it	  thought	  to	  be	  morally	  wrong	  to	  
ask	  or	  offer	  a	  price	  that	  is	  more	  or	  less	  than	  the	  price	  a	  non-­‐disadvantaged	  party	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would	  accept?	  I	  will	  discuss	  two	  possible	  arguments	  for	  this	  claim,	  one	  based	  on	  
vulnerability,	  and	  one	  based	  on	  justice.	  
	  
3.7.1	  Vulnerability	  
Mayer	  does	  not	  directly	  address	  the	  question	  of	  why	  his	  method	  indeed	  yields	  
fair	  prices,	  but	  throughout	  his	  work,	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  in	  mind	  the	  fact	  that	  by	  
following	  his	  method,	  we	  avoid	  taking	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  vulnerabilities.	  He	  
writes,	  for	  instance:	  ‘But	  we	  should	  not	  dismiss	  exploitation	  as	  a	  minor	  offense.	  
Taking	   unfair	   advantage	   of	   others	   can	   be	   seriously	   wrong,	   even	   when	   it	   is	  
noncoercive	  and	  mutually	  advantageous.	  …	  Exploiters	  prey	  upon	  the	  vulnerable,	  
and	  that	   is	  an	  unsavory	  way	  to	  enrich	  oneself.’141	  Moreover,	   in	  a	  discussion	  of	  
what	  distinguishes	  exploitation	  from	  other	  less-­‐wrong	  forms	  of	  failing	  to	  benefit	  
another	  fairly,	  such	  as	  being	  cheap,	  Mayer	  argues	  that	  cheapness	  ‘is	  an	  abuse	  of	  
discretion	  whereas	  exploitation	  is	  an	  abuse	  of	  vulnerability’.142	  It	  might	  be	  that	  
such	  a	  vulnerability-­‐argument	   is	  also	  what	  really	  underlies	  Wertheimer’s	  view	  
of	   why	   the	   competitive	   market	   price	   is	   fair,	   instead	   of	   the	   consent-­‐based	  
argument	   that	   I	   discussed	   in	   section	   3.5.	   After	   all,	   as	   noted	   in	   that	   section,	  
Wertheimer	   says	   that	   offering	   the	   competitive	   market	   price	   is	   fair	   and	   non-­‐
exploitative	  because	  it	  avoids	  taking	  unfair	  advantage	  of	  ‘special	  vulnerabilities’	  
in	  the	  other	  party’s	  situation.	  	  
However,	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   take	   advantage	   of	   another’s	  
vulnerability	   is	   what	   ultimately	   makes	   a	   price	   unfair,	   we	   have	   come	   to	   a	  
peculiar	   conclusion.	   As	   shown	   in	   chapter	   2,	   section	   1,	   the	   idea	   that	   taking	  
advantage	   of	   people’s	   vulnerability	   is	   what	  makes	   exploitation	   wrong	   cannot	  
adequately	   account	   for	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   (and	   this	   rejection	   of	   the	  
vulnerability	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  shared	  by	  Mayer	  as	  well143).	  That	  section	  
showed	   that	   although	   exploitation	   always	   involves	   using	   another’s	  
vulnerability,	   this	   fact	   itself	  does	  not	   explain	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  
and	  we	  must	  make	  intelligible	  why	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  someone’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  147.	  	  
142	  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  143.	  
143	  Mayer,	  ‘What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Exploitation?’,	  op.cit.	  137.	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vulnerability	   (or	  why	   in	   certain	   cases	   or	   in	   certain	  ways)	   in	   order	   to	   explain	  
why	  these	  are	  exploitative.	  The	  unfairness	  account’s	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  
that	   taking	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability	   is	   wrong	   and	   exploitative	   if	  
and	   because	   it	   is	   an	   unfair	   advantage.	   Yet	   if,	   in	   explaining	  when	   and	  why	   an	  
advantage	  is	  unfair,	  we	  eventually	  answer	  that	  this	  is	  so	  if	  and	  because	  we	  take	  
advantage	  of	  another’s	  vulnerability,	  we	  are	  making	  a	  circular	  argument,	  since	  
the	  starting	  point	  was	  that	  taking	  advantage	  of	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  is	  itself	  
not	   wrong,	   and	   that	   we	   must	   explain	   why	   it	   is	   wrong	   in	   certain	   cases	   or	   in	  
certain	  ways.	  	  
In	   other	  words:	   this	   version	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   says	   that	   taking	  
advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability	   is	   only	   exploitative	   when	   unfair,	   but	  
whether	  a	  transaction	  is	  unfair	  depends	  on	  whether	  someone’s	  vulnerability	  is	  
taken	  advantage	  of.	  This	  still	   leaves	  us	   to	  answer	   the	  question:	  what	   is	  wrong	  
with	   taking	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability?	  Or	   in	   other	  words:	  what	   is	  
wrong	   with	   exploitation?	   This	   version	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   is	   therefore	  
perhaps	  not	   incorrect,	  but	   ‘empty’:	   it	  does	  not	  actually	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  
what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  but,	  at	  most,	  gives	  a	  description	  of	  the	  features	  
of	  exploitative	  transactions.	  
	  
3.7.2	  Injustice	  
Perhaps,	   though,	   there	   is	   another	   argument	   for	  why	   fairness	   requires	   indeed	  
what	   this	   method	   says	   it	   requires—that	   we	   offer	   a	   price	   that	   a	   non-­‐
disadvantaged	  party	  would	  accept	  or	  pay.	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  this	  method	  
does	  not	  imply	  that	  the	  use	  of	  any	  disadvantage	  to	  obtain	  a	  certain	  price	  makes	  
the	   price	   unfair,	   but	   only	   when	   this	   disadvantage	   is	   the	   consequence	   of	   an	  
injustice.	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  a	  disadvantage	   in	  bargaining	  power	  would	   then	  
only	   make	   the	   agreed	   price	   exploitative	   if,	   according	   to	   some	   conception	   of	  
justice,	   the	  difference	  in	  bargaining	  power	  is	   itself	   thought	  to	  be	  unjust.144	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  This	  idea	  corresponds	  to	  some	  writers’	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle’s	  distinction	  between	  
distributive	  justice	  and	  ‘commutative	  justice’,	  which	  deals	  with	  fairness	  in	  private	  exchanges.	  
James	  Gordley	  says,	  for	  instance:	  ‘While	  the	  aim	  of	  distributive	  justice	  is	  to	  provide	  each	  citizen	  
with	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  purchasing	  power,	  that	  of	  commutative	  justice	  is	  to	  preserve	  each	  person’s	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instance,	   in	   Mayer’s	   example	   of	   fair	   trade	   coffee,	   it	   may	   be	   argued	   that	   the	  
disadvantaged	   position	   in	  which	   poor	   coffee	   growers	   in	   developing	   countries	  
find	  themselves,	   flows	   from	  global	  differences	   in	  wealth	  which	  are	   themselves	  
unjust.	  Conversely,	  this	  reasoning	  would	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  not	  exploitative	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  the	  weak	  bargaining	  position	  of,	  say,	  an	  incredibly	  rich	  philatelist	  
who	   desperately	   wants	   to	   own	   a	   rare	   stamp,	   because	   the	   philatelist’s	   weak	  
bargaining	  position	   is	   (assumedly)	  not	   the	   consequence	  of	   an	   injustice,	   but	  of	  
his	  own	  choice	  to	  collect	  stamps	  and	  his	  desire	  for	  this	  particular	  stamp.	  	  
	   However,	  this	  argument	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  injustice	  
account	  of	  exploitation,	  which	  was	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  section	  4,	  and	  which	  
says	   that	  people	  ought	  not	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  prior	   (distributive)	   injustices,	  
and	   that	   doing	   so	   is	  what	  makes	   exploitation	  wrong.	   In	   that	   section,	   I	   argued	  
that	   this	  account	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  what	  makes	  exploitation	  wrong,	  
amongst	  others	  because	  it	  cannot	  be	  shown	  that	  taking	  advantage	  of	  an	  existing	  
injustice	   is	   necessarily	   wrong,	   because	   we	   can	   exploit	   people	   who	   have	   not	  
suffered	  an	  injustice,	  because	  exploiters	  do	  not	  necessarily	  exacerbate	  injustice,	  
and	   possibly	   because,	   by	   locating	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitative	   transactions	   in	  
background	   injustice,	   we	   unjustly	   hold	   particular	   people	   disproportionately	  
responsible	  for	  correcting	  macro-­‐injustices,	  which	  is	  a	  responsibility	  of	  society	  
as	  a	  whole.	  	  
It	  might	  be	  objected,	  it	  was	  said	  in	  chapter	  2,	  that	  irrespective	  of	  the	  fact	  
that	  correcting	  societal	   injustices	   is	  a	  societal	  responsibility,	  we	  may	  still	  have	  
an	  individual	  duty	  to	  compensate	  for	  unjust	  differences	  in	  wealth.	  Yet	  even	  if	  we	  
assume	   that	   this	   is	   true,	   it	  was	   argued,	   the	   requirement	  of	   such	   an	   individual	  
duty	   is	   not	   necessarily	   related	   to	   whether	   and	   when	   we	   find	   a	   particular	  
transaction	  exploitative.	  The	  requirement	  of	  such	  a	  duty	  is	  also	  not	  necessarily	  
related	  to	  the	  price	  that	  a	  non-­‐disadvantaged	  party	  in	  a	  transaction	  would	  have	  
accepted,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  what	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  fair	  price	  by	  the	  bargaining	  
disadvantages	  method	  of	  calculating	  the	  fair	  price.	  An	  individual	  moral	  duty	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
share.’	  J	  Gordley,	  ‘The	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  Foundations	  of	  Private	  Law’	  (2002)	  47	  The	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compensate	   for	  macro	   injustices	  would	   ask	   us	   to	   give	   people	  with	  whom	  we	  
transact	   (and	   other	   people)	   enough	   to	   correct	   their	   existing	   disadvantage	   in	  
wealth	  or,	  perhaps,	  to	  give	  them	  our	   ‘share’	  of	  what	  they	  need	  to	  correct	  their	  
disadvantage	  (see	  sections	  2.3.3	  and	  2.4.2).	  This	  amount	  would	  not	  be	  related	  to	  
which	   good	   is	   being	   sold,	   and	   thus	   also	   not	   to	   the	   price	   that	   a	   non-­‐
disadvantaged	  party	  would	  accept	  or	  pay,	  or	  to	  whether	  we	  find	  the	  price	  in	  a	  
transaction	  unfair,	  or	  the	  transaction	  exploitative.	  Hence,	  we	  cannot	  justify	  why	  
and	  when	  transactions	  are	  unfair	  and	  exploitative	  by	  appealing	  to	  principles	  of	  
distributive	  justice.	  	  
	   To	   conclude,	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   that	   the	   bargaining	   disadvantage	  
method	  of	  determining	  the	  fair	  price	  is	  problematic	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  when	  
transactions	  are	  unfair	  and	  why	  this	  is	  so.	  First,	  this	  method	  can	  lead	  to	  fairness	  
requirements	   that	   are	   too	   demanding.	   Second,	   in	   justifying	   this	   method,	   we	  
have	   to	   rely	   on	   an	   argument	  based	  on	  vulnerability	   or	   injustice,	  which	   I	   have	  
rejected	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  as	  explanations	  of	  why	  exploitation	  is	  wrong.	  	  
	  
3.8	  Exploitation	  as	  unfairness:	  Conclusion	  
	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   discussed	   what	   I	   have	   called	   the	   unfairness	   account	   of	  
exploitation:	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	   exploitative	  
transactions	   is	   an	  unfair	  division	  of	  benefits	   and	  burdens.	   I	   distinguished	   two	  
questions	   that	   are	   important	   in	   analysing	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	  
exploitative	  transactions	  is	  unfairness.	  The	  first	  question	  is:	  when	  is	  the	  division	  
of	  benefits	  and	  burdens—or	  price,	  for	  short—(un)fair?	  The	  second	  question	  is:	  
why	  is	  this	  so?	  That	  is:	  why	  should	  we,	  morally,	  offer	  the	  price	  that	  is	  said	  to	  be	  
the	  fair	  price,	  and	  why	  is	  it	  morally	  wrong	  to	  offer	  a	  lower	  or	  ask	  a	  higher	  price?	  
This	  second	  question	  is	  important,	  I	  argued,	  because	  if	  we	  say	  that	  the	  wrong	  of	  
exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  unfairness,	  we	  use	  ‘unfair’	  as	  the	  explanation	  of	  what	  
is	  morally	  wrong	  with	   exploitation,	   and	   are	   thus	   saying	   that	   exploiters	   ought,	  
for	  some	  moral	  reason,	  not	  to	  pay	  an	  unfair	  price.	  Therefore,	  in	  describing	  what	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makes	  for	  an	  (un)fair	  and	  thus	  exploitative	  transaction,	  we	  have	  to	  explain	  why	  
such	  transactions	  are	  indeed	  morally	  wrong.	  	  
	   In	  sections	  3.2,	  3.4	  and	  3.6,	   I	  described	  three	  competing	  answers	  to	  the	  
question	  of	  when	  a	  price	  is	  (un)fair:	  that	  a	  price	  is	  fair	  if	  it	  reflects	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  good	  transacted,	  which	  can	  be	  measured	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  production	  costs;	  
that	   a	   price	   is	   fair	   if	   it	   corresponds	   to	   the	   (hypothetical)	   competitive	  market	  
price;	   and	   that	   a	  price	   is	   fair	   if	   it	   corresponds	   to	   the	  hypothetical	  price	   that	   a	  
non-­‐disadvantaged	  party	  would	  accept	  or	  pay.	  I	  argued	  that	  all	  three	  views	  face	  
some	   problems,	   amongst	   which	   the	   problem	   that	   they	   all	   lead	   to	  
counterintuitive	  conclusions	  about	  which	  prices	  are	  fair	  and	  unfair.	  	  
I	  also	  discussed	  five	  possible	  answers	  to	  the	  second	  question:	  why	  what	  
is	   said	   to	   be	   the	   fair	   price	   is	   indeed	   fair,	   or	   in	   other	  words,	  why	   it	   is	  morally	  
wrong	   to	   pay	   a	   lower	   or	   ask	   a	   higher	   price.	   These	   five	   answers	   were	   that	  
offering	  what	   is	  said	  to	  be	  the	  fair	  price	   is	  required	  for	  the	  productivity	  of	   the	  
capitalist	   system	   (section	   3.3);	   that	   doing	   so	   is	   morally	   required	   because	   we	  
ought	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need	   (section	   3.3);	   that	   doing	   so	   is	  morally	   required	  
because	  we	  ought	  not	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  people’s	   invalid	   consent	  or	   lack	  of	  
better	  choices	  (section	  3.5);	  that	  doing	  so	  is	  morally	  required	  because	  we	  ought	  
not	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  vulnerability	   (section	  3.6);	   and	   that	  offering	  
what	  is	  said	  to	  be	  the	  fair	  price	  is	  morally	  required	  because	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  distributive	   injustices	   (section	  3.7).	  Although	   I	  discussed	  each	  of	  
these	   possible	   justifications	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   particular	   answer	   to	   the	   first	  
question—how	   to	   calculate	   the	   fair	   price—it	   was	   shown	   that	   some	   of	   these	  
justifications	  might	  perhaps	  also	  be	  given	   in	  relation	   to	  other	  views	  of	  how	  to	  
calculate	  the	  fair	  price.	  	  
I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   how	   each	   of	   these	   possible	   justifications	   is	  
problematic.	   The	   first	   one,	   I	   argued,	   simply	   does	   not	   give	   an	   adequate	  moral	  
explanation.	  The	  other	  four,	   I	  have	  tried	  to	  show,	  actually	  bring	  us	  back	  to	  the	  
same	   four	  arguments	   for	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation	   that	  were	  discussed	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   and	   that	  were	   there	   shown	  not	   to	  be	  able	   to	  offer	  adequate	  
explanations	   of	   when	   transactions	   are	   wrong	   or	   exploitative.	   Hence,	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter,	   I	   discussed	   four	   different	   arguments	   for	   the	   wrong	   in	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exploitation	   that	   feature	   in	   the	   present-­‐day	   philosophical	   debate	   on	  
exploitation,	   and	   argued	   that	   none	   of	   them	   can	   explain	   why	   exploitation	   is	  
wrong.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   that	   the	   unfairness	   account	   of	  
exploitation,	  in	  explaining	  why	  certain	  transactions	  are	  unfair	  and	  exploitative,	  
ultimately	  has	  to	  appeal	  to	  one	  of	  those	  four	  arguments	  that	  were	  rejected	  in	  the	  
previous	   chapter—and	   that	   this	   account	   can	   therefore	   also	   not	   satisfactorily	  
explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  	  
	  
The	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation	   seems	   right,	   and	   preferable	   over	   the	  
accounts	  of	  exploitation	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  realizing	  that	  the	  
wrong	  of	  exploitation	  has	   to	  do	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  exploiters	   take	  an	  excessive	  
benefit	  for	  themselves.	  Yet	  by	  saying	  that	  taking	  excessive	  benefits	  for	  oneself	  is	  
wrong	  if	  and	  because	  it	  is	  unfair,	  the	  unfairness	  account	  does	  not	  bring	  us	  closer	  
to	  answering	   the	  question	  of	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  This	   is	  because	  
the	  term	  fairness	   is,	  by	   itself,	   ‘morally	  empty’.	  To	  say	  that	  some	  distribution	  is	  
unfair	   is	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   for	   some	   reason	  morally	  wrong,	   and	   that	   there	   is	   a	  
moral	  reason	  why	  we	  should	  offer	  a	  higher	  or	  ask	  a	  lower	  price.	  This	  means	  that	  
a	  claim	  of	  (un)fairness	  always	  has	  to	  be	  paired	  with	  a	  further	  moral	  argument,	  
the	   argument	   that	   explains	  why	  we	   indeed	   ought	   to	   offer	   a	   certain	   price;	   the	  
price	   that	   is	   said	   to	   be	   the	   fair	   price.	   Yet	   once	   we	   are	   looking	   for	   such	   an	  
argument,	  we	  are	  almost	  back	  where	  this	  thesis	  started:	  with	  the	  search	  for	  an	  
argument	   that	   explains	   why	  we	   ought	   not	   to	   offer	   exploitatively	   low	   or	   high	  
prices.	   It	   is	   perhaps	   not	   surprising,	   then,	   that	   the	   justifications	   on	   which	   a	  
fairness	   argument	   for	   exploitation	   could	   try	   to	   rely	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   why	  
offering	   a	   certain	   price	   is	   unfair,	   are	   the	   same	   justifications	   that	   are	   used	   to	  
explain	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation:	   a	   moral	   duty	   not	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	  
vulnerability,	  needs,	  injustice,	  or	  invalid	  consent.	  	  
	   The	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   therefore,	  may	   perhaps	   give	   an	  
adequate	  description	  of	  which	  transactions	  we	  consider	  exploitative,	  but	  it	  does	  
not	  help	   in	  explaining	   their	  wrongness.	   In	   chapter	  1	   it	  was	  said	   that	   the	  most	  
general	  definition	  of	  exploitation	  is	  ‘taking	  wrongful	  advantage	  of	  someone’,	  but	  
that	  the	  question	  is	  what	  makes	   it	  wrong.	  The	  unfairness	  account	  replaces	  the	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word	   ‘wrongful’	  with	   ‘unfair’,	  and	  says	   ‘exploitation	   is	   taking	  unfair	  advantage	  
of	   someone’.	   But	   without	   an	   adequate	   explanation	   of	   when	   a	   transaction	   is	  
unfair,	  and	  at	  least	  as	  importantly,	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  we	  are	  no	  closer	  to	  explaining	  
the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	   exploitation.	   Rather	   than	   saying	   that	   the	   unfairness	  
account	   gives	   an	   incorrect	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
exploitation,	   as	   I	   have	   argued	   for	   the	   accounts	   of	   exploitation	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
previous	  chapter,	  I	  would	  therefore	  say	  that	  it	  gives	  no	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  
since	   it	   is	   completely	   dependent	   on	   other	   theories	   to	   be	   able	   to	   explain	  why	  
transactions	  are	  unfair	  and	  thus	  exploitative.	  And	  if	  one	  of	  those	  theories,	  such	  
as	   the	  ones	   set	   out	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   could	   adequately	   explain	  why	  we	  
ought	  to	  offer	  a	  certain	  price	  in	  certain	  situations,	  and	  why	  not	  doing	  so	  would	  
be	  unfair	  and	  thus	  exploitative,	  that	  theory	  would	  be	  doing	  all	  the	  ‘moral	  work’,	  
and	  would	  also	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation	  without	  using	  
the	  term	  unfairness.	  	  
Yet,	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   argue	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   that	   those	   theories	  
cannot	   adequately	   explain	   why	   we	   ought	   not	   to	   exploit	   someone	   and	   why	  
consensual	   exploitation	   is	   wrong.	   Therefore,	   looking	   at	   all	   the	   discussed	  
theories	  of	  exploitation,	   I	  believe	  that	   it	  might	  be	   impossible	  to	   justify	  a	  moral	  
duty	  not	  to	  exploit.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  think	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  morally	  
problematic	   about	   consensual	   exploitation.	   What	   I	   want	   to	   argue	   is	   that	   the	  
wrongness	  of	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  the	  violation	  of	  some	  
moral	  duty,	  as	  all	  discussed	  accounts	  do,	  but	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue.	  I	  will	  set	  out	  
this	  argument	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  4	  –	  EXPLOITATION	  AS	  GREED	  
	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   I	   discussed	   five	   different	   views	   of	   what	   makes	  
consensual	   exploitation	   morally	   wrong,	   and	   argued	   that	   all	   those	   views	   are	  
problematic.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  put	  forward	  my	  own,	  alternative,	  view,	  which	  
is	   that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   failure	  of	  virtue.	  
More	   specifically,	   I	   believe	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	  
greediness,	  which	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  	  
	   To	  avoid	  misunderstanding:	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  say	  
that	   all	   cases	   of	   being	   greedy	   are	   exploitative.	   We	   can	   be	   greedy	   without	  
exploiting	   anyone,	   for	   instance	   by	   giving	   very	   cheap	   birthday	   presents	   to	   our	  
friends.	   Or,	   for	   example,	   we	   may	   consider	   managers	   who	   accept	   or	   award	  
themselves	   extremely	   high	   bonuses	   greedy,	   without	   thinking	   that	   they	  
necessarily	   exploit	   anyone.	   As	   said	   in	   chapter	   1,	   it	   is	   generally	   agreed	   that	  
exploitation	  means	  taking	  advantage	  of	  someone	  in	  a	  wrongful	  way,	  although	  in	  
the	   case	  of	   consensual	   exploitation,	  people	  disagree	  about	  what	   this	  wrongful	  
way	  is—why	  it	  is	  wrong.	  My	  answer	  is	  that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  is	  acting	  
greedily,	   but	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   greedy	   behaviour	   is	   exploitative.	  
Nonetheless,	   I	   believe	   that	   our	   feelings	   about	   cases	   such	   as	   managers	   who	  
accept	   large	   bonuses,	   do	   have	   something	   in	   common	  with	   our	   feelings	   about	  
cases	  of	  exploitation,	  because	  they	  are	  all	  instances	  of	  greediness.	  
I	  will	  start	  setting	  out	  my	  understanding	  of	  exploitation	  by	  explaining	  the	  
concept	   of	   virtue	   in	   general	   terms	   in	   section	   4.1,	   and	   the	   role	   virtue	   plays	   in	  
moral	   theory	   in	   section	   4.2.	   This	   is	   followed	   by	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity	   and	   the	   vice	   of	   greediness,	   and	   their	   relation	   to	   exploitation,	   in	  
section	  4.3.	  The	  next	   two	  sections	  discuss	   some	   important	   features	  of	  virtues,	  
and	   their	   significance	   for	  my	   view	   of	   exploitation	   as	   greediness:	   the	   context-­‐
dependence	   of	   virtues	   (section	   4.4),	   and	   the	   role	   of	   perception,	   emotion	   and	  
responsiveness	  (section	  4.5).	  The	  chapter	  closes	  in	  section	  4.6	  with	  a	  discussion	  
of	   some	   possible	   objections	   to	   my	   account	   of	   exploitation:	   that	   virtue	  
approaches	   are	   self-­‐centred;	   that	   the	   unfortunate	   circumstances	   that	   are	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typically	  part	  of	  exploitation	  should	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  what	  makes	  
it	  wrong;	  that	  my	  view	  seems	  ultimately	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  unfairness	  account	  
of	   exploitation;	   that	  my	  view	   is	   similar	   to	  Ruth	   Sample’s	   version	  of	   the	  needs	  
account	  of	  exploitation	  (discussed	  in	  chapter	  2);	  that	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  approach	  to	  
explaining	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  ultimately	  not	  that	  different	  from	  a	  duty-­‐
based	  approach;	  and	  that	  being	  greedy,	  although	  not	  praiseworthy,	  is	  not	  a	  very	  




In	  order	  to	  explain	  my	  argument	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  greediness,	  a	  
failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  I	  will	  start	  by	  discussing	  in	  this	  section	  some	  
general	   characteristics	   of	   virtues	   and	   vices.	   Simply	   put,	   a	   virtue	   is	   a	   good,	  
excellent,	  or	  admirable145	  character	   trait.	  Some	  such	  character	   traits	  mainly146	  
relate	  to	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  own	  wellbeing,	  such	  as	  industriousness,	  temperance,	  
courage,	   or	  patience;	  while	   other	   virtues	   involve	  one’s	   attitude	   towards	  other	  
people,	   such	   as	   honesty,	   kindness,	   forgiveness,	   or	   generosity.	   Virtues	   are	  
opposed	  to	  vices—bad	  character	  traits—such	  as	  gluttony,	  laziness,	  impatience,	  
dishonesty,	   callousness,	   anger,	   or	   greediness.	   Philippa	   Foot	   usefully	   describes	  
virtues	   as	   ‘correctives’	   to	   temptations	   or	   flaws	   of	   motivation	   that	   humans	  
typically	  face.147	  The	  virtue	  of	  industriousness,	  for	  example,	  only	  exists	  because	  
people	   are	   often	   tempted	   not	   to	   work	   by	   a	   desire	   for	   leisure	   or	   to	   do	   other	  
things	  they	  find	  more	  enjoyable.	  Likewise,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  for	  a	  virtue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  difference	  between	  something	  being	  an	  admirable	  character	  trait	  and	  a	  
good	  character	  trait,	  as	  the	  former	  is	  more	  subjective.	  While	  most	  writers	  describe	  virtues	  as	  
good	  or	  excellent	  traits,	  some,	  notably	  Michael	  Slote,	  prefer	  to	  describe	  them	  as	  admirable	  
character	  traits	  (see	  his	  Morals	  from	  Motives	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  
146	  Mainly,	  but	  not	  solely,	  because	  all	  virtues	  affect	  both	  ourselves	  and	  others.	  While	  people	  
sometimes	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  self-­‐regarding	  virtues	  (such	  as	  prudence	  and	  patience)	  
and	  other-­‐regarding	  virtues,	  such	  as	  kindness,	  justice,	  loyalty	  and	  generosity,	  this	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  
mistaken.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  because	  other-­‐regarding	  virtues	  like	  loyalty	  and	  generosity	  do	  
benefit	  their	  possessors,	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later;	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  because,	  since	  people	  are	  
social	  beings	  living	  in	  communities,	  ‘self-­‐regarding’	  virtues	  also	  benefit	  people	  around	  them.	  
People	  who	  are	  imprudent	  or	  impatient,	  for	  instance,	  can	  bring	  much	  burden,	  nuisance	  or	  pain	  
to	  their	  family,	  friends,	  or	  to	  other	  people	  close	  to	  them.	  See	  R	  Hursthouse,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics’	  in	  EN	  
Zalta	  (ed),	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Spring	  2013	  Edition)	  19.	  	  
147	  P	  Foot,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices:	  And	  Other	  Essays	  in	  Moral	  Philosophy	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  2002)	  8-­‐9.	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of	  generosity	  if	  people	  were	  not	  tempted	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  maximize	  their	  wealth	  or	  
if	  they	  were	  not	  more	  attached	  to	  their	  own	  wellbeing	  than	  to	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  
others.	  As	   correctives	   to	   temptations,	   virtues	  are	  undoubtedly	  beneficial,	  both	  
for	   their	   possessors	   and	   for	   other	   people	   around	   them.	   We	   will	   not	   achieve	  
much	  if	  we	  have	  no	  perseverance,	  courage,	  curiosity	  or	  temperance,	  and	  we	  will	  
not	  get	  on	  well	  with	  others	  if	  we	  possess	  no	  kindness,	  honesty,	  forgiveness,	  or	  
tolerance.	  Moreover,	  many	  people	  will	  all	   in	  all	  be	  better	  off	   living	  in	  a	  society	  
instilled	   with	   justice,	   charity,	   or	   generosity,	   than	   in	   a	   society	   that	   lacks	   such	  
virtues.148	  	  
	   Although	   virtues	   have	   for	   a	   large	   part	   been	   ignored	   by	   20th	   century	  
moral	   philosophy,	   they	   do	   seem	   to	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	   our	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
moral	   and	   ethical	   thinking.	   Most	   of	   us	   admire	   someone	   we	   know	   for	   being	  
diligent	   and	   hard	   working,	   or	   for	   showing	   perseverance	   and	   discipline	   in	  
sticking	  to	  a	  degree	  programme,	  an	  exercise	  programme,	  or	  a	  diet.	  Or	  we	  praise	  
(perhaps	  only	  in	  our	  minds)	  a	  friend	  or	  family	  member	  for	  being	  helpful,	  honest,	  
kind,	   patient	   or	   generous,	   or	   are	   annoyed	   by	   a	   colleague	   we	   find	   lazy,	   a	  
shopkeeper	  we	  find	  unfriendly,	  or	  a	  neighbour	  we	  find	  boastful.	  Hence,	  most	  of	  
us,	   if	   not	   all	   of	   us,	   evaluate	   people	   and	   their	   behaviour	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	  
rights	   and	  duties,	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	   good	   and	  bad	   character	   traits—virtues	  
and	  vices.	  	  
However,	  the	  label	  ‘virtuous’	  is	  applied	  both	  to	  people’s	  character	  and	  to	  
specific	   actions	   they	   perform.	   In	   the	   first	   meaning,	   we	   say	   that	   someone	   is	  
virtuous,	  or	  has	  a	  particular	  virtue	  as	  a	  character	   trait.	  Seen	  as	  such	  character	  
traits,	  virtues	  are	  not	  just	  inclinations	  or	  habits	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  but	  
stable,	   reliable	  dispositions.	  Thus,	  when	   someone	  possesses	   the	  virtue	  of,	   say,	  
friendliness,	   she	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   friendly	   in	   many	   different	   types	   of	  
situations,	   towards	   many	   different	   people,	   over	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time,	   even	  
when	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  do	  so.149	  Moreover,	  a	  character	  trait	  involves	  not	  only	  the	  
way	   someone	   acts,	   but	   also	   her	   reasons	   for	   action	   and	   her	   emotions.	   As	  
Rosalind	  Hursthouse	  puts	  it,	  a	  character	  trait	  ‘goes	  all	  the	  way	  down’,	  and	  ‘[t]o	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  See	  Foot,	  op.cit.	  2.	  
149	  See	  R	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  10-­‐12.	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possess	   a	   virtue	   is	   to	   be	   a	   certain	   sort	   of	   person	   with	   a	   certain	   complex	  
mindset.’150	  	  
Yet	   we	   also	   speak	   of	   certain	   actions	   as	   being	   virtuous,	   instead	   of	  
someone’s	  character.	  I	  might	  say,	  for	  example,	  that	  it	  is	  generous	  of	  you	  to	  give	  
money	  to	  charity,	  or	  that	   it	   is	  honest	  to	  admit	  that	  you	  broke	  a	  vase	   in	  a	  shop	  
even	  though	  no	  one	  noticed.	  As	  with	  virtue	  seen	  as	  a	  character	  trait,	  saying	  that	  
a	   specific	   action	   is	   virtuous	   means	   that	   we	   are	   not	   only	   judging	   the	   specific	  
deed,	   but	   also	   the	   reason	   for	   performing	   the	   act,	   and	   the	   emotions	   and	  
perceptions	   that	  accompany	   it.	   In	  other	  words,	   as	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	   section	  
4.5,	   the	   virtuousness	  of	   an	   act	  depends	  on	   the	   action,	   the	  motivation,	   and	   the	  
emotions	  and	  perceptions	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  
The	   two	   meanings	   of	   virtue—applying	   to	   character	   and	   applying	   to	  
actions—are	   related	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   having	   a	   virtuous	   character	  means	   that	  
one	   tends	   to	   perform	   virtuous	   acts	   and	   to	   have	   virtuous	   emotions	   and	  
motivations.	  Yet	  there	  are	  two	  different	  views	  of	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  relation.151	  
According	   to	   one	   view,	   virtuous	   character	   traits	   are	   primary;	   they	   are	   what	  
gives	  moral	  value	   to	  virtue,	  and	  virtuous	  acts	   (and	  emotions	  and	  motivations)	  
are	  acts	  that	  result	  from	  such	  dispositions.	  Aristotle,	  for	  instance,	  said	  that	  acts	  
only	   count	   as	   virtuous	   if	   they	   ‘proceed	   from	   a	   firm	   and	   unchangeable	  
character’.152	  If	  they	  do	  not,	  they	  may	  be	  acts	  a	  virtuous	  person	  would	  perform,	  
and	   may	   have	   a	   certain	   moral	   value	   in	   themselves,	   but	   they	   are	   not	   truly	  
virtuous	   acts.	   According	   to	   another	   view,	   virtuous	   acts	   are	   primary	   and	   are	  
where	   the	  moral	  value	  of	  virtue	  comes	   from,	  and	  virtuous	  character	   traits	  are	  
merely	   the	  disposition	   to	  perform	  virtuous	  acts	  and	   feel	  virtuous	  emotions.153	  
Thomas	  Hurka,	   for	   instance,	  argues	  that	   the	  value	  of	  virtuous	  acts	   issues	   from	  
their	  underlying	  motivation	  and	  emotion,	  and	  rejects	  the	  view	  that	  acts	  can	  only	  
be	  called	  truly	  virtuous	  if	  they	  are	  performed	  out	  of	  a	  stable	  character	  trait.	  He	  
says	   that	   if	   a	   friend	   who	   normally	   does	   not	   act	   generously	   suddenly	   gives	  
money	  to	  a	  homeless	  person	  (with	  the	  right	  motivation	  and	  emotions),	  there	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  Hursthouse,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics’	  op.cit.	  3-­‐4.	  
151	  See	  T	  Hurka,	  ‘Virtuous	  Act,	  Virtuous	  Dispositions’	  (2006)	  66(1)	  Analysis	  69-­‐76.	  
152	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  II.3,	  1105a27-­‐1105b12.	  	  
153	  See	  Hurka,	  op.cit.	  70.	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nothing	  self-­‐contradictory	  about	  saying	  ‘that	  was	  uncharacteristically	  generous	  
of	  you’.154	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  an	  act	  performed	  for	  
a	   virtuous	  motive,	   such	   as	   another’s	   pleasure,	   is	   less	   good	   if	   it	   does	  not	   issue	  
from	  a	  stable	  character	  trait.155	  	  
Proponents	   of	   the	   first	   view	   might	   reply	   that	   although	   virtuous	  
dispositions	  of	  character	  are	  primary,	  perfect	  virtue	  rarely,	  if	  ever,	  exists.	  They	  
might	  say	  that	  being	  virtuous	  can	  better	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  degree,	  and	  that	  
while	  perfectly	  kind,	  patient	  or	  generous	  people	  are	  hard	  to	  find,	  we	  can	  still	  say	  
that	   some	   people	   are	   more	   or	   less	   kind,	   patient	   or	   generous	   than	   other	  
people.156	  Hence,	  when	  people	  perform	  virtuous	  acts	  that	  do	  not	  result	   from	  a	  
perfect	  and	  stable	  virtuous	  character	  trait,	  we	  might	  still	  say	  that	  their	  actions	  
are	  valuable	  and	  that	  their	  character	  is	  more	  virtuous	  than	  that	  of	  other	  people,	  
or	  that	  they	  are	  more	  ‘on	  their	  way’	  to	  becoming	  virtuous.	  	  
I	  am	  more	  in	  sympathy	  with	  the	  second	  view	  of	  virtue,	  that	  sees	  virtuous	  
acts	  and	  emotions	  as	  primary,	  but	   I	   think	   that	  my	  account	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  
failure	  of	  generosity	  can	  be	  accepted	  on	  both	  views.	  Both	  views	  can	  agree	  that	  it	  
is	  valuable	  to	  have	  a	  generous	  character,	  though	  on	  the	  first	  view	  the	  value	  lies	  
in	  having	  such	  a	  character	  in	  itself,	  while	  on	  the	  second	  view	  it	  has	  instrumental	  
value	   because	   someone	  with	   a	   generous	   character	   can	   be	   trusted	   to	   perform	  
more	  generous	  acts157	  and,	  amongst	  others,	  not	  to	  exploit	  people.	  Yet	  both	  can	  
also	  agree	  that	   it	   is	  good	  to	  perform	  generous	  acts,	  even	  if	  this	   is	  not	  part	  of	  a	  
perfect	  and	  stable	  generous	  character,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  bad	  to	  fail	  to	  do	  so,	  such	  as	  
by	  exploiting	  others.	  	  
Therefore,	  I	  think	  that	  on	  both	  views	  one	  could	  accept	  that,	  although	  it	  is	  
best	  if	  people	  have	  a	  reliable	  generous	  character,	  when	  I	  say	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  
exploitative	  transactions	  is	  greediness,	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  I	  am	  
not	  primarily	  talking	  about	  exploiters’	  overall	  character,	  but	  about	  their	  actions	  
in	   particular	   exploitative	   transactions.	   I	   primarily	  mean	   to	   say	   that	   exploiters	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  Hurka,	  op.cit.	  72.	  
155	  Hurka,	  op.cit.	  73.	  
156	  See	  e.g.	  Hursthouse,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics’,	  op.cit.	  4-­‐5.	  	  
157	  Hurka,	  op.cit.	  73.	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act	   greedily	   in	   the	   particular	   exploitative	   transactions	   (in	   which	   ‘act’	   also	  
involves	  their	  motivation,	  emotion	  and	  attitude	  towards	  the	  other),	  and	  that	   it	  
would	   be	   better	   if	   they	   acted	   less	   greedily,	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   doing	   so	  
would	   be	   ‘out	   of	   character’,	   because	   they	   often	   act	   greedily	   in	   other	   areas	   of	  
their	  life	  as	  well.	  	  
	  After	   having	   set	   out	   what	   is	  meant	   with	   ‘virtue’	   and	   ‘vice’,	   I	   will	   now	  
briefly	   illustrate	   the	   role	   virtues	   and	   vices	   play	   in	   moral	   theory,	   before	  
discussing	   the	   particular	   virtue	   of	   generosity	   and	   the	   vice	   of	   greed	   in	   section	  
4.3.	  	  
	  
4.2	  Virtue	  in	  moral	  theory	  
	  
It	   is	   common	   to	   distinguish	   between	   three	   types	   of	   moral	   approaches:	   duty-­‐
based	  or	  deontological	  approaches,	  consequentialism,	  and	  virtue	  ethics.	  Virtues	  
and	   vices	   are	  most	   obviously	   associated	  with	   virtue	   ethics,	   which	   focuses	   on	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  a	  virtuous	  life	  and	  to	  have	  particular	  virtues.	  Most	  of	  what	  
will	  be	  said	  about	  virtues	   in	   this	  chapter	   is	   therefore	  based	  on	  work	  by	  virtue	  
ethicists,	  since	  they	  have	  analysed	  virtues,	  including	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  in	  
greatest	  depth.	  Nevertheless,	  virtues	  can	  also	  be	   important	   in	  deontological	  or	  
consequentialist	   approaches,	   and	   some	   deontological	   and	   consequentialist	  
writers	   have	   indeed	   given	   substantial	   attention	   to	   the	   virtues.	   Therefore,	  
although	   I	   realize	   that	   my	   view	   of	   exploitation	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   virtue	   is	   most	  
naturally	  associated	  with	  virtue	  ethics	  approaches,	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  argument	  
is	  not	  incompatible	  with	  some	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  approaches	  as	  
well,	   and	   I	  do	  not	  mean	   to	  exclusively	  endorse	  virtue	  ethics,	  or	  any	  particular	  
virtue	  ethics	  theory.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  exploitation	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  
generosity,	  and	  that	  this	  virtue	  has	  certain	  features,	  and	  can	  have	  an	  important	  
role	   to	   play	   in	   society;	   and	   I	   believe	   that	   this	   argument	   can	   be	   accepted	   by	  
supporters	  of	  many	  different	   types	  of	  virtue	  ethics	   theories,	  as	  well	  as	  several	  
consequentialist	  and	  deontological	  theories.	  Of	  course,	  not	  everyone	  may	  agree	  
with	  what	  I	  describe	  as	  general	  features	  of	  virtues,	  or	  features	  of	  generosity	  or	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greed.	   There	   are	   certainly	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   virtues	   are	   seen	   by	   virtue	  
ethics,	   deontological,	   and	   consequentialist	   theories;	   and	   by	   different	   theories	  
within	  those	  approaches.	  The	  characteristics	  of	  virtue	  I	  describe	  in	  this	  chapter	  
are	   primarily	  what	   I	   consider	   important	   elements	   of	   virtues,	   yet	   I	   do	   believe	  
that	   supporters	  of	  many	  different	   types	  of	  virtue-­‐oriented	  views	  can	  agree	  on	  
the	   existence	   and	   importance	   of	   these	   elements.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   therefore	  
briefly	  illustrate,	  first,	  some	  different	  virtue	  ethics	  theories,	  and,	  second,	  the	  role	  
virtue	  plays	  in	  certain	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  theories.	  	  	  
	  
In	  simple	  terms,	  virtue	  ethics	  theories	  argue	  that	  moral	  philosophy	  should	  not	  
just	   be	   concerned	   with	   people’s	   choices	   and	   actions,	   but	   also	   with	   their	  
character.	   This	   means	   that	   such	   theories	   also	   focus	   on	   people’s	   ‘inner	   state’:	  
their	  perception,	  motivations,	  and	  emotions.	  Instead	  of	  identifying	  specific	  rules	  
for	  correct	  moral	  action,	  they	  try	  to	  describe	  what	  type	  of	  person	  we	  should	  be.	  
Their	   answer	   is	   that	  we	   should	   be	   virtuous	   people;	   people	  who	   live	   virtuous	  
lives.158	  Consequently,	  virtue	  ethics	   theories	   try	  to	   formulate	  what	   it	  means	  to	  
be	  virtuous	  and	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  specific	  virtues,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  what	  
makes	  certain	  character	  traits	  virtues.	  	  
	   Different	  virtue	  ethics	  theories	  give	  different	  explanations	  of	  what	  makes	  
certain	   character	   traits	   virtues,	   and	   where	   their	   goodness	   derives	   from.	   On	  
many	  virtue	  ethics	  theories,	  living	  virtuously	  is	  necessary	  for	  eudaimonia,	  which	  
can	   be	   translated	   as	   ‘human	   flourishing’,	   ‘real	   happiness’,	   or	   ‘the	   sort	   of	  
happiness	  worth	  having.’159	  This	  supposes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  human	  
life	  that	  constitutes	  human	  flourishing,	  and	  that	  we	  might	  be	  mistaken	  about	  it,	  
believing,	   for	   instance,	   that	   the	   good	   human	   life	   consists	   solely	   in	   physical	  
pleasure	   or	   in	   opulence.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   people	  with	   different	   views	   about	  
human	  life	  will	  likely	  disagree	  about	  what	  human	  flourishing	  consists	  in.	  	  
	   One	  view,	  put	   forward	  by	  Aristotle	  and	  certain	  neo-­‐Aristotelians,	   starts	  
with	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  things	  have	  a	  distinctive	  function,	  and	  can	  be	  evaluated	  as	  
good	   or	   bad	   instances	   of	   their	   kind,	   according	   to	   how	  well	   they	   perform	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158	  N	  Athanassoulis,	  Virtue	  Ethics	  (Internet	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  2010)	  6.	  
159	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  10.	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function.160	   The	   distinctive	   function	   of	   humans	   is	   to	   use	   reason,	   it	   is	   thought,	  
because	  their	  rational	  capacity	  is	  what	  sets	  them	  apart	  from	  all	  other	  creatures	  
and	   distinguishes	   them	   as	   humans.	   Therefore,	   according	   to	   this	   view,	   to	   live	  
well	   as	   a	   human	   being	   is	   to	   reason	   well,	   and	   to	   have	   our	   actions	   guided	   by	  
reason.	   In	   other	   words:	   acting	   virtuously	   (patiently,	   courageously,	   kindly,	  
etcetera)	  means	   to	   act	   in	   line	  with	   reason,	   and	  acting	   in	   line	  with	   reason	  will	  
lead	  to	  human	  flourishing.	  	  
On	   this	   ‘eudaimonist’	   view,	   virtues	   are	   not	   just	   beneficial	   for	   other	  
people	   (see	   section	   4.6.1),	   but	   are	   also	   necessarily	   beneficial	   for	   the	   person	  
possessing	   the	   virtues,	   except	   perhaps	   in	   situations	   of	   bad	   luck.161	   This	   is	  
because	   on	   this	   view,	   human	   flourishing	   or	   real	   happiness	   consists	   in	   living	  
according	   to	   virtue	   (living	   patiently,	   courageously,	   kindly,	   etcetera).	   Hence,	  
while	   on	   some	  moral	   theories	   the	   demands	   of	  morality	  might	   go	   against	   our	  
self-­‐interest,	   on	   this	   virtue	   ethics	   understanding	   that	   is	   not	   the	   case:	   what	   is	  
required	  for	  morality	  and	  what	  is	  good	  for	  ourselves	  is	  identical.	  	  
Others	   have	   made	   the	   connection	   between	   the	   good	   human	   life	   and	  
virtues	   in	   fairly	   similar	   ways,	   yet	   reject	   the	   ‘eudaimonist’	   implication	   that	  
virtues	  are	  necessarily	  beneficial	  for	  their	  possessor.	  Philippa	  Foot,	  for	  example,	  
describes	  the	  goodness	  of	  virtues	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  practical	  rationality,	  related	  to	  
human	  nature.162	  Birds	  need	   to	  build	  nests	  and	  wolves	  need	   to	  hunt	   in	  packs,	  
which	   indicates	   that	  what	   it	   is	   for	  a	  particular	  species	   to	  be	  as	   they	  should	  be	  
and	   to	  do	  what	   they	   should	  do,	   is	  determined	  by	  what	   that	  particular	   species	  
needs.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  humans,	  Foot	  argues.	  And	  this	  does	  not	  just	  explain	  
virtues	  such	  as	  courage	  or	  temperance,	  which	  are	  clearly	  beneficial	  for	  oneself,	  
but	   also	   virtues	   such	   as	   kindness,	   honesty	   and	   generosity,	   since	   humans	   are	  
social	   animals,	   who	   depend	   on	   each	   other	   and	   need	   cooperation.163	   Quite	  
comparable,	   Alasdair	   MacIntyre’s	   theory	   of	   virtues	   is	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  I.6,	  1097b22-­‐1098a20.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  
Ethics,	  op.cit.	  part	  III.	  
161	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  while	  living	  virtuously	  generally	  leads	  to	  human	  flourishing,	  there	  are	  certain	  
things	  outside	  of	  our	  control	  that	  will	  negatively	  influence	  our	  happiness	  or	  flourishing,	  such	  as,	  
for	  instance,	  the	  death	  of	  one’s	  children.	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  I.9,	  1099a32-­‐1099b9.	  	  
162	  P	  Foot,	  Natural	  Goodness	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  2001)	  15.	  
163	  Foot,	  Natural	  Goodness,	  op.cit.	  16.	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humans	  are	  dependent	  on	  help	  from	  other	  humans	  throughout	  their	  lives.164	  In	  
contrast	   with	   eudaimonist	   theories,	   however,	   these	   writers	   believe	   that	  
although	   virtues	   are	   overall	   beneficial	   for	   humans,	   they	   are	   not	   necessarily	  
beneficial	  for	  every	  individual	  in	  every	  case.165	  	  
	   Rather	   different	   accounts	   of	   virtues	   are	   presented,	   for	   example,	   in	  
Michael	   Slote’s	   ‘sentimentalist’	   virtue	   ethics	   theory	   and	   Christine	   Swanton’s	  
‘pluralist’	   virtue	   ethics	   theory.	   Slote	   proposes	   what	   he	   calls	   an	   ‘agent-­‐based’,	  
‘sentimentalist’	  virtue	  ethics	  inspired	  by	  Martineau,	  Sidgwick,	  Hume	  and	  ethics	  
of	   care	   theorists,	   in	  which	   the	  value	  of	  virtuous	  acts	  derives	   from	  the	  motives	  
those	   acts	   express.166	   Particularly	   admirable	   motives	   are	   ‘caring’	   motives;	  
motives	   that	   express	   concern	   for	   the	   welfare	   of	   particular	   others,	   such	   as	  
benevolence	  and	  compassion.167	  Swanton,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  defines	  a	  virtue	  as	  
a	  disposition	  to	  respond	  well	  to	  ‘items	  within	  its	  field’,168	  such	  as	  other	  people,	  
oneself,	  objects,	  and	  animals.	  She	  argues	  that	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  respond	  to	  those	  
‘demands	   of	   the	   world’169	   depends	   on	   their	   value,	   their	   good	   (if	   they	   have	   a	  
good),	   their	   status,	   and	   the	   bonds	   between	   them	   and	   ourselves.170	   The	  moral	  
goodness	   of	   virtues,	   in	   Swanton’s	   view,	   lies	   in	   being	   thus	   appropriately	  
responsive	  to	  other	  people	  and	  other	  ‘items’	  in	  our	  world.	  Appropriate	  modes	  of	  
responsiveness,	  which	  are	  present	  in	  all	  virtues,	  she	  says,	  are	  love,	  respect,	  and	  
creativity.	  	  
	  
Supporters	   of	   virtue	   ethics	   theories	   have	   often	   criticized	   deontological	   and	  
consequentialist	   approaches	   for	   failing	   to	   see	   the	   importance	   of	   virtue,	  
character,	  perception,	  emotion	  and	  upbringing.	  Although	  this	  is	  may	  be	  true	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  A	  MacIntyre,	  Dependent	  Rational	  Animals:	  Why	  Human	  Beings	  Need	  the	  Virtues	  (Duckworth,	  
1999).	  
165	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  when	  someone	  has	  cheated	  on	  his	  wife,	  being	  honest	  about	  this	  
will	  damage	  his	  flourishing	  because	  it	  leads	  him	  to	  lose	  his	  wife	  and	  his	  children.	  Yet	  this	  does	  
not	  negate	  the	  fact	  that	  honesty	  is	  generally	  good	  for	  humans,	  or	  that	  being	  honest	  is	  the	  correct	  
thing	  to	  do	  in	  this	  situation.	  	  
166	  Slote,	  op.cit.	  
167	  Slote,	  op.cit.	  
168	  C	  Swanton,	  Virtue	  Ethics:	  A	  Pluralistic	  View	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003)	  19.	  
169	  Swanton,	  op.cit.	  21.	  
170	  Swanton,	  op.cit.	  41-­‐42.	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the	   work	   of	   many	   twentieth-­‐century	   deontological	   and	   consequentialist	  
theorists,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  for	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  approaches	  per	  se.	  
For	  instance,	  while	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	  which	  is	  central	  to	  most	  
deontological	   theories,	   is	   often	   regarded	   as	   solely	   concerned	  with	   duty,	   Kant	  
does	  have	  a	  theory	  of	  virtue,171	  which	  has	  an	  important	  role	  in	  his	  philosophy.	  
Therefore,	  as	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  argues,	  it	  is	  mistaken	  to	  think	  of	  Kant’s	  view	  as	  
obsessed	  with	  duty	  and	  principle	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  character-­‐formation.	  Kant	  
offers	  both	  a	  general	   account	  of	   virtue,	   and	  detailed	  analyses	  of	   some	  specific	  
virtues	  and	  vices,	  including	  the	  vice	  of	  greediness.	  Although	  Kant’s	  account	  does	  
differ	  from	  the	  classical	  Greek	  theories	  that	  most	  virtue	  ethics	  theories	  get	  their	  
inspiration	  from,	  especially	  in	  its	  non-­‐cognitive	  account	  of	  emotion	  (see	  section	  
4.5.2),	   it	   is,	   Nussbaum	   argues,	   a	   theory	   about	   the	   same	   things,	   which	   covers	  
most	   of	   the	   same	   topics,	   and	   bears	   substantial	   comparison	   with	   those	  
theories.172	  	  
For	  Kant,	  virtues	  are	  a	  strength	  of	  will,	  or	  ‘the	  moral	  capacity	  to	  constrain	  
oneself’173	   in	   light	   of	   our	   inclinations	   to	   do	   things	   that	   oppose	   moral	  
requirements,	   such	   as	   selfishness,	   laziness	   or	   greed.	   His	   doctrine	   of	   virtue	   is	  
related	   to	   the	   distinction	   he	   makes	   between	   perfect	   and	   imperfect	   duties.	  
Perfect	   duties	   tell	   us	   which	   acts	   we	   should	   not	   do,	   such	   as	   killing	   or	   lying.	  
Imperfect	  duties	  tell	  us	  what	  is	  required,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  tell	  us	  which	  acts	  are	  
required,	   but	  which	  ends	   or	  maxims	  we	   should	   adopt.	   Kant	   distinguishes	   two	  
broad	  imperfect	  duties	  we	  should	  adopt	  as	  ends:	  to	  develop	  our	  talents,	  and	  to	  
make	   other	   people’s	   ends	   our	   own.174	   From	   these,	   more	   specific	   ‘duties	   of	  
virtue’	  derive,	  such	  as	  kindness,	  compassion,	  beneficence,	  hospitality,	  and	  self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Mainly	  discussed	  in	  his	  later	  writings;	  most	  notably	  in	  the	  ‘Doctrine	  of	  Virtue’,	  in	  the	  second	  
part	  of	  his	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  (1797),	  but	  also	  in	  his	  Anthropology	  from	  a	  Pragmatic	  Point	  of	  
View	  (1798)	  and	  his	  Religion	  within	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Mere	  Reason	  (1793).	  	  
172	  MC	  Nussbaum,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics:	  A	  Misleading	  Category?’	  (1999)	  3(3)	  The	  Journal	  of	  Ethics	  163-­‐
201,	  165.	  See	  also	  N	  Sherman,	  Making	  Necessity	  a	  Virtue:	  Aristotle	  and	  Kant	  on	  Virtue	  
(Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997).	  
173	  I	  Kant,	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  (1797)	  [6:	  394],	  cited	  in	  M	  Betzler,	  ‘Kant’s	  Ethics	  of	  Virtue:	  An	  
Introduction’	  in	  M	  Betzler,	  Kant’s	  Ethics	  of	  Virtue	  (Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  2008)	  10.	  
174	  In	  his	  Groundwork	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  (1785),	  cited	  in	  PS	  Lake,	  ‘Being	  Virtuous	  and	  
the	  Virtues:	  Two	  Aspects	  of	  Kant’s	  Doctrine	  of	  Virtue’	  in	  M	  Betzler	  (ed),	  Kant’s	  Ethics	  of	  Virtue	  
(Walter	  de	  Gruyter,	  2008)	  107.	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control.	  Hence,	   for	  Kant,	   virtues	  are	  dispositions	   to	  act	   from	   imperfect	  duties;	  
that	  is,	  to	  act	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  made	  imperfect	  duties	  our	  end.175	  
The	   fact	   that	   imperfect	   duties	   are	   ends	   to	   strive	   towards,	   means	   that	  
people	  have	   a	   certain	  discretion	   in	   exactly	  how	   to	  do	   so.	   For	   example,	   having	  
adopted	   the	   end	   to	  be	   compassionate	   to	  other	  people	  does	  not	   require	   giving	  
away	  everything	  we	  own	  to	  help	  others,	  and	  having	  adopted	  the	  end	  to	  learn	  a	  
foreign	  language	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  have	  to	  spend	  all	  our	  time	  doing	  so.	  At	  
the	   same	   time,	   if	   we	   never	   help	   anyone,	   or	   never	   spend	   any	   time	   studying	  
vocabulary	   or	   grammar,	   we	   have	   clearly	   not	   adopted	   the	   end	   to	   be	  
compassionate	   or	   to	   learn	   a	   language.	   What	   duties	   of	   virtue	   require,	   Onora	  
O’Neill	  says,	  is	  that	  we	  ask	  ourselves	  questions	  such	  as,	  ‘“What	  must	  I	  do	  if	  I	  am	  
not	  to	  be	  indifferent	  to	  others’	  happiness?”,	  or	  “In	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  I	   find	  
myself,	  what	  could	  I	  do	  if	  I	  am	  not	  to	  neglect	  to	  develop	  my	  talents?”,	  or	  “What	  
does	   kindness	   (or	   honesty	   or	   gratitude)	   require	   here?”’176	   Because	   on	   Kant’s	  
theory	  duties	  of	  virtue	  require	  us	  to	  adopt	  certain	  ends,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  our	  actions	  
that	  matter	  for	  virtue,	  but	  our	  motives	  as	  well,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  ethics	  theories.	  
For	  example,	  the	  virtue	  of	  beneficence	  that	  Kant	  describes	  tells	  us	  not	  merely	  to	  
help	  others,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  from	  the	  duty	  to	  make	  others’	  ends	  our	  own.	  That	  is,	  to	  
help	   others	   because	  we	   have	   a	   true	   concern	   for	   the	   needs	   and	   interests	   of	  
others	  and	  want	  to	  advance	  them.177	  	  
	  
Hence,	  virtues	  and	  vices,	  including	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  and	  the	  vice	  of	  greed,	  
are	  regarded	  as	  important	  in	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy.	  Several	  consequentialist	  
theorists	   emphasize	   the	   significance	  of	  virtue	  as	  well.	  Consequentialism	   is	   the	  
view	  that	  normative	  properties	  depend	  exclusively	  on	   future	  consequences.178	  
Numerous	   different	   types	   of	   consequentialist	   theories	   exist,	   amongst	   which,	  
most	   prominently,	   utilitarianism.	   Crudely	   put,	   utilitarians	   argue	   that	   acts	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  this	  comes	  close	  to	  the	  argument	  in	  Ruth	  Sample’s	  theory	  of	  
exploitation	  that	  I	  rejected	  in	  chapter	  2.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  objection	  in	  section	  4.6.4	  below.	  	  
176	  O	  O’Neill,	  ‘Kant’s	  Virtues’	  in	  R	  Crisp	  (ed),	  How	  Should	  One	  Live?	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1996)	  77-­‐97,	  94-­‐95.	  
177	  See	  Lake,	  op.cit.	  113-­‐114.	  
178	  W	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong,	  ‘What	  is	  Consequentialism?	  A	  Reply	  to	  Howard-­‐Snyder’	  (2001)	  Utilitas	  
342-­‐349,	  345.	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morally	   right	   if	   they	   maximize	   the	   good;	   that	   is,	   if	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   good	  
minus	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   bad	   caused	  by	   an	   act	   is	   greater	   than	   for	   any	   other	  
available	  act.179	  Classical	  utilitarians	  combine	  this	  with	  hedonism,	  the	  idea	  that	  
pleasure	  and	  pain	  are	  the	  only	  intrinsically	  good	  and	  bad	  attributes,	  which	  leads	  
to	  the	  claim	  that	  an	  act	  is	  morally	  right	  if	  it	  causes	  the	  greatest	  happiness	  for	  the	  
greatest	   number.	   And	   it	   has	   often	   been	   argued	   that	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	  
greatest	  happiness	  for	  the	  greatest	  number,	  we	  may	  need	  virtue.	  This	  is	  so	  for	  
several	  reasons.	  
First,	  virtuous	  behaviour	  will	  bring	  good	  consequences,	  both	  for	  oneself	  and	  
for	  others.	  This	  is,	  as	  said	  before,180	  true	  for	  both	  ‘self-­‐regarding’	  virtues	  such	  as	  
prudence,	  industriousness	  and	  patience,	  and	  for	  other-­‐regarding	  virtues	  such	  as	  
honesty	   and	   generosity.	   Therefore,	   although	   virtue	   will	   sometimes	   require	  
people	   to	   sacrifice	   their	   pleasure	   or	   interests,	   overall,	   having	   a	   society	   of	  
virtuous	  people	  is	  likely	  to	  maximize	  everyone’s	  happiness.181	  	  
Second,	  the	  sacrifices	  of	  one’s	  interests	  that	  are	  required	  by	  virtue	  may	  not	  
actually	  be	  perceived	  as	  unpleasant.	   Some	  argue	   in	   an	  Aristotelian	   fashion,	   as	  
John	  Stuart	  Mill	  did	  in	  his	  Utilitarianism,	  that	  pleasure	  comes	  in	  different	  kinds,	  
and	  that	  we	  may	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  ‘higher’	  and	  ‘lower’	  pleasures.182	  It	  
might	   be	   argued	   that	   being	   virtuous	   and	   acting	   virtuously	  may	   bring	   about	   a	  
‘higher’	   type	   of	   pleasure,	   because	   acting	   virtuously	   can	   itself	   be	   considered	  
pleasurable.183	  	  
Third,	  having	  a	  society	  of	  virtuous	  people	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  added	  benefit	  
that	  follows	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  virtue	  guarantees	  certain	  conduct.184	  If	  we	  know	  
that	   we	   can	   rely	   on	   other	   people	   to	   act	   honestly,	   justly,	   courageously,	  
generously,	  etcetera,	  and	  if	  other	  people	  can	  rely	  on	  us	  to	  do	  the	  same,	  everyone	  
will	   be	  more	  willing	   to	   cooperate	  with	   each	   other	   to	   achieve	  mutual	   benefits,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179	  W	  Sinnott-­‐Armstrong,	  ‘Consequentialism’	  in	  EN	  Zalta	  (ed),	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  
Philosophy	  (Spring	  2013	  Edition)	  1.	  	  
180	  See	  note	  139.	  
181	  For	  a	  consequentialist	  virtue	  theory	  along	  these	  lines	  see	  J	  Driver,	  Uneasy	  Virtue	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2001).	  
182	  JS	  Mill,	  Utilitarianism	  (1863)	  (Hackett	  Publishing,	  2001)	  chapter	  2.	  	  
183	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  in	  Mill’s	  work,	  see	  R	  Crisp,	  ‘Utilitarianism	  and	  the	  Life	  of	  Virtue’	  
(1992)	  42(167)	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly	  139-­‐160,	  155-­‐156.	  	  
184	  See	  J	  Kilcullen,	  ‘Utilitarianism	  and	  Virtue’	  (1983)	  93(3)	  Ethics	  451-­‐466.	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and	  everyone	  will	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  benefit	  others	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  be	  too	  
risky	   if	   others’	   behaviour	   cannot	   be	   predicted.	   Moreover,	   the	   sense	   of	   trust,	  
security	  and	  friendship	  created	  by	  the	  guarantee	  that	  virtue	  provides	  can	  itself	  
contribute	   to	   our	   pleasure	   or	   happiness.185	   One	  might	   object	   that	   in	   order	   to	  
achieve	  such	  benefits	  of	  trust,	  we	  do	  not	  actually	  need	  to	  be	  virtuous,	  but	  merely	  
need	  to	  pretend	  that	  we	  are.	  Yet,	  some	  argue,	  to	  truly	  win	  the	  trust	  or	  friendship	  
of	   other	  people,	  who	  may	  be	   good	   judges	   of	   character,	   it	   is	   overall	   best	   to	   be	  
actually	   committed	   to	   virtue	   for	   its	   own	   sake,	   and	   even	   act	   virtuously	   in	   the	  
occasional	  situation	  where	  a	  non-­‐virtuous	  act	  would	  give	  us	  a	  better	  result.186	  
	   In	   sum,	   there	   are	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   consequentialism,	   like	  
deontology,	  can	  and	  does	  incorporate	  virtues	  and	  vices.187	  I	  realize	  that	  this	  may	  
not	  be	   true	   for	  all	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	   theories,	  and	  that	   I	  have	  
also	   not	   given	   an	   exhaustive	   overview	   of	   all	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   different	  
deontological	   and	   consequentialist	   theories	   do	   incorporate	   virtues.	   I	   have	  
merely	   intended	   to	   show	   that	   the	   importance	   of	   virtues	   and	   vices	   is	   not	   only	  
recognized	   by	   virtue	   ethics	   theories,	   but	   can	   also	   be	   acknowledged	   by	  
consequentialist	  and	  deontological	  approaches.188	  
Now	  that	   I	  have	  set	  out	   in	  general	   terms	  what	   is	  meant	  by	   ‘virtue’,	  and	  
what	  role	  virtues	  play	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  moral	  theories,	  I	  will	  next	  discuss	  
the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  and	  the	  vice	  of	  greed.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  Kilcullen,	  op.cit.	  452-­‐453.	  
186	  Kilcullen,	  op.cit	  455.	  See	  also	  M	  Baurmann,	  The	  Market	  of	  Virtue,	  Morality	  and	  Commitment	  in	  
a	  Liberal	  Society	  (Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  1996)	  chapter	  3,	  for	  a	  similar	  argument	  applied	  
specifically	  to	  liberal	  market-­‐states.	  	  
187	  For	  a	  recent	  consequentialist	  virtue	  theory,	  in	  which	  virtues	  are	  understood	  as	  intrinsically	  
good,	  and	  vices	  as	  intrinsically	  bad,	  see	  T	  Hurka,	  Virtue,	  Vice	  and	  Value	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2001)	  chapter	  1.	  	  
188	  Because	  deontic	  and	  consequentialist	  theories	  can	  recognize	  as	  well	  that	  virtues	  are	  
important	  for	  our	  moral	  lives,	  some	  argue	  that	  virtue	  ethics	  is	  not	  a	  genuinely	  distinctive	  moral	  
approach	  (e.g.	  Nussbaum,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics:	  A	  Misleading	  Category?’,	  op.cit.	  165).	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  
issue	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  my	  argument,	  and	  do	  not	  want	  to	  take	  a	  stance	  on	  it	  here.	  Even	  if	  
it	  is	  true,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  insights	  from	  virtue	  ethics	  are	  not	  valuable	  or	  that	  virtues	  are	  
not	  important,	  but	  the	  opposite:	  that	  insights	  from	  virtue	  ethics	  can	  be	  recognized	  as	  important	  
on	  all	  moral	  approaches.	  And	  if	  it	  is	  not	  true,	  and	  virtue	  ethics	  does	  have	  some	  characteristic	  
that	  is	  not	  shared	  with	  the	  other	  approaches,	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  virtues	  can	  and	  
do	  have	  an	  important	  place	  in	  other	  moral	  approaches	  as	  well.	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4.3	  Generosity	  and	  greed	  
	  
4.3.1	  Generosity	  
The	  virtue	  of	  generosity	   is	  the	  character	  trait	  that	  disposes	  us	  to	  benefit	  other	  
people	  by	  giving	  them	  some	  of	  our	  own	  wealth	  or	  possessions.189	  Not	  all	  types	  
of	  voluntary	  giving	  to	  others	  count	  as	  generous,	  but	  only	  when	  it	   is	  done	  with	  
the	  right	  motive.190	  When	  we	  give	  something	  merely	  because	  of	  some	  duty,	  for	  
example,	  we	  are	  not	  acting	  generously.	   I	  am	  not	  being	  generous	  by	  paying	  my	  
taxes,	   or	   by	   giving	   my	   cousin	   a	   birthday	   present	   because	   I	   feel	   a	   social	  
obligation	   to	   do	   so.	   Similarly,	   if	   we	   give	   to	   someone	   because	   we	   think	   she	  
deserves	  it	   for	  some	  reason,	  we	  are	  not	  being	  generous,	  but	   just.	  For	  example,	  
we	  do	  not	  consider	  generous	  a	  teacher	  who	  rewards	  an	  A+	  to	  a	  student	  for	  an	  
outstanding	   essay,	   or	   an	   employment	   manager	   who	   gives	   a	   job	   to	   the	   most	  
suitable	   applicant.191	   Likewise,	   if	   we	   give	   someone	   money	   because	   we	   are	  
buying	   something,	   or	   if	   we	   give	   someone	   money	   with	   the	   hope	   that	   she	   or	  
others	   will	   think	   well	   of	   us,	   we	   are	   not	   being	   generous,	   but	   merely	   want	   to	  
acquire	   something	   for	   ourselves:	   a	   product	   or	   a	   reputation.	   In	   short,	   giving	  
something	   to	  someone	   is	  only	  generous	   if	  our	  motive	   for	  giving	   is	   to	  promote	  
the	  other’s	  good—her	  interests,	  wellbeing	  or	  happiness.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  may	  
give	  for	  reasons	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  described	  above,	  and	  still	  be	  generous,	  if	  what	  
we	  give	  is	  partly	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  benefit	  the	  other.	  For	  example,	  I	  may	  
feel	  I	  am	  under	  a	  social	  obligation	  to	  give	  a	  birthday	  present	  to	  my	  cousin,	  but	  
choose	  to	  give	  her	  an	  exceptionally	  expensive	  present	  because	  I	  know	  she	  will	  
love	   that	   particular	   present.	   Or	   I	   may	   give	   a	   bartender	   money	   because	   I	   am	  
buying	   a	   cocktail,	   but	   choose	   to	   give	   her	   a	   large	   tip	   as	   well.	   Or	   I	   may	   pay	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  Generosity	  is	  usually	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  money	  or	  wealth,	  yet	  might	  also	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  
terms	  of	  other	  goods,	  such	  as	  time	  or	  attention.	  
190	  See	  for	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  LH	  Hunt,	  ‘Generosity’	  (1975)	  12(3)	  American	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly	  235-­‐244,	  235-­‐238.	  	  
191	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  do	  call	  a	  teacher	  generous	  for	  giving	  an	  A+,	  or	  a	  manager	  for	  giving	  someone	  a	  
job,	  this	  implies	  that	  the	  student	  or	  applicant	  does	  not	  really	  deserve	  the	  grade	  or	  the	  job,	  and	  
that,	  quite	  likely,	  the	  teacher	  or	  manager	  is	  being	  unjust	  towards	  other	  students	  or	  applicants.	  
Generosity	  and	  justice	  thus	  seem	  to	  conflict	  in	  a	  way,	  although	  some	  might	  say	  that	  these	  are	  not	  
cases	  of	  true	  generosity,	  but	  a	  distorted	  version	  of	  generosity.	  See	  section	  4.4.	  
	   135	  
someone	  because	  I	  want	  her	  to	  fix	  my	  computer,	  or	  clean	  my	  house,	  or	  work	  for	  
my	   company,	   but	   choose	   to	   pay	   her	  more	   for	   it	   than	  what	   I	   could	   get	   her	   to	  
agree	  on.	  
Generosity	   is	   often	   regarded	   as	   falling	   in	   the	   same	   family	   of	   virtues	   as	  
kindness	  and	  compassion,	  which	  might	  all	  be	  called	  virtues	  of	  benevolence.	  Of	  
these	  virtues,	  kindness	  is	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  one.	  We	  can	  be	  kind	  in	  many	  
different	  ways,	  and	  one	  of	  those	  ways	  is	  by	  being	  generous—by	  giving	  another	  
something	  for	  their	  benefit.	  Compassion,	   like	  kindness,	  differs	   from	  generosity	  
in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  giving	  another	  something,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  
something	  material.	  Yet	  it	  also	  differs	  from	  generosity	  in	  that	  it	  seems	  to	  imply	  
that	  the	  person	  we	  want	  to	  help	  is	  somehow	  to	  be	  pitied,	  is	  in	  some	  bad	  state	  of	  
affairs,	  whereas	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true	  for	  generosity.	  It	  is	  quite	  possible	  to	  
be	  generous	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  at	  all	  in	  a	  bad	  state,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  when	  we	  
want	  to	  make	  someone	  who	  is	  reasonably	  well-­‐off	  and	  happy	  even	  more	  happy	  
by	  giving	  her	  an	  expensive	  present.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  many	  situations	  we	  may	  be	  
generous	   to	   someone	  who	   is	   in	   some	   bad	   state	   of	   affairs,	   and	   our	   generosity	  
may	   be	   aimed	   at	   helping	   them.	   In	   that	   case,	   we	   may	   be	   generous	   and	  
compassionate	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  precisely,	  we	  may	  be	  acting	  
compassionately	  by	  acting	  generously.	  Despite	   their	  differences,	   the	  virtues	  of	  
kindness,	   compassion,	   and	   generosity	   do	   have	   a	   lot	   in	   common,	   which	   lies	  
mainly	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  all	   involve	  a	   concern	   for	   the	  good	  or	  wellbeing	  of	  
others,	  and	  all	  involve	  being	  moved	  to	  promote	  others’	  wellbeing.	  Much	  of	  what	  
will	  be	  said	  about	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  in	  this	  chapter	  will	  therefore	  equally	  
apply	   to	   compassion	  and	  kindness.	  Related,	   although	   the	  vice	  of	   greediness	   is	  
most	  directly	  opposed	  to	  generosity,	  if	  we	  act	  greedily,	  we	  are	  certainly	  also	  not	  
being	   kind.	   And	   if	   we	   act	   greedily	   towards	   someone	   who	   is	   somehow	   to	   be	  
pitied,	   we	   are	   likely	   failing	   not	   only	   in	   generosity	   and	   kindness,	   but	   also	   in	  
compassion.	  	  
	  
As	   was	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   different	   virtue	   theorists	   have	  
different	   views	   of	   what	   makes	   certain	   character	   traits	   virtues,	   or,	   in	   other	  
words,	   why	   those	   character	   traits	   are	   good.	   This	   also	   holds	   for	   the	   virtue	   of	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generosity.	  Nevertheless,	  although	  different	  theories	  ground	  the	  goodness	  of	  the	  
virtue	   of	   generosity	   in	   different	   ways,	   it	   seems	   generally	   accepted	   that	  
generosity	  is	  a	  virtue,	  and	  that	  greed	  is	  a	  vice.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
agreement	   on	   different	   aspects	   of	   its	   goodness,	   although	   some	   theorists	  
emphasize	  certain	  aspects	  more	  than	  others.	  As	  said	  before,	  most	  virtue	  ethics	  
theorists	  agree	  that	  virtues	  are	  good	  both	   for	   the	  person	  possessing	  them	  and	  
for	  other	  people,	   although	   they	  may	  disagree	  on	  whether	  virtues	  are	   in	   every	  
instance	  beneficial	  for	  the	  possessor	  of	  a	  virtue.	  Likewise,	  most	  theorists	  agree	  
that	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  is	  beneficial	  both	  for	  the	  generous	  person	  and	  for	  
other	  people.	  (Neo-­‐)Aristotelian	  virtue	  theories	  will	  emphasize	  the	  benefits	  for	  
the	   generous	   person	   more	   than	   some	   other	   views	   that	   mainly	   focus	   on	   the	  
relational	  aspect	  of	  generosity	  and	  the	  benefits	  for	  other	  people,	  but	  both	  types	  
of	   benefit	   are	   recognized	   by	   all	   of	   them.	   I	   will	   close	   this	   section	   by	   briefly	  
discussing	  some	  reasons	  why	  generosity	  is	  traditionally	  thought	  to	  be	  good	  for	  
its	  possessors.	  In	  section	  4.6.1,	  I	  will	  discuss	  more	  extensively	  how	  generosity	  is	  
good	  for	  other	  people.	  
	  
Being	   generous	   towards	   people	   to	   whom	  we	   are	   close,	   or	   being	   generous	   in	  
small	   communities,	   has	   clear	   advantages	   to	   ourselves,	   because	   in	   such	  
situations	  our	  reputation	  matters	  and	  by	  being	  generous	  we	  may	  build	  up	  trust,	  
encourage	  cooperation,	  and	  encourage	  others	   to	   reciprocate	  our	  generosity	  at	  
some	   time	   in	   the	   future.	   Yet	   in	   economic	   transactions	  with	   people	  we	   do	   not	  
know	   well,	   people	   we	   might	   never	   see	   again,	   or	   people	   with	   whom	   our	  
reputation	  is	  not	  very	  important,	  those	  advantages	  do	  not	  exist.	  How	  can	  being	  
generous	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  generous	  person	  in	  these	  situations?	  	  
	   Aristotle	   mentions	   several	   reasons	   why	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity	   is	  
beneficial	   to	   its	  possessors,	   or,	   in	  his	   terms,	   is	   rational	   for	   its	  possessors,	   and	  
can	  contribute	  to	  a	  flourishing	  life.	  A	  first	  possible	  benefit	  relates	  to	  one’s	  safety	  
and	  society’s	  stability.	  An	  important	  cause	  of	  crime,	  conflict,	  and	  revolution	  in	  a	  
society	   is	   poverty,	   Aristotle	   says.192	   Giving	   away	   part	   of	   our	   wealth	   to	   other	  
people	  can	  therefore	  help	  reduce	  the	  level	  of	  crime	  and	  instability	  in	  our	  society.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192	  Aristotle,	  Politics	  5.	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Consequently,	  it	  can	  be	  rational	  to	  give	  away	  part	  of	  our	  wealth	  if	  we	  think	  that	  
reducing	   other	   people’s	   poverty	   may	   ultimately	   protect	   our	   safety	   and	  
wellbeing	  much	  better	  than	  spending	  our	  wealth	  more	  directly	  on	  ourselves.193	  	  
A	   wider,	   but	   similarly	   ‘consequentialist’	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	  
Aristotle,	  is	  that	  by	  donating	  some	  of	  our	  wealth	  to	  poorer	  people	  we	  might	  not	  
only	   prevent	   crime	   and	   instability,	   but	   may	   also	   help	   others	   to	   become	   self-­‐
sufficient	  and	  free	  to	  live	  reasonably	  or	  virtuously.	  And,	  he	  says,	  we	  have	  good	  
reason	  to	  want	  to	  live	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  as	  many	  other	  people	  as	  possible	  live	  
reasonably	  or	  virtuously,	  because	  such	  a	  society	  is	  much	  better	  to	  live	  in	  than	  a	  
society	  full	  of	  ignorant	  or	  vicious	  people.194	  	  
Nevertheless,	   in	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  even	  if	   there	   is	  no	  prospect	  that	  being	  
generous	   will	   contribute	   to	   a	   safe,	   stable,	   or	   virtuous	   society,	   generosity	   has	  
other	   benefits	   for	   its	   possessors	   as	  well.	   First,	   there	   is	   the	   pleasure	   of	   giving.	  
Giving	  to	  others	  is	  rewarding,	  he	  argues,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  generates	  pleasant	  
and	  friendly	  feelings:	   ‘Those	  who	  have	  done	  a	  service	  to	  others	  feel	   friendship	  
and	  love	  for	  those	  they	  have	  served,	  even	  if	  these	  are	  not	  of	  any	  use	  to	  them	  and	  
never	  will	  be’.195	  That	  giving	  is	  often	  pleasurable,	  especially	  when	  the	  receiver	  is	  
very	  happy	  with	  one’s	  gift,	   is	  an	  often-­‐recognized	  fact,	  and	  is	  well	  documented	  
in	  psychological	  and	  sociological	   research.196	  This	  pleasure	  of	  giving	   is	  related	  
to	  the	  pleasure	  that	  one’s	  gift	  brings	  to	  others,	  which	  means	  that	  this	  benefit	  for	  
the	  generous	  person,	  like	  the	  first	  two	  mentioned	  benefits,	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  
benefits	  generosity	  has	  for	  others.	  	  
Aristotle	   hints	   at	   two	   other	   benefits	   of	   being	   generous,	   but	   they	   are	  
mainly	  applicable	  to	  people	  who	  are	  very	  wealthy,	  whereas	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  See	  JA	  Swanson,	  ‘Aristotle	  on	  Liberality:	  Its	  Relation	  to	  Justice	  and	  Its	  Public	  and	  Private	  
Practice’	  (1994)	  27(1)	  Polity	  3-­‐23,	  7.	  
194	  More	  precisely,	  on	  Aristotle’s	  view,	  which	  bases	  virtue	  on	  reason,	  what	  one	  wants	  is	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  live	  a	  life	  as	  reasonably	  and	  intellectually	  engaged	  as	  possible.	  This	  means,	  he	  argues,	  
that	  we	  should	  want	  to	  promote	  the	  moral	  and	  intellectual	  conditions	  for	  such	  a	  life,	  which	  
includes	  having	  as	  many	  other	  reasonable	  human	  beings	  around	  us	  as	  possible.	  Nevertheless,	  
we	  might	  interpret	  or	  stretch	  his	  argument	  more	  broadly,	  and	  think	  that,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  
equate	  virtue	  with	  reason,	  it	  is	  better	  or	  more	  pleasant	  for	  us	  to	  live	  in	  a	  society	  where	  other	  
people	  live	  according	  to	  the	  virtues.	  	  
195	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  IX.7,	  1167b31-­‐1167b33.	  Cited	  in	  Swanson,	  op.cit.	  8.	  	  
196	  See	  e.g.	  D	  Cheal,	  ‘Moral	  Economy’	  in	  AE	  Komter	  (ed),	  The	  Gift:	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Perspective	  
(Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  1996)	  81-­‐94;	  and	  JT	  Godbout,	  ‘The	  Moral	  of	  the	  Gift’	  (1998)	  27(4)	  
Journal	  of	  Socio-­‐Economics	  557-­‐570.	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very	  wealthy	  can	  still	  be	  generous.	  The	  first	  argument	  says	  that	  it	  is	  good	  to	  give	  
wealth	  away	  to	  free	  ourselves	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  safeguarding	  and	  managing	  our	  
wealth,	  which	  great	  amounts	  of	  wealth	  necessitate.197	  The	  second	  argument	   is	  
that	  when	  we	  are	  very	  wealthy,	   it	   is	  good	   to	  give	  away	  some	  of	  our	  wealth	   in	  
order	  to	  affirm	  or	  cultivate	  indifference	  to	  great	  wealth,	  because	  the	  purpose	  of	  
wealth	   is	   to	   spend	   it	   and	   not	   to	   gather	   it,	   and	   the	   ‘well-­‐ordered	   human	   soul’	  
should	  be	  indifferent	  to	  such	  wealth.198	  	  
	   In	   short,	   there	   are	   different	   reasons	   why	   generosity	   can	   be	   seen	   as	  
beneficial	   to	   persons	   possessing	   the	   virtue,	   some	   of	   which	   all	   virtue	   ethics	  
theorists	   can	   agree	   upon.	   They	   will	   also	   agree,	   as	   said,	   that	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity	   is	  beneficial	   for	  other	  people.	  That	   the	  virtue	  of	   generosity	   is	   good	  
for	  others	  seems	  rather	  self-­‐evident.	  Being	  generous	  means	  giving	  something	  to	  
another	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  her;	  giving	  something	  to	  another	  who	  needs,	  wants	  
or	   enjoys	   that	   something.	   Hence,	   generosity	   is	   clearly	   beneficial	   for	   others	  
because	   they	  will	   receive	  what	   they	   need,	   want	   or	   enjoy.	   Nevertheless,	  more	  
will	   be	   said	   about	   how	  generosity	   is	   aimed	   at	   the	   benefit	   of	   others	   in	   section	  
4.6.1.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  however,	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  vice	  that	  is	  directly	  opposed	  
to	  generosity:	  greed.	  	  
	  
4.3.2	  Greed	  
Greed	   is	   generally	   defined	   as	   having	   an	   excessive	   and	   selfish	   desire	   for	  
something.	  This	  something	  might	  be	  food,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  term	  is	  synonymous	  
with	  gluttony,	  but	   in	   the	  context	  of	   this	   thesis,	   greed	   is	  meant	  as	  an	  excessive	  
desire	  for	  money	  or	  wealth.	  As	  such,	  I	  think	  that	  greed	  can	  manifest	  itself	  both	  
in	   one’s	   spending	   and	   in	   one’s	   acquiring	   tendencies,	   and	   can	   therefore	   take	  
several	  different	  shapes	  (that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  found	  alongside	  each	  other	  in	  
one	  person):	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197	  Aristotle,	  Politics	  IV,	  1320a27-­‐1320a28.	  See	  Swanson,	  op.cit.	  8.	  	  
198	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  I.4,	  1096a6-­‐1096a7;	  and	  IV.3,	  1120b15-­‐1120b17.	  See	  
Swanson,	  op.cit.	  7-­‐8.	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(a)	  Regarding	  one’s	  spending	  tendencies,	  the	  term	  greed	  can	  refer	  to	  what	  may	  
perhaps	   better	   be	   called	   parsimony	   or	  miserliness:	  wanting	   to	   spend	   as	   little	  
money	  (or	  give	  away	  as	  few	  goods)	  as	  possible,	  either	  on	  oneself	  or	  on	  others,	  in	  
order	  to	  keep	  as	  much	  money	  (or	  goods)	  as	  possible.	  Not	  liking	  to	  spend	  money	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  vice.	  Someone	  who	  does	  not	  have	  much	  money,	  or	  who	   is	  
saving	  for	  some	  future	  spending,	  is	  simply	  being	  prudent	  by	  trying	  to	  spend	  as	  
little	   as	   possible.	   The	  desire	  not	   to	   spend	   is	   only	   greedy	  when	   it	   is	   excessive:	  
when	   one	   desires	   to	   keep	   as	   much	   money	   as	   possible	   for	   its	   own	   sake,	   not	  
because	  of	  need	  but	  because	  one	  simply	  desires	  to	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  money.	  Think,	  
for	  instance,	  of	  Disney’s	  Scrooge	  McDuck.	  
	  (b)	  Second,	  the	  term	  greedy	  might	  refer	  to	  people	  who	  do	  not	  dislike	  spending	  
money	   per	   se,	   but	  who	   try	   to	   spend	   as	   little	   as	   possible	   on	  others.	  Think,	   for	  
example,	   of	   someone	  who	   is	  wealthy,	   and	  who	   likes	   to	   buy	   herself	   expensive	  
clothes,	  cars,	  holidays,	  and	  restaurant	  meals,	  but	  who	  always	  gives	  very	  cheap	  
birthday	  presents,	  and	  when	  on	  holiday	  or	  in	  a	  restaurant,	  never	  leaves	  a	  tip.	  	  
	  (c)	  Regarding	  people’s	  acquiring	  tendencies,	  the	  term	  greedy	  is	  sometimes	  used	  
to	  describe	  people	  who	  want	  to	  buy	  many	  or	  very	  expensive	  goods,	  much	  more	  
than	  what	  they	  could	  possibly	  need.	  Trying	  to	  buy	  many	  or	  expensive	  goods	  is	  
not	  per	  se	  problematic.	  Everyone	  wants	  to	  be	  able	  to	  live	  a	  pleasant	  life,	  which	  
involves,	   for	   many	   people,	   spending	   money	   on	   things	   such	   as	   a	   comfortable	  
house	  in	  a	  nice	  location,	  hobbies,	  travelling,	  and	  eating	  well.	  It	  is	  only	  regarded	  
problematic	  and	  greedy	  when	  the	  desire	  to	  buy	  many	  or	  very	  expensive	  goods	  is	  
excessive,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   desiring	   to	   acquire	   expensive	   things	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  
acquiring	   them,	   instead	   of	   because	   one	   needs	   them	   or	   enjoys	   them	   for	   their	  
purpose.	  M	  Hirsch	  Goldberg	  gives	  many	  extreme	  examples	  of	   such	  behaviour,	  
including	  an	  opulent	  dinner	  party	  given	  to	  celebrate	  the	  host’s	  dog’s	  birthday,	  at	  
which	  the	  dog	  received	  a	  $15,000	  diamond	  collar;	  and	  Imelda	  Marcos,	  Felipino	  
politician	   and	   widow	   of	   former	   dictator	   Ferdinand	   Marcos,	   who	   owns	   2,700	  
pairs	  of	  shoes.199	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  M	  Hirsch	  Goldberg,	  The	  Complete	  Book	  of	  Greed:	  The	  Strange	  and	  Amazing	  History	  of	  Human	  
Excess	  (William	  Morrow	  &	  Co,	  1994).	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(d)	   Finally,	   greed	   can	   manifest	   itself	   in	   a	   desire	   to	   earn	   as	   much	   money	   as	  
possible,	   often,	   though	   not	   necessarily,	   combined	   with	   and	   required	   for	   (c).	  
Again,	   desiring	   to	   earn	   a	   lot	   of	   money	   is	   not	   always	   problematic.	   Almost	  
everyone	  wants	  to	  earn	  enough	  money	  to	  be	  able	  to	   live	  a	  pleasant	   life	  and	  to	  
provide	  for	  people	  they	  care	  about.	  This	  may	  even	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  
development	   of	   civilizations.200	  Without	   the	   desire	   for	   easier	   and	   better	   lives,	  
people	  would	  have	  little	  incentive	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  and	  to	  invent	  or	  create	  
new	   things,	   and	   societies	   would	   have	   much	   less	   overall	   wealth,	   health,	  
education,	  technology	  and	  art.	  Wanting	  to	  earn	  more	  is	  only	  considered	  greedy	  
when	   excessive,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   more	   than	   one	   reasonably	   needs	   and	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  other	   things	   that	   are	   important.	   For	   instance,	  when	   someone	   is	   so	  
obsessed	   with	   earning	   money	   and	   working	   that	   she	   has	   no	   time	   for	   other	  
important	  things	  in	  her	  life	  such	  as	  her	  family;	  or	  when	  trying	  to	  earn	  as	  much	  
as	   possible	   requires	   damaging	   the	   environment,	   or	   damaging	   other	   people’s	  
health;	  or	  when	  trying	  to	  earn	  more	  than	  one	  reasonably	  needs	  sacrifices	  what	  
other	   people	   are	   able	   to	   have	   or	   earn,	   such	   as	   public	   officers	   receiving	  
extraordinary	   bonuses	   or	   salaries	   from	   tax	   payers’	   money,	   or	   managers	   or	  
shareholders	   receiving	   extraordinary	   bonuses	   or	   salaries,	   while	   most	  
employees	  receive	  minimum	  wage.	  	  
As	  James	  Child	  notes,201	  the	  excessive	  element	  in	  greed	  is	  not	  simply	  an	  
excess	   in	  desire	   for	  wealth,	  but	   this	  excessive	  desire	  also	   implies	  an	  excess	   in	  
self-­‐concern,	   or	   an	   excessive	   self-­‐aggrandizement.	   Greedy	   people	   want	   to	  
acquire	  or	  keep	  as	  much	  money	  or	  goods	  as	  possible	  for	  themselves,	  even	  if	  that	  
wealth	  could	  much	  better	  be	  spent	  in	  different	  ways,	  without	  them	  suffering	  any	  
real	  harm.	  This	   is	   true	   for	  all	  of	   the	  above	  manifestations	  of	  greed;	   for	  misers	  
who	   hoard	   money	   or	   possessions	   (a),	   for	   affluent	   people	   who	   don’t	   mind	  
spending	   much	   on	   themselves	   but	   hate	   spending	   anything	   on	   others	   (b),	   for	  
people	  who	  want	  to	  buy	  excessively	  luxurious	  goods	  they	  do	  not	  really	  need	  (c),	  
and	   for	   people	   who	   want	   to	   earn	   as	   much	   as	   possible,	   irrespective	   of	   the	  
negative	   consequences	   for	   others	   or	   for	   other	   important	   things	   (d).	   In	   the	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  See	  e.g.	  R	  Girling,	  Greed	  (Doubleday,	  2009)	  20-­‐21.	  	  
201	  JM	  Childs,	  Greed:	  Economics	  and	  Ethics	  in	  Conflict	  (Fortress	  Press,	  2000)	  2.	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previous	  section	  it	  was	  said	  that	  generosity	  exists	  in	  giving	  others	  some	  of	  our	  
own	  wealth	  or	  possessions	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  benefiting	  them,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  
involves	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   good	   or	   wellbeing	   of	   others.	   Greed	   is	   the	   exact	  
opposite	   of	   generosity,	   in	   that	   it	   involves	   trying	   to	   acquire	   or	   keep	   as	   much	  
wealth	  for	  oneself	  and,	  thereby,	  showing	  no	  or	  limited	  concern	  for	  the	  good	  or	  
wellbeing	  of	  others.	  The	  problem	  with	  greed	   is	   therefore	  not	   just,	   as	  Aristotle	  
pointed	   out,	   a	   matter	   of	   caring	   too	   much	   about	   what	   we	   ought	   not	   to	   care	  
about—wealth	  an	  sich—	  and	  forgetting	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  wealth	  is	  to	  use	  or	  
enjoy	   it	   instead	   of	   to	   gather	   it.202	   The	   wrongness	   of	   greed	   is	   partly	   this:	   an	  
‘inappropriate	   overvaluation	   of	  material	   objects’,203	   yet	   it	   is	   also,	   and,	   I	   think,	  
primarily,	   the	   other	   side	   of	   this	   coin:	   the	   lack	   of	   care	   and	   concern	   for	   other	  
people—the	  inappropriate	  undervaluation	  of	  other	  people’s	  wellbeing.	  This	  will	  
be	  further	  discussed	  in	  section	  4.5.	  	  
The	  greediness	  involved	  in	  exploitation	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  (b)	  and	  (d);	  
of	  wanting	   to	   spend	   as	   little	   as	   possible	   on	   others,	   and	  wanting	   to	   acquire	   as	  
much	  as	  possible	  for	  oneself.	  In	  exploitative	  transactions,	  exploiters	  try	  to	  get	  as	  
much	  personal	  benefit,	  and	  give	  as	   little	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  other	  person.	   ‘Give’	  
might	   seem	   a	   strange	   term	  when	   thinking	   of	   commercial	   transactions.	   Yet	   all	  
consensual	   commercial	   transactions	   create	   a	   certain	   total	   benefit,	   which	   the	  
parties	   have	   to	   divide	   between	   them.	  Very	   simply	   put,	   an	   employer	   hiring	   an	  
employee,	  does	  so	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  making	  a	  certain	  profit,	  which	  the	  employer	  
and	   the	   employee	   have	   to	   divide	   between	   them.	   If	   the	   added	   net	   profit	   an	  
employee	   creates	   is,	   say,	   £60,000	   per	   year,	   and	   her	   salary	   is	   £30,000,	   the	  
transaction	   brings	   £30,000	   to	   the	   employer,	   and	   £30,000	   to	   the	   employee,	  
minus	   the	   negative	   value	   she	   attaches	   to	   her	   lost	   free	   time	   and	   the	   effort	   of	  
working.	  If	  a	  taxi	  driver	  brings	  a	  stranded	  passenger	  to	  a	  destination,	  the	  total	  
benefit	  created	  by	  the	  transaction	  is	  the	  value	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  passenger	  gets	  
where	  she	  wants	   to	  go	  without	  walking.	   If	   the	  passenger	  values	  not	  having	   to	  
walk	  as,	  say,	  £50,	  and	  she	  pays	  £30,	  the	  net	  value	  the	  transaction	  brings	  her	  is	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  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  1096a6-­‐7,	  1120b15-­‐1.	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  Nussbaum,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics:	  A	  Misleading	  Category?’,	  op.cit.	  186.	  
	  
	   142	  
£20,	  while	  it	  brings	  the	  driver	  £30.	  Hence,	  when	  negotiating	  about	  a	  commercial	  
transaction,	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	   how	   much	   of	   the	   created	   total	   value	   of	   a	  
transaction	  each	  of	   the	  parties	  will	   receive.	  Exploiters	   try	   to	  give	  very	   little	   to	  
the	  other	  party,	   so	   they	  can	  keep	  a	   large	  amount	   for	   themselves,	   even	   though	  
they	   could	  afford	   giving	   the	  other	  more	  and	   still	   keep	  enough	   for	   themselves.	  
Thus,	   exploitative	   employers	   try	   to	   give	   very	   low	   wages	   to	   their	   employees,	  
and/or	   require	   them	   to	  work	   for	   long	  hours	   or	   in	   bad	  working	   conditions,	   in	  
order	  to	  keep	  more	  profit	  for	  themselves	  or	  their	  company.	  And	  exploitative	  taxi	  
drivers	  ask	  stranded	  passengers	  very	  high	  prices	  for	  a	  ride,	  in	  order	  to	  earn	  a	  lot	  
of	  money.	  They	  thereby	  act	  greedily,	  in	  the	  senses	  described	  under	  (b)	  and	  (d)	  
above:	  they	  try	  to	  spend	  as	  little	  as	  possible	  on	  others	  and/or	  try	  to	  get	  as	  much	  
wealth	  for	  themselves,	   irrespective	  of	  the	  consequences	  for	  others,	   in	  terms	  of	  
how	  much	  wealth	  is	  left	  for	  the	  others,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  hardship	  others	  need	  
to	  suffer,	  such	  as	  long	  working	  hours	  or	  harsh	  working	  conditions.	  	  
	  
The	  vice	  of	  greediness	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  
opposed	   to	   other	   virtues.	   First,	   as	   said,	   it	   can	   be	   opposed	   to	   the	   virtues	   of	  
kindness	  and	  compassion,	  if	  in	  some	  situation	  compassion	  or	  kindness	  requires	  
us	  to	  give	  to	  others.	  Greed	  can	  also	  be	  opposed	  to	  justice,	  if	  we	  do	  not	  want	  to	  
give	  someone	  what	  she	  deserves	  according	  to	  requirements	  of	   justice,	  or	  if	  we	  
want	  to	  take	  for	  ourselves	  something	  that	  others	  deserve.	  I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2	  
that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   cannot	   rightly	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  
injustice.	   Therefore,	   when	   I	   speak	   in	   this	   thesis	   of	   greed	   as	   the	   wrong	   in	  
exploitation,	  I	  mean	  it	  as	  a	  vice	  that	  is	  opposed	  to	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  and	  
thereby	  sometimes	  also	  to	  kindness	  and	  compassion.	  
	   There	   may,	   however,	   be	   a	   difference	   between	   acting	   greedily	   and	   not	  
acting	  generously.	  For	  instance,	  if	  tipping	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  bill	  in	  a	  restaurant	  
is	  generally	  expected,	  some	  people	  may	  think	  it	  not	  actually	  generous	  to	  indeed	  
tip	   ten	   percent,	   while	   they	   do	   not	   think	   it	   is	   greedy	   either.	   Likewise,	   if	   an	  
employer	   in	   a	   country	  with	   no	  minimum	  wage	   laws	   pays	   the	   equivalent	   to	   a	  
minimum	  wage	  in	  other	  countries,	  while	  she	  could	  have	  gotten	  her	  employees	  
to	   accept	   less,	   but	   could	   also	   easily	   have	  paid	  more,	   this	  might	   be	   considered	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neither	   very	   generous,	   nor	   very	   greedy.	   This	   indicates	   that	   what	   counts	   as	  
generous	  and	  what	  counts	  as	  greedy	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree,	  on	  which	  people	  may	  
disagree,	   and	   which	   may	   depend	   on	   the	   circumstances.	   This	   will	   be	   further	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  on	  the	  context-­‐dependence	  of	  virtues.	  	  
	  
4.4	  Context-­‐dependence	  	  
	  
In	  the	  previous	  two	  sections,	   I	  analysed	  what	   is	  meant	  with	  virtues	  and	  virtue	  
ethics	   in	   general,	   and	   with	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity	   and	   the	   vice	   of	   greed	   in	  
particular.	   In	   this	   section	   and	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   will	   discuss	   some	   further	  
characteristic	  of	  virtues	  in	  general	  and	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  in	  particular,	  and	  
the	  relationship	  of	  these	  characteristics	  with	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  failure	  
of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  The	  feature	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  is	  the	  context-­‐
dependence	  of	  virtue;	   in	   section	  4.5,	   I	  discuss	   the	  role	  of	  perception,	  emotion,	  
and	  responsiveness	  in	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  	  
	  
4.4.1	  Virtue	  and	  context-­‐dependence	  
An	   important	   feature	  of	  virtue	   is	   that	   it	   is	   context-­‐dependent.	  Character	   traits	  
that	   are	   typically	   regarded	   virtuous,	   such	   as	   honesty,	   industriousness	   or	  
kindness,	   might	   be	   seen	   as	   faults	   in	   some	   situations.	   We	   are	   too	   honest,	   for	  
example,	  if	  we	  cannot	  resist	  revealing	  that	  we	  are	  organizing	  a	  surprise	  birthday	  
party	   for	   a	   friend,	   are	   too	   industrious	   if	  we	  work	   so	   hard	   that	  we	   ignore	   the	  
needs	  of	  our	  family	  or	  friends,	  and	  too	  kind	  if	  we	  spend	  so	  much	  time	  and	  effort	  
helping	  others,	  that	  we	  cannot	  manage	  to	  properly	  take	  care	  of	  our	  own	  health	  
or	  wellbeing.	  It	  thus	  appears	  that	  virtues	  do	  not	  always	  result	  in	  good	  action.	  	  
	   One	   response	   to	   this—the	   (neo-­‐)Aristotelian	   response—is	   that	   in	   such	  
situations,	  we	  do	  not	   really	  possess	   the	  virtues	  of	  honesty,	   industriousness	  or	  
kindness,	  but	  a	  distorted	  form	  of	  them,	  because,	  it	  is	  said,	  virtues	  by	  definition	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result	   in	   the	   proper	   or	   excellent	   response	   to	   different	   situations.204	   Aristotle	  
therefore	  famously	  described	  virtue	  as	  a	  ‘mean’,205	  because	  the	  proper	  response	  
to	  particular	  situations	  is	  neither	  too	  little	  nor	  too	  much.	  For	  example,	  the	  virtue	  
of	  kindness	  lies	  in	  between,	  amongst	  others,	  unkindness	  or	  grumpiness	  on	  the	  
one	  hand,	   and	   flattery	  or	   slavishness	  on	   the	  other.	  However,	   it	   is	  mistaken	   to	  
conclude	  from	  this	  that	  virtue	  always	  involves	  the	  display	  of	  some	  emotion	  and	  
action	  in	  a	  moderate	  degree.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  proper	  degree	  for	  
a	   particular	   situation,	   and	   the	   proper	   degree	   might	   sometimes	   be	   a	   large	  
amount.206	  Acting	  virtuously	  thus	  means,	  in	  Hursthouse’s	  words,	  ‘getting	  things	  
right’:	  giving	  the	  right	  response	  in	  the	  right	  situations,	  for	  the	  right	  reasons.207	  
	   As	   a	   consequence,	   proponents	   of	   Aristotelian	   virtue	   theories	   emphasize,	  
virtuous	  people	  need	   ‘practical	  wisdom’.	  This	   is	   the	  ability	   to	  reason	  correctly	  
about	   what	   is	   required	   in	   different	   practical	   situations.	   To	   have	   practical	  
wisdom	  means,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  one	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  discern	  which	  things	  
are	  of	  value	  in	  different	  situations.	  In	  other	  words:	  that	  one	  knows	  which	  ends	  
are	  worth	  striving	   for,	  and	  how	  much	  those	  particular	  ends	  are	  worth.	  On	   the	  
other	   hand,	   it	   means	   that	   one	   knows	   how	   best	   to	   achieve	   those	   ends	   in	  
particular	   situations.	   Practical	  wisdom,	   on	   this	   view,	   distinguishes	   true	   virtue	  
from	  what	  Aristotle	   calls	   ‘natural	   virtue’,208	  which	   is	   the	  mere	   tendency	   to	  be	  
moved	  by	  virtuous	  impulsions	  such	  as	  compassion,	  generosity	  or	  honesty.	  Such	  
natural	  virtue	   is	  something	  we	  can	  see	   in	  children,	  and	  although	  children	  who	  
act	  on	  such	  inclinations	  have	  good	  intentions,	  it	  can	  lead	  to	  bad	  results	  because	  
they	   do	   not	   yet	   know	   what	   being	   compassionate,	   generous	   or	   honest	   in	   a	  
particular	   situation	   requires.	   For	   example,	   a	   young	   child	   may	   feel	   real	  
compassion	   for	   her	   goldfish	   who	   seems	   hungry,	   and	   try	   to	   feed	   the	   fish	   by	  
putting	  a	  bar	  of	  chocolate	  in	  the	  fishbowl,	  which	  pollutes	  the	  water	  and	  kills	  the	  
fish.	  Although	  the	  child’s	  intentions	  and	  feeling	  of	  compassion	  are	  praiseworthy,	  
the	  result	   is	  clearly	  not,	  because	   the	  child	   lacks	  practical	  wisdom	  about	  which	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  See	  e.g.	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  II.5,	  1106a15-­‐1109b25;	  Aquinas,	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II	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  Ethics	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  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  9.	  
207	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sort	   of	   action	   compassion	   requires	   in	   the	   situation.	   Such	   ignorance	   may	   be	  
excused	   in	   children,	   Aristotelian	   theorists	   say,	   but	   if	   an	   adult	   acts	  merely	   on	  
inclination	  without	  considering	  whether	  her	  action	  is	  actually	  what	  is	  required	  
in	  the	  situation,	  this	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  practical	  wisdom	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue.209	  	  
	   Other	   people,	   in	   contrast,	   give	   a	   different	   response	   to	   the	   question	   of	  
whether	  we	  can	  be	  virtuous	   ‘to	  a	   fault’:	   too	  virtuous,	  or	  virtuous	   in	   the	  wrong	  
way,	  in	  the	  wrong	  situation	  or	  towards	  the	  wrong	  people.210	  On	  this	  view,	  which	  
perhaps	  better	   corresponds	   to	   the	  way	  many	  people	  use	  virtue-­‐terms	   in	   their	  
daily	  lives,	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  being	  virtuous	  to	  a	  fault	  still	  constitutes	  real	  virtue,	  
especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   virtues	   of	   benevolence	   such	   as	   kindness,	   compassion	  
and	  generosity.211	  People	  with	   this	  view	  might	  agree	   that	  someone	   fails	   in	   the	  
virtue	  of,	  say,	  kindness,	  if	  she	  does	  not	  actually	  aim	  at	  another’s	  good	  but	  merely	  
at	  what	  the	  other	  desires,	  such	  as	  when	  helping	  a	  recovering	  drug	  addict	  to	  buy	  
drugs	  while	  knowing	  that	   this	  will	  harm	  her.	  Yet	   they	  think	  that	   if	  someone	   is	  
being	  too	  kind,	  such	  as	  by	  spending	  so	  much	  time	  helping	  others	  that	  she	  cannot	  
properly	  take	  care	  of	  herself,	  she	  is	  not	  failing	  in	  kindness.	   In	  such	  a	  situation,	  
the	  argument	  is,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  person	  is	  failing	  in	  another	  virtue	  like	  pride	  
or	   justice,	  or	  maybe	  that	  she	  has	   insufficient	  practical	  wisdom,	  or	   that	  she	  did	  
not	  make	  the	  best	  decision	  all	  things	  considered,	  but	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  she	  is	  
not	  truly	  kind.212	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  See	  Hursthouse,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics’,	  op.cit.	  3-­‐4.	  	  
210	  This	  is	  distinct	  from	  another	  issue:	  whether	  virtues	  can	  still	  be	  called	  virtues	  if	  they	  are	  
directed	  at	  wrong	  ends.	  For	  instance,	  a	  criminal	  may	  benefit	  from	  being	  courageous	  if	  she	  wants	  
to	  rob	  a	  bank,	  or	  may	  benefit	  from	  being	  industrious	  or	  patient	  if	  she	  wants	  to	  devise	  a	  plan	  to	  
do	  so.	  Can	  we	  still	  call	  this	  true	  courage,	  industriousness	  and	  patience?	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  
point	  see	  Foot,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices,	  op.cit.	  14-­‐18.	  
211	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Wallace,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices	  (Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1978)	  142.	  See	  also	  for	  a	  
related	  but	  slightly	  different	  argument	  M	  Slote,	  The	  Impossibility	  of	  Perfection:	  Aristotle,	  
Feminism,	  and	  the	  Complexities	  of	  Ethics	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011)	  31.	  
212	  For	  (neo-­‐)Aristotelians	  who	  support	  the	  ‘unity’	  or	  ‘reciprocity’	  of	  virtue	  thesis	  this	  is	  
impossible	  for	  another	  reason,	  because	  this	  thesis	  says	  that	  to	  fully	  possess	  one	  virtue,	  we	  need	  
to	  possess	  all	  virtues.	  This	  idea	  follows	  from	  Aristotle’s	  statements	  that	  people	  ‘cannot	  be	  fully	  
good	  without	  practical	  wisdom	  or	  practically	  wise	  without	  virtue	  of	  character’	  and	  that	  ‘as	  soon	  
as	  [a	  person]	  has	  practical	  wisdom,	  which	  is	  a	  single	  state,	  he	  has	  all	  the	  virtues	  as	  well.'	  
(Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  VI.13,	  1144b32;	  1145a2.	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Annas,	  The	  Morality	  of	  
Happiness	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  73-­‐78;	  and	  G	  Watson,	  ‘Virtues	  in	  Excess’	  (1984)	  46	  
Philosophical	  Studies	  57-­‐74.	  This	  thesis	  has	  received	  much	  criticism,	  however.	  See	  e.g.	  P	  Foot,	  
‘Moral	  Realism	  and	  Moral	  Dilemma’	  (1983)	  80	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  396;	  and	  B	  Williams,	  Ethics	  
and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Philosophy	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  36.	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4.4.2	  Context-­‐dependence,	  generosity	  and	  exploitation	  
What	   does	   this	  mean	   for	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity,	   and	  my	   argument	   that	   the	  
wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   greed	   and	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity?	  The	   two	  different	   views	  on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   virtuous	   action	   is	  
limited	  by	  rational	  considerations	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  context,	  bear	  on	  the	  virtue	  
of	  generosity	  and	  the	  vice	  of	  greed	  as	  well.	  On	  the	  (neo-­‐)Aristotelian	  view,	  the	  
virtue	  of	  generosity	  lies	  in	  between,	  amongst	  others,	  greediness	  or	  miserliness	  
on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   wastefulness	   on	   the	   other.	   It	   involves	   a	   rational	  
consideration	  of	  when	  to	  give,	  to	  whom	  to	  give,	  and	  how	  much	  to	  give.213	  Hence,	  
on	  this	  view,	  if	  we	  give	  to	  the	  wrong	  person,	  it	  does	  not	  count	  as	  true	  generosity.	  
Need	  for	  or	  potential	  use	  of	  what	  we	  give	  matters,	  and	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  
it	  is	  better	  to	  give	  to	  people	  who	  need	  our	  help	  than	  to	  people	  who	  do	  not.	  For	  
example,	   if	  we	   are	   relatively	   poor,	  we	   are	   not	   being	   ungenerous	   if	  we	   do	   not	  
give	   luxurious	   presents	   to	   much	   richer	   friends.214	   We	   also	   do	   not	   count	   as	  
ungenerous	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  give	  money	  to	  someone	  whom	  we	  know	  will	  waste	  it	  
in	  an	  extravagant	  desire	  for,	  say,	  dining	  at	  Michelin-­‐star	  restaurants,	  or	  who	  will	  
use	   it	   to	   feed	   an	   addiction	   or	   to	   execute	   a	   criminal	   scheme.	   Likewise,	   on	   this	  
view	  it	  matters	  how	  much	  we	  give,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  count	  as	  proper	  generosity	  if	  
we	  give	  away	  too	  much	  or	  too	  little.	  We	  can	  give	  away	  too	  much,	  for	  example,	  if	  
we	  give	  away	  more	  than	  the	  recipient	  needs	  or	  if	  we	  cannot	  actually	  afford	  what	  
we	   give	   away.	   For	   instance,	   giving	   a	   thirty	   percent	   tip	   to	   a	  waitress	   for	   good	  
service	  may	  be	  generous,	  but	  giving	  her	  your	  car	  as	  a	   tip	  seems	  generous	  to	  a	  
fault.	  The	  reason	  this	  is	  so,	  according	  to	  Aristotle,	  is	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  generosity	  is	  
to	  help	  others,	  and	  if	  we	  give	  away	  our	  wealth	  excessively	  and	  unthinkingly	  to	  
certain	  people,	  we	  will	   have	   less	   left	   to	   give	   to	  others	  who	  may	  need	   it	  much	  
more.215	  Thus,	  Hursthouse	  argues,	  ‘[a]ny	  virtue	  may	  contrast	  with	  several	  vices	  
or	  failings,	  and	  generosity	  contrasts	  not	  only	  with	  meanness	  or	  selfishness	  but	  
also	  with	  being	  prodigal,	  too	  open-­‐handed,	  a	  sucker.’216	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  See	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  IV.2,	  1120a23-­‐1121a1.	  	  
214	  See	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  12-­‐13.	  
215	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  IV.2,	  1120b20-­‐1120b24.	  
216	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  12-­‐13.	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As	  said,	  others	  have	  a	  different	  view	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  be	  virtuous	  to	  a	  
fault,	   including	   generous	   to	   a	   fault.	   They	   disagree	   that	   generosity	   necessarily	  
involves	  a	  certain	  calculation	  and	  rational	  consideration,	  and	   that	  giving	  away	  
too	  much	  or	  to	  the	  wrong	  person	  does	  not	  count	  as	  generous.	  Lester	  Hunt,	   for	  
instance,	  argues	  that	  although	  this	  ‘intellectualist	  picture’217	  makes	  sense	  when	  
applied	   to	   the	   virtues	   of	   justice	   and	   prudence,	   it	   does	   not	   make	   sense	   when	  
applied	   to	   generosity.218	   He	   says	   that	   there	   is	   no	   contradiction	   in	   saying	  
something	   like	   ‘she	   shouldn’t	   have	   given	   away	   that	  much	  money	   because	   she	  
can’t	  afford	  to,	  but	  we	  can’t	  doubt	  her	  generosity’,	  because	   in	  such	  a	  situation,	  
the	   gift	   is	   not	   being	   criticized	   as	   failing	   to	   be	   generous,	   but	   as	   failing	   to	   be	  
prudent.219	  He	   admits	   that	   virtues	   can	  balance	  or	  qualify	   each	  other,	   and	   that	  
generosity	   may	   have	   to	   be	   tempered	   by	   prudence	   or	   justice	   or	   some	   other	  
virtue.	  Yet,	  he	  says,	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  virtues	  are	  distinct	  
qualities	  and	  that	  if	  someone	  is	  too	  generous	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  prudence	  
or	  justice,	  she	  is	  nevertheless	  still	  generous.220	  
	   I	   am	  not	   sure	  which	   of	   these	   views	   is	   superior.	   Yet	   irrespective	   of	   their	  
differences,	  I	  expect	  that	  advocates	  of	  both	  views	  will	  at	  least	  agree	  that	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  be	  generous	  is	  limited	  by	  contextual	  factors	  in	  the	  opposite	  sense:	  that	  
we	  cannot	  be	  called	  greedy	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  give	  too	  much	  (say,	  give	  a	  car	  as	  a	  tip	  
to	  a	  waitress),	  or	  give	  to	  the	  wrong	  person	  (say,	  someone	  who	  will	  put	  it	  to	  bad	  
use	   or	   who	   needs	   it	   much	   less	   than	   we	   do	   ourselves).	   Likewise,	   both	   views	  
would	  agree	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  good	  opportunity	  to	  benefit	  another,	  when	  we	  can	  
afford	   it	   and	   when	   we	   know	   that	   the	   other	   can	   make	   good	   use	   of	   the	   extra	  
money,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  occasion	  to	  be	  generous.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  exploiters	  refuse	  to	  
do.	  They	  have	  a	  very	  good	  opportunity	  to	  benefit	  another	  by	  offering	  a	  higher	  or	  
lower	  price	  than	  they	  could	  get	  the	  other	  to	  agree	  on,	  they	  know	  that	  the	  other	  
would	  like	  them	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  they	  could	  offer	  the	  higher	  or	   lower	  price	  while	  
still	  having	  enough	  left	  for	  themselves.	  Yet	  they	  still	  choose	  not	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217	  Hunt,	  op.cit.	  240.	  
218	  Hunt,	  op.cit.	  240.	  
219	  Hunt,	  op.cit.	  241.	  
220	  Hunt,	  op.cit.	  241-­‐242.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  CA	  Sanchez,	  ‘Generosity:	  Variations	  on	  a	  Theme	  from	  
Aristotle	  to	  Levinas’	  (2010)	  The	  Heytrop	  Journal	  442-­‐453,	  for	  another	  argument	  that	  generosity	  
is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  rational	  calculation.	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try	   to	  keep	  a	   large	  benefit	   for	   themselves,	   leaving	   the	  other	  with	   little	  benefit.	  
This	   is	  why	   I	   believe	   that	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   greediness,	  
and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  Think	  of	  the	  examples	  set	  out	  in	  chapter	  
1	  of	  situations	  that	  are	  typically	  found	  exploitative,	  such	  as	  employers	  who	  pay	  
their	   employees	   dreadfully	   low	   wages;	   ‘rescue	   cases’	   in	   which	   someone	   is	  
stranded	  and	  a	  passerby	  offers	  to	  help	  her,	  but	  only	  in	  return	  for	  a	  high	  price;	  
companies	   who	   pay	   nothing	   to	   their	   interns;	   or	   money	   lenders	   who	   ask	  
exorbitant	   interest	   rates	   for	   a	   loan	   to	   people	   in	   urgent	   need	   of	  money.	   In	   all	  
these	   situations,	   the	  alleged	  exploiters	   could,	  presumably,221	   easily	  ask	   less	  or	  
give	  more	  to	  the	  exploitee	  while	  still	  having	  plenty	  left	  for	  themselves.	  And	  they	  
know,	   or	   at	   least	   could	  be	   expected	   to	  presume,	   that	   the	   exploitee	  would	   like	  
them	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  would	  benefit	  if	  they	  would	  do	  so.	  Yet	  they	  choose	  not	  to	  do	  
so,	  but	  to	  try	  to	  get	  a	  lot	  of	  personal	  gain	  out	  of	  the	  situation,	  leaving	  relatively	  
little	  for	  the	  other	  person.	  	  
	  
The	   context-­‐dependence	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity	   means	   that	   the	   more	  
another	  needs	  or	  can	  make	  good	  use	  of	  some	  extra	  benefit,	  the	  more	  greedy	  it	  is	  
to	   withhold	   it.	   Likewise,	   the	   more	   we	   actually	   need	   the	   extra	   benefit	   for	  
ourselves	  or	  for	  other	  people	  around	  us,	  the	  less	  greedy	  it	  is	  not	  to	  give	  it	  away.	  
This	   has	   some	   implications	   for	   what,	   on	   my	   view	   of	   exploitation,	   counts	   as	  
exploitation.	  	  
	   First,	   it	  means	   that	   other	   things	   being	   equal,	   it	   is	  much	   less	   greedy	   and	  
exploitative	  to	  try	  to	  get	  as	  good	  a	  price	  as	  possible	  when,	  for	  example,	  selling	  a	  
rare	   painting	   to	   a	   multimillionaire	   who	   does	   not	   care	   very	   much	   about	   how	  
much	  she	  pays,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  try	  to	  get	  as	  good	  a	  price	  as	  possible	  when	  engaging	  
in	  a	  transaction	  with	  a	  very	  poor	  person	  who	  needs	  all	  the	  money	  she	  can	  get.	  
This	  perhaps	  explains	  some	  of	   the	  appeal	  of	   the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
(chapter	   2),	   which	   says	   that	   violating	   a	   duty	   to	   help	   others	   in	   need	   is	   what	  
makes	   exploitation	   wrong,	   and	   that	   we	   can	   consequently	   only	   wrongfully	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221	  We	  might	  be	  wrong	  in	  assuming	  that.	  It	  might	  be	  that,	  for	  instance,	  an	  employer	  who	  offers	  
very	  low	  wages	  only	  does	  so	  because	  she	  would	  make	  a	  loss	  on	  the	  product	  if	  her	  production	  
costs	  were	  any	  higher.	  In	  that	  case,	  we	  are	  mistaken	  to	  think	  the	  employer	  is	  acting	  greedily	  and	  
to	  consider	  that	  particular	  transaction	  exploitative.	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exploit	   someone	   if	   she	   needs	   help	   in	   meeting	   a	   basic	   need.	   As	   I	   argued	   in	  
chapter	  2,	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  meeting	  their	  
basic	  needs	  can	  adequately	  explain	   the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation,	  nor	   that	  we	  can	  
only	  exploit	  people	  who	  have	  a	  basic	  need	   to	  be	  met.	  Yet	   the	   fact	   that	  what	   it	  
means	   to	   act	   generously	   partly	   depends	   on	   the	   needs	   and	  desires	   of	   another,	  
and	   that	   the	  more	   another	   needs	   or	   can	  make	   good	   use	   of	   some	   benefit,	   the	  
more	   greedy	   it	   is	   to	   withhold	   it,	   does	   imply	   that	   it	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   exploit	  
someone	  who	  has	  some	  basic	  need	  to	  be	  met.	  
	   Second,	   and	   conversely,	   the	   fact	   that	  what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   generous	   also	  
depends	  on	  one’s	  own	  needs	  and	  wealth,	   implies	  that	   if	  a	  poor	  person	  tries	  to	  
get	  as	  much	  personal	  benefit	  as	  possible	   in	  a	  transaction	  with	  a	  relatively	  rich	  
person,	  this	  is	  not	  as	  greedy	  as	  when	  a	  richer	  person	  tries	  to	  get	  as	  much	  benefit	  
from	   someone	   who	   is	   equally	   well	   off	   or	   less	   well	   off	   as	   she	   is	   herself.	   For	  
instance,	  if	  a	  poor	  child	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  tries	  to	  sell	  a	  rich	  tourist	  a	  bottle	  
of	  water	  for	  $3,	  while	  the	  normal	  price	  is	  $0.50,	  this	  counts	  as	  much	  less	  greedy	  
than	  if,	  say,	  a	  very	  wealthy	  person	  tries	  to	  pay	  as	  little	  as	  possible	  when	  hiring	  
someone	   to	   paint	   her	   kitchen,	   even	   if	   the	   painter	   is	   not	   badly	   off	   herself	  
(although,	  as	  said,	  it	  is	  even	  more	  greedy	  if	  the	  painter	  is	  actually	  quite	  poor,	  and	  
the	  wealthy	  person	  knows	  it).	  As	  said	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  trying	  to	  earn	  or	  
save	  a	   lot	  of	  money	   is	  not	  greedy	  per	  se;	   it	  only	  becomes	  problematic	   if	  one’s	  
desire	   to	  earn	  or	  save	  money	   is	  excessive,	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  exceeding	  what	  one	  
reasonably	  needs	  and	  sacrificing	  the	  needs	  or	   interests	  of	  others.	  A	  poor	  child	  
who	  asks	  $3	  instead	  of	  $0.50	  is	  therefore	  not	  greedy	  if	  she	  seriously	  needs	  the	  
money,	  and	  expects	  that	  the	  tourist	  can	  easily	  miss	  it.	  
	   Finally,	   as	   this	   discussion	   indicates,	   the	   context-­‐dependence	   of	  
generosity	   and	   greediness	  means	   that	   exploitation	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   degree.	   The	  
fact	   that	  which	   behaviour	   is	   generous	   and	  which	   is	   greedy	   depends	   on	   one’s	  
own	  needs	  and	  affluence,	  and	  on	  other	  people’s	  needs	  and	  affluence,	  entails	  that	  
whether	  a	  transaction	  is	  exploitative	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  with	  no	  clear	  cut-­‐off	  
point.	  Simply	  speaking,	  as	  explained,	  if	  we	  try	  to	  get	  as	  good	  a	  price	  as	  possible	  
in	   a	   transaction	   irrespective	   of	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	   other,	   this	   is	   clearly	  
greedy	  if	  we	  are	  very	  wealthy	  and	  the	  other	  is	  very	  poor,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  greedy	  if	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we	  are	  very	  poor	  and	  the	  other	  is	  very	  wealthy.	  And	  the	  wealthier	  we	  are	  or	  the	  
poorer	  the	  other	  is,	  the	  greedier	  it	  is	  to	  try	  to	  get	  as	  good	  a	  price	  as	  possible.	  But	  
things	   are	   not	   that	   simple.	   Many	   people	   who	   transact	   with	   each	   other	   are	  
neither	  very	  wealthy	  nor	  very	  poor,	  which	  means	  that	  determining	  what	  being	  
generous	  and	  greedy	  involves	  is	  not	  as	  straightforward.	  	  
Determining	  exactly	  what	  counts	  as	  generous,	  what	  as	  ungenerous,	  and	  
what	  as	  greedy,	  is	  not	  straightforward	  for	  another	  reason	  as	  well.	  This	  is	  that	  it	  
is	  not	  generally	  clear	  how	  much	  one	  should	  give	  to	  be	  generous,	  and	  how	  little	  
one	  should	  give	  to	  count	  as	  greedy.	  As	  said,	  this	  depends	  on	  one’s	  own	  wealth	  
and	  needs	  and	  on	  the	  other’s	  wealth	  and	  needs,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  truly	  answer	  
the	   question.	   Imagine,	   for	   example,	   a	   very	  wealthy	   person	  who	  wants	   to	   hire	  
someone	  to	  clean	  her	  house	  twice	  a	  week.	  I	  think	  we	  would	  agree	  that	  offering	  
to	  pay	  below	  minimum	  wage	  would	  be	  greedy,	  and	  that	  offering	  £1,000,000	  per	  
year	   would	   be	   extremely	   generous.	   But	   where	   on	   the	   scale	   between	   below	  
minimum	  wage	  and	  £1,000,000	  lie	  the	  boundaries	  between	  what	  is	  greedy	  and	  
what	   is	   non-­‐greedy	   but	   non-­‐generous	   either,	   and	   between	   what	   is	   non-­‐
greedy/non-­‐generous	   and	  what	   is	   generous?	  People	  will	   disagree	   about	   these	  
boundaries,	   or	   may	   not	   even	   be	   able	   to	   precisely	   pinpoint	   such	   boundaries.	  
Whether	  a	   transaction	   is	   exploitative	   is	   thus	  a	  matter	  of	  degree,	   and	  although	  
many	   people	   will	   be	   able	   to	   agree	   on	   instances	   of	   clearly	   exploitative	  
transactions,	  such	  as	  sweatshop	  labour,	  they	  may	  disagree	  on	  ‘boundary	  cases’.	  
	  
4.5	  Perception,	  emotion	  and	  exploitation	  	  
	  
In	  the	  previous	  section,	   I	  discussed	  the	  context-­‐dependence	  of	  virtue	  and	  vice,	  
and	  its	  implications	  for	  what	  counts	  as	  exploitation	  on	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation.	  
Three	   other	   important	   elements	   of	   virtue	   are	   perception,	   emotion,	   and	  
responsiveness.	  These	  elements	  are	  related	  to	  each	  other	  and	  will	  each	  in	  turn	  
be	  explained	  in	  this	  section.	  I	  will	  close	  the	  section	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  the	  
three	  elements	  relate	  to	  my	  argument	  that	  exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness	  
and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	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4.5.1	  Virtue	  and	  perception	  
The	  first	  element	  of	  virtue	  I	  will	  discuss	  is	  perception:	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  see	  
the	   world	   around	   us.	   The	   idea	   that	   perception	   is	   morally	   important	   can	   be	  
found	  in	  the	  classical	  writings	  of	  Aristotle222	  and	  Aquinas,223	  and	  in	  present-­‐day	  
(neo-­‐)Aristotelian	  virtue	  ethicists,224	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  key	  element	  in	  the	  work	  of	  
Simone	  Weil,225	   Iris	  Murdoch,226	  and	  many	  authors	   inspired	  by	  them.227	  These	  
writers	  reject	  the	  idea	  that	  morality	  is	  solely	  about	  choice	  and	  action,	  and	  show	  
that	   when	   we	  make	   a	   choice	   in	   a	   certain	   situation,	   this	   choice	   is	   necessarily	  
determined	  by	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  see	  that	  situation.	  Moral	  reasoning	  is	  thus	  
partly	   a	   matter	   of	   perception—the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   perceive	   or	   ‘read’	  
situations—and	   part	   of	   our	   moral	   development	   consists	   in	   improving	   the	  
accuracy	  of	  our	  perception.	  	  
	   The	   notion	   of	   moral	   perception	   is	   an	   element	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   practical	  
wisdom,	  discussed	   in	  section	  4.4.1	  above.	  Virtuous	  people	  know	  what	  to	  do	   in	  
particular	   situations	   by	   perceiving	   the	   relevant	   features	   of	   that	   particular	  
situation,	  and	  knowing	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  those	  features.	  An	  important	  part	  of	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  see	  the	  relevant	  features	  of	  a	  situation	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  way	  
we	  see	  other	  people	  and	  their	  needs	  and	  interests.	  After	  all,	  as	  explained	  before,	  
virtues	   such	   as	   generosity,	   compassion	   and	   kindness	   entail	   that	   we	   aim	   to	  
improve	   other	   people’s	   needs	   and	   interests,	   and	   we	   can	   only	   be	   moved	   to	  
advance	  other	  people’s	  interests	  if	  we	  are	  properly	  aware	  of	  their	  interests.	  	  
	   Our	  perception	  of	  other	  people	  can	  be	  deficient	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways.	  First,	  
we	  can	  have	  a	  mistaken	  or	  distorted	  perception	  of	  someone.	  Second,	  we	  can	  fail	  
to	   perceive	   someone,	   or	   someone’s	   needs,	   desires	   or	   interests	   to	   a	   sufficient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  II.9,	  1109b13-­‐1109b23.	  
223	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica	  I	  Q78	  A4.	  
224	  See	  e.g.	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  12;	  J	  McDowell,	  ‘Virtue	  and	  Reason’	  (1979)	  62	  
The	  Monist	  345.	  
225	  S	  Weil,	  Simone	  Weil:	  An	  Anthology	  (Penguin	  Classics,	  2005).	  	  
226	  I	  Murdoch,	  The	  Sovereignty	  of	  Good	  (Routledge,	  1970).	  	  
227	  See	  e.g.	  LA	  Blum,	  Moral	  Perception	  and	  Particularity	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  M	  
Holland,	  ‘Touching	  the	  Weights:	  Moral	  Perception	  and	  Attention’	  38	  (1998)	  International	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly	  299-­‐312;	  and	  MC	  Nussbaum,	  Love’s	  Knowledge:	  Essays	  on	  Philosophy	  and	  
Literature	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1990)	  54-­‐105.	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degree—or	   at	   all.	   Considering	   the	   former,	   Iris	   Murdoch	   gives	   the	   now	   well-­‐
known	  example	  of	  a	  mother,	  M,	  reflecting	  on	  her	  daughter-­‐in-­‐law,	  D.	  At	  first,	  the	  
mother	   finds	  D	   vulgar,	   undignified	   and	   tiresomely	   juvenile,	   and	   feels	   that	   her	  
son	  has	  married	  beneath	  him.	  Yet	  M	  does	  not	  allow	  this	  opinion	  to	  appear	  in	  any	  
way,	   and	   behaves	   perfectly	   towards	   D.228	   Moreover,	   M	   is	   ‘an	   intelligent	   and	  
well-­‐intentioned	  person	  capable	  of	   self-­‐criticism,	  capable	  of	  giving	  careful	  and	  
just	   attention	   to	   an	   object	  which	   confronts	   her’229	   and	   she	   tells	   herself:	   ‘I	   am	  
old-­‐fashioned	  and	  conventional.	  I	  may	  be	  prejudiced	  and	  narrow-­‐minded.	  I	  may	  
be	  snobbish.	  I	  am	  certainly	  jealous.	  Let	  me	  look	  again.’230	  As	  a	  result,	  M’s	  vision	  
of	  D	  changes	  after	  some	  time.	  She	  now	  considers	  her	  refreshingly	  simple	  instead	  
of	   vulgar,	   spontaneous	   instead	   of	   undignified,	   delightfully	   youthful	   instead	   of	  
juvenile.	   Murdoch’s	   point	   is	   that	   the	  way	   in	  which	  M	   sees	   D,	   and	   the	  mental	  
process	   M	   undertakes	   in	   assessing	   and	   changing	   her	   perception	   of	   D,	   has	   a	  
moral	  aspect,	  even	  though	  M’s	  outward	  behaviour	  towards	  D	  does	  not	  change	  at	  
all.	  Murdoch	  uses	  this	  example	  to	  contest	  the	  view	  that	  only	  outward	  activities	  
are	   morally	   significant,	   and	   to	   argue	   that	   moral	   activity	   also	   takes	   place	   in	  
people’s	  mind,	   in	   the	  way	   they	   choose	   to	   strive	   for	   an	   accurate	   and	   loving231	  
perception	   of	   other	   people.232	   Such	   an	   accurate	   perception,	   Murdoch	   argues,	  
requires	  ‘unselfing’:	  seeing	  other	  persons	  and	  their	  needs	  and	  interests	  without	  
letting	  our	  own	  interests	  and	  biases	  towards	  them	  cloud	  the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  
see	   them.233	  Things	   like	   jealousy,	   racism,	   and	   self-­‐centredness	   can	  distort	   our	  
perception	  of	  others,	  and	  part	  of	  our	  moral	  development	  consists	  in	  overcoming	  
such	  biases	  to	  acquire	  a	  more	  accurate	  view	  of	  other	  people.	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  having	  a	  distorted	  perception	  of	  someone,	  we	  can	  also	  fail	  in	  
our	   perception	   by	   not	   being	   sufficiently	   aware	   of	   the	   condition,	   needs,	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  I	  Murdoch,	  The	  Sovereignty	  of	  Good	  (Routledge,	  1970)	  17.	  	  
229	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  17.	  
230	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  17.	  
231	  Murdoch	  argues	  for	  seeing	  others	  in	  an	  accurate	  and	  loving	  way.	  Yet	  arguably,	  certain	  
situations	  require	  us	  not	  to	  try	  to	  see	  someone	  in	  the	  most	  charitable	  light	  possible.	  For	  
example,	  if	  a	  child	  is	  bullying	  other	  children,	  we	  may	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  causes,	  but	  should	  
not	  deny	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  is	  bullying,	  thinking	  something	  like	  ‘she’s	  only	  a	  little	  playful,	  she	  
doesn’t	  have	  bad	  intentions’.	  For	  a	  criticism	  along	  these	  lines	  see	  C	  Starkey,	  ‘On	  the	  Category	  of	  
Moral	  Perception’	  (2006)	  32(1)	  Social	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  75-­‐96.	  	  
232	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  23.	  
233	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  84;	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  12.	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interests	   of	   other	   people	   around	   us,	   or	   by	   not	   being	   aware	   of	   them	   at	   all.	  
Lawrence	  Blum	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  two	  people,	  John	  and	  Joan,	  who	  are	  sitting	  
in	  a	  subway	  train.234	  There	  are	  no	  empty	  seats	  and	  some	  people	  are	  standing,	  
amongst	   whom	   a	   woman	   holding	   two	   full	   shopping	   bags.	   John	   is	   not	   paying	  
particular	   attention	   to	   the	  woman,	   although	   he	   is	   aware	   of	   her,	  while	   Joan	   is	  
distinctly	   aware	   that	   the	   woman	   is	   uncomfortable.	   Blum	   argues	   that	   the	  
difference	   between	   what	   is	   salient	   for	   John	   and	   Joan	   has	   moral	   significance,	  
because	  Joan	  perceives	  the	  standing	  woman’s	  interests	  as	  a	  stake	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
John	  does	  not,	  and	  thus	  perceives	  a	  morally	  relevant	  value	  in	  the	  situation	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  John	  does	  not.235	  
	   For	  Blum,	  as	  for	  Murdoch,	  having	  accurate	  perception	  has	  moral	  value	  in	  
itself,	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   it	   leads	   us	   to	   perform	   a	   certain	   action.236	   Both	  
would	   say,	   for	   instance,	   that	   it	   is	   morally	   better	   to	   perceive	   the	   plight	   of	   a	  
homeless	  drug	  addict	  we	  pass	  on	  the	  street	  than	  to	  not	  truly	  notice	  her,	  even	  if	  it	  
makes	  no	  practical	  difference	  because,	   for	   instance,	  we	  believe	   that	  giving	  her	  
money	   is	   bad	   because	   she	  will	   likely	   spend	   it	   on	   drugs.	   Or,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
above	   example,	   both	   would	   consider	   it	   morally	   better	   if	   John	   perceived	   the	  
woman’s	  discomfort,	  even	   if	  he	  had	  broken	  his	   leg	  and	  was	  unable	   to	  actually	  
offer	   her	   his	   seat.	   Similarly,	   on	   this	   view	   having	   a	   mistaken	   or	   distorted	  
perception	  of	  others	  or	  oneself	   is	  morally	  relevant,	  even	  if	   it	  does	  not	  show	  in	  
our	  actions.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  arrogantly	  perceive	  any	  opinion	  a	  colleague	  may	  
have	  to	  give	  as	  unworthy	  of	  consideration,	  even	  if	  the	  colleague	  ends	  up	  giving	  
no	  opinion	  at	  all.237	  Murdoch	  and	  Blum	  seem	  right	  that	  accurate	  perception	  can	  
have	   moral	   value	   in	   itself.	   This	   becomes	   especially	   clear	   when	   thinking,	   for	  
instance,	  of	  a	  person	  who	  always	  behaves	  very	  ‘correctly’	  and	  politely	  towards	  
others,	  but	  who	  has	  a	   racist	  attribute	   in	   the	  sense	   that,	  although	  she	  does	  not	  
hate	  or	  avoid	  black	  people,	  she	  does	  deep	  down	  see	  them	  as	  less	  intelligent	  and	  
less	   civilized	   than	  white	   people.	  Or,	   for	   example,	  when	   thinking	  of	   a	   similarly	  
well-­‐behaved	  man	  who	  has	   a	   sexist	   attribute	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   he	   deep	   down	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  31-­‐37.	  
235	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  32.	  
236	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  43.	  
237	  Based	  on	  an	  example	  in	  Starkey,	  op.cit.	  88-­‐89.	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sees	  women	  as	   less	   intelligent	  or	  rational.	  Even	   if	   the	  views	  of	  such	  people	  do	  
not	   have	   any	   consequences	   in	   the	   way	   they	   behave,	   and	   even	   if	   they	   do	   not	  
share	   their	   view	   in	   any	   way	   with	   anyone	   else,	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   perceive	  
themselves	   as	   more	   intelligent,	   civilized	   or	   rational	   than	   black	   people	   or	  
women,	  seems	  indeed	  morally	  blameworthy.	  	  
	   Some	   theorists	   may	   disagree	   that	   accurate	   perception	   has	   any	   intrinsic	  
moral	  value.	  Nevertheless,	  virtue	  theorists	  do	  generally	  agree	  that	  perception	  is	  
at	   least	  morally	  relevant	  in	  a	  more	  indirect	  way:	  as	  something	  that	  is	  required	  
for	  and	  part	  of	  practical	  wisdom,	  and	  therefore	  required	  for	  and	  part	  of	  virtue.	  
This	   is	   the	   role	  perception	  has	   in	  Aristotelian	   theories.	   Since	  what	   is	   required	  
for	   virtuous	   action	   depends	   on	   the	   circumstances,	   we	   need	   to	   see	   in	   every	  
particular	  situation	  what	   features	  are	  relevant,	  and	   to	  what	  degree,	  before	  we	  
can	  decide	  which	  action	  is	  an	  appropriate	  response	  to	  those	  features.	  Hence,	  we	  
can	  only	  be	  generous	  to	  people,	  if	  we	  actually	  perceive	  their	  needs,	  condition	  or	  
interests,	  and	  are	  not	  either	  blind	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  others,	  or	  have	  our	  vision	  
of	   the	   importance	   of	   others’	   condition	   distorted	   by	   things	   such	   as	   racism,	  
sexism,	   jealousy	   or	   self-­‐aggrandizement.	   Thus,	   on	   this	   view	   as	   well,	   accurate	  
perception	   of	   other	   people	   and	   their	   interests	   is	   an	   important	   element	   of	  
virtues,	  and	  especially	  of	  virtues	  of	  benevolence	  such	  as	  kindness,	  compassion	  
and	  generosity.	  	  
	  
4.5.2	  Virtue	  and	  emotion	  
The	  previous	  section	  discussed	  the	  role	  of	  perception	  in	  virtue.	  Another	  central	  
feature	   of	   virtue	   theories	   is	   the	   importance	   attributed	   to	   emotion.	   To	   be	  
virtuous	   implies	  not	   just	   that	  we	  act	   correctly,	   but	   also	   that	  we	   feel	  correctly;	  
that	   we	   have	   the	   correct	   emotions	   in	   particular	   situations.238	   An	   often-­‐made	  
distinction,	   first	  proposed	  by	  Aristotle,239	   is	  therefore	  between	  ‘self-­‐controlled’	  
and	   fully	   virtuous	   people.	   Self-­‐controlled	   people	   act	   according	   to	   virtue—do	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  See	  e.g.	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  5;	  LA	  Kosman,	  ‘Being	  Properly	  Affected:	  
Virtues	  and	  Feelings	  in	  Aristotle’s	  Ethics’	  in	  AO	  Rorty	  (ed),	  Essays	  on	  Aristotle’s	  Ethics	  
(University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1980)	  105;	  Nussbaum,	  Love’s	  Knowledge,	  op.cit.	  78.	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  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  III.4,	  1111b5-­‐1111b11.	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what	   they	   should	   do—but	   have	   a	   desire	   to	   do	   otherwise.	   For	   example,	   they	  
‘generously’	   give	   money	   away	   or	   ‘kindly’	   help	   other	   people,	   but	   do	   so	   only	  
grudgingly.	   Fully	   virtuous	   people,	   in	   contrast,	   do	   what	   they	   should	   do,	   and	  
desire	  to	  do	  so.	  When	  they	  act	  generously	  or	  kindly,	  they	  do	  so	  without	  regret	  
and	  with	  pleasure	   in	   the	   knowledge	  of	   how	   their	  money	  or	   kindness	   benefits	  
others.	  According	  to	  Aristotle,	  being	  self-­‐controlled	  is	  morally	  better	  than	  doing	  
the	  wrong	  thing,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  as	  good	  as	  being	  fully	  virtuous.240	  	  
This	   might	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   objection	   that	   it	   seems	   much	   less	  
praiseworthy	  if	  we	  do	  what	  we	  actually	  want	  to	  do,	  than	  if	  we	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  
do	  the	  right	  thing	  but	  still	  force	  ourselves	  to	  do	  so.	  However,	  as	  Foot	  points	  out,	  
this	   depends	   on	   why	   we	   find	   it	   difficult	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing.241	   If	   our	  
circumstances	   somehow	   make	   it	   harder	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing	   but	   we	   still	  
manage,	  this	  is	  indeed	  more	  praiseworthy	  and	  may	  show	  great	  virtue.	  Yet	  if	  it	  is	  
something	   in	   our	   character	   that	  makes	   it	   hard	   for	   us	   to	   do	   the	   right	   thing,	   it	  
seems	   less	   praiseworthy	   and	   to	   show	   a	   flaw	   in	   virtue.	   Think	   for	   example,	   as	  
Foot	  says,	  of	  someone	  who	  finds	  it	  difficult	  not	  to	  steal,	  but	  who	  refrains	  from	  
doing	  so	  anyway.	  If	  the	  person	  is	  tempted	  to	  steal	  because	  she	  is	  poor,	  the	  fact	  
that	   she	   nonetheless	   decides	   not	   to	   steal	  may	   show	   that	   she	   is	   a	   very	   honest	  
person.	  Yet	  if	  she	  is	  tempted	  to	  steal	  not	  because	  she	  is	  poor,	  but	  simply	  because	  
of	  something	  in	  her	  character,	  this	  shows	  that	  she	  is	  less	  honest.	  The	  same	  can	  
be	   said	   about	   generosity.	   If	  we	   are	   tempted	  not	   to	   give	   something	   to	   another	  
because	  we	  are	  not	  very	  wealthy,	  but	  we	  still	  do	  so,	  this	  may	  show	  that	  we	  are	  
very	  generous.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  have	  plenty	  of	  wealth	  and	  are	  tempted	  
not	   to	   give	   to	   another	   because	   of	   something	   in	   our	   character—because	   we	  
generally	  want	  to	  keep	  as	  much	  wealth	  as	  possible	  for	  ourselves—this	  indicates	  
that	  we	  are	  less	  generous.	  
	  
Many	  virtue	  theories	  contend	  that	  although	  emotions	  do	  give	  rise	  to	  action,	  they	  
do	  not	  merely	  have	  ‘instrumental’	  value	  in	  bringing	  about	  action,	  but	  also	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point,	  see	  e.g.	  Foot,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices,	  op.cit.	  11-­‐14;	  and	  Hursthouse,	  
On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  4.	  
241	  Foot,	  Virtues	  and	  Vices,	  op.cit.	  11-­‐14.	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own	   intrinsic	  moral	  value.242	   In	  other	  words:	  proper	  emotions	  are	  not	  merely	  
that	   what	   prompts	   us	   to	   virtuous	   action,	   with	   the	   action	   being	   the	   actual	  
realization	  of	  the	  virtue.	  Instead,	  the	  emotions	  themselves	  are	  an	  essential	  part	  
of	  virtue,	  which	  consists	  of	  both	  proper	  emotions	  and	  proper	  action.243	  Virtuous	  
people	  feel	  the	  proper	  emotions,	  to	  a	  proper	  degree,	  towards	  the	  proper	  person	  
or	  other	  object,	  in	  the	  proper	  situation,	  for	  the	  proper	  reason—and	  then	  are	  also	  
prompted	  to	  proper	  action.	  	  
Behind	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘proper	  emotions’	  lies	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  many	  
situations	   in	  which	  we	   think	   that	  a	  certain	  emotional	   response	   is	  appropriate,	  
whereas	   others	   are	   not.	   If	  we	  witness	   or	   hear	   of	   a	  massacre,	   for	   example,	   an	  
appropriate	   response	  might	   involve	   a	   feeling	   of	   sadness,	   disgust,	   pity,	   and/or	  
indignation,	  whereas	  we	  would	   find	   it	   disturbing,	   to	   say	   the	   least,	   if	   someone	  
admits	  to	  feel	  pleasure	  or	  indifference.	  	  
That	   emotions	   are	   important	   components	   of	   virtue	   may	   seem	   more	  
obvious	   in	   virtue	   theories	   such	   as	   Slote’s	   sentimentalist	   virtue	   ethics,	   which	  
bases	   the	   value	   of	   virtue	   on	   the	   motivation	   it	   expresses,	   than	   in	   the	   more	  
rationalistic	   (neo-­‐)Aristotelian	   theories.	   Yet	   proper	   emotional	   responses	   are	  
considered	   equally	   important	   in	   Aristotelian	   virtue	   approaches.	   Which	  
emotional	  response	  is	  appropriate	  in	  a	  certain	  situation	  can,	  on	  the	  Aristotelian	  
view,	  be	   rationally	   assessed.	  This	   is	  because	  on	   this	   view,	  beliefs	  have	  a	   large	  
influence	  on	  our	  emotions,	  or	  are	  even	  part	  of	  our	  emotions.244	  To	  feel	  sad,	  for	  
example,	  normally245	  requires	  a	  belief	  that	  something	  bad	  has	  happened	  or	  will	  
happen.	  Feeling	  the	  emotion	  of	  sadness,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  not	  independent	  from	  
the	  belief	  that	  something	  bad	  has	  happened,	  but	  follows	  from	  this	  belief.	  If	  our	  
belief	   that	   something	   bad	   has	   happened	   changes	   (I	   might,	   for	   instance,	  
mistakenly	  have	  thought	  that	  my	  grandmother	  died,	  but	  learn	  that	  it	  is	  not	  so),	  
our	   sadness	   will	   also	   change.	   And	   since	   we	   can	   assess	   beliefs	   on	   their	   truth,	  
reasonableness,	   or	   rationality,	   and	   since	   beliefs	   are	   constitutive	   of	   our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics,	  op.cit.	  108.	  
243	  Kosman,	  op.cit.	  109.	  	  
244	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  see	  MC	  Nussbaum,	  ‘Aristotle	  on	  Emotions	  and	  Rational	  Persuasion’	  in	  
AO	  Rorty	  (ed),	  Essays	  on	  Aristotle’s	  Rhetoric	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1996)	  303-­‐323.	  	  
245	  Unless	  one	  suffers	  from	  a	  psychological	  illness,	  such	  as	  depression.	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emotions,	   we	   can,	   on	   this	   view,	   also	   assess	   our	   emotions	   on	   their	  
reasonableness	  or	  rationality.	  
	   Conversely,	   Aristotle	   holds	   that	   if	   someone	   does	   not	   feel	   a	   certain	  
emotion,	   this	   reflects	   something	   in	   her	   beliefs	   or	   judgments.246	   If,	   say,	   my	  
grandmother	  dies	  and	  I	  do	  not	  feel	  any	  sadness,	  this	  has	  to	  mean	  that	  I	  judge	  my	  
grandmother	  to	  not	  have	  been	  very	  important	  to	  me,	  or	  that	  I	  think	  it	  not	  bad	  
that	   she	   died	   for	   some	   other	   reason.	   Similarly,	   it	   seems	   that	   if	   we	   hear	   of	   a	  
massacre	   and	   feel	   pleasure	   or	   indifference,	   this	   reflects	   our	   beliefs	   about	   the	  
importance	  of	  other	  people’s	   lives	  or	  suffering.	  And	  since	  our	  emotions	  can	  be	  
incorrect,	   because	   our	   beliefs	   can	   be	   incorrect,	   they	   can	   improve,	   on	   the	  
Aristotelian	  view,	  by	  education	  of	  those	  beliefs.	  	  
In	  sum,	  emotions	  are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  virtues,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  someone	  acts	  virtuously,	  we	  have	  to	  consider	  not	  only	  her	  
actions	   and	  motivations,	   but	   also	   her	   emotional	   responses	   and	   attitudes.	   For	  
example,	  being	  a	  good	  child	  to	  our	  parents	  does	  not	  only	  depend	  on	  what	  we	  do	  
for	  our	  parents,	  but	  also	  on	  which	  emotions	  we	  have	  towards	  them,	  and	  how	  we	  
are	   moved	   by	   their	   happiness	   or	   distress.	   Someone	   who	   takes	   care	   of	   her	  
elderly	  parents,	  but	  does	  so	  grudgingly	  and	  with	  no	  feeling	  of	  affection	  towards	  
them,	   is	   not	   considered	   as	   good	   a	   child	   as	   someone	  who	  may	   do	   exactly	   the	  
same	   for	   her	   parents,	   but	   with	   different	   feelings	   towards	   them.	   Conversely,	  
neglecting	   elderly	   parents	  who	   need	   care	   is,	   generally	   speaking,	   not	   only	   bad	  
because	  we	   refuse	   to	   do	  what	  would	   be	   good	   to	   do	   for	   our	   parents,	   but	   also	  
because	   it	   exhibits	   a	   failure	   to	   care	   about	   whom	   we	   ought	   to	   care	   about.247	  
Elderly	  parents	  who	  are	  neglected	  by	   their	   children	  will,	   rightly,	   not	  only	   feel	  
upset	  because	  of	   the	  actual	  difficulties	   they	  have	   in	   taking	  care	  of	   themselves,	  
but	   also,	   and	  possibly	  more,	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   their	   children	  do	  not	   truly	  
care	  about	  them.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246	  See	  Nussbaum,	  ‘Aristotle	  on	  Emotions	  and	  Rational	  Persuasion’,	  op.cit.	  316.	  
247	  See	  W	  Chiong,	  A	  Principles	  Partiality:	  A	  Kantian	  Account	  of	  Special	  Obligation	  (New	  York	  
University,	  2005)	  14-­‐15.	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4.5.3	  Perception	  and	  emotion:	  responsiveness	  	  
The	  two	  elements	  of	  virtue	  discussed	   in	   the	  previous	  sections,	  perception	  and	  
emotion,	  are	  connected	  with	  each	  other.	  According	  to	  (neo-­‐)Aristotelian	  virtue	  
ethicists,	  perception	  is	  influenced	  by	  emotions,	  because	  emotions	  may	  alter	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  we	  see	  things.	  If	  we	  love	  someone,	  we	  will	  likely	  see	  and	  judge	  her	  
actions	  in	  a	  more	  positive	  light	  than	  if	  we	  hate	  her.248	  Yet,	  as	  Nussbaum	  points	  
out,	   our	   perception	   may	   also	   be	   partly	   constituted	   by	   emotions.249	   Accurate	  
perception	  is	  a	  full	  recognition	  or	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  situation,	  
she	  says,	  which	  means	  that	  if	  we	  observe	  intellectually	  that	  a	  friend	  is	  in	  need	  or	  
a	  loved	  one	  has	  died,	  but	  do	  not	  feel	  the	  appropriate	  sympathy	  or	  grief,	  a	  part	  of	  
our	  discernment	  or	  perception	   is	   lacking	  because	  we	  do	  not	   take	   in	  what	  has	  
happened	   in	   a	   full-­‐blooded	  way.	  We	  might	   say	   ‘she	  needs	  my	  help’,	   or	   ‘she	   is	  
dead’,	  but	  do	  not	  yet	  fully	  know	  it,	  because	  the	  emotional	  part	  of	  the	  cognition	  is	  
lacking.	   Thus,	   Nussbaum	   argues,	   intellectual	   knowledge	   also	   needs	  
‘responsiveness’	  to	  arrive	  at	  full	  knowledge,	  or	  full	  perception.250	  
	   This	  view	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  emotion	  and	  perception	  is	  shared	  by	  
non-­‐Aristotelians	  as	  well.	  Blum,	  following	  Iris	  Murdoch,	  argues	  for	  instance	  that	  
if	  we	  truly	   ‘see’	  another	  person’s	  distress,	  most	  people	  will	  automatically	  have	  
some	   altruistic	   sentiment	   towards	   that	   person,	   and	   feel	   moved	   to	   help	   her,	  
because	  truly	  seeing	  someone	  involves	  being	  able	  to	  imagine	  her	  distress	  and	  to	  
allow	   her	   distress	   to	   affect	   ourselves.251	   Responsiveness,	   Blum	   says,	   thus	   has	  
both	   a	   cognitive	   and	   an	   affective	   part:	   we	   have	   to	   accurately	   perceive	   other	  
people’s	   condition,	   and	   to	   feel	   an	   altruistic	   sentiment	   and	   motivation	   in	  
response	  to	  it.252	  This	  is	  also	  often	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	   ‘empathy’:	  having	  the	  
feelings	   of	   another	   (involuntarily)	   aroused	   in	   ourselves.253	   On	   most	   views,	  
empathy	   is	   spurred	   by	   seeing	   another’s	   condition	   and	   does	   not	   need	   careful	  
reflection	  about	  what	  we	  morally	  ought	   to	  do,	  or	  a	   conscious	   thought	   that	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  Aristotle,	  Rhetoric	  II.1,	  1377b30-­‐1378a4.	  	  
249	  Nussbaum,	  Love’s	  Knowledge,	  op.cit.	  79.	  
250	  Nussbaum,	  Love’s	  Knowledge,	  op.cit.	  80-­‐81.	  
251	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  188-­‐190;	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  See	  also	  McDowell,	  op.cit.	  
252	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  189.	  
253	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Slote,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Care	  and	  Empathy	  (Routledge,	  2007)	  13.	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ought	   to	   care	   for	   others.254	   It	   can	   even	   be	   found	   in	   very	   young	   children,	  
psychological	  literature	  shows;255	  children	  who	  are	  too	  young	  to	  have	  a	  notion	  
of	  rules	  or	  moral	  principles.	  All	  that	  is	  required	  for	  empathy	  is	  that	  we	  perceive	  
another	   person’s	   condition	   and	   feel	   an	   altruistic	   sentiment	   or	   motivation	  
toward	   her.256	   For	   instance,	   when	   Joan	   in	   the	   earlier	   mentioned	   subway-­‐
example	  sees	  the	  woman	  standing	  with	  two	  heavy	  bags,	  she	  may	  be	  prompted	  
to	  offer	  her	  seat	  without	   thinking	   that	   that	   is	   the	  right	   thing	   to	  do,	  but	  simply	  
because	   of	   ‘feeling’	   the	   woman’s	   discomfort	   and	   wanting	   to	   alleviate	   her	  
discomfort.	  	  
	   As	  discussed	  before,	  many	  (neo-­‐)Aristotelians	  will	  deny	  that	  such	  ‘natural’	  
empathy	  that	  can	  be	  found	  in	  young	  children,	  can	  generate	  true	  virtue.	  They	  will	  
also	  say	  that	  if	  someone	  never	  gives	  any	  thought	  to	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  her	  
emotional	  responses	  to	  seeing	  another’s	  discomfort,	  this	  is	  contrary	  to	  practical	  
wisdom	  and	  virtue.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  would	  agree	  that	  in	  general,	  empathy,	  or	  
responsiveness,	  as	  the	  proper	  emotional	  response	  to	  another’s	  condition,	  and	  as	  
part	  of	  accurately	  perceiving	  another’s	  condition,	  is	  a	  central	  component	  of	  and	  
requirement	   for	   virtues	   such	   as	   compassion,	   concern,	   kindness,	   care,	  
thoughtfulness,	  and	  generosity—and	  as	  such,	  has	  moral	  value.257	  	  
	   Although	  I	  have	  so	  far	  mainly	  spoken	  of	  responding	  to	  other	  people’s	  need,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  198.	  
255	  See	  e.g.	  ML	  Hoffman,	  Empathy	  and	  Moral	  Development:	  Implications	  for	  Caring	  and	  Justice	  
(Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  and	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  	  
256	  Blum,	  op.cit.	  197.	  
257	  The	  moral	  importance	  of	  empathy	  is	  also	  stressed	  by	  proponents	  of	  ‘ethics	  of	  care’	  theories.	  
See	  e.g.	  V	  Held,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Care	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  31;	  N	  Noddings,	  Caring:	  A	  
Feminine	  Approach	  to	  Ethics	  and	  Moral	  Education	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1986)	  14-­‐19;	  M	  
Slote,	  Morals	  from	  Motives	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  (Carol	  Gilligan’s	  In	  a	  Different	  Voice	  
(Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1982)	  is	  generally	  regarded	  as	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  surge	  of	  ethics	  
of	  care	  writings,	  although	  it	  does	  not	  itself	  set	  forth	  an	  ‘ethics	  of	  care’	  theory	  as	  such.)	  Whether	  
the	  ethics	  of	  care	  is	  a	  form	  of	  virtue	  ethics	  is	  debated,	  yet	  there	  are	  certainly	  many	  similarities.	  
Advocates	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  criticize	  traditional	  liberal	  approaches	  to	  morality	  for	  reasoning	  
in	  terms	  of	  abstract	  principles	  and	  for	  viewing	  humans	  as	  independent	  and	  autonomous	  
individuals,	  and	  for	  thereby	  overlooking	  the	  fact	  that	  humans	  are	  relational	  beings	  who	  are	  
dependent	  on	  the	  care	  they	  receive	  from	  other	  humans	  at	  many	  points	  in	  their	  lives.	  An	  
adequate	  morality,	  they	  say,	  should	  focus	  on	  this	  dependency	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  care,	  and	  
on	  the	  conditions	  particular	  individuals	  are	  in,	  instead	  of	  on	  abstract	  moral	  principles.	  Caring,	  as	  
Nel	  Noddings	  says,	  means	  that	  we	  are	  not	  merely	  focussed	  on	  another	  person,	  but	  are	  
‘engrossed’	  in	  that	  person:	  open	  and	  receptive	  to	  her	  needs,	  desires,	  thoughts	  etc	  (Noddings,	  
op.cit.	  33).	  Advocates	  of	  ethics	  of	  care	  theories	  therefore	  argue	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  attitudes	  
such	  as	  attentiveness,	  sensitivity,	  responsiveness	  to	  needs	  and	  empathy.	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discomfort	   or	   distress,	   responsiveness	   does	   not	   necessarily	   involve	   someone	  
being	   in	   a	   negative	   state.	   The	   important	   thing	   is	   that	   one	   attempts	   to	  
understand	  and	  perceive	  another	  person’s	  good,	  is	  moved	  by	  that	  good	  and	  acts	  
out	  of	  regard	  for	  that	  good.	  The	  other	  person	  does	  not	  need	  to	  have	  a	  pressing	  
need;	  we	  may	  simply	  be	  able	  to	  make	  her	  better	  off	  or	  happier	  than	  she	  already	  
is.	  This	  is	  frequently	  the	  case	  with	  the	  virtues	  of	  kindness,	  thoughtfulness,	  and	  
generosity.	   Although	   it	   may	   be	  more	   important	   to	   act	   kindly,	   thoughtfully	   or	  
generously	   when	   someone	   has	   a	   pressing	   need,	   and	   we	   are	   thus	   more	  
blameable	  when	  we	  fail	  to	  do	  so,	  there	  are	  also	  many	  situations	  in	  which	  we	  can	  
be	  kind,	  thoughtful	  or	  generous	  to	  someone	  who	  is	  not	  in	  a	  particularly	  negative	  
state.	  When	   I	   argue	   that	   exploitation	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity,	   I	  
therefore,	   as	   said	   before,	   do	   not	   want	   to	   make	   a	   strict	   distinction	   between	  
transactions	  that	  concern	  a	  need	  and	  transactions	  that	  concern	  a	  mere	  desire.	  	  
	  
4.5.4	  Perception,	  emotion	  and	  exploitation	  
The	   previous	   sections	   discussed	   the	   importance	   of	   perception,	   emotion,	   and	  
responsiveness	  for	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  Let	  us	  now	  return	  to	  my	  argument	  that	  the	  
wrong	   in	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness	  and	  a	  
failure	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity.	  What	   does	   the	   role	   of	   perception,	   emotion	  
and	  responsiveness	  in	  virtue	  imply	  for	  my	  argument?	  	  
	   First,	  it	  means	  that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  lies	  not	  only	  in	  their	  actions,	  
but	   also	   in	   their	   perception	   of	   other	   people:	   they	   fail	   to	   sufficiently	   perceive	  
people	  with	  whom	  they	  interact	  as	  human	  beings	  with	  their	  own	  interests	  and	  
needs	  that	  are	  worthy	  of	  consideration,	  seeing	  them	  mainly	  as	  abstract	  players	  
in	  the	  market	  field.	  They	  either	  do	  not	  truly	  perceive	  the	  exploitees’	  condition,	  
needs	  or	  interests,	  or	  they	  do	  perceive	  it	  rationally,	  but	  fail	  to	  let	  themselves	  be	  
moved	  by	  the	  other’s	  condition	  to	  actually	  give	  up	  some	  of	  their	  own	  interests.	  	  
	   Second	   and	   related,	   my	   argument	   that	   exploitation	   is	   a	   failure	   of	   the	  
virtue	  of	  generosity	  means	  that	  exploiters	  fail	  not	  just	  in	  what	  they	  do—refusing	  
to	  offer	  more	  to	  people	  with	  whom	  they	  transact—but	  also	  in	  the	  emotions	  and	  
attitude	   they	   thereby	   have	   and	   show	   towards	   people.	   When	   we	   engage	   in	   a	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transaction	   with	   someone	   and	   know	   that	   she	   is	   doing	   so	   with	   the	   aim	   of	  
acquiring	   some	  benefit—say,	  money—and	  we	  know	   that	   she	  would	  be	  happy	  
with,	   or	   perhaps	   even	   need	   this	   money,	   an	   appropriate	   emotional	   response	  
seems	  to	  be	  at	  least	  acknowledgement	  of	  and	  sympathy	  with	  her	  situation	  and	  
aims,	   if	   not	   compassion	   or	   pity,	   depending	   on	   the	   situation.	   Exploiters,	   in	  
contrast,	   do	   not	   show	   such	   an	   attitude,	   but	   instead,	   by	   trying	   to	   get	   as	  much	  
personal	   benefit	   irrespective	   of	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	   person	   they	   are	  
interacting	   with,	   show	   an	   attitude	   of	   indifference,	   at	   best.	   And	   that	   attitude	  
reflects	   that	   they	   attach	   little	   importance	   to	   the	   interests	   and	   wellbeing	   of	  
others.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  people	  who	  voluntarily	  offer	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  price	  
than	  they	  could	  get	  the	  other	  to	  agree	  on,	  seem	  to	  see	  the	  person	  they	  interact	  
with	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  not	  as	  abstract	  entities	  in	  the	  market	  field,	  only	  relevant	  
for	  one’s	  own	  benefit,	  but	  as	  particular	  individuals	  in	  particular	  circumstances,	  
with	  their	  own	  goals,	  needs	  and	  desires.	  By	  not	  trying	  to	  get	  as	  much	  personal	  
benefit	  out	  of	  a	  situation	  as	  they	  can,	  they	  show	  an	  attitude	  of	  consideration	  for	  
other	  people,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  reflects	  that	  they	  consider	  other	  people’s	  wellbeing	  
and	  interests	  as	  important.	  	  
Put	  together,	  this	  means	  that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  is	  partly	  a	  matter	  
of	   inadequate	   responsiveness	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   others.	   Think	   of	   the	   classic	  
examples	  of	  exploitation	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  1,	  such	  as	  sweatshop	  factories	  or	  
other	   employees	   who	   are	   paid	   exceptionally	   low	   wages	   for	   very	   hard	   work;	  
‘rescue	  cases’,	  in	  which	  someone	  is	  stranded	  and	  a	  passerby	  offers	  to	  help	  for	  an	  
extremely	  high	  price;	  or	  money	   lender	  who	  offer	   loans	   for	   exorbitant	   interest	  
rates	  to	  people	  in	  urgent	  need	  for	  money.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  in	  all	  such	  cases	  
the	   alleged	   exploiters	   are	   acting	   greedily.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	  
that	  part	  of	  what	   this	  means	   is	   that	   they	   fail	   to	  go	  beyond	   their	  own	   interests	  
and	  desires	  and	  to	  see	  the	  other	  person	  as	  someone	  whose	  interests	  are	  worthy	  
of	   consideration,	  and	   that	   they,	   consequently,	   fail	   to	  be	  emotionally	  moved	  by	  
the	  other’s	  condition	  or	  interests.258	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  it	  might	  of	  course	  be	  that	  some	  employer	  does	  perceive	  and	  is	  moved	  
by	  an	  employee’s	  condition,	  but	  is	  simply	  unable	  to	  offer	  any	  more	  without	  making	  a	  loss	  or	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4.6	  Possible	  objections	  	  
	  
So	   far	   I	   have	   explained	   my	   view	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   can	   best	   be	  
understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  In	  
the	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   further	   clarify	   and	   support	   my	   view	   by	  
defending	   it	   against	   some	   possible	   objections.	   These	   are	   the	   objections	   that	  
virtue	   approaches	   are	   self-­‐centred	   (section	   4.6.1);	   that	   unfortunate	  
circumstances	   are	   typically	   part	   of	   exploitation	   and	   should	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	  
explanation	  of	  its	  wrongness	  (section	  4.6.2);	  that	  my	  theory	  is	  rather	  similar	  to	  
the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  (4.6.3);	  that	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  Ruth	  Sample’s	  
version	   of	   the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation	   (4.6.4);	   that	   a	   virtue-­‐based	  
approach	   is	   ultimately	   not	   very	   different	   from	   a	   duty-­‐based	   approach	   (4.6.5);	  
and	  that	  being	  greedy,	  although	  not	  praiseworthy,	   is	  not	  a	  very	  serious	  wrong	  
(also	  in	  4.6.5).	  	  
	  
4.6.1	  Self-­‐centredness	  
It	  is	  sometimes	  objected	  to	  virtue	  approaches	  that	  they	  are	  self-­‐centred,	  or	  even	  
egoistic.259	  This	  is	  because	  virtue	  ethics	  focuses	  on	  the	  development	  of	  people’s	  
character,	  and	   the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  developing	  a	  virtuous	  character	  seems,	  
on	   many	   virtue	   theories,	   to	   be	   one’s	   own	   flourishing.	   There	   appears	   to	   be	  
something	   wrong,	   it	   is	   argued,	   with	   trying	   to	   be	   kind,	   just,	   honest,	   etcetera,	  
solely	  because	  this	  will	  benefit	  one’s	  own	  moral	  development.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  
truly	   relational	  aspect,	  which	   is	   considered	  crucial	   for	  morality,	   appears	   to	  be	  
missing	  in	  virtue	  approaches.	  
	   A	  similar	  objection	  might	  be	  raised	  against	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  
failure	  of	   the	   virtue	  of	   generosity.	   It	   is	  wrong,	   one	  might	   say,	   to	   explain	  what	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
becoming	  unable	  to	  make	  a	  living	  herself.	  Or	  it	  might	  be	  that	  a	  rescuer	  does	  empathize	  with	  
someone’s	  plight,	  but	  really	  does	  have	  very	  high	  costs	  in	  giving	  someone	  a	  lift.	  Generosity	  does	  
not	  require	  us	  to	  give	  away	  everything	  we	  own,	  and	  whether	  someone	  emphasizes	  with	  
another’s	  plight	  might	  not	  always	  be	  deducible	  from	  her	  actions.	  	  	  
259	  See	  e.g.	  T	  Nagel,	  The	  View	  From	  Nowhere	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986)	  195-­‐197.	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exploiters	  do	  wrong	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  harm	  they	  do	  to	  themselves,	  instead	  of	  to	  the	  
person	  they	  are	  exploiting.	  Surely,	  people	  who	  are	  being	  exploited	  will	  not	  care	  
very	  much	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  exploiter	  is	  not	  optimally	  developing	  her	  own	  
character.	  They	  care	  about	  being	  exploited,	  about	  being	  offered	  too	  high	  or	  low	  
a	  price	  for	  something	  they	  need	  or	  want	  to	  buy	  or	  sell.	  
	   The	   idea	   that	   virtues	   only	   concern	  people’s	   own	   character	   and	   are	  not	  
relational	   is	   mistaken,	   however.	   Firstly,	   we	  may	   note	   that	  many,	   if	   not	   all,260	  
virtues	   benefit	   other	   people	   around	   us.	   Think	   of	   virtues	   such	   as	   loyalty,	  
kindness,	   honesty,	   generosity	   and	   justice,	   which	   often	   require	   us	   to	   give	   up	  
some	  of	  our	  own	  interests	  for	  other	  people’s	  benefit.	  Secondly,	  these	  virtues	  do	  
not	   ‘accidentally’	   benefit	   others,	   as	   if	   this	   is	   a	   lucky	  by-­‐product	  of	  what	   really	  
matters—the	   benefit	   they	   bestow	   upon	   our	   own	   character.	   They	   are	   virtues	  
partly	  because	  they	  benefit	  others.	  	  
Think	  of	  what	  has	  been	  said	  above	  about	   the	   importance	  of	  motivation	  
and	  emotion	  for	  virtues.	  To	  act	  virtuously	  means	  not	  only	  performing	  the	  right	  
action,	   but	   performing	   it	   for	   the	   right	   reason	   and	  with	   the	   right	   emotion.	   For	  
instance,	  if	  we	  perform	  a	  generous	  act,	  but	  do	  so	  only	  because	  we	  think	  it	  will	  be	  
good	   for	   our	   reputation,	   we	   are	   not	   truly	   acting	   generously.	   To	   truly	   act	  
generously	   involves	   performing	   a	   generous	   act	   towards	   someone	   because	  we	  
are	  moved	  by	  her	  interests	  and	  have	  a	  desire	  to	  benefit	  her.	  If	  such	  a	  desire	  to	  
help	  another	  for	  her	  own	  sake	  is	  not	  at	  least	  part	  of	  our	  motivation	  to	  give	  her	  
something,	  our	  giving	  does	  not	  show	  generosity	  (or	  kindness,	  or	  compassion).	  
Hence,	   virtues	   like	   generosity	   are	   inherently	   other-­‐regarding,	   because	   they	  
necessarily	   involve	   a	   true	   concern	   for	   another’s	   good	   and	   a	   desire	   to	   benefit	  
another	  for	  her	  own	  sake,	  instead	  of	  for	  some	  selfish	  motive.261	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260	  As	  said	  before	  (see	  note	  146),	  all	  virtues,	  even	  ‘self-­‐regarding’	  virtues	  such	  as	  prudence,	  
industriousness,	  or	  patience	  benefit	  others,	  because	  people	  who	  are	  imprudent,	  lazy,	  or	  
impatient	  can	  be	  a	  great	  nuisance	  or	  burden	  to	  other	  people.	  	  
261	  What	  is	  more,	  even	  if	  we	  act	  from	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  virtuous,	  this	  may	  prevent	  us	  from	  actually	  
acting	  virtuously.	  This	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘self-­‐effacing’	  problem,	  which	  is	  that	  the	  
reasons	  ethical	  theories	  give	  for	  why	  a	  certain	  act	  is	  valuable	  or	  right	  (e.g.	  there	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  
perform	  that	  act,	  or	  it	  is	  virtuous	  to	  perform	  that	  act),	  are	  not	  always	  the	  reasons	  that	  should	  
motivate	  the	  act,	  lest	  they	  loose	  their	  moral	  value	  (see	  M	  Stocker,	  ‘The	  Schizophrenia	  of	  Modern	  
Ethical	  Theories’	  (1976)	  73	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  453-­‐466).	  If	  we	  want	  to	  act	  generously,	  we	  
should	  not	  act	  generously	  merely	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  or	  become	  a	  generous	  or	  good	  person,	  but	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   It	   is	   true	   that	   most	   virtue	   ethics	   theories	   contend	   that	   virtues	   benefit	  
people’s	   own	   flourishing.	   Yet,	   as	   said	   before,	   what	   is	   good	   for	   ourselves	   and	  
what	  is	  good	  for	  others	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  two	  separate	  things,	  pulling	  in	  opposite	  
directions.	  Instead,	  both	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  virtues:	  what	  is	  good	  for	  our	  own	  
moral	   flourishing	   is	  acting	  virtuously,	  and	  what	   it	   is	   to	  act	  virtuously	   is	  partly	  
defined	  by	  the	  needs	  and	  interests	  of	  others	  around	  us,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
virtues	  of	  benevolence	  such	  as	  kindness,	  compassion	  and	  generosity.262	  	  
The	   virtue	   of	   generosity	   involves	   being	   able	   to	   recognize	   situations	  
where	   we	   should	   be	   generous,	   by	   recognizing	   other	   people’s	   interests	   and	  
needs,	  and	  being	  moved	  to	  help	  other	  people	  for	  their	  own	  sake.	  The	  virtue	  of	  
generosity	   thereby	   limits	   the	  considerations	  we	  give	   to	  our	  own	   interests	  and	  
wishes,	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   those	   of	   others.263	   To	   say	   that	   exploiters	   fail	   in	   the	  
virtue	  of	  generosity	  is	  therefore	  not	  merely	  a	  criticism	  of	  their	  acts	  or	  character,	  
which	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  person	  who	  is	  being	  exploited.	  It	  is	  a	  criticism	  
of	  exploiters’	  acts	  or	  character,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  also	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  
not	   take	   the	  exploitee’s	   interest	  and	  needs	  as	  sufficiently	   important,	  or	  do	  not	  
respond	  to	  them	  in	  an	  appropriate	  way.	  	  
	   The	   fact	   that	   virtues,	   including	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity,	   are	   other-­‐
regarding,	  becomes	  even	  more	  apparent	  when	   thinking	  of	  what	  has	  been	  said	  
about	  the	  role	  of	  accurate	  perception	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  empathy	  with	  or	  
responsiveness	   to	   others.	   True	   perception	   requires	   that	   we	   pay	   careful	   and	  
honest	  attention	  to	  other	  people	  and	  to	  other	  people’s	  situation,	  and	  try	  to	  see	  a	  
situation	   from	   other	   people’s	   point	   of	   view.	   Responsiveness	   or	   empathy	  
requires	   that	  we	  are	  emotionally	  moved	  by	   their	  situation,	  and	  moved	  to	  help	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should	  a	  least	  partly	  be	  motivated	  by	  another’s	  situation	  and	  interests,	  and	  want	  to	  advance	  her	  
interests	  for	  her	  own	  sake.	  
262	  This	  other-­‐regarding	  element	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  individuals	  to	  flourish	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  
the	  fact	  that	  virtue	  approaches	  generally	  understand	  people	  and	  human	  flourishing	  in	  a	  societal	  
context.	  For	  Aquinas,	  for	  instance,	  each	  person	  is	  naturally	  part	  of	  one	  or	  more	  communities	  and	  
involved	  in	  many	  different	  types	  of	  relationships.	  These	  different	  communities	  (such	  as	  
societies,	  families	  and	  friendships)	  are	  thought	  to	  all	  benefit	  from	  the	  acquisition	  of	  virtue	  by	  its	  
members	  (Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica	  II-­‐II	  Q58	  A5;	  I-­‐II	  Q19	  A10;	  and	  I-­‐II	  Q90	  A2).	  Similarly,	  
Aristotle	  understands	  humans	  first	  and	  foremost	  as	  part	  of	  their	  relationships	  with	  others;	  as	  
political	  animals	  (Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  I.5,	  1097b8-­‐1097b12).	  When	  he	  describes	  
human	  flourishing,	  he	  does	  not	  think	  of	  isolated	  individuals	  flourishing	  in	  a	  solitary	  life,	  but	  of	  
what	  constitutes	  flourishing	  for	  humans	  as	  social,	  relational	  beings.	  
263	  See	  C	  Toner,	  ‘The	  Self-­‐Centredness	  Objection	  to	  Virtue	  Ethics’	  (2006)	  81	  Philosophy	  597.	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them.	  This	  all	  entails	  what	  Murdoch	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘unselfing’:264	  going	  beyond	  our	  
own	  interests,	  needs,	  desires,	  and	  prejudices	  and	  not	   letting	  them	  obscure	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  we	  appreciate	  another’s	  situation.	  	  
	  
4.6.2	  Unfortunate	  circumstances	  	  
A	  second	  possible	  objection	  could	  be	  that	  I	  argue	  that	  greediness	  is	  what	  makes	  
exploitation	  wrong,	  but	  we	  can	  be	  greedy	   in	  many	  situations,	  and	  exploitation	  
seems	   typically	   to	   involve	   being	   greedy	   when	   someone	   else	   is	   in	   a	  
disadvantaged	  position	  because	  of	  some	  sort	  of	  unfortunate	  circumstance.	  For	  
instance,	  when	  taxi	  drivers	  take	  advantage	  of	  a	  bus	  strike	  by	  tripling	  their	  fees,	  
or	  when	  people	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  so	  poor265	  that	  they	  have	  no	  better	  
choice	   than	   to	   consent	   to	  work	   in	   a	   sweatshop	   factory.	   It	  might	  be	  wondered	  
whether	   this	   ‘unfortunate	   circumstances	   factor’	   should	  not	  also	  be	  part	  of	   the	  
explanation	  of	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  because	   this	   seems	   intuitively	  
the	   case,	   and	   this	   factor	   seems	   to	   be	   generally	   present	   in	   exploitative	  
transactions.	   I	   agree	   that	   unfortunate	   circumstances	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	  
explanation	   of	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   in	   that,	   as	   argued	   before,	   generosity	  
becomes	  more	  relevant	  the	  more	  someone	  needs	  or	  could	  use	  the	  extra	  benefit,	  
which	  is	  the	  case	  in	  many	  exploitative	  situations.	  Yet	  I	  still	  think	  that	  if	  someone	  
finds	  herself	  in	  some	  unfortunate	  circumstance,	  but	  is	  incredibly	  rich,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  
greedy	   or	   exploitative	   for	   a	   very	   poor	   person	   (whose	   poorness	  might	   also	   be	  
described	  as	  a	  form	  of	  unfortunate	  circumstances)	  to	  try	  to	  get	  a	  good	  price	  for	  
helping	  the	  rich	  person,	  as	  it	  would	  be	  the	  other	  way	  around,	  given	  that	  the	  rich	  
person	  does	  not	  need	  the	  extra	  money	  as	  much	  as	  the	  poor	  person	  does.	  Thus,	  it	  
is	   not	   the	   unfortunate	   circumstances	   per	   se	   that	  make	   trying	   to	   get	   as	  much	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	  Murdoch,	  op.cit.	  84.	  
265	  It	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  poverty	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  mere	  unfortunate	  circumstances,	  but	  of	  
injustice.	  Yet	  as	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2,	  although	  poverty	  is	  often	  a	  matter	  of	  injustice,	  and	  although	  
the	  concept	  of	  injustice	  may	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  wrongs	  in	  the	  working	  of	  entire	  societies	  or	  
systems,	  it	  cannot	  explain	  what	  exploiters	  in	  particular	  transactions	  do	  wrong.	  Second,	  although	  
the	  existence	  of	  poverty	  among	  certain	  groups	  of	  people	  may	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  injustice,	  the	  fact	  
that	  a	  particular	  person	  is	  born	  into	  these	  circumstances	  while	  others	  are	  not,	  can	  arguably	  be	  
described	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ‘bad	  luck’	  or	  unfortunate	  circumstances.	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advantage	   as	   possible	   vicious,	   but	   the	   need	   that	   unfortunate	   circumstances	  
often,	  but	  not	  always,	  create.	  	  
Second,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   reason	   that	   unfortunate	   circumstances	   are	  
generally	   part	   of	   exploitation	   is	   not	   because	   they	   are	  what	  make	   exploitation	  
wrong,	  but	  because	  they	  are	  what	  make	  it	  possible.	  Only	  when	  someone	  is	  in	  a	  
truly	  bad	  bargaining	  position	  because	  of	  some	  type	  of	  ‘bad	  luck’	  or	  unfortunate	  
circumstances	  (widespread	  unemployment,	  being	  stranded,	  needing	  a	  loan,	  etc),	  
is	   it	   possible	   to	   succeed	   in	   trying	   to	   get	   as	   much	   out	   of	   price	   or	   wage	  
negotiations	  as	  one	  wants.	  If	  someone	  has	  an	  equally	  strong	  bargaining	  position	  
as	  we	  do,	  we	  may	  offer	  her	  a	  greedily	  low	  or	  high	  price,	  but	  she	  will	  simply	  not	  
accept	   it.	   Similarly,	   it	   is	   only	   when,	   due	   to	   some	   form	   of	   unfortunate	  
circumstances,	   someone	  has	   actual	  need	   for	   a	   good,	   that	   the	   issue	  of	   asking	  a	  
high	   price	   becomes	   problematic.	   This	   is	   because	   when	   someone	   does	   not	  
actually	  need	  a	  good,	   she	  will	   simply	  not	  buy	  something	   if	   she	   thinks	   it	   is	  not	  
worth	  the	  price.	  	  
	  
4.6.3	  Relation	  to	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
A	   third	  possible	  objection	  could	  be	  directed	  at	  my	  statement	   that	  exploitation	  
involves	   greedily	   trying	   to	   get	   a	   lot	   of	   personal	   benefit	   out	   of	   a	   transaction,	  
leaving	   very	   little	   for	   the	   person	   with	   whom	   one	   is	   transacting.	   It	   may	   be	  
objected	   that	   this	   sounds	   a	   lot	   like	   unfairness,	   while	   I	   rejected	   the	   fairness	  
understanding	  of	  exploitation	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
I	   agree	   that	   my	   description	   of	   greediness	   in	   exploitative	   transactions	  
resembles	   unfairness.	   Yet	   my	   argument	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   was	   that	  
‘unfairness’	  may	  describe	  quite	  well	  which	  transactions	  we	  see	  as	  exploitative,	  
but	  does	  not	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  them,	  and	  that	  the	  fairness	  argument	  
for	   the	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   parasitic	   upon	   other	   theories	   of	   exploitation.	  
Hence,	  had	  I	  proposed	  a	  completely	  different	  theory	  of	  exploitation;	  for	  example	  
one	   that	   said	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   coercion	   because	   exploiters	  
extract	   a	   lot	   of	   personal	   benefit	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   bad	   bargaining	  
position	  of	  people	  who	  have	  no	  better	   choice	   than	   to	   consent;	   even	   then,	   one	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could	   still	   say	   ‘doesn’t	   that	   sound	   a	   lot	   like	   unfairness?’.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	  
explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   term	   (un)fairness	   has	   a	   very	   broad	  
meaning,	   so	   that	   it	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   many	   different	   forms	   of	   seemingly	  
wrongful	   behaviour.	   Yet,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   saying	   that	   a	  
voluntary	  transaction	  is	  unfair	  means	  saying	  that	  someone	  should	  morally	  pay	  
more	  or	  ask	  less,	  and	  thus	  requires	  that	  we	  explain	  why	  one	  morally	  ought	  to	  do	  
so.	   My	   explanation	   is	   that	   not	   doing	   so	   is	   greedy	   and	   a	   failure	   of	   virtue.	   If	  
someone	   still	  wants	   to	  describe	   this	   in	   terms	  of	   paying	   a	   fair	   price,	   I	   have	  no	  
problem	  with	   that,	  as	   long	  as	  we	  keep	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   fairness	   label	  by	   itself	  
does	  not	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  right	  or	  wrong,	  or	  good	  or	  bad.	  
For	  this	  reason	  I	  think	  that	  my	  account	  of	  exploitation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  
incompatible	  with	  the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	  
none	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  a	  fairness	  understanding	  of	  exploitation	  does	  so,	  but	  
the	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   talking	   about	  
virtue,	  if	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue	  is	  given	  as	  the	  reason	  for	  why	  it	  is	  wrong	  not	  to	  pay	  a	  
certain	  price—which	  is	  subsequently	  called	  the	  ‘fair’	  price.	  Hence,	  if	  one	  wants	  
to	  keep	   to	   the	  unfairness	  account	  of	   exploitation,	  one	   could	  perhaps	   interpret	  
my	  thesis	  as	  giving	  an	  answer	  to	  what	  is	  wrong	  about	  offering	  or	  asking	  unfair	  
prices;	  the	  answer	  being	  that	  this	  is	  greedy,	  instead	  of	  the	  answer	  being	  that	  we	  
somehow	   have	   a	   duty	   to	   pay	   a	   fair	   price.266	   I	   still	   think	   that	   this	   step	   is	   not	  
necessary;	  that	  saying	  that	  exploiting	  is	  wrong	  because	  greedy	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  
virtue	  is	  just	  as	  valid	  as	  saying	  that	  exploiting	  is	  wrong	  because	  unfair,	  and	  that	  
being	  unfair	   is	  wrong	  because	   it	   is	   greedy	  and	  a	   failure	  of	   virtue.	  Or,	   in	  other	  
words,	  I	  still	  think	  the	  ‘fairness’	  label	  itself	  does	  not	  do	  any	  moral	  work,	  and	  that	  
it	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   failure	   of	   virtue	   that	   can	   best	   explain	   the	   moral	   wrong	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266	  While	  I	  think	  that	  this	  argument	  might	  perhaps	  be	  made,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  obvious	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  spelled	  out	  in	  section	  3.1,	  fairness	  is	  
commonly	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  share	  one	  is	  due,	  or	  which	  claims	  different	  parties	  have	  
to	  a	  good.	  When	  we	  understand	  exploitation	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  however,	  the	  moral	  
wrong	  is	  not	  that	  the	  exploited	  party	  has	  a	  claim	  or	  right	  to	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  benefit	  than	  she	  
receives,	  or	  does	  not	  get	  what	  she	  is	  ‘due’,	  but	  that	  the	  exploiter	  fails	  to	  voluntarily	  refrain	  from	  
extracting	  a	  lot	  of	  personal	  benefit	  from	  a	  transaction,	  even	  though	  the	  exploitee	  has	  no	  right	  to	  
it.	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exploitation.	   Yet	   I	   also	   think	   that	   this	   means	   that	   my	   approach	   is	   not	  
incompatible	  with	  an	  unfairness	  account	  of	  exploitation.	  	  
There	   might	   be	   another	   connection	   between	   exploitation	   seen	   as	  
greediness	   and	  my	  discussion	   of	   the	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation	   in	   the	  
previous	   chapter.	   In	   that	   chapter,	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   different	   views	   of	   when	  
consensual	   transactions	   are	   fair	   all	   fail	   for	   different	   reasons.	   One	   of	   those	  
reasons	   is	   that	   the	  different	  views	   cannot	  account	   for	   all	   transactions	  we	   find	  
fair	   or	  unfair,	   and	   that	   they	   can	   all	   lead	   to	   counterintuitive	   conclusions	   about	  
which	   transactions	   are	   fair	   and	   unfair.	   For	   example,	   if	   we	   define	   fair	  
transactions	  by	  using	  the	  common	  or	  hypothetical	  market	  price,	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  
counterintuitive	   conclusion	   that	   sweatshop	  work	   is	   not	   unfair	   or	   exploitative.	  
And	  if	  we	  define	  fair	  transactions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  production	  costs,	  this	  leads	  to	  
the	  counterintuitive	  conclusion	  that	  products	  become	  more	  valuable	  if	  they	  are	  
produced	   inefficiently.	  Nevertheless,	   in	   some	  cases,	   looking	  at	   the	  competitive	  
market	   price	   or	   the	   production	   costs	   does	   seem	   an	   accurate	   method	   of	  
determining	  when	  we	  consider	  a	  price	  fair.	  
	   It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  the	  discussed	  methods	  of	  determining	  
fair	  prices	  works	  in	  all	  situations,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  how	  much	  one	  has	  
to	  ask	  from	  or	  offer	  to	  another	  for	  a	  commercial	  transaction	  to	  count	  as	  greedy,	  
depends	  on	   several	   factors,	  most	   importantly	  both	  parties’	   relative	  needs	   and	  
wealth	  (see	  section	  4.4.2).	  Therefore,	  what	  one	  has	  to	  ask	  or	  offer	  in	  order	  not	  to	  
be	   considered	   greedy	   cannot	   be	   explained	  with	   a	   single	   principle	   such	   as	   the	  
common	   market	   price	   or	   production	   costs.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   as	   was	   also	  
explained	  in	  section	  4.4.2,	  we	  often	  do	  not	  know	  exactly	  how	  to	  determine	  what	  
is	  a	  reasonable	  and	  non-­‐greedy	  price	  to	  pay,	  especially	  in	  a	  transaction	  between	  
two	  equally	  well-­‐off	  people,	  and	  the	  common	  market	  price	  or	  production	  costs	  
may	  be	  useful	  methods	  for	  providing	  a	  practical	  answer	  in	  such	  cases.	  	  
	  
4.6.4	  Relation	  to	  Ruth	  Sample’s	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation	  
A	  fourth	  possible	  objection	  is	  that	  while,	  in	  chapter	  2,	  I	  criticized	  Ruth	  Sample’s	  
theory	  of	  exploitation,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  an	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  beneficence,	  the	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virtue	  of	  generosity	   that	   I	  describe	  seems	  very	  similar	   to	  an	   imperfect	  duty	  of	  
beneficence.	  To	   recall,	   the	   imperfect	  duty	  of	   beneficence	  described	  by	   Sample	  
means	   that	   we	   have	   an	   overall	   duty	   to	   help	   others	   in	   need,	   but	   can	   choose	  
ourselves	   when	   and	   how	   to	   implement	   this	   duty.	   Yet,	   Sample	   argues,	   if	   we	  
engage	   in	   a	   transaction	   with	   someone	   in	   need,	   this	   provides	   such	   a	   good	  
opportunity	   to	   help	   others,	   that	   not	   doing	   so	   is	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   duty	   of	  
beneficence.	   In	   this	  chapter,	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  virtues	  are	  context-­‐dependent,	  
and	  that	  although	  generosity	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  we	  always	  give	  to	  others,	  good	  
occasions	   to	   be	   generous	   are	   transactions	   in	   which	   we	   know	   that	   the	   other	  
needs	   some	   extra	   benefit,	   and	  we	   can	   easily	   give	   it	   and	   still	   keep	   enough	   for	  
ourselves.	  This,	  it	  might	  be	  objected,	  sounds	  rather	  similar	  to	  the	  imperfect	  duty	  
of	  beneficence,	  while	  I	  rejected	  Sample’s	  account	  of	  exploitation	  based	  on	  such	  a	  
duty.	  	  
I	  agree	  that	  Sample’s	  view	  and	  my	  view	  of	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  are	  
to	   a	   certain	   extent	   similar,	   but	   there	   are	   also	   important	   differences.	   To	   start	  
with	  the	  similarity,	  as	  described	  in	  section	  2	  of	  this	  chapter,	  virtues	  can	  play	  a	  
role	  in	  deontological	  theories,	  and	  do	  so	  in	  Kant’s	  virtue	  theory,	  in	  which	  virtues	  
are	  dispositions	  to	  act	  from	  imperfect	  duties.	  Sample’s	  theory	  is	  based	  on	  Kant’s	  
notion	  of	  imperfect	  duties,	  and	  as	  this	  notion	  is	  part	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  virtue,	  there	  
are	  certainly	  similarities	  between	  Sample’s	  view	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  
an	  imperfect	  duty	  to	  benefit	  others,	  and	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  
the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  Nevertheless,	   there	  are	  significant	  differences	  as	  well,	  
which	   are	   reflected	   in	   a	   number	   of	   the	   problems	  with	   Sample’s	   theory	   that	   I	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  
	   First,	   on	   Sample’s	   theory,	   we	   can	   only	   exploit	   people	   who	   lack	   some	  
basic	  need,	  whereas	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  exploit	  people	  who	  
do	  not	  need	  our	  help	  to	  meet	  their	  basic	  needs.	  Second,	  Sample	  uses	  the	  notion	  
of	  an	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  ‘perfect’	  moral	  duty:	  a	  duty	  to	  
always	   help	   people	   in	   need	  with	  whom	  we	   transact	   to	  meet	   their	   needs.	   And	  
this	  is	  problematic	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  chapter	  2.	  One	  is	  
that	  even	  if	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  to	  meet	  their	  needs,	  this	  does	  
not	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  that	   in	  the	  process	  of	  helping	  someone	  to	  meet	  her	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needs,	  we	  may	  also,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  exploit	  her,	  if	  the	  exploitative	  transaction	  
itself	  helps	  to	  meet	  someone’s	  needs.	  For	  instance,	  a	  person	  who,	  after	  a	  natural	  
disaster,	  sells	   food	  and	  generators	   for	   ten	  times	  the	  normal	  price,	   is	  providing	  
people	  with	  their	  basic	  needs,	  but	  may	  still	  be	  considered	  an	  exploiter.	  Another	  
problem	   with	   Sample’s	   argument	   pointed	   out	   in	   chapter	   2	   is	   that	   it	   seems	  
possible	  to	  engage	  in	  non-­‐exploitative	  transactions	  without	  helping	  someone	  to	  
meet	  her	  needs.	  I	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  a	  poor	  child	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  who	  
sells	  drinks	  for	  $1,	  and	  a	  tourist	  who	  feels	  sorry	  for	  the	  child	  and	  gives	  $100	  for	  
one	  drink,	  to	  help	  the	  child	  somewhat,	  although	  the	  $100	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  meet	  
the	  child’s	  basic	  needs.	  This	  particular	  transaction,	  I	  argued,	  would	  not	  be	  called	  
exploitative,	   even	   if	   we	   think	   that	   the	   tourist	   has	   a	   moral	   duty	   to	   meet	   the	  
child’s	   basic	   needs,	   and	   has	   not	   met	   the	   requirements	   of	   this	   duty	   by	   giving	  
$100.	   Hence,	   I	   argued,	   the	   problem	   with	   Sample’s	   argument,	   and	   with	   all	  
versions	  of	  the	  needs	  account	  of	  exploitation,	  is	  that	  moral	  duties	  to	  help	  others	  
to	   meet	   their	   needs	   are	   ultimately	   dependent	   on	   factors	   such	   as	   what	   is	  
required	  to	  meet	  people’s	  needs	  or	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  can	  help	  someone	  in	  
need;	   factors	   which	   are	   not	   necessarily	   related	   to	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	  
specific	   transactions	   in	   which	   people	   engage.	   Consequently,	   what	   such	  moral	  
duties	  require	  us	  to	  do	  is	  not	  necessarily	  related	  to	  whether	  we	  find	  a	  particular	  
transaction	   exploitative,	   and	  we	  may	   violate	   a	  moral	   duty	   to	  meet	   someone’s	  
needs	  but	  not	  exploit	  her;	  or	  obey	  a	  moral	  duty	   to	  meet	  someone’s	  needs	  and	  
still	  exploit	  her.	  Sample’s	  theory	  of	  exploitation	  is	  different	  from	  mine,	  then,	  in	  
that	  on	  my	  view,	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  a	  moral	  duty	  to	  
help	   someone	   to	   meet	   her	   needs,	   but	   a	   matter	   of	   greediness;	   although,	   as	  
argued,	   what	   it	   means	   to	   act	   greedily,	   is	   partly	   influenced	   by	   the	   needs	   of	  
people.	  	  
Another,	   related,	   possible	   objection	   might	   be	   made.	   One	   could	   accept	  
that	   I	   am	   right	   that	   there	   are	   differences	   between	  my	   account	   of	   exploitation	  
and	  Sample’s	  theory,	  which	  argues	  for	  a	  perfect	  duty	  to	  help	  people	  in	  need	  with	  
whom	  we	  transact	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  Kantian	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  beneficence.	  Yet,	  
one	  could	  argue,	  we	  might	  also	  see	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  
Kantian	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  beneficence,	  without	  trying	  to	  use	  this	  imperfect	  duty	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to	  justify	  a	  perfect	  duty	  not	  to	  exploit,	  and	  without	  only	  applying	  it	  to	  people	  in	  
serious	  need.	  On	  such	  an	  argument,	  what	  exploiters	  do	  morally	  wrong	  would	  be	  
not	   using	   a	   good	   opportunity	   to	   benefit	   someone	   who	   clearly	   could	   use	   the	  
benefit,	   thereby	   failing	   in	   the	   imperfect	   duty	   of	   beneficence.	   As	   described	   in	  
section	   2	   of	   this	   chapter,	   imperfect	   duties	   require	   that	   we	   ask	   ourselves	  
questions	   such	   as	   ‘What	   must	   I	   do	   if	   I	   am	   not	   to	   be	   indifferent	   to	   others’	  
happiness?’	  or	  ‘In	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  I	  find	  myself,	  what	  could	  I	  do	  if	  I	  am	  to	  
be	  kind,	  or	  generous?’.	  And	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  exactly	  where	  exploiters	  
fail,	  morally	  speaking.	  	  
	   	  I	  do	  not	  disagree	  with	  this	  point,	  but	  I	  do	  not	  see	  it	  as	  an	  objection	  to	  my	  
argument.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  ‘objection’	  that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  can	  also	  
be	  seen	  as	  the	  disregarding	  of	  an	  imperfect	  duty—of	  a	   ‘duty	  of	  virtue’	  in	  other	  
words—basically	   says	   that	   what	   exploiters	   do	   wrong	   can	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  
failure	  of	  virtue,	  on	  a	  Kantian	  conception	  of	  virtues.	   I	  explained	  in	  section	  2	  of	  
this	  chapter	  that	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  and	  the	  vice	  of	  greediness	  can	  play	  a	  
role	   not	   just	   in	   virtue	   ethics,	   but	   also	   in	   consequentialist	   and	   deontological	  
theories.	  If	  someone	  were	  to	  object	  to	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  that	  it	  could	  also	  
be	  rephrased	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  Kantian	  conception	  of	  virtue,	  I	  think	  this	  might	  be	  a	  
possible	   strengthening	   of,	   instead	   of	   an	   objection	   to,	   my	   argument	   that	   the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue.	  
	  
4.6.5	  What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  duty-­‐based	  and	  virtue-­‐based	  explanations?	  
Another	  possible	  doubt	  about	  my	  argument	  is	  somewhat	  related	  to	  the	  previous	  
objection:	   one	   might	   wonder	   what	   the	   difference	   is	   between	   saying	   that	  
exploitation	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  a	  certain	  moral	  duty,	  and	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  
virtue.	   In	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   I	   have	   rejected	   a	   number	   of	   duty-­‐based	  
accounts	  of	  exploitation,	  that	  said,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  
injustice,	  or	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  duty	  of	  beneficence.	  I	  argued	  that	  all	  these	  accounts	  
of	   exploitation	   are	   problematic,	   and	   argued	   instead	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	  
exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  and	  a	   failure	  of	  
the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  I	  also	  explained	  that	  virtues	  such	  as	  generosity	  involve	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wanting	  to	  benefit	  others	  for	  their	  own	  sake	  instead	  of	  for	  some	  selfish	  motive,	  
and	   therefore	   to	   regard	   others	   as	   important	   for	   their	   own	   sake.	   It	   might	   be	  
objected	   that	   because	   of	   this,	   the	   virtue	   approach	   that	   I	   describe	   ultimately	  
sounds	  not	  very	  different	  from	  a	  Kantian	  argument	  for	  ‘treating	  people	  as	  ends	  
in	  themselves’.	  Moreover,	  when	  I	  say	  that	  exploitation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  
it	   seems	   that	   I	   am	   describing	   this	   as	   a	   wrong—that	   I	   am	   saying	   that	   people	  
should	  not	   act	   greedily.	   It	  may	   thus	  be	  wondered	  how	   the	  demand	  not	   to	   act	  
greedily	   is	   different	   from	   a	   duty-­‐based	   argument	   about	   the	   wrong	   in	  
exploitation.	   	  
Virtue-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  moral	  questions	  differ	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  
from	   approaches	   that	   answer	   moral	   questions	   in	   terms	   of	   rights	   and	   duties.	  
First,	   as	   explained	   in	   section	  4.5,	   our	  perception	  of	  people	   and	   situations,	   our	  
emotions,	  and	  our	  motives,	  are	  important	  elements	  of	  virtues	  and	  vices.	  In	  order	  
to	   evaluate	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   someone	   acts	   virtuously	   or	   viciously,	   we	   not	  
only	   have	   to	   look	   at	  what	   someone	   does,	   but	   also	  why	   she	   does	   so,	   and	  with	  
which	   emotions.	   In	   contrast,	   duty-­‐based	   answers	   to	   moral	   questions	   (and	  
consequentialist	   approaches,	   for	   that	   matter),	   are	   primarily	   concerned	   with	  
action,	   with	   how	   someone	   acts,	   and	   less	   with	   the	   motives,	   emotions,	   and	  
perceptions	   that	   accompany	   the	   act.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   deontological	   or	  
consequentialist	   theories	   never	   leave	   room	   for	  or	   recognize	   the	   importance	  of	  
emotions	   and	   motives.267	   For	   one	   thing,	   as	   shown	   in	   section	   4.2,	   there	   are	  
deontological	   and	   consequentialist	   theories	   that	   do	   incorporate	   virtues,	   and	  
thus	   also	   the	   emotions,	  motives,	   and	   perceptions	   that	   are	   part	   of	   virtues.	  My	  
point	   is	   that	   insofar	   as	   arguments	   about	   moral	   questions	   are	   based	   on	  
arguments	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  moral	  duties	  or	  consequentialist	  rules,	  
they	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  impermissibility,	  permissibility,	  or	  obligatory	  nature	  
of	   certain	   acts,	   and	   not	   on	   the	   accompanying	   emotions,	   motivations	   and	  
perceptions.	   A	   virtue-­‐based	   explanation	   of	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	  
therefore	   different	   from	   a	   duty-­‐based	   explanation,	   in	   that	   it	   highlights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267	  See	  for	  objections	  to	  this	  idea	  M	  Baron,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics	  in	  Relation	  to	  Kantian	  Ethics:	  An	  
Opinionated	  Overview	  and	  Commentary’	  in	  L	  Jost	  and	  J	  Wuerth	  (eds),	  Perfecting	  Virtue:	  New	  
Essays	  on	  Kantian	  Ethics	  and	  Virtue	  Ethics	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  and	  Nussbaum,	  
‘Virtue	  Ethics:	  A	  Misleading	  Category?’,	  op.cit.	  163-­‐201.	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exploiters’	   selfish	   motivations,	   emotional	   responses	   and	   attitudes	   towards	  
exploitees,	   and	   sees	   these	   as	   part	   of	   what	   is	   morally	   problematic	   about	  
exploitation.	  	  
A	  second	  difference	  between	  virtue-­‐based	  and	  duty-­‐based	  approaches	  to	  
moral	   questions	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   why	   I	   believe	   a	   virtue-­‐based	  
argument	  is	  more	  successful	  in	  explaining	  the	  wrong	  in	  consensual	  exploitation	  
than	  duty-­‐based	  arguments.	  This	  difference	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  explained	  in	  
section	  4.4,	  virtues	  and	  vices	  are	  context-­‐dependent:	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  acting	  
generously	  or	  greedily,	  depends	  on	  the	  specific	  features	  of	  a	  particular	  situation,	  
and	  is	  thus	  not	  the	  same	  in	  all	  circumstances.	  Moral	  duties,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
are	   generally	   based	   on	   abstract	   and	   universal	   principles,	   such	   as	   equality,	  
autonomy,	   needs,	   or	   rationality,	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   are	   typically	   less	  
sensitive	  to	  the	  particularities	  of	  situations,	  and	  prescribe	  the	  same	  actions	  in	  all	  
circumstances.	  For	  example,	  the	  moral	  duties	  not	  to	  kill,	  steal	  or	  lie	  are	  deemed	  
and	  meant	  to	  apply	  generally,	  to	  all	  people	  and	  at	  all	  times,	  although	  they	  might	  
be	  outweighed	  by	  other	  moral	  duties,	  such	  as	  when	  lying	  or	  stealing	  something	  
is	   required	   to	   save	   lives.	   The	   fact	   that	   duty-­‐based	   approaches	   rely	   on	   general	  
principles	  is	  the	  reason	  they	  work	  well	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  justify	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
universal	  moral	  rule,	  such	  as	  ‘you	  shall	  not	  kill’	  or	  ‘you	  shall	  not	  steal’.	  Yet	  it	  is	  
also	   a	   reason,	   I	   believe,	   why	   duty-­‐based	   arguments	   have	   difficulties	   in	  
explaining	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  
2,	  when	  one	  tries	  to	  explain	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  with	  a	  moral	  duty	  based	  
on	   a	   general	   moral	   principle,	   such	   as	   a	   duty	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need,	   or	   to	  
compensate	  injustice,	  one	  encounters	  the	  problem	  that,	  put	  simply,	  such	  duties	  
will	  be	  held	  by	  many	  people	  towards	  many	  people,	  and	  not	  just	  apply	  to	  people	  
who	   engage	   in	   an	   exploitative	   transaction	   with	   each	   other.	   Moreover,	   as	  
explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  succeed	  in	  justifying	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  others	  
that	  only	  applies	   to	  people	  who	  engage	   in	  a	   transaction,	   this	  duty	  will	   still	   be	  
‘general’	  in	  another	  sense:	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  how	  much	  this	  duty	  asks	  us	  to	  give	  
to	  the	  other	  person,	   is	  dependent	  on	  the	  other’s	  needs	  or	  unjust	  situation,	  and	  
not	  on	  the	  particularities	  of	  the	  transaction,	  such	  as	  the	  value	  of	  the	  good	  sold	  or	  
the	  price	  offered.	  And	  therefore	  it	  is	  also	  not	  related	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  find	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the	  particular	  transaction	  exploitative.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  attempt	  to	  explain	  
the	  wrong	  in	  exploitative	  transactions	  with	  moral	  duties	  will	  lead	  either	  to	  the	  
conclusion	  that	  exploiters	  do	  nothing	  wrong;	  that	  they	  do	  nothing	  more	  wrong	  
than	   everybody	   else;	   or	   that	   what	   they	   do	   wrong	   (violating	   the	   duty)	   is	   not	  
related	   to	  whether	  we	   find	   the	   transaction	  exploitative.	  This	   is	  why	   I	   contend	  
that	   while	   duty-­‐based	   approaches	   to	   answering	   moral	   problems	   often	   have	  
great	  value,	  they	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  the	  widespread	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  
something	   morally	   problematic	   about	   exploiters’	   behaviour	   in	   consensual	  
exploitative	  transactions,	  while	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  argument	  can.	  And	  this	  is	  partly	  
because	  virtue-­‐based	  arguments	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  the	  moral	  importance	  of	  
people’s	  motivations	  and	  emotions	  towards	  others	  and	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	  
others,	  and	  partly	  because	  virtue-­‐based	  approaches	  focus	  not	  on	  general	  moral	  
principles,	  but	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  act	  good,	  or	  bad,	  in	  specific	  
situations.	  	  
	   A	   third	   and	   related	   difference	   between	   duty-­‐based	   (and	  
consequentialist)	  approaches	  to	  moral	  issues	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  virtue-­‐based	  
approaches	  on	  the	  other,	  is	  that	  virtue	  approaches	  leave	  more	  room	  for	  degrees	  
of	   goodness	   and	   badness.	   Both	   duty-­‐based	   and	   consequentialist	   arguments	  
typically	   lead	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	  a	   certain	  act	   is	   either	   right	   (obligatory	  or	  
permissible)	   or	   wrong	   (and	   thus	   impermissible);	   depending	   on	   what	   follows	  
from	  applying	  a	  moral	  rule,	  or	  several	  moral	  rules,	  to	  the	  specific	  act.268	  Virtue	  
approaches,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  do	  not	  think	  in	  terms	  of	  such	  ‘deontic’269	  distinct	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  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  deontological	  or	  consequentialist	  theories	  or	  theorists	  never	  
recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  classes	  of	  moral	  action	  than	  permissible,	  impermissible,	  and	  
obligatory.	  As	  said,	  a	  number	  of	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  theories	  recognize	  the	  
importance	  of	  virtues,	  and	  thus	  of	  degrees	  of	  goodness	  or	  badness	  that	  cannot	  be	  fitted	  neatly	  
into	  the	  three	  classes	  of	  moral	  action.	  Moreover,	  some	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  
‘supererogatory’	  acts:	  acts	  that	  are	  morally	  better	  than	  what	  is	  required	  by	  duty,	  but	  not	  morally	  
required,	  and	  whose	  omission	  is	  not	  morally	  condemnable.	  For	  example,	  donating	  all	  of	  our	  
income	  to	  charity,	  or	  sacrificing	  our	  life	  to	  save	  a	  stranger.	  The	  idea	  of	  supererogatory	  acts	  is	  a	  
combination	  of	  the	  aretaic	  and	  deontic	  mode	  of	  moral	  evaluation,	  because	  supererogatory	  acts	  
are	  better	  than	  what	  is	  minimally	  permissible.	  M	  Ferry,	  Beyond	  Obligation:	  Reasons,	  Demands,	  
and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Supererogation	  (Proquest,	  2008)	  2-­‐3.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  AM	  Flescher,	  Heroes,	  Saints	  
&	  Ordinary	  Morality	  (Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  D	  Heyd,	  Supererogation:	  Its	  Status	  in	  
Ethical	  Theory	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1982);	  JO	  Urmson,	  ‘Saints	  and	  Heroes’	  in	  AI	  Melden	  
(ed),	  Essays	  in	  Moral	  Philosophy	  (University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1958)	  198-­‐216;	  S	  Wolf,	  ‘Moral	  
Saints’	  (1982)	  79(8)	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  419-­‐439.	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categories	   of	   right	   and	   wrong,	   but	   evaluate	   moral	   choices	   and	   questions	   in	  
‘aretaic’270	   terms,	   such	   as	   good,	   excellent,	   admirable,	   virtuous,	   or	   bad,	  
reprehensible,	  and	  vicious.	  This	  means	  that	  on	  virtue-­‐based	  approaches,	  there	  is	  
no	   clear	   cut-­‐off	   point	   between	   which	   behaviour	   is	   morally	   right	   and	   which	  
morally	   wrong,	   or	   between	   which	   behaviour	   should	   be	   allowed	   and	   which	  
prohibited.	   Instead,	   the	  goodness	  or	  badness	  of	   certain	  behaviour	   is	   seen	  as	  a	  
matter	   of	   degree.	   Virtue-­‐based	   evaluations	   of	   moral	   choices	   are	   also	   open-­‐
ended,	   because	   one	   can	   always	   act	   or	   be,	   for	   instance,	   more	   admirable,	  
courageous,	   kind,	   or	   industrious;	   or	  more	   reprehensible,	   cowardly,	   unkind,	   or	  
lazy.	   For	   example,	   kindness	   is	   not	   something	   that	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   two	  
separate	   categories,	  with	  no	  difference	  within	   the	   categories.	  That	   is:	   it	   is	  not	  
the	  case	  that	  either	  one	  meets	  certain	  specified	  criteria	  and	  therefore	  is	  kind,	  or	  
one	   fails	   to	   meet	   the	   specified	   criteria	   and	   is	   unkind,	   and	   within	   the	   two	  
categories,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  people	  who	  only	  just	  fail	  or	  meet	  the	  
criteria,	  and	  people	  who	  very	  much	  fail	  or	  meet	  the	  criteria.	  Instead,	  we	  think	  of	  
kindness	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   degree,	   and	   judge	   people	   to	   be	  more	   or	   less	   kind,	   or	  
more	  or	  less	  unkind.	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  all	  or	  most	  virtues	  and	  vices,	  including	  
the	   virtue	  of	   generosity	   and	   the	   vice	   of	   greediness.	  We	   can	   judge	   someone	   as	  
very	   greedy,	   a	   little	   greedy,	   very	   generous,	   or	   a	   little	   generous,	   or	   neither	  
generous	   nor	   greedy,	   or	   anything	   in	   between.	   There	   is	   no	   clear	   cut-­‐off	   point	  
between	  which	  level	  or	  type	  of	  greediness	  and	  generosity	  are	  wrong,	  and	  which	  
are	  acceptable,	  or	   right,	  with	  everything	   that	   falls	  below	   the	   cut-­‐off	   line	  being	  
equally	   wrong,	   and	   everything	   that	   falls	   above	   it	   equally	   right.	   We	   might	  
individually	  or	  as	  a	  society	  want	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  at	  a	  point	  below	  which	  we	  think	  
the	  level	  of	  greediness	  becomes	  absolutely	  unacceptable	  to	  us,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  
change	   the	   fact	   that	   this	   is	   a	   point	   on	   a	   continuum	   that	   goes	   from	   extremely	  
generous	  to	  extremely	  greedy.	  	  
	   The	  fact	  that	  virtues	  and	  vices	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  also	  contributes	  to	  
my	   view	   that	   virtue-­‐based	   arguments	   are	   better	   suited	   than	   duty-­‐based	  
arguments	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation.	  The	  charge	  of	  
exploitation	   is	  applied	   to	  a	  wide	   range	  of	   consensual	   transactions,	  which	  vary	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considerably	   in	   terms	   of	   seriousness.	   For	   example,	   the	   term	   exploitation	   is	  
applied	  to	  situations	  like	  taxi	  drivers	  charging	  more	  during	  a	  railway	  strike;	  or	  
concert	   halls	   charging	   very	   high	   prices	   for	   drinks	   because	  within	   the	   concert	  
hall	   there	   is	   no	   other	   provider	   of	   drinks	   and	   people	   cannot	   bring	   their	   own	  
drinks,	   but	   people	   do	   often	  want	   to	   drink	   something.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  
term	   exploitation	   is	   also	   applied	   to	   situations	   that	   appear	   more	   extreme	   or	  
serious,	   such	   as	   factories	   that	   pay	  workers	   in	   developing	   countries	   extremely	  
low	  wages	  for	  very	  long	  working	  hours	  and	  hard	  work;	  money	  lenders	  who	  ask	  
1000	   percent	   interest	   rates	   to	   people	   in	   desperate	   need	   for	   money;	   or	   price	  
gougers	  who	  go	  to	  areas	  where	  a	  natural	  disaster	  has	  occurred	  and	  offer	  food,	  
generators	  and	  other	  basic	  necessities	  for	  exorbitant	  prices.	  All	  these	  situations	  
are	   frequently	   called	  exploitative,	  but	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  explain	  how	   they	  are	  all	  
instances	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  wrong	  with	  a	  duty-­‐based	  argument	  that	  is	  based	  
on	  general	  rules	  and	  principles,	  and	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  degrees	  of	  wrongness.	  
If,	   for	  example,	  we	  try	  to	  explain	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  with	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  
people	  in	  need,	  or	  compensate	  injustice,	  this	  might	  work	  (although	  I	  argued	  that	  
it	   does	   not)	   for	   the	   more	   extreme	   instances	   of	   exploitation,	   such	   as	   the	  
sweatshop	   labour,	   the	  money	   lenders,	   and	   the	   price	   gougers.	   Yet	   it	   does	   not	  
work	  for	  the	   less	  extreme	  instances	  of	  exploitation,	  such	  as	  the	  taxi	  drivers	  or	  
concert	  halls.	  This	  means	  that	  duty-­‐based	  approaches	  have	  to	  deny	  that	  the	  less	  
extreme	  cases	  of	  exploitative	  transactions	  are	  exploitative,	  and	  that	  duty-­‐based	  
approaches	   have	   to	   maintain	   that	   the	   common	   application	   of	   the	   charge	   of	  
exploitation	   to	   such	   transactions	   is	   mistaken.	   This	   is	   not	   necessarily	  
problematic:	  common	  usage	  of	  terms	  can	  indeed	  be	  mistaken.	  Yet	  I	  think	  that	  a	  
benefit	  of	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  explanation	  of	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  that	  it	  can	  
also	   account	   for	   what	   people	   regard	   as	   wrong	   in	   less	   serious	   instances	   of	  
consensual	  exploitation.	  	  
The	   fact	   that	   generosity	   and	   greed	   are	   a	  matter	   of	   degree,	  means	   that	  
when	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  moral	  wrong	   in	   exploitation	   can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  
greediness,	  this	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  indicate	  how	  bad	  this	  is.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  
when	  a	   certain	   transaction	   is	   criticized	   for	  being	  exploitative,	  what	   is	  morally	  
problematic	   in	   the	   transaction	   is	   the	   greedy	   behaviour	   of	   one	   of	   the	   parties.	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Exactly	   how	   greedy	   the	   behaviour	   is,	   or	   how	   serious	   or	   reprehensible	   the	  
greediness	   is,	   depends,	   I	   argued	   in	   section	   4.4.2,	   on	   the	   relative	   needs	   of	   the	  
parties,	  and	  on	  their	  relative	  wealth.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  
sweatshop	   example,	   the	   greediness	   in	   and	   the	   wrong	   of	   exploitation	   is	   more	  
serious	  than	  in	  other	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  concert	  hall	  example.	  	  
	   It	  could	  be	  that	  one	  disagrees	  that	  the	  concert	  hall	  example	  is	  an	  example	  
of	  exploitation,	  and	  that	  one	  thinks	  that	  the	  concert	  hall	  owner	  is	  merely	  doing	  
smart	   business.	   People	   will	   likely	   disagree	   on	   whether	   this	   is	   so.	   Yet	   my	  
argument	   is	   that	   whether	   one	   thinks	   this	   is	   an	   example	   of	   an	   exploitative	  
transaction,	  depends	  on	  whether	  one	  thinks	  that	  concert	  hall	  owners	  are	  acting	  
greedily	  in	  the	  way	  they	  use	  their	  monopoly	  position	  within	  the	  concert	  halls.	  If	  
we	   think	   that	   they	   are	   exploiting	   people,	   then	   we	   think	   that	   they	   are	   acting	  
greedily;	  if	  we	  think	  that	  they	  are	  not	  exploiting	  people,	  then	  we	  think	  that	  they	  
are	  not	  acting	  greedily	  but	  merely	  doing	  smart	  business.	  	  
	   This	  brings	  me	  to	  a	   final	  possible	  objection	  to	  mention.	  An	  objection	  to	  
my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  as	  greediness	  might	  be	  that	  while	  acting	  greedily	  is	  not	  
praiseworthy,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  very	  serious	  wrong	  either.	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  clear	  now	  that	  in	  
my	  view,	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  true,	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  situation.	  Sometimes,	  
such	  as	  when	  not	  giving	  a	  tip	  in	  a	  restaurant,	  acting	  greedily	  seems	  indeed	  not	  
among	   the	  most	   serious	  moral	   failures.	   Yet	   at	   other	   times	   acting	   greedily	   is	   a	  
more	  serious	  moral	  failure,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  very	  wealthy	  person	  employs	  a	  very	  
poor	  and	  hardworking	  person	  and	  negotiates	  an	  extremely	   low	  wage	   for	   long	  
working	   hours	   and	   hard	   work,	   while	   the	   wealthy	   person	   could	   easily	   have	  
afforded	  to	  offer	  better	  payment	  and	  conditions.	  	  
Moreover,	   this	   may	   not	   be	   any	   different	   from	   duty-­‐based	   or	  
consequentialist	   approaches.	   For	   example,	   although	   I	   cannot	   here	   adequately	  
support	   this	   claim,	   to	   me,	   and	   I	   think	   many	   people	   will	   agree,	   violating	   the	  
moral	  duty	  not	   to	  steal	   is	  a	  more	  serious	  moral	   failure	  when	  stealing	   the	  only	  
source	  of	   income	  from	  a	  poor	   family,	   than	  when	  stealing	  a	  cheap	  pen	   from	  an	  
academic	   conference	   (of	   course,	   deontologists	   may	   disagree	   with	   this).	  
Furthermore,	   I	   also	   do	   not	   think	   that	   failures	   of	   virtue	   are	   necessarily	   less	  
serious	  than	  violations	  of	  moral	  duties.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  difficult	  or	  even	  impossible	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to	  compare	  failures	  of	  virtue	  and	  violations	  of	  duty	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘seriousness’,	  and	  
again,	  it	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  thesis	  to	  properly	  substantiate	  this	  claim.	  
But,	   for	   example,	   the	   very	   rich	   person	   who	   employs	   a	   very	   poor	   and	  
hardworking	  person	  for	  an	  extremely	  low	  wage	  and	  long	  working	  hours	  while	  
she	  could	  easily	  have	  afforded	  differently,	  seems	  in	  my	  view	  to	  be	  failing	  more	  
seriously,	  morally	  speaking,	  than	  the	  person	  who	  violated	  the	  moral	  duty	  not	  to	  
steal	  by	  stealing	  a	  pen	  from	  a	  conference.	  	  
To	  sum	  up	  this	  section,	  saying	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  consensual	  exploitation	  
is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness	  differs	  from	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  moral	  duty	  
in	  at	  least	  three	  ways.	  First,	  it	  highlights	  that	  what	  exploiters	  do	  wrong	  lies	  not	  
merely	   in	   their	   actions,	   but	   also	   in	   their	   motive,	   emotions	   and	   perception:	   a	  
selfish	  motive,	   lack	   of	   empathy,	   and	   disregard	   of	   the	   people	  with	  whom	   they	  
interact.	  Second,	  virtue-­‐based	  arguments	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  universally	  applicable	  
moral	   principles,	   but	   on	   what	   counts	   as	   good	   or	   bad	   behaviour	   in	   particular	  
situations.	   Third,	   virtue-­‐based	   arguments	   leave	   more	   room	   for	   degrees	   of	  
goodness	  and	  badness,	  instead	  of	  categorizing	  actions	  as	  either	  right	  or	  wrong.	  
These	   three	   differences	   help	   to	   explain,	   I	   have	   argued,	   why	   a	   virtue-­‐based	  
argument	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  explain	  the	  wrong	  in	  consensual	  exploitation	  than	  
duty-­‐based	  arguments.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  set	  out	  my	  view	  on	  what	  makes	  consensual	  exploitation	  
wrong,	  and	  defended	  it	  against	  some	  possible	  objections.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  
wrong	   in	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  and	  a	  
failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  I	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  what	  counts	  as	  greedy	  
and	  exploitative	  is	  context-­‐dependent,	  and	  that	  part	  of	  the	  wrongness	  of	  being	  
greedy	  is	  failing	  to	  accurately	  perceive	  other	  people’s	  needs	  or	  condition,	  or	  to	  
be	  emotionally	  moved	  by	  their	  condition.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  
second	  research	  question	  of	  my	  thesis	  set	  out	  in	  chapter	  1:	  if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  greediness,	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  
virtue	  of	  generosity,	  what	  implications	  does	  this	  have	  for	  the	  legal	  restriction	  of	  
consensual	   transactions	  that	  are	  considered	  exploitative	   in	  present-­‐day	   liberal	  
societies?	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CHAPTER	  5	  –	  EXPLOITATION	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  	  
	  
In	  chapter	  1,	  the	  two	  main	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis	  were	  put	  forward:	  1.	  
What	   is	   wrong	   with	   consensual	   exploitation?	   2.	   What	   implications	   may	   the	  
answer	   to	   this	   question	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   certain	   consensual	  
transactions	   that	   are	   regarded	   exploitative	   in	   present-­‐day	   liberal	   societies?	  
Chapters	   2,	   3,	   and	   4	   addressed	   the	   first	   question.	   In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  
chapter	   4,	   I	   argued	   that	   exploitation	   can	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  
greediness;	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  I	  also	  argued	  that	  an	  important	  
element	   of	   this	   virtue	   is	   responsiveness	   to	   other	   people’s	   needs	   or	   interests,	  
which	  requires	  an	  accurate	  perception	  of	  other	  people	  and	  their	  situation,	  and	  a	  
proper	  emotional	  response	  to	  their	  situation.	   In	  this	  chapter,	   I	  will	   turn	  to	  the	  
second	  research	  question,	  and	  discuss	  which	  implications	  I	  believe	  my	  view	  of	  
exploitation	  has	  for	  the	  legal	  restriction	  of	  exploitative	  transactions.	  	  
Section	  5.1	  argues	  that	  legal	  restriction	  of	  exploitative	  transactions	  may	  
be	   justified	   as	   a	  means	   to	   curb	   certain	   greedy	   acts,	   and	   to	   promote	   a	   certain	  
perception	  of	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  other	  people	  in	  society.	  Section	  5.2	  shows	  
how	  such	  other-­‐regardingness	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  good	  for	  societies	  on	  
many	   different	   political	   theories.	   Section	   5.3	   discusses	   the	   possible	   objection	  
that	  law	  should	  only	  be	  used	  to	  regulate	   ‘right’	  and	  ‘wrong’	  actions,	  and	  not	  to	  
promote	   virtuous	   or	   excellent	   behaviour.	   It	   argues	   that	   while	   we	   have	   good	  
reasons	   to	   be	  hesitant	   about	   allowing	   too	  much	   state	   interference,	  we	   cannot	  
justify	   making	   an	   absolute	   distinction	   between	   ‘arguments	   for	   the	   right’	   and	  
‘arguments	   for	   the	   good’	   when	   debating	   which	   types	   of	   regulation	   to	   allow.	  
Instead,	  the	  desirability	  of	  certain	  regulations,	  including	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws,	  
has	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  weighing	  their	  disadvantages	  against	  
the	  goods	  they	  aim	  to	  achieve.	  Section	  5.4	  concludes	  by	  further	  illustrating	  my	  
view	   of	   exploitation	   with	   two	   examples:	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   and	   legal	  
restrictions	  on	  payday	  loans.	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5.1	  Exploitation,	  greediness	  and	  the	  law	  	  
	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   argued	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   can	   best	   be	  
understood	  as	  greediness,	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  I	  also	  argued	  
that	  key	  elements	  of	  virtues	   like	  generosity,	  kindness	  and	  compassion	  are	   the	  
motivation	   to	   promote	   others’	   interests,	   an	   accurate	   moral	   perception	   of	   the	  
condition	   of	   others,	   and	   responsiveness	   to	   or	   empathy	   with	   the	   condition	   of	  
others.	  Throughout	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  these	  features	  together	  as	  ‘other-­‐
regardingness’.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   laws	   restricting	   consensual	  
exploitative	   transactions	   can	   be	   justified	   as	   means	   to	   prevent	   certain	   greedy	  
behaviour,	  and	  to	  try	  to	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  from	  
the	   outset,	   however,	   that	   my	   goal	   is	   not	   to	   argue	   that	   all	   societies	   should	  
introduce	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws,	   or	   should	   try	   to	   curb	   greedy	   behaviour	   or	  
promote	   other-­‐regardingness.	   As	   stated	   in	   chapter	   1,	  my	   aim	   throughout	   this	  
thesis	   is	   the	   other	  way	   around:	   there	  are	  many	  modern	   liberal	   societies	  with	  
laws	  that	  aim	  to	  restrict	  what	  are	  seen	  as	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions,	  
or	  with	   calls	   for	   such	   transactions.	  My	   goal	   is	   to	   analyse	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  
such	   transactions—what	  makes	   them	   exploitative—and	   thus	   to	   know	  what	   it	  
means	  to	   justify	   legal	  restrictions	  on	  those	  transactions	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  
are	  exploitative,	  and	  to	  see	  if	  this	  justification	  is	  an	  acceptable	  ground	  for	  legal	  
restrictions	  on	   consensual	   transactions	   in	   a	   liberal	   society.	   I	   have	  argued	   that	  
consensual	  exploitation	  is	  wrong	  because	  of	  greediness,	  and	  I	  will	  now	  consider	  
what	   it	   means	   to	   use	   this	   wrong	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   legal	   restrictions	   on	  
consensual	   exploitative	   transactions,	   and	   whether	   this	   wrong	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
justify	  such	  restrictions	  in	  liberal	  societies.	  My	  view	  is	  that	  it	  can,	  in	  principle,	  as	  
I	   shall	   show	   in	   this	   chapter,	   but	   this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   I	   am	  arguing	   for	   the	  
legal	   regulation	   of	   all	   or	   even	   some	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions.	   In	  
order	  to	  decide	  whether	  restricting	  certain	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions	  
is	  indeed	  desirable,	  many	  other	  factors	  will	  also	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  
as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later.	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My	   statement	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   can	  be	   justified	   as	  means	   to	  prevent	  
certain	  greedy	  behaviour,	  and	  to	  try	  to	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness,	  comprises	  
two	   different	   claims.	   The	   first	   claim	   is	   that	   if	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	  
matter	   of	   greediness,	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   can	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   means	   to	  
prevent	  certain	  greedy	  acts.	  The	  second	  claim	  is	  that	  if	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  
is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	  can	  be	   justified	  as	  a	  means	   to	  
try	  to	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness.	  These	  two	  claims	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  turn.	  	  
For	   the	   claim	   that	   laws	   restricting	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	  
can	  be	   justified	   as	   a	  means	   to	  prevent	   greedy	   acts,	   recall	   that	   in	   the	  previous	  
chapter	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  labels	  ‘virtuous’	  and	  ‘vicious’	  are	  applied	  both	  to	  
people’s	   stable	   character	   traits	   and	   to	   specific	   acts	   they	   perform.	   It	   was	   also	  
shown	  that	  there	  are,	  broadly	  speaking,	  two	  different	  views	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	   the	   two	  usages	  of	  virtue	   terms,	  but	   that	  both	   these	  views	  will	  accept	  
that	   it	   is	  bad	  if	  people	  perform	  greedy	  acts,	  and	  that	   it	  would	  be	  better	   if	   they	  
acted	  less	  greedily,	  irrespective	  of	  their	  overall	  character.	  The	  first	  way	  in	  which	  
laws	   that	   restrict	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions	   may	   be	   justified,	   is	   as	  
means	  to	  prevent	  such	  greedy	  acts.	  	  
	  It	   might	   be	   objected	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   do	   not	   truly	   prevent	  
greedy	  acts,	  because	  acting	  greedily	  or	  generously	  depends	  not	   solely	  on	  how	  
people	  act,	  but	  also	  on	  their	  reasons	  for	  acting	  and	  emotions.	  Thus,	  it	  might	  be	  
objected,	   if	  one	  refrains	  from	  acting	  greedily	  merely	  because	  of	  the	  law,	  this	  is	  
not	  truly	  non-­‐greedy.	  This	  objection	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.3.2.	  For	  now,	  
we	   may	   note	   that	   even	   if	   it	   is	   true	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   do	   not	   truly	  
prevent	   greediness,	   they	   at	   least	   prevent	   exploiters	   from	   doing	   what	   are	  
considered	   greedy	   acts,	   and	   thereby,	   they	   can	   at	   least	   protect	   potential	  
exploitees	   against	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   such	   greedy	   acts.	   For	   example,	  
minimum	   wage	   laws	   or	   working	   hour	   regulations	   protect	   employees	   against	  
employers’	   potential	   greedy	   acts	   by	   restricting	   what	   employers	   can	   demand	  
from	   their	   employees	   and	   for	   what	   wage	   (see	   section	   5.4.1	   for	   a	   further	  
discussion	  of	  this).	  	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   it	   was	   shown	   that	   on	   most	   virtue	   theories,	  
generosity,	   like	   all	   virtues,	   is	   considered	   good	   for	   both	   its	   possessor	   and	   for	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other	  people	  in	  society.	  Likewise,	  greediness,	  like	  all	  vices,	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  bad	  
both	   for	   its	   possessor	   and	   for	   other	   people.	   Trying	   to	   justify	   anti-­‐exploitation	  
laws	  with	  the	  negative	  effect	  of	  greediness	  on	  exploiters	  themselves	  will	   likely	  
be	  controversial	  and	  problematic,	  because	   it	  means	  that	  anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	  
are	  there	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  exploiters.	  However,	  if	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  a	  
matter	  of	  greediness,	  we	  can	  also	  justify	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws	  with	  the	  negative	  
effect	  of	  greediness	  on	  others,	  since	  this	  is	  an	  equally	  important	  element	  of	  the	  
vice.	   As	   was	   argued	   in	   section	   4.6.1,	   virtues	   such	   as	   kindness,	   justice,	   and	  
generosity	  do	  not	  ‘accidentally’	  benefit	  others;	  they	  are	  virtues	  partly	  because	  of	  
the	  benefit	   to	  others.	  Conversely,	  vices	  such	  as	  unkindness	  and	  greediness	  are	  
not	   ‘accidentally’	   bad	   for	   others,	   with	   the	   real	   badness	   being	   the	   damage	   to	  
one’s	  own	  character.	  They	  are	  vices	  partly	  because	  they	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  
others.	   Greediness	   involves,	   it	   was	   said	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   trying	   to	  
acquire	   or	   keep	   an	   excessive	   amount	   of	   wealth	   for	   oneself,	   irrespective	   of	  
negative	  consequences	  on	  others	  (and	  oneself).	  Hence,	   if	  our	   trying	  to	  acquire	  
or	   keep	   a	   lot	   of	  wealth	   did	   not	   have	   negative	   effects,	   it	  would	   not	   be	   seen	   as	  
greediness.	  Or,	  in	  other	  words:	  if	  we	  did	  not	  think	  it	  undesirable	  or	  morally	  bad	  
that	  other	  people	  (or	  ourselves)	  suffer	  negative	  consequences,	  greediness	  (and	  
unkindness,	   injustice,	  etc)	  would	  not	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  bad	  either.	  And	   if,	  
on	  a	  virtue	  approach,	  the	  negative	  consequences	  on	  others	  of	  vicious	  behaviour,	  
such	  as	  greedy	  behaviour,	  are	  considered	  undesirable	  and	  morally	  bad,	   then	  a	  
first	  way	  in	  which	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions	  can	  
be	  justified,	  is	  that	  they	  prevent	  such	  negative	  consequences.	  	  
Another	  way	  of	  seeing	  this	  is	  by	  recalling	  that,	  as	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  saying	  that	  someone	  acts	  greedily	  means	  at	  least	  partly	  to	  criticise	  the	  
fact	   that	   she	   does	   not	   regard	   another’s	   interests	   and	  wellbeing	   as	   sufficiently	  
important.	   That	   is,	   as	   important	   as	   they	   are.	   This	   means	   that	   on	   a	   virtue	  
approach,	  other	  people’s	   interests	  and	  wellbeing	  are	  considered	  as	   important.	  
Hence,	   again,	   this	   shows	   that	  what	   is	   considered	  bad	  about	  greedy	  acts	   is	  not	  
only	   what	   it	   says	   about	   the	   greedy	   person’s	   character,	   but	   also	   the	   actual	  
negative	  consequences	  of	  these	  acts	  on	  other	  people’s	  interests	  and	  wellbeing.	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   Therefore,	   if	   I	   am	   right	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	   exploitation	   is	  
greediness,	   a	   first	  way	   in	  which	   legal	   restrictions	   on	   exploitative	   transactions	  
can	   be	   justified	   is	   as	   means	   to	   limit	   the	   negative	   consequences	   of	   greedy	  
behaviour	   on	   other	   people’s	   interests.	   Even	   if	   one	  might	   not	   succeed	   in	   truly	  
reducing	   people’s	   greediness	   (although	   one	   might,	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	  
section	   5.3.2)	   legislation	   restricting	   exploitative	   transactions	  may	   in	   any	   case	  
protect	  other	  people’s	  interests	  against	  certain	  greedy	  acts.	  
	  
The	  second	  way	  in	  which	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws	  may	  be	  justified	  if	  exploitation	  
is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  is	  slightly	  more	  indirect:	  as	  a	  means	  to	  try	  to	  promote	  
other-­‐regardingness.	   In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   it	   was	   argued	   that	   important	  
elements	   of	   virtues	   like	   generosity,	   kindness	   and	   compassion	   are	  what	   I	   here	  
call	   other-­‐regardingness:	   an	   accurate	   moral	   perception	   of	   (the	   condition	   of)	  
others,	  emotional	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  motivation	  
to	   promote	   others’	   interests.	   Conversely,	   it	   was	   argued,	   greediness	   in	  
consensual	  commercial	  transactions	  involves	  a	  disregard	  for	  or	  undervaluation	  
of	  the	  interests	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  appropriate	  emotional	  response	  
to	   the	   condition	   of	   others.	   Moreover,	   it	   was	   argued,	   it	   may	   involve	   a	   lack	   of	  
accurate	  moral	   perception	  of	   other	  people	  or	   of	   their	   condition,	  which	  means	  
that	  people	  with	  whom	  one	   interacts	  are	  not	  perceived	  as	  human	  beings	  with	  
their	   own	   desires,	   conditions	   and	   feelings	   that	   are	   worth	   taking	   into	  
consideration,	  but	  more	  as	  abstract	  entities	  whose	  well-­‐being	  is	  not	  important	  
to	  oneself.	  Hence,	  as	  argued	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	  greediness	   in	  consensual	  
commercial	  transactions	  means	  that	  people	  are	  either	  blind	  to	  the	  condition	  of	  
people	  with	  whom	  they	  interact,	  or	  do	  perceive	  it	  in	  some	  way,	  but	  fail	  to	  regard	  
people’s	  condition,	   interests,	  and	  wellbeing	  as	  sufficiently	   important	  and	  to	   let	  
themselves	  be	  emotionally	  affected	  by	  it.271	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271	  This	  corresponds	  to	  what	  Axel	  Honneth,	  after	  Georg	  Lukács,	  describes	  as	  ‘reification’:	  the	  
mental	  habit	  of	  viewing	  people	  and	  interacting	  with	  people	  ‘without	  a	  trace	  of	  inner	  sentiment	  
or	  any	  attempt	  at	  understanding	  the	  other’s	  point	  of	  view’	  (A	  Honneth,	  ‘Reification	  and	  
Recognition:	  A	  New	  Look	  at	  an	  Old	  Idea’	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  18),	  in	  which	  people	  
lose	  their	  ability	  for	  empathetic	  engagement	  with	  other	  persons	  (Honneth,	  op.cit.	  53)	  and	  view	  
people	  merely	  ‘as	  things’	  (Honneth,	  op.cit.	  24-­‐25).	  As	  Honneth	  describes	  it,	  it	  means	  that	  ‘we	  
lose	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  immediately	  the	  behaviour	  of	  other	  persons	  as	  making	  claims	  on	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These	   features	   do	   not	   only	   concern	   individuals	   interacting	   with	   each	  
other,	   but	   can	   also	   be	   of	   interest	   to	   societies	   as	   a	   whole.	   A	   commonly	   heard	  
complaint	   is	   that	   in	   modern	   Western	   societies,	   people	   live	   alongside	   and	  
interact	  with	  others	  in	  a	  detached,	  cold	  way,	  either	  not	  perceiving	  others	  at	  all,	  
or	  perceiving	  them	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  benefit.272	  This	  complaint	  is	  not	  
just	   heard	   about	   the	  way	  people	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   in	  market	   relationships,	  
but	  also,	   for	   instance,	  about	  some	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  health	  care	  sector,	  or	  
about	  the	  way	  people	  ignore	  homeless	  people	  on	  the	  streets.	  
	   By	  trying	  to	  discourage	  greediness	  and	  promote	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  
(or	  kindness	  or	  compassion,	  for	  that	  matter),	  a	  society	  might	  therefore	  not	  only	  
try	   to	   encourage	   people	   to	   help	   others	   by	   being	   more	   generous	   (or	   kind	   or	  
compassionate),	  but	  also,	  thereby,	  to	  promote	  more	  other-­‐regardingness	  and	  a	  
more	  accurate	  moral	  perception	  of	  other	  people,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  being	  blind	  
to	  other	  people,	  but	  responsive	  to	  and	  affected	  by	  their	  condition.	  Hence,	  if	  I	  am	  
right	   that	   exploitation	   can	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity,	   what	   societies	   may	   try	   to	   promote	   by	   restricting	   exploitative	  
transactions,	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  exploiters	  benefit	  others	  by	  acting	  less	  greedily,	  
but	   also	   an	   awareness	   or	   perception	   of	   other	   people	   as	   not	   simply	   things	   for	  
their	  own	  benefit,	  or	  abstract	  actors	  in	  market	  transactions,	  but	  as	  real	  people	  
whose	  condition	  is	  morally	  important	  and	  can	  make	  a	  claim	  on	  them.	  
	  
To	   summarize,	   in	   chapters	   2	   and	   3,	   I	   argued	   against	   explaining	   the	  wrong	   in	  
exploitation	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  consent	  or	  unfairness,	  or	  as	  the	  violation	  of	  a	  duty	  
to	  help	  people	  who	  are	  vulnerable,	  in	  need,	  or	  in	  unjust	  circumstances.	  If	  these	  
justifications	  are	   indeed	  unfit	   to	  explain	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	   they	  
are	   also	   problematic	   as	   justifications	   for	   laws	   that	   aim	   to	   regulate	   allegedly	  
exploitative	  voluntary	   transactions,	   such	  as	  minimum	  wage	   laws,	   interest	   rate	  
ceilings,	   and	   price	   gouging	   laws.	   My	   view	   is	   that	   greediness	   is	   the	   wrong	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
us—as	  demanding	  that	  we	  react	  in	  an	  appropriate	  way.	  We	  may	  indeed	  be	  capable	  in	  a	  cognitive	  
sense	  of	  perceiving	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  human	  expressions,	  but	  we	  lack,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  feeling	  
of	  connection	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  expressions	  we	  perceive’	  
(Honneth,	  op.cit.	  57-­‐58).	  	  
272	  See	  e.g.	  ME	  Cavanagh,	  ‘Rediscovering	  Compassion’	  (1995)	  34(4)	  Journal	  of	  Religion	  and	  
Health	  317-­‐327.	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exploitation,	   and	   therefore	   that	   laws	   that	   are	   intended	   to	   prevent	   or	   limit	  
exploitation,	   can	   be	   justified	   as	   means	   of	   curbing	   greediness	   and	   promoting	  
generosity	  in	  situations	  where	  this	  is	  particularly	  called	  for,273	  and	  thereby	  also	  
as	   means	   of	   trying	   to	   promote	   people’s	   awareness	   of	   and	   responsiveness	   to	  
others	  with	  whom	  they	  interact.	  	  
	  	   To	   avoid	   misunderstanding:	   I	   am	   not	   making	   the	   empirical	   claim	   that	  
this	  is	  the	  intention	  lawmakers	  in	  all	  or	  even	  some	  societies	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  
introducing	  laws	  that	  restrict	  exploitative	  transactions.	  This	  is	  a	  claim	  I	  cannot	  
prove	  and	  that,	  I	  think,	  seems	  unlikely	  to	  be	  true	  for	  many	  cases.	  I	  am	  also	  not	  
making	  the	  claim	  that	  by	  introducing	  some	  anti-­‐exploitation	  law,	  people	  indeed	  
will	   always	   become	   less	   greedy,	   or	   more	   other-­‐regarding.	   This	   too	   is	   an	  
empirical	  claim	  that	   I	  cannot	  prove	   in	   this	   thesis,	  and	  the	  extent	   to	  which	   it	   is	  
true	   likely	   varies	   for	   different	   laws	   and	   different	   societies.	  Whether	   a	   certain	  
law	  will	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  people	  less	  greedy	  and	  more	  other-­‐regarding,	  
will	  thus	  have	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  Yet	  I	  think	  it	  is	  a	  plausible	  
assumption	   that	   laws	   can	   influence	   our	   moral	   thinking	   and	   attitudes,	   as	   has	  
been	  argued	  by	  many,274	  and	  as	  will	  be	  explained	   further	   in	  section	  5.3.2;	  and	  
that	   this	   can,	   at	   least	   partly,	   justify	   the	   introduction	   or	   existence	   of	   laws	   that	  
restrict	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions.	  	  
Hence,	  my	  argument	  is	  that	  since	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  is	  greediness,	  
laws	  that	  aim	  to	  restrict	  exploitation	  in	  consensual	  transactions	  can	  be	  justified	  
as	  means	   to	  curb	  greedy	  acts	  and	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  
deny	   that	   there	   can	   be	   other,	   instrumental,	   reasons,	   for	  why	  we	  may	  want	   to	  
have	  certain	  laws	  that	  curb	  exploitation.	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  support	  
minimum	  wage	  laws	  in	  a	  certain	  society	  because,	  in	  that	  society,	  such	  laws	  turn	  
out	   to	   be	   a	   reasonably	   effective	   means	   of	   reducing	   poverty,	   differences	   in	  
income	   inequality,	   and	   societal	   injustice.	   In	   that	   case,	   we	   would	   try	   to	   fight	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  Which,	  as	  noted	  in	  section	  4.4,	  depends	  on	  several	  factors	  including	  the	  relative	  affluence	  and	  
needs	  of	  the	  parties.	  
274	  See	  e.g.	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  X.10,	  1179a35-­‐1181b20;	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica,	  
I-­‐II	  Q49-­‐56;	  Q92	  and	  Q96);	  Z	  Bankowski,	  Living	  Lawfully:	  Love	  in	  Law	  and	  Law	  in	  Love	  (Kluwer	  
Academic	  Publishers,	  2001)	  70-­‐71;	  DF	  Brosnan,	  ‘Virtue	  Ethics	  in	  a	  Perfectionist	  Theory	  of	  Law	  
and	  Justice’	  (1989)	  11	  Cardozo	  Law	  Review	  335-­‐425;	  and	  M	  Therrien,	  Law,	  Liberty	  &	  Virtue:	  A	  
Thomistic	  Defense	  for	  the	  Pedagogical	  Character	  of	  Law	  (University	  of	  Fribourg,	  2007).	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poverty	  or	  injustice	  on	  a	  societal	  level,	  by	  regulating	  private	  transactions,	  on	  an	  
individual	   level.	   Minimum	   wage	   laws	   could	   then	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   means	   to	  
reduce	   injustice,	   yet	   as	   a	  means	   to	  prevent	  exploitation,	   they	   could	  merely	  be	  
justified	  instrumentally,	  because,	  as	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  chapter	  2,	  principles	  
of	   justice	   cannot	   truly	   justify	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	   individual	   exploitative	  
transactions,	   and	  what	   is	  morally	   required	   to	   correct	   societal	   injustice	   is	   not	  
related	  to	  which	  particular	  individuals	  happen	  to	  transact	  with	  each	  other	  and	  
what	   they	   transact.	   Still,	   such	   an	   instrumental	   use	   of	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	  
might	   be	   valid,	   if,	   all	   in	   all,	   we	   think	   that	   the	   benefits	   in	   reducing	   poverty	  
outweigh	   the	   disadvantage	   that	   we	   are	   making	   particular	   individuals	  
disproportionately	  and	  possibly	  unjustly	  responsible	  for	  doing	  so.	  	  
My	   argument	   is	   that	   even	   if	   we	   would	   not	   have	   such	   instrumental	  
reasons	   to	   justify	  anti-­‐exploitation	   laws,	  because,	   for	   instance,	  minimum	  wage	  
laws	   do	   not	   reduce	   the	   overall	   levels	   of	   poverty	   or	   distributive	   injustice	   in	   a	  
society	  (which	  may	  well	  be	  the	  case	  in	  certain	  societies;	  see	  section	  5.4.1),	  there	  
is	  a	  separate	  reason	  why	  we	  may	  still	  want	  to	  regulate	  exploitative	  transactions,	  
and	  this	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  discouraging	  greedy	  behaviour	  and	  promoting	  generosity	  
and	   other-­‐regardingness.	   For	   any	   specific	   law	   that	   restricts	   exploitation	   in	  
consensual	   transactions,	   both	   reasons—alleviating	   societal	   injustice	   and	  
curbing	  greediness/promoting	  generosity—might	   function	  as	   a	   justification	  at	  
the	   same	   time,	   but	  my	   focus	   is	   on	   the	   second	   reason.	   In	   other	  words,	  while	   I	  
acknowledge	   that	   states	   may	   want	   to	   use	   certain	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   as	   a	  
means	  to	  address	  macro-­‐level	  societal	  problems	  such	  as	  poverty	  and	  injustice,	  I	  
believe	  that	  there	  may	  also	  be	  an	  independent	  justification	  for	  such	  laws,	  which	  
is	   not	   based	   on	   an	   argument	   against	   poverty	   or	   injustice	   itself,	   but	   on	   an	  
argument	  against	  a	  certain	  response	  towards	  people	  who	  are	  in	  a	  dire	  situation	  
because	   of	   poverty	   or	   injustice:	   a	   greedy	   response.	   And	   this	   involves,	   as	  
explained,	   both	   acting	   greedily	   by	   trying	   to	   get	   the	   other	   to	   agree	   on	   a	  
transaction	   that	  benefits	  oneself	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  and	  a	  greedy	  perceptual	  
and	   emotional	   response,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   blind	   to	   or	   not	   taking	   as	  
sufficiently	  important	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  person	  with	  whom	  one	  interacts.	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My	   view	   of	   exploitation	   does	   raise	   a	   potential	   problem,	   however.	   It	  might	   be	  
thought	  that	  although	  it	  is	  indeed	  good	  to	  have	  less	  greediness	  and	  more	  other-­‐
regardingness	   between	   people,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   society	   or	   the	   state	  
should	   be	   concerned	   with	   promoting	   these	   goals.	   I	   will	   briefly	   discuss	   this	  
possible	   objection	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   and	   explain	   why	   I	   think	   that	   curbing	  
greediness	   and	   promoting	   other-­‐regardingness	   can	   be	   considered	   a	   desirable	  
goal	  for	  societies	  on	  many	  different	  political	  theories.	  In	  section	  5.3,	  I	  will	  next	  
discuss	  the	  related	  but	  more	  specific	  possible	  objection	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  use	  
the	  law	  to	  curb	  greediness	  and	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness.	  
	  
5.2	  Other-­‐regardingness	  in	  political	  theory	  	  
	  
My	   argument	   is	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   can	   be	   justified	   as	  means	   to	   curb	  
greediness	   and	   promote	   the	   virtue	   of	   generosity,	   and	   thereby	   to	   promote	   a	  
higher	   level	   of	   other-­‐regardingness.	   It	  might	   be	   objected	   that	   on	  most	   liberal	  
views,	   states	   should	   only	   be	   concerned	   with	   enforcing	   ‘right’	   and	   ‘wrong’	  
behaviour,	   and	   should	   not	   be	   concerned	   with	   promoting	   virtues	   or	   other-­‐
regardingness.	  Justifying	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws	  as	  means	  to	  promote	  generosity	  
and	  other-­‐regardingness	  might	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  incompatible	  with	  all	  such	  
political	  theories.	  I	  believe,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  
First	  of	  all,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  value	  of	  other-­‐regardingness	  is	  evident	  
in	   a	   number	   of	   theories,	   such	   as	   communitarian	   theories	  which	   argue	   for	   the	  
importance	  of	  social	  attachments	   for	  our	  wellbeing,275	   feminist	   theories	  which	  
emphasize	   the	   importance	   for	   society	   of	   attitudes	   of	   care	   and	   responsiveness	  
towards	   the	   needs	   of	   others,276	   and	   ‘republican’	   liberal	   theories	   which	   argue	  
that	   liberal-­‐democratic	   institutions	   require	   citizens	   to	   possess	   certain	   virtues,	  
because	   those	   institutions	   will	   break	   down	   if	   citizens	   continuously	   put	   their	  
own	  interests	  above	  the	  common	  good.277	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  See	  e.g.	  A	  MacIntyre,	  After	  Virtue	  (2nd	  ed,	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1984);	  A	  Etzioni,	  
New	  Communitarian	  Thinking	  (University	  of	  Virginia	  Press,	  1995).	  
276	  See	  e.g.	  V	  Held,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Care	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  N	  Noddings,	  Caring:	  A	  
Feminine	  Approach	  to	  Ethics	  and	  Moral	  Education	  (University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1986).	  
277	  See	  e.g.	  R	  Putnam,	  Making	  Democracy	  Work	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  Q	  Skinner,	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Yet	   even	   on	   several	   more	   mainstream	   liberal	   theories,	   other-­‐
regardingness	  could	  be	  recognized	  as	  an	  important	  element	  of	  a	  healthy	  society.	  
Take	  for	  example	  the	  political	  theory	  of	  John	  Rawls,	  as	  set	  forth	  in	  his	  A	  Theory	  
of	   Justice278	   and	   Political	   Liberalism.279	   Although	   Rawls	   explicitly	   rejects	  
perfectionism,	   the	  view	   that	   the	   state	   should	  be	   concerned	  with	  perfecting	   its	  
members’	   virtue	   or	   excellence,	   virtues	   do	   play	   an	   important	   role	   in	   his	  
theory.280	   A	   just,	   liberal	   society	   requires,	   Rawls	   says,	   ‘virtues	   of	   fair	   social	  
cooperation’,281	  such	  as	  the	  virtue	  of	  reasonableness,	  justice,	  civility,	  tolerance,	  a	  
sense	  of	  fairness,	  mutual	  trust,	  a	  spirit	  of	  compromise,	  and	  a	  readiness	  to	  meet	  
others	   half-­‐way.282	   For	   Rawls,	   these	   virtues	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   a	   particular	  
conception	   of	   human	   flourishing,	   but	   are	   compatible	   with	   a	   variety	   of	  
conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  held	  in	  a	  pluralist	  society.	  They	  are	  character	  features	  
required	   to	   maintain	   a	   just	   society	   and	   to	   realize	   the	   values	   of	   liberty	   and	  
equality.	   Virtues,	   in	   Rawls’	   writings,	   are	   thus	   instrumental	   for	   achieving	   and	  
maintaining	   the	   type	   of	   society	  we	  want.283	   ‘A	   good	   person’,	   he	   says,	   ‘has	   the	  
features	   of	   moral	   character	   that	   it	   is	   rational	   for	  members	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	  
society	  to	  want	  in	  their	  associates.’284	  	  
Rawls	   does	   not	   discuss	   virtues	   at	   great	   length,	   and	   does	   not	   explicitly	  
mention	   the	  character	   traits	   important	  on	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation:	  generosity	  
and	   other-­‐regardingness.	   Yet	   his	   reasoning	   might	   be	   taken	   further,	   as	   some	  
authors	   have	   done,285	   to	   also	   include	   other	   virtues	   that	   are	   rational	   for	  
members	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  to	  want	  in	  their	  associates,	  or	  necessary	  for	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘The	  Republican	  Idea	  of	  Political	  Liberty’	  in	  G	  Bock,	  Q	  Skinner	  and	  M	  Viroli	  (eds),	  Machiavelli	  and	  
Republicanism	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990);	  P	  Pettit,	  Republicanism:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Freedom	  
and	  Government	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  1997).	  
278	  J	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1971).	  	  
279	  J	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1993).	  	  
280For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  virtues	  in	  Rawls’	  work,	  see	  e.g.	  L	  Beckman,	  The	  Liberal	  State	  
and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Virtue	  (Transaction	  publishers,	  2001);	  and	  WA	  Galston,	  Liberal	  Purposes:	  
Goods,	  Virtues,	  and	  Diversity	  in	  the	  Liberal	  State	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991).	  
281	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism,	  op.cit.	  194.	  
282	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism,	  op.cit.	  163,	  194-­‐195.	  
283	  Although	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  his	  later	  work,	  Rawls	  describes	  the	  development	  of	  
moral	  personality	  also	  as	  an	  intrinsic	  good,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  expressing	  our	  innate	  capacity	  for	  
justice.	  See	  Galston,	  op.cit.	  chapter	  6.	  
284	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice,	  op.cit.	  436-­‐437.	  	  
285	  See	  e.g.	  MV	  Costa,	  ‘Political	  Liberalism	  and	  the	  Complexity	  of	  Civic	  Virtue’	  (2004)	  42	  The	  
Southern	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  149-­‐170.	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well-­‐ordered,	  liberal	  and	  equal	  society.	  Virtues	  such	  as	  a	  ‘habitual	  disposition	  to	  
express	   egalitarian	   respect	   for	   fellow	   citizens	   …	   in	   nonideal	   contexts’,286	   and	  
kindness,	  compassion	  and	  generosity.	  	  
I	   cannot	  here	  provide	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	   the	   importance	  other-­‐
regardingness	  may	  have	   in	   the	   liberal	   theory	  of	  Rawls,	   or	   in	   any	  other	   liberal	  
theories.	   My	   only	   aim	   here	   is	   to	   indicate	   that	   the	   notion	   that	   other-­‐
regardingness	   is	   an	   important	   attribute	   to	   have	   in	   societies	   is	   not	   necessarily	  
incompatible	  with	  many	  political	  theories,	  even	  liberal	  ones.	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   this	   still	   leaves	   a	   second	   and	   perhaps	  more	   problematic	  
objection.	  Even	  if	  we	  would	  agree	  that	  generosity	  or	  other-­‐regardingness	  can	  be	  
understood	  as	  important	  goods	  for	  society	  on	  many	  different	  political	  theories,	  
it	   might	   still	   be	   objected	   that	   it	   is	   not	   desirable	   that	   states	   use	   the	   law	   to	  
promote	  this	  type	  of	  good.	  This	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  
	  
5.3	  Virtue	  and	  the	  law	  	  
	  
In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  explained	  why	  I	  think	  that	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  and	  
other-­‐regardingness,	  can	  be	  considered	  desirable	  traits	  for	  societies	  on	  several	  
different	  political	   theories.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	  will	  discuss	   the	  possible	  objection	  
that	  even	   if	   this	   is	   true,	  we	  ought	  not	   to	  use	   the	   law	  to	  curb	  vices	  or	  promote	  
virtues.287	  	  
It	   is	   common	   to	   distinguish	   two	   categories	   of	   moral	   judgement:	   the	  
aretaic	  and	  the	  deontic.	  As	  noted	  before,	  the	  former	  refers	  to	  virtues,	  ideals	  and	  
goodness,	  and	  is	  open-­‐ended	  because	  virtues,	  ideals	  or	  good	  states	  of	  affairs	  can	  
in	  principle	  always	  be	   further	  perfected	  or	  realized.	  The	   latter	  (including	  both	  
deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  theories)	  gives	  requirements	  which	  are	  fixed	  
and	   have	   clear	   criteria	   of	   fulfilment,	   and	   which	   are	   often	   seen	   as	   giving	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  As	  is	  argued	  in	  Costa,	  op.cit.	  155.	  
287	  For	  several	  recent	  examinations	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  virtue	  see	  A	  Amaya	  and	  
H	  Hock	  Lai	  (eds),	  Law,	  Virtue	  and	  Justice	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2013);	  and	  C	  Farrelly	  and	  L	  Solum	  
(eds),	  Virtue	  Jurisprudence	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2007).	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minimal	  requirements	  of	  morality.288	  It	  is	  concerned	  with	  determining	  the	  cut-­‐
off	   point	   between	   which	   actions	   are	   right	   and	   wrong,	   or	   acceptable	   and	  
unacceptable,	  instead	  of	  with	  what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  as	  well	  as	  one	  can.	  
	   In	   traditional	   liberal	   thought,	   law	   has	   usually	   been	   associated	   with	  
deontic	  thinking	  (‘the	  right’),	  but	  discussions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  aretaic	  
ethics	   (‘the	   good’)	   and	   the	   law	   have	   re-­‐emerged	   in	   post-­‐war	  moral	   and	   legal	  
philosophy.	  A	  central	  question	  in	  these	  discussions	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  desirable	  to	  
use	   law	   to	   promote	   ‘the	   good’,	   or	   virtuous	   behaviour.	   According	   to	   many	  
liberals,	   the	   answer	   is	   no.	   Although	   the	  moral	   perfection	   of	   people	  may	   be	   a	  
valuable	  end,	   they	  say,	   it	   is	  not	  a	  valid	  reason	   for	   legal	  action.	  The	   law	  should	  
only	   be	   concerned	   with	   enforcing	   ‘right’	   conduct,	   and	   not	   ‘good’	   or	   virtuous	  
conduct.	  This	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  liberal	  neutrality	  principle,	  which	  says	  
that	  states	  should	  be	  neutral	  with	  regard	   to	  different	  citizens’	  moral,	   religious	  
and	  political	  views,	  or,	  as	   it	   is	  often	   termed,	   their	   ‘conceptions	  of	   the	  good’.289	  
This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  neutralists	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  virtue,	  
or	  that	  they	  deny	  that	  certain	  views	  of	  the	  good	  are	  more	  desirable	  than	  others.	  
Yet	  they	  do	  state	  that	  reasons	  about	  the	  good	  are	  the	  wrong	  type	  of	  reasons	  for	  
justifying	   public	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   law.	   This	   view	   thus	   involves	   a	   strict	  
distinction	  between	  types	  of	  arguments:	  arguments	  based	  on	  conceptions	  of	  the	  
right,	  which	   are	   suitable	   for	   public	   decision-­‐making,	   and	   arguments	   based	   on	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   good,	   which	   should	   only	   play	   a	   role	   in	   people’s	   private	  
decisions.290	  	  
	   So-­‐called	   moral	   perfectionists	   disagree.	   They	   say	   that	   it	   is,	   at	   least	   in	  
some	   situations,	   appropriate	   for	   the	   state	   to	   promote	   valuable	   conceptions	   of	  
the	  good	  or	  discourage	  bad	  ones,	   and	   to	  assist	   citizens	   in	   their	   endeavours	   to	  
lead	  a	  good	  life.	  Although	  this	  view	  contradicts	  the	  liberal	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  
has	  dominated	  much	  of	  20th	  century	  moral	  philosophy,	  moral	  perfectionism	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288	  D	  Heyd,	  ‘Supererogation’	  in	  EN	  Zalta	  (ed),	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Spring	  2013	  
Edition)	  2.	  	  
289	  S	  Wall	  and	  G	  Klosko,	  ‘Introduction’	  in	  Perfectionism	  and	  Neutrality.	  Essays	  in	  Liberal	  Theory	  
(Rowman	  and	  Littlefield,	  2003)	  1.	  
290	  See	  C	  Michelon,	  Being	  Apart	  from	  Reasons	  (Springer,	  2006)	  79-­‐80.	  
	   191	  
in	  fact	  an	  old	  position	  that	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	  view	  of	  the	  state	  for	  most	  of	  
Western	  history.291	  	  
	   If	  I	  am	  right	  that	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue	  
and	  other-­‐regardingness,	  and	  that	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  
a	   means	   to	   curb	   greediness,	   promote	   generosity	   and,	   thereby,	   other-­‐
regardingness,	   this	  might	   trigger	   the	   neutralist	   objection	   that	   the	   state	   ought	  
not	   to	   concern	   itself	  with	   promoting	   such	   goods.	   This	   section	   discusses	   three	  
versions	   of	   this	   objection,	   and	   concludes	   that	   although	   those	   objections	   give	  
good	  reasons	  to	  be	  careful	  with	  using	  the	  law	  to	  promote	  certain	  conceptions	  of	  
the	   good,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	  why	   this	   should	  never	   be	  done.	  Those	  objections	  
thus	   provide	   no	   conclusive	   reasons	   against	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws.	   Instead,	   it	  
will	  be	  argued,	  the	  desirability	  of	  such	  laws	  should	  be	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  
basis,	  balancing	  their	  drawbacks	  against	  the	  goods	  they	  promote.	  	  
	  
5.3.1	  Autonomy	  
The	   neutralist	   view	   that	   the	   state	   ought	   not	   to	   use	   the	   law	   to	   promote	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   good	   and	   virtuous	   behaviour,	   often	   stems	   from	   the	  
importance	   attached	   to	   respect	   for	   individuals’	   autonomy	   and	   their	  
corresponding	  right	  to	  decide	  for	  themselves	  how	  they	  want	  to	  construct	  their	  
lives.292	  For	  some	  neutralists,	  this	   is	  coupled	  with	  fear	  of	  misuse	  of	  power	  and	  
repression	   by	   the	   state,	   if	   the	   state	   is	   given	   the	   power	   to	   enforce	   personal	  
convictions	  and	  virtues.293	  They	  consequently	  object	  to	  letting	  certain	  people	  in	  
society	   impose	   their	   conception	   of	   the	   good	   on	   others,	  which	   they	   consider	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291	  See	  Wall	  and	  Klosko,	  op.cit.	  13.	  Important	  articulations	  of	  this	  view	  can	  thus	  not	  only	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  relatively	  recent	  works	  of	  e.g.	  Thomas	  Hurka	  (Perfectionism	  (Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  1993)),	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  (‘The	  Privatization	  of	  the	  Good:	  An	  Inaugural	  Lecture’	  (1990)	  
52(3)	  The	  Review	  of	  Politics	  344-­‐377),	  and	  George	  Sher	  (Beyond	  Neutrality:	  Perfectionism	  and	  
Politics	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997)),	  but	  also	  in	  classical	  works	  of,	  most	  notably,	  
Aristotle	  (Nicomachean	  Ethics	  X.10,	  1179a35-­‐1181b20)	  and	  Aquinas	  (Summa	  Theologica	  I-­‐II	  
Q49-­‐56,	  Q92	  and	  Q96).	  	  
292	  See	  J	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986)	  400.	  	  
293	  P	  Koller,	  ‘Law,	  Morality	  and	  Virtue’	  in	  RL	  Walker	  and	  PJ	  Ivanhoe	  (eds),	  Working	  Virtue:	  Virtue	  
Ethics	  and	  Contemporary	  Moral	  Problems	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  39.	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degrading	   violation	   of	   autonomy,	   except	   when	   necessary	   to	   protect	   the	  
autonomy	  of	  others,	  or,	  possibly,	  one’s	  own	  autonomy.294	  
	   However,	   the	   argument	   for	   autonomy	   seems	   by	   itself	   unable	   to	   justify	  
the	   absolute	   exclusion	   of	   arguments	   about	   the	   good	   from	   the	   realm	   of	   public	  
decision-­‐making.	  This	  is	  because	  for	  this	  argument	  to	  work,	  it	  needs	  to	  assume	  
as	  a	  general	  principle	  that	  one	  particular	  kind	  of	  evil—the	  loss	  of	  autonomy—is	  
more	  important	  than	  all	  other	  possible	  evils,	  or	  all	  other	  possible	  goods.	  Yet	  this	  
need	   not	   necessarily	   be	   the	   case.	   Moral	   perfectionists	   work	   from	   another	  
principle,	  which	  says	  that	  ‘it	  is	  always	  right,	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  to	  prevent	  
evils;	   that	   the	   need	   to	   prevent	   evils	   of	   any	   description295	   is	   a	   good	   kind	   of	  
reason	   in	   support	   of	   legal	   prohibition.’296	   And,	   as	   Joel	   Feinberg	   argues,	   this	  
principle	   appears	   to	   be	   as	   plausible	   a	   principle	   as	   that	   which	   makes	   the	  
prevention	  of	  one	  particular	  kind	  of	  evil,	  the	  loss	  of	  autonomy,	  a	  presumptively	  
good	  reason	  against	  legal	  coercion.297	  	  
The	   consequence	   of	   this	   is	   that	   for	   every	   particular	   law,	   the	   neutralist	  
liberal	  has	   to	  argue	  why	   the	  evil	  of	   limiting	  autonomy	  outweighs	   the	  evil	   that	  
the	  law	  would	  prevent.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  the	  balance	  will	  very	  often	  be	  in	  favour	  
of	  autonomy,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  main	  point	  of	  the	  argument,	  that	  this	  
is	   not	   a	   priori	   the	   case.	   In	   other	   words:	   autonomy	   is	   certainly	   an	   important	  
value,	   but	   if	   it	   is	   to	   justify	   the	   exclusion	   of	   arguments	   for	   the	   good	   from	   the	  
realm	   of	   public	   decision-­‐making,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   shown	   why	   the	   value	   of	  
autonomy	  will,	  in	  every	  particular	  situation,	  always	  outweigh	  all	  other	  possible	  
values.	  And	  this	  seems	  very	  unlikely,	  especially	   if	  we	  take	   into	  account	   that	   in	  
some	  situations,	  the	  possible	  gains	  or	  losses	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  particular	  value	  (such	  
as	   equality,	   autonomy,	   welfare,	   education,	   etc)	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   a	   certain	  
policy,	  will	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  in	  other	  situations.	  There	  can	  thus	  always	  be	  
situations	   in	  which	  a	  certain	  policy	  brings	  a	  relatively	  small	   loss	  of	  autonomy,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	  J	  Feinberg,	  Harmless	  Wrongdoing:	  The	  Moral	  Limits	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Law	  (vol	  4,	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1990)	  xvii-­‐xviii.	  
295	  This	  need	  not	  necessarily	  be	  positive	  evils,	  but	  may	  also	  be	  the	  loss	  of	  a	  (potential)	  good.	  	  
296	  Feinberg,	  Harmless	  Wrongdoing,	  op.cit.	  5.	  
297	  Feinberg,	  Harmless	  Wrongdoing,	  op.cit.	  5.	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but	  great	  gains	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  other	  value,298	  which	  makes	  it	  seem	  mistaken	  
to	  assume	  that	  the	  values	  of	  autonomy	  and	  state	  neutrality	  will	  always	  trump	  all	  
other	  values.299	  	  
	  
While	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   autonomy	   argument	   for	   state	   neutrality	   is	  
problematic,	   another	   possibility	   is	   to	   argue	   that	   state	   neutrality	   towards	  
conceptions	  of	   the	  good	   is	  a	  special	   type	  of	  value,	  a	  value	  on	  a	  different	   ‘level’	  
than	   other	   values,	   which	   therefore	   overrides	   other	   values.	   In	   the	   next	   two	  
sections,	   I	   will	   discuss	   two	   such	   arguments,	   which	   might	   be	   called	   ‘ethical	  
liberalism’	  and	  ‘political	  liberalism’.300	  	  
	  
5.3.2	  Ethical	  liberalism	  	  
The	  ‘ethical	  liberalism’	  argument301	  is	  also	  based	  on	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy,	  but	  
in	  contrast	  with	  the	  earlier	  argument	  treats	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  second-­‐
order	   value.	   On	   this	   view,	   autonomy	   is	   important	   because	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  
enable	   people	   to	   act	   virtuously	   or	   morally.	   The	   argument	   holds	   that	   what	  
matters	   for	  moral	  behaviour	   is	  not	   just	  how	  people	  act,	  but	  also	  whether	  they	  
choose	  their	  actions	  truly	  autonomously.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	   to	  
be	   virtuous	   means	   not	   just	   to	   show	   excellent	   behaviour,	   but	   to	   voluntarily	  
choose	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   to	   do	   so	   for	   the	   right	   reasons.	   This	   means,	   the	   ethical	  
liberalism	  argument	   says,	   that	  obliging	  people	   to	  act	  virtuously	  by	   law	   is	   self-­‐
defeating,	   because	   people	   will	   act	   out	   of	   fear	   of	   punishment	   or	   ‘automatic	  
conformity’302	  to	  the	  law,	  and	  not	  because	  of	  a	  genuine	  moral	  choice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298	  Think,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	  use	  of	  taxpayers’	  money	  (which	  impairs	  taxpayers’	  autonomy)	  to	  
fund	  nationwide	  vaccination	  programmes	  or	  education,	  bans	  on	  having	  sex	  in	  public,	  rules	  on	  
the	  collection	  of	  rubbish,	  and	  mandatory	  education	  for	  all	  children.	  
299	  See	  Michelon,	  op.cit.	  88-­‐90.	  
300	  Beckman,	  op.cit.	  8-­‐9.	  
301	  A	  classic	  expression	  of	  this	  view	  is	  given	  by	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  in	  On	  Liberty	  (1859).	  For	  a	  more	  
recent	  variant	  see	  Ronald	  Dworkin’s	  ‘Liberalism’	  in	  S	  Hampshire	  (ed),	  Public	  and	  Private	  
Morality	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1978);	  and	  ‘Foundations	  of	  Liberal	  Equality’	  in	  S	  Darwall	  
(ed),	  Equal	  Freedom	  (University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1995).	  For	  a	  version	  of	  this	  argument	  
specifically	  directed	  against	  the	  promotion	  of	  generosity	  by	  the	  state	  see	  TR	  Machan,	  Generosity:	  
Virtue	  in	  Civil	  Society	  (Cato	  Institute,	  1998).	  
302	  Feinberg,	  op.cit.	  293.	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   All	   virtue	   ethicists	   would	   acknowledge	   that	   voluntary	   choice	   is	  
important	   for	   true	   virtuous	   behaviour.	   Yet	   most	   of	   them	   also	   agree	   that	   the	  
development	   of	   virtue	   and	   true	   moral	   freedom	   require	   moral	   education	   and	  
‘habituation’,	  and	  law	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this.303	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  while	  
virtues	  involve	  doing	  the	  right	  thing	  voluntarily,	  for	  the	  right	  reasons,	  and	  with	  
the	   right	   emotion,	   no	   one	   is	   born	  with	   this	   ability,	   and	   it	   therefore	   has	   to	   be	  
trained	   from	  an	   early	   age.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   said,	   children	  need	   to	   be	   taught	  what	   is	  
good	   and	   bad	   behaviour	   by	   their	   parents,	   teachers	   and	   other	   people	   around	  
them,	  and	  it	  makes	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  difference	  for	  someone’s	  character	  in	  later	  life	  
whether	   someone	   has	   received	   such	   moral	   education.304	   Teaching	   people	   to	  
have	   correct	   emotional,	   rational,	   and	   behavioural	   responses,	   is	   however	   not	  
something	  that	  can	  usually	  be	  achieved	  by	  explanation	  or	  reasoning	  alone.	  It	  is	  
thought	   that	   this	  usually	  also	  requires,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  beginning,	  some	   form	  of	  
authority	  or	  coercion.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  parent	  tells	  a	  very	  young	  child	  not	  to	  
take	  a	  toy	  from	  another	  child,	  the	  reason	  why	  a	  child	  initially	  obeys	  will	  often	  be	  
the	  authority	  of	  the	  parent,	  and	  not	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  child	  properly	  (emotionally	  
and	   rationally)	   agrees	   with	   or	   understands	   the	   reasoning	   behind	   the	  
command—in	   this	   case,	   that	   she	   has	   to	   take	   other	   children’s	   feelings	   and	  
interests	  into	  account.	  Yet	  it	  is	  thought	  that	  while	  children	  are	  initially	  taught	  to	  
act	   morally	   correct	   because	   some	   authority	   forces	   them	   to	   do	   so,	   over	   time,	  
most	  of	  them	  get	  into	  the	  habit	  of	  acting	  in	  the	  desired	  manner,	  will	  start	  acting	  
correctly	  without	   being	   coerced	   to	   do	   so,	   and	  will	  want	   to	   act	   in	   the	   desired	  
manner,	  for	  the	  right	  reasons,	  without	  being	  coerced	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  idea	  is	  thus	  
that	   while	   people	   may	   initially	   make	   ‘virtuous’	   choices	   because	   an	   authority	  
coerces	   them	   to	   do	   so,	   over	   time,	   this	   moral	   education	   and	   habituation	   may	  
produce	  a	  corresponding	  development	  of	  character	  in	  them,	  and	  ultimately	  lead	  
them	  to	  freely	  choose	  the	  virtuous	  acts.	  And,	  it	  is	  thought,	  the	  required	  authority	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  moral	  education	  is	  perhaps	  most	  famously	  associated	  
with	  Aristotle	  and	  Aquinas,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  important	  element	  in	  almost	  all	  virtue	  ethics	  theories.	  
See	  Aristotle,	  Politics	  III.5,	  1280b;	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  X.9,	  1179b-­‐1180b;	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  
Theologica,	  I-­‐II	  Q49-­‐54,	  Q91,	  Q92,	  and	  Q95-­‐97,	  and	  e.g.	  J	  Annas,	  ‘Being	  Virtuous	  and	  Doing	  the	  
Right	  Thing’	  (2004)	  78(2)	  Proceedings	  and	  Addresses	  of	  the	  American	  Philosophical	  Association	  
61-­‐75,	  69;	  R	  Hursthouse,	  On	  Virtue	  Ethics	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1999)	  chapter	  5.	  
304	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  II.2,	  1103b23-­‐1103b25.	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is	  initially,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  very	  young	  children,	  primarily	  provided	  by	  the	  parents,	  
but	   for	   older	   children	   it	   is	   also	   provided	   by	   the	   law,	   which	   stipulates	   what	  
people	  are	  and	  are	  not	   allowed	   to	  do.	  Moreover,	   although	   the	  working	  of	   this	  
process	   of	   moral	   education	   through	   habituation	   is	   relatively	   uncontroversial	  
when	   it	   comes	   to	   children,	   in	   the	   view	   of	   most	   virtue	   ethicists,	   moral	  
development	  does	  not	  stop	  the	  moment	  someone	  turns	  18.	  Moral	  growth	  is	  an	  
ongoing	   process,	   it	   is	   thought,	   and	   even	   adults	   need	   support	   from	   their	  
environment,	  which	  laws	  that	  delineate	  which	  actions	  are	  mandated,	  permitted,	  
or	  forbidden,	  help	  provide.305	  This	  is	  not	  just	  true	  for	  morally	  immature	  or	  ‘bad’	  
adults,	   it	   is	   thought;	   laws	   also	   help	   basically	   good	   or	  well-­‐meaning	   people	   to	  
form	  good	  habits	  and	  acquire	   the	  virtues	   they	  already	  wish	   to	  have.306	   In	   fact,	  
some	  argue	  that	  it	   is	   inevitable	  that	  law	  influences	  people’s	  character,	  whether	  
we	   like	   it	   or	   not.307	   Exactly	   how	   it	   is	   that	   laws	   help	   to	   promote	   virtue	   is	  
described	  differently	  by	  different	  people.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  to	  
provide	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	   these	  views,	  but	   I	  do	  wish	   to	  outline	  a	   few	  
arguments.	  	  
One	   argument	   focuses	   on	   explaining	   the	   psychological	   mechanism	   of	  
‘internalization’,	   which	   means	   that	   the	   commands	   that	   are	   initially	   given	   by	  
parents	   or	   another	   authority	   are	   taken	   over	   by	   individuals	   themselves.308	  
Hence,	  this	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  children	  initially	  learn	  that	  stealing	  is	  wrong	  
because	   their	  parents	   tell	   them	  so,	   but	  over	   time	   start	   telling	   themselves	   that	  
stealing	   is	   wrong.	   A	   particularly	   good	   educational	   technique	   is	   thought	   to	   be	  
‘induction’,	   in	   which	   parents	   try	   to	   make	   the	   child	   see	   the	   effects	   of	   her	  
behaviour	   on	   others;	   for	   instance,	   that	   stealing	   a	   toy	   from	   another	   child	   will	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305	  Aristotle,	  Nicomachean	  Ethics	  X.10,	  1179a35-­‐1181b20;	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica,	  I-­‐II	  Q49-­‐
56;	  Q92	  and	  Q96.	  See	  also	  MC	  Nussbaum,	  The	  Fragility	  of	  Goodness.	  Luck	  and	  Ethics	  in	  Greek	  
Tragedy	  and	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1986)	  347-­‐348.	  
306	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  MM	  Keys,	  ‘Aquinas’s	  Two	  Pedagogies:	  A	  Reconsideration	  of	  
the	  Relation	  Between	  Law	  and	  Moral	  Virtue’	  (2001)	  45(3)	  American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  
519-­‐531.	  
307	  See	  e,g,	  SJ	  Clark,	  ‘Neoclassical	  Public	  Virtues:	  Towards	  an	  Aretaic	  Theory	  of	  Law-­‐Making	  (and	  
Law	  Teaching)’	  in	  A	  Amaya	  and	  H	  Hock	  Lai	  (eds),	  Law,	  Virtue	  and	  Justice	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2013)	  
81-­‐104,	  84.	  Clark	  describes	  six	  ways	  in	  which	  law	  and	  politics	  influence	  virtue,	  whether	  
intentionally	  or	  unintentionally.	  
308	  Brosnan,	  op.cit.	  367-­‐382.	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upset	   the	   other	   child.309	  Over	   time,	   it	   is	   argued,	  many	   children	  will	   no	   longer	  
need	  their	  parents	  to	  point	  out	  such	  things,	  but	  they	  will	  start	  to	  generate	  their	  
own	   feelings	   of	   guilt,	   and	  will	   themselves	   be	   both	   rationally	   and	   emotionally	  
motivated	   not	   to	   steal,	   and	   to	   take	   other	   children’s	   feelings	   into	   account.	   For	  
older	  children	  and	  adults,	  this	  process	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  aided	  by	  the	  law,	  which	  
also	  proscribes	  certain	  behaviour,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  forces	  people	  to	  take	  others	  
into	   account	   when	   making	   decisions.	   It	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   the	   degree	   of	  
internalization	   of	   norms	   set	   by	   parents	   and	   laws	   varies	   considerably	   from	  
person	   to	   person,310	   and	   from	  norm	   to	   norm.	  But	   research	   indicates	   that	   this	  
psychological	  process	  does	  take	  place	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  in	  most	  people,	  and	  
that	  many	  legal	  rules	  are	  internalized.311	  	  
	   An	   alternative	   way	   in	   which	   the	   idea	   that	   law	   promotes	   virtue	   is	  
sometimes	  described	   is	   in	   terms	  of	  a	   ‘moral	  environment’	  which	   law	  can	  help	  
create	  or	  sustain.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  a	  framework	  of	  understandings,	  expectations	  
and	  conditions	  of	  social	  interaction	  influences	  people’s	  moral	  education	  and	  the	  
choices	   people	   want	   to	   make.	   And	   people’s	   choices,	   in	   turn,	   shape	   that	  
framework.	   A	   good	  moral	   environment	   helps	   people	   by	   encouraging	   them	   to	  
choose	   good	   actions	   and	   avoid	   bad	   actions.	   This	   might	   be	   because	   a	   healthy	  
moral	  environment	  offers	  fewer	  inducements	  to	  choose	  bad	  things,	  or	  because	  
it	  makes	  moral	   conduct	   beneficial	   instead	   of	   to	   people’s	   disadvantage.312	   The	  
importance	  of	  one’s	  moral	   environment	   for	   the	  development	  of	   virtues	   seems	  
particularly	  clear	  when	  we	   imagine	  a	  society	   in	  which	  such	  a	   framework	  does	  
not	  exist.	  As	  Peter	  Koller	  argues:	  ‘In	  a	  state	  of	  social	  affairs	  which	  is	  dominated	  
by	   corruption,	   lawlessness,	   and	   injustice,	   individuals	   have	   little	   incentive	   to	  
develop	   moral	   dispositions,	   such	   as	   honesty,	   reliability,	   justice,	   trust,	   and	  
benevolence,	   since	   these	  dispositions	  would	  be	   to	   their	  detriment.’313	   In	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  Brosnan,	  op.cit.	  374-­‐375.	  
310	  While	  some	  people	  will	  not	  internalize	  certain	  norms,	  and	  merely	  observe	  them	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  
punishment,	  another	  possibility	  is	  that	  for	  some	  people,	  the	  mechanism	  of	  internalizing	  norms	  
with	  the	  aid	  of	  authority,	  does	  not	  lead	  them	  to	  internalize	  the	  norms	  or	  dispositions	  that	  others	  
are	  trying	  to	  teach	  them,	  but	  instead	  leads	  them	  to	  internalize	  the	  disposition	  to	  obey	  authority.	  	  
311	  Brosnan,	  op.cit.	  381.	  	  
312	  See	  e.g.	  Clark,	  op.cit.	  86-­‐87;	  RP	  George,	  ‘The	  Central	  Tradition—Its	  Value	  and	  Limits’	  in	  C	  
Farrelly	  and	  L	  Solum,	  Virtue	  Jurisprudence	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2007)	  46;	  Koller,	  op.cit.	  
313	  Koller,	  op.cit.	  41-­‐42.	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words:	   what	   people	   see	   as	   behaviour	   that	   can	   reasonably	   be	   expected	   of	  
themselves	  and	  of	  others,	  and	  what	  behaviour	  they	  see	  as	  an	  undue	  burden,	  is	  
heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  society	  in	  which	  they	  grow	  up.	  Societies	  and	  their	  laws	  
thus	  influence	  people’s	  willingness	  to	  maintain	  a	  level	  of	  virtuous	  conduct	  that	  
in	  another	  society	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  too	  much	  to	  be	  demanded.314	  	  
Other	  writers315	  explain	  how	  law	  can	  aid	  virtue	  by	  arguing	  that	  law	  is	  a	  
form	  of	  ‘rational	  persuasion’;	  that	  law	  can	  rationally	  persuade	  people	  to	  behave	  
correctly.	   They	   recognize	   that	   law	   can	   and	   frequently	   does	   induce	   people	   to	  
behave	   in	  a	  certain	  way	  merely	  because	  of	   the	  threat	  of	  punishment.	  Yet,	   they	  
say,	   this	   fear	  of	  punishment	  only	   serves	  as	   the	  motivation	   for	  people	  who	  are	  
not	  rationally	  persuaded	  by	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  good	  that	  a	  certain	  law	  aims	  
to	   achieve.	   People	   who	   are	   persuaded	   that	   the	   rules	   laid	   down	   by	   a	   law	   are	  
desirable	  and	  reasonable,	  obey	  the	   law	  not	  because	  of	   fear	  of	  punishment,	  but	  
because	  they	  agree	  with	  it,	  and	  they	  would	  even	  obey	  it	  without	  punishment.	  	  
An	  important	  part	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  law	  cannot	  truly	  force	  
people	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  but	  can	  at	  most	  persuade	  people	  to	  behave	  in	  
a	   certain	   way	   by	   changing	   the	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   of	   doing	   so	   by	  
introducing	  penalties	  or	  rewards.	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  am	  driving	  on	  a	  road	  with	  a	  
speed	   limit	   of	   20	  miles	   per	   hour,	   I	   am	   still	   able	   to	   choose	  whether	   or	   not	   to	  
observe	   the	   speed	   limit,	   and	   I	  might	   choose	   to	   ignore	   it	   and	   take	   the	   risk	   of	  
getting	  a	  penalty.316	   It	  might	  also	  be	   that	   I	  want	   to	   ignore	   the	  speed	   limit	  and	  
drive	  faster,	  but	  that	  I	  am	  too	  afraid	  of	  being	  caught	  and	  getting	  a	  penalty,	  and	  
that	   I	   therefore	   observe	   the	   speed	   limit	   merely	   out	   of	   fear	   of	   punishment.	  
Nevertheless,	  some	  theorists	  argue,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  speed	  limit	  
is	   that,	   at	   least	   sometimes,	   it	   makes	   me	   consider	   the	   advantages	   and	  
disadvantages	  of	  observing	  it;	  of	  driving	  no	  more	  than	  20	  miles	  per	  hour	  on	  that	  
road.	  And	  this	  means	  that	  I	  will	  not	  only	  consider	  the	  risks	  of	  punishment	  and	  
the	  benefits	   of	  driving	   faster,	   but	  probably	   also	   consider	  why	   the	   state	  would	  
not	  want	  me	  to	  drive	  faster	  on	  that	  road.	  I	  may	  then	  realize,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  point	  LA	  Blum,	  Moral	  Perception	  and	  Particularity	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1994)	  chapter	  7.	  
315	  E.g.	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica	  I-­‐II	  Q90,	  Q92,	  and	  Q96;	  Therrien,	  op.cit.	  part	  1.	  	  
316	  Based	  on	  an	  example	  in	  Therrien,	  op.cit.	  91-­‐92.	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lot	  of	  children	  may	  live	  near	  the	  road,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  indeed	  be	  dangerous	  for	  
me	  to	  drive	  faster	  than	  20	  miles	  per	  hour.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  chance	  that	  the	  speed	  
limit	  will	  ‘rationally	  persuade’	  me	  that	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  drive	  faster	  than	  20	  miles	  
per	  hour	  on	   that	  road,	  and	   if	   so,	   I	  will	   follow	  the	  speed	   limit	   truly	  voluntarily,	  
and	  would	  do	  so	  even	  without	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  penalty.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  it	  is	  argued,	  
all	   laws	  can	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  people	  consider	  or	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  
desirability	   of	   certain	   behaviour,	   and	   thereby	   they	   can	   rationally	   persuade	  
people	   of	   the	   reasonableness	   and	   importance	   of	   the	   norms	   laid	   down	   by	   the	  
law.	  	  
Of	   course,	   laws	  will	   frequently	   fail	   to	   rationally	   convince	   people	   of	   the	  
desirability	  of	  certain	  behaviour.	  Some	  people	  might	  never	  stop	  to	  consider	  the	  
reasoning	  behind	  a	   law;	  others	  may	  do	  so,	  but	  disagree	  with	  the	  reasoning,	  or	  
think	   it	   right,	   but	  not	   as	   important	   as	   their	   own	   interests.	   In	   such	   cases,	   laws	  
will	  at	  most	  change	  people’s	  behaviour	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment.	  Yet	  
for	   other	   people,	   at	   least	   some	   laws	   will	   make	   them	   consider	   the	   reasoning	  
behind	  the	  law,	  and	  will	  convince	  them	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  the	  norm	  that	  the	  
law	  puts	  forward.	  Those	  people	  will	  therefore	  obey	  laws	  truly	  voluntary,	  which	  
means	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  virtuous	  act	   is	  prescribed	  by	   law,	  does	  not	  preclude	  
people	  from	  voluntarily	  choosing	  the	  act,	  and	  thus	  from	  acting	  virtuously.	  
	   A	   somewhat	   related	   argument	   says	   that	   laws	   can	   help	   virtue	   because	  
they	   can	  help	   to	   specify	  what	   is	   required	   for	   virtuous	   behaviour	   in	   particular	  
cases.	   In	  many	   situations	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   exactly	  what	  would	   be	   the	   best	  
course	  of	  action,	  especially	  when	  it	  concerns	  the	  common	  good	  of	  society.	  Law,	  
it	   is	   said,	   therefore	  helps	   virtue,	   because	   it	   specifies	  what	   everyone	   in	   society	  
ought	  to	  do	  for	  the	  common	  good,	  which	  is	  something	  that	  even	  individuals	  who	  
are	  disposed	  to	  virtue	  often	  cannot	  determine	  for	  themselves.317	  Think	  again	  of	  
the	   speed	   limit	   example	   described	   above.	   Even	   people	   who	   are	   disposed	   to	  
behave	  well,	   and	   do	   not	  want	   to	   endanger	   anyone	   else	  while	   driving,	   cannot	  
possibly	   know	   which	   speed	   limit	   is	   safe	   on	   every	   particular	   road.	   Speed	  
restrictions	   thus	   help	   them	   by	   telling	   them	   what	   speed	   is	   acceptable	   in	  
particular	   situations.	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   further	   argued,	   over	   time,	   following	   laws	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  See	  e.g.	  Aquinas,	  Summa	  Theologica	  I-­‐II	  Q96;	  Therrien,	  op.cit.	  65.	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such	   as	   traffic	   laws	  brings	   people	   experience	   and	   gives	   them	  a	   feel	   for	  which	  
type	  of	  situations	  call	  for	  which	  behaviour.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  can	  habituate	  them	  
into	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  practical	  wisdom	  and	  virtue.	  	  
	   It	  might	   be	   objected	   that	   I	   claim	   that	   for	   people	   to	   act	   virtuously	   they	  
need	   to	   follow	   the	   law	   from	   their	   own	   conviction	   instead	   of	   from	   fear	   of	  
punishment,	   but	   that	   if	   they	   do	   so,	   the	   law	   becomes	   superfluous	   because	   if	  
people	  act	  out	  of	  their	  own	  conviction,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  the	  law	  in	  order	  to	  act	  
in	  that	  way.	  For	  example,	  many	  people	  would	  say	  that	  they	  would	  not	  steal	  or	  
rape	  even	  if	  it	  was	  legally	  allowed,	  because	  it	  is	  their	  own	  moral	  conviction	  that	  
doing	   so	   is	  wrong.	   Yet	   the	  point	   of	   the	   arguments	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   is	  
that	  an	  important	  part	  of	  what	  made	  this	  into	  people’s	  own	  moral	  conviction,	  is	  
their	   upbringing	   and	   the	   initially	   coercive	   imposition	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   stealing	  
and	   raping	   is	   wrong,	   and	   that	   part	   of	   this	   moral	   environment	   and	   coercive	  
imposition	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   law.	   The	   argument	   is	   not	   that	   law	   is	   the	   only	  
factor	  that	  creates	  people’s	  moral	  convictions	  and	  attitudes,	  but	  that	  laws	  help,	  
and	   that	   they	   do	   not	   inhibit	   people’s	   ability	   to	   truly	   voluntarily	   choose	   to	   act	  
virtuously.	  	  
It	  would	   be	   naïve	   to	   think	   that	   law	   always	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   promoting	  
virtue,	  whether	  by	  aiding	  the	  internalization	  of	  certain	  moral	  standards	  through	  
habituation	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   certain	   moral	   environment,	   by	   rationally	  
persuading	  people	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  those	  moral	  standards,	  or	  by	  specifying	  
what	   is	   required	   for	   virtue	   in	   particular	   cases.	   This	  will,	   as	   said,	   vary	   greatly	  
from	  person	  to	  person,	  from	  law	  to	  law,	  and	  perhaps	  from	  society	  to	  society.	  Yet	  
it	  would	  be	  equally	  mistaken	  to	  think	  that	  law	  never	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  influencing	  
people’s	  moral	  outlook	  and	  attitudes,	  and	  of	  aiding	  our	  moral	  development.	  This	  
seems	   evident,	   as	   noted	   before,	   when	   imagining	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   certain	  
moral	  norms,	  or	  virtues,	   are	  not	   supported	  by	   law.	   Imagine,	   for	   example,	   that	  
we	   have	   to	   try	   to	   teach	   our	   children	   that	   stealing	   is	   bad	   in	   a	   society	   where	  
stealing	  is	  not	  illegal	  and	  therefore	  widely	  practiced	  (because	  in	  societies	  where	  
stealing	  is	  illegal	  there	  are	  plenty	  of	  people	  who	  refrain	  from	  stealing	  only	  out	  of	  
fear	  of	  being	  caught).	  When	  children	  are	  still	  young,	  and	  their	  parents	  the	  main	  
authority	   they	   are	   aware	   of,	   this	  would	   perhaps	   not	   be	   a	   problem.	   But	  when	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they	  grow	  older,	  and	  realize	  that	  stealing	  is	  not	  illegal,	  and	  that	  many	  people	  do	  
in	  fact	  steal,	  there	  is	  a	  large	  chance	  that	  they	  will	  start	  thinking	  that	  they	  should	  
steal	  as	  well,	   since	   it	  will	  benefit	   them,	   since	  many	  other	  people	  are	  doing	  so,	  
and	  since	  it	  is	  legal	  which	  indicates	  that	  apparently	  the	  state	  thinks	  it	  is	  not	  such	  
an	  unacceptable	  thing.	  Many	   laws	  have	  the	  effect	  of	   the	  state	  or	  society	  giving	  
out	   the	   message	   ‘this	   is	   something	   we	   think	   is	   unacceptable’	   or	   ‘this	   is	  
something	   we	   think	   is	   desirable’.	   If	   that	   message	   is	   missing,	   along	   with	   the	  
general	  habit	  of	  people	  to	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  it	  is	  likely	  more	  difficult	  to	  teach	  
or	  internalize	  that	  behaviour	  as	  a	  moral	  standard.	  	  	  
	   In	  sum,	  while	   it	   is	   indeed	  important	  for	  virtue	  that	  people’s	  choices	  are	  
voluntary,	  the	  existence	  of	  laws	  regulating	  certain	  virtuous	  or	  vicious	  behaviour	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  prevent	  this,	  and,	  moreover,	  may	  even	  aid	  the	  development	  
and	  maintenance	  of	  virtue.	  The	   ‘ethical	   liberalism’	  argument	  can	  therefore	  not	  
explain	  why	  we	  ought	  never	   to	  use	   law	   to	  promote	   a	   certain	   virtue.	  The	  next	  
section	  will	  discuss	  a	  third	  and	  final	  argument	  against	  using	  the	  law	  to	  promote	  
virtue	  or	  curb	  vice,	  which	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘political	  liberalism’.	  
	  
5.3.3	  Political	  liberalism	  	  
So	   far	   I	   have	  discussed	   two	  arguments	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   law	  ought	  not	   to	  be	  
used	   to	   promote	   virtue:	   an	   argument	   which	   is	   based	   on	   autonomy,	   and	   an	  
argument	  which	  says	  that	  laws	  prevent	  the	  possibility	  to	  make	  voluntary	  moral	  
choices.	   A	   third	   argument	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   law	   should	   not	   be	   used	   to	  
promote	  virtue	  or	  certain	  views	  of	  the	  good	  focuses	  on	  political	  justification.	  Its	  
point	   of	   departure	   is	   that	   in	   a	   pluralist	   society,	   reasonable	   and	  well-­‐meaning	  
people	  often	  disagree	  about	  the	  best	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  Yet	  laws	  and	  other	  
state	   institutions	   are	   coercive	   and	   have	   a	   large	   impact	   on	   people’s	   lives.	  
Therefore,	   it	   is	   argued,	   a	   certain	  kind	  of	   legitimacy	   is	   required	   to	   justify	   state	  
institutions,	   with	   stricter	   requirements	   than	   when	   justifying	   decisions	   in	   our	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private	  lives.318	  More	  specifically,	  proponents	  of	  this	  argument	  want	  to	  restrict	  
the	   types	  of	   reasons	   that	   are	  permissible	   grounds	   for	   government	   action,	   and	  
mere	  ‘personal	  beliefs’	  or	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  are	  not	  considered	  valid,	  but	  
only	   reasons	   based	   on	  moral	   beliefs	   that	   are	   held	   in	   common	   in	   society.	   This	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  everyone	   in	  society	  needs	  to	  agree	  on	  all	  public	  decisions,	  
but	  only	  that	  the	  arguments	  with	  which	  public	  decisions	  are	  justified	  are	  based	  
on	  principles	  that	  other	  (reasonable)	  people	  recognize	  as	  valid	  moral	  principles	  
as	   well,	   even	   though	   they	   might	   draw	   different	   conclusions	   from	   those	  
principles	  about	  the	  desired	  public	  policies.	  For	  some,	  like	  Thomas	  Nagel,319	  it	  is	  
important	  that	  principles	  are	  actually	  shared	  in	  a	  society,	  while	  for	  others,	  like	  
John	   Rawls,320	   it	   is	   the	   shareability	   of	   principles	   by	   rational	   free	   and	   equal	  
people	   that	   counts.	   But	   the	   conclusion	   is	   the	   same:	   only	   shared	   grounds	   are	  
suitable	  to	  legitimate	  state	  actions	  and	  institutions	  that	  greatly	  impact	  people’s	  
lives.	  Why	  would	  this	  be	  so?	  	  
	   One	   possible	   answer	  might	   be	   that	   such	   reasons	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  
true.	   It	   seems	   logical	   to	   think	   that	   arguments	   based	   on	   principles	   held	   in	  
common	   in	   a	   society	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   correct	   than	   arguments	   based	   on	  
private	   views	   of	   the	   good	   over	   which	   people	   disagree.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	  
proof	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   an	   argument	   refers	   to	   shared	   principles	   increases	   the	  
likelihood	   of	   that	   argument	   being	   correct.	   As	   Claudio	   Michelon	   points	   out,	  
common	  principles	  are	  as	  likely	  to	  ground	  massacres	  as	  personal	  moral	  beliefs	  
are.321	  Moreover,	  societies	   in	  different	  times	  and	  places	  have	  often	  had	  shared	  
beliefs	  that	  contradicted	  shared	  beliefs	  in	  other	  societies,	  for	  example	  about	  the	  
appropriate	   role	   of	   women	   in	   politics	   or	   society,	   the	   role	   of	   children,	   or	  
homosexuality.	   Because	   many	   of	   those	   different	   views	   are	   in	   complete	  
opposition	  with	  each	  other,	   they	  cannot	  all	  be	   true,	   so	   the	   fact	   that	   they	  were	  
shared	  beliefs	  cannot	  have	  influenced	  the	  likelihood	  of	  them	  being	  true.	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  Beckman,	  op.cit.	  8-­‐9.	  Two	  important	  articulations	  of	  this	  view	  are	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism,	  
op.cit.	  and	  T	  Nagel,	  ‘Moral	  Conflict	  and	  Political	  Legitimacy’	  (1987)	  16(3)	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  
Affairs	  215-­‐40.	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  Nagel,	  op.cit.	  
320	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism,	  op.cit.	  
321	  Michelon,	  op.cit.	  97.	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Another	   possible	   argument	   for	  why	   shared	   principles	   are	  more	   suitable	   than	  
private	  beliefs	   for	   legitimizing	  public	  decisions	   is	  based	  on	   the	   idea	  of	   respect	  
for	  people’s	  dignity,	  or,	  as	  Michelon	  suggests,	  on	  Kant’s	  formulation	  of	  humanity	  
as	  respecting	  people	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves.322	  As	  said	  before,	  a	  feature	  of	  public	  
decision-­‐making	   is	   that	   such	   decisions	   are	   backed	   by	   state	   force	   and	   have	   a	  
large	  impact	  on	  people’s	  lives.	  This	  imposition	  of	  coercive	  force	  by	  the	  state	  may	  
give	   rise	   to	   worries	   about	   respecting	   people	   as	   ends	   in	   themselves.	   It	   might	  
therefore	   be	   argued	   that	   if	   public	   decisions	   are	   based	   solely	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
principles	  that	  everyone	  potentially	  recognizes	  as	  valid	  principles	  (even	  if	  they	  
disagree	  with	  the	  actual	  decision),	  people	  are	  respected	  more	  than	  if	  decisions	  
that	  impact	  their	  lives	  are	  based	  on	  private	  beliefs	  that	  they	  don’t	  agree	  with.	  
	   One	  problem	  with	  this	  view,	  as	  Michelon	  points	  out,323	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
idea	  that	  it	   is	  acceptable	  to	  force	  others	  in	  society	  to	  abide	  by	  public	  decisions	  
that	   go	   against	   their	   opinion	   if	   and	   because	   those	   decisions	   are	   grounded	   in	  
principles	   others	   recognize,	   even	   though	   others	   derive	   different	   conclusions	  
from	  those	  common	  grounds.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  it	  means	  we	  have	  to	  
consider	   ourselves	   to	   be	   more	   capable	   of	   drawing	   conclusions	   from	   shared	  
principles	  than	  others	  are,	  and	  in	  imposing	  our	  conclusions	  on	  them,	  have	  to	  act	  
rather	  paternalistically.	  Yet	  if	  we	  want	  to	  maintain	  that	  treating	  people	  as	  ends	  
in	   themselves	   outweighs	   all	   other	   moral	   values,	   it	   seems	   to	   follow	   that	  
coercively	  imposing	  a	  certain	  policy	  on	  others	  is	  intolerable	  in	  both	  situations:	  
both	  when	  people	  disagree	  on	  which	  common	  grounds	  can	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  a	  
policy	  and	  when	  people	  disagree	  on	  how	  those	  grounds	  are	   to	  be	   interpreted.	  
This	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   either	   coercively	   imposing	   policies	   is	   never	  
justified,	  and	  only	  anarchism	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  humanity	  argument,	  or	  the	  
humanity	  argument	  is	  not	  systematically	  prior	  to	  all	  other	  moral	  considerations.	  
The	   latter	   seems	   the	   right	   choice,	   which	   means,	   as	   shown	   in	   the	   previous	  
sections,	   that	   the	   humanity	   argument	   is	   a	   value	   that	   has	   to	   be	  weighed	   on	   a	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  Michelon,	  op.cit.	  99.	  
323	  Michelon,	  op.cit.	  99-­‐100.	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case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   against	   all	   other	   possible	  moral	   reasons,	   including	   reasons	  
for	  the	  good.	  	  
A	   second	   and	   perhaps	   even	  more	   important	   problem	   is	   that	  while	   the	  
humanity	   argument	   seems	   convincing	   as	   an	   argument	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   it	   is	  
better	   to	   base	   arguments	   for	   public	   decisions	   on	   common	   grounds	   than	   on	  
people’s	   private	   beliefs,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   this	   would	   justify	   excluding	  
arguments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  types	  of	  argument;	  arguments	  
for	   the	   good	   and	   arguments	   for	   the	   right.	   It	   may	   well	   be—and	   is	   in	   fact	  
frequently	  the	  case—that	  there	  is	  common	  agreement	  in	  a	  society	  on	  the	  value	  
of	  some	  aspects	  required	  for	  leading	  a	  good	  life,	  such	  as	  acquiring	  knowledge,	  or	  
on	   the	   importance	   of	   specific	   virtues,	   such	   as	   honesty.	   In	   such	   situations,	   the	  
humanity	   argument	   gives	   no	   grounds	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   disrespectful	   to	  
justify	   public	   arguments	   and	   policies	   on	   conceptions	   of	   the	   good.	   Likewise,	   if	  
there	  is	  common	  agreement	  on	  the	  undesirability	  of	  greed	  or	  the	  importance	  of	  
generosity	   or	   other-­‐regardingness	   in	   a	   society,	   then	   the	   humanity	   argument	  
gives	  no	  reason	  against	  trying	  to	  promote	  those	  values	  with	  legal	  regulation.	  	  
	  
Concluding,	   the	   problem	   with	   trying	   to	   systematically	   exclude	   from	   public	  
decision-­‐making	   a	   certain	   type	   of	   reasons,	   reasons	   for	   the	   good,	   is	   that	   this	  
requires	  a	  moral	  argument;	  either	  directly,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  argument	  
for	  autonomy	  I	  described,	  or	  indirectly,	  as	  with	  the	  second-­‐order	  arguments	  for	  
ethical	  and	  political	  liberalism.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  that	  
moral	   argument	   itself	   cannot	   be	  weighed	   against	   other	  moral	   considerations,	  
and,	   in	  particular	  circumstances,	  be	  outweighed	  by	   them.	  Thus,	  even	  though	  a	  
particular	  reason,	  such	  as	  autonomy	  or	  respecting	  people	  as	  ends	  in	  themselves,	  
may	  generally	  provide	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  being	  reluctant	   towards	  using	   law	  to	  
promote	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  this	  reason	  
will	   necessarily	   always	  outweigh	   all	   other	  possible	   reasons,	   including	   reasons	  
based	  on	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.	  Such	  reasons	  can	  therefore	  not	  systematically	  
rule	  out	  arguments	  based	  on	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  or	  virtues.	  	  
	   Moreover,	  even	  if	  we	  were	  to	  use	  the	  argument	  for	  respecting	  people	  as	  
ends	   in	   themselves	   to	   only	   approve	   of	   laws	   which	   enforce	   values	   that	   are	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commonly	  shared	   in	  society,	   this	  would	  not	   justify	   the	  exclusion	  of	  arguments	  
based	   on	   the	   value	   of	   certain	   virtues,	   because	   such	   values	   may	   well	   be	  
commonly	  shared	  in	  society.	  Consequently,	  while	  we	  may	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  
wanting	  to	  restrict	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  state	  may	  interfere	  in	  people’s	  lives	  
through	   the	   law,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   why	   the	   restriction	   of	   such	   state	  
interference	   should	   be	   based	   on	   a	   division	   between	   arguments	   for	   ‘the	   good’	  
and	  arguments	  for	  ‘the	  right’.	  	  
	  
In	   section	   1,	   I	   argued	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	  
attempt	  to	  curb	  greed	  and	  promote	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity	  and,	  thereby,	  other-­‐
regardingness.	   In	   section	   2,	   I	   argued	   that	   such	   other-­‐regardingness	   can	   be	  
recognized	   as	   an	   important	   good	   for	   societies	   on	   many	   different	   political	  
theories.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  answer	  to	  the	  possible	  objection	  that	  law	  
ought	  not	   to	  be	  used	   to	  promote	  virtues	   such	  as	   generosity,	   in	  order	   to	   show	  
that	   even	   if	  we	   understand	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   as	   attempts	   to	   curb	   greedy	  
behaviour	   and	   to	   promote	   generosity	   and	   other-­‐regardingness,	   this	   does	   not	  
necessarily	   make	   such	   laws	   objectionable.	   Instead,	   whether	   a	   certain	   anti-­‐
exploitation	   law	   is	   desirable	   should	   be	   decided	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	  
balancing	   the	   goods	   the	   law	   seeks	   to	  promote	   against	   its	   possible	  drawbacks,	  
including	   the	  possible	   threats	   to	  people’s	   autonomy.	   In	   the	  next	   section	   I	  will	  
further	   illustrate	   this—and	   my	   argument	   that	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   can	   be	  
understood	  as	  a	  means	  of	  curbing	  greed	  and	  promoting	  generosity	  and	  other-­‐
regardingness—with	   two	   examples:	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   and	   the	   legal	  




I	   will	   conclude	   this	   chapter	   by	   illustrating	   my	   view	   of	   exploitation	   and	   its	  
relationship	   to	   law	   with	   a	   discussion	   of	   some	   existing	   laws	   that	   are	   used	   to	  
regulate	   transactions	   that	   are	   widely	   considered	   exploitative.	   In	   particular,	   I	  
will	   discuss	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   (section	   5.4.1)	   and	   payday	   loan	   regulation	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(section	   5.4.2),	   although	   I	   think	   that	  my	   view	   of	   exploitation	   could	   also	   have	  
implications	   for	   how	   we	   may	   view	   some	   other	   laws	   that	   restrict	   allegedly	  
exploitative	   transactions,	   such	   as	   price	   gouging	   laws	   or	   working	   hour	  
regulations.	  	  
	  
5.4.1	  Minimum	  wage	  law	  	  
Minimum	   wage	   laws	   were	   first	   introduced	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   in	  
Australia	   and	   New	   Zealand.324	   Since	   then,	   most	   countries	   in	   the	   world	   have	  
adopted	  some	   form	  of	  minimum	  wage	   law,	  either	  at	   the	  national	   level	  or	  on	  a	  
state	   or	   regional	   level.	   In	   many	   countries,	   minimum	  wage	   laws	   initially	   only	  
applied	  to	  specific	  industries	  or	  specific	  groups,	  such	  as	  women	  or	  children,	  and	  
were	  introduced	  as	  a	  means	  to	  fight	  sweatshops.325	  Over	  time,	  minimum	  wages	  
became	   increasingly	   advocated	   as	   a	   means	   to	   combat	   poverty	   and	   enable	  
employees	  to	  be	  self-­‐sufficient	  and	  meet	  their	  basic	  needs,326	  and	  today,	  many	  
countries	  have	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  employees.	  	  
Generally	  speaking,	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  are	  popular	  with	  the	  public,327	  
yet	  they	  have	  been	  controversial	  since	  before	  their	  first	  introduction,	  and	  there	  
is	   a	   continuing	   debate	   about	   their	   desirability.	   Very	   low	   wages	   are	   widely	  
considered	   exploitative,	   and	   many	   of	   the	   arguments	   of	   proponents	   and	  
opponents	   of	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   mirror	   the	   different	   arguments	   about	  
exploitation	   that	   have	  been	   spelled	   out	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Some	  proponents	   argue	  
that	  minimum	  wages	  prevent	   employers	   from	  paying	  unfairly	   or	  unjustly	   low	  
wages,	   or	   from	  benefiting	   from	  or	   exacerbating	   injustice.328	  Others	   argue	   that	  
minimum	  wages	  prevent	  employers	  from	  taking	  advantage	  of	  vulnerable	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324	  D	  Neumark	  and	  WL	  Wascher,	  Minimum	  Wages	  (Massachusetts	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  2008)	  
10.	  
325	  See	  e.g.	  Neumark	  and	  Wascher,	  op.cit.	  1;	  G	  Pitt,	  Employment	  Law	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2011)	  
242.	  
326	  Neumark	  and	  Wascher,	  op.cit.	  1.	  
327	  See	  e.g.	  DA	  Green	  and	  K	  Harrison,	  ‘Races	  to	  the	  Bottom	  versus	  Races	  to	  the	  Middle:	  Minimum	  
Wage	  Setting	  in	  Canada’	  in	  K	  Harrison,	  Racing	  to	  the	  Bottom?	  Provincial	  Interdependence	  in	  the	  
Canadian	  Federation	  (University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press,	  2006)	  193-­‐229,	  198;	  J	  Waltman,	  The	  
Politics	  of	  the	  Minimum	  Wage	  (University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2000)	  65-­‐68;	  J	  Waltman,	  Minimum	  
Wage	  Policy	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Algora	  Publishing,	  2008)	  21-­‐23.	  	  
328	  See	  e.g.	  MR	  Reiff,	  Exploitation	  and	  Economic	  Justice	  in	  the	  Liberal	  Capitalist	  State	  (Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2013)	  14,	  135.	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or	  people	  in	  need	  by	  offering	  extremely	  low	  wages;329	  or	  that	  minimum	  wages	  
protect	  low-­‐skilled	  employees	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  accept	  any	  wage	  because	  they	  
have	   limited	   employment	   opportunities.330	   I	   have	   argued	   in	   this	   thesis,	  
however,	  that	  such	  arguments	  based	  on	  fairness,	  injustice,	  vulnerability,	  needs,	  
and	   consent,	   cannot	   adequately	   explain	   why	   exploitation	   is	   wrong,	   and	   why	  
employers	  would	  have	  a	  moral	  duty	  not	   to	  exploit.	   Instead,	   I	  have	  argued,	   the	  
wrong	  in	  exploitation	  can	  better	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness.	  In	  line	  
with	  this,	  I	  believe	  that	  minimum	  wage	  regulation	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
curbing	  greediness	  and	  promoting	  other-­‐regardingness,	  as	  I	  will	  explain	  below.	  	  
Opponents	   of	  minimum	  wage	   laws	   argue	   that	  minimum	  wages	   lead	   to	  
higher	  unemployment	  amongst	   less-­‐skilled	  workers,	  because	  many	  employers	  
will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   afford	   to	   employ	   those	   workers	   for	   higher	   wages.	   Some	  
economists	  also	  argue	  that	  minimum	  wages	  do	  not,	  all	  in	  all,	  reduce	  the	  poverty	  
of	   low-­‐skilled	   workers,	   but	   merely	   redistribute	   income	   among	   low-­‐skilled	  
workers,	  and	  may	  actually	   increase	  poverty.331	  Other	  economists,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  argue	  that	  minimum	  wages	  do,	  all	  in	  all,	  lead	  to	  less	  poverty	  amongst	  low-­‐
skilled	  workers	  and	  to	  less	  income	  inequality,	  and	  that	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  
lead	   to	   higher	   unemployment.332	   Whether	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   are	   actually	  
effective	   in	   improving	   the	   income	   of	   low-­‐skilled	   workers	   thus	   remains	  
uncertain,	  and	  research	  on	  this	  question	  is	  surrounded	  by	  a	  lot	  of	  disagreement	  
and	  controversy.333	  Yet	  my	  view	  of	  exploitation	  provides	  a	  possible	  justification	  
for	  the	  existence	  of	  minimum	  wages	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  overall	  effects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	  See	  e.g.	  DG	  Arnold	  and	  LP	  Hartman,	  ‘Worker	  Rights	  and	  Low	  Wage	  Industrialization:	  How	  to	  
Avoid	  Sweatshops’	  (2006)	  28(3)	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  676-­‐700,	  692-­‐693;	  JC	  Snyder,	  ‘Needs	  
Exploitation’	  (2008)	  11	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  Moral	  Practice	  389-­‐405.	  	  
330	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Cassidy,	  ‘The	  Case	  for	  a	  Higher	  Minimum	  Wage’	  The	  New	  Yorker	  (14	  February	  2013)	  
<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/02/the-­‐case-­‐for-­‐a-­‐higher-­‐
minimum-­‐wage.html>;	  Industrial	  Global	  Union,	  ‘Minimum	  Wage	  Needed	  to	  Push	  Back	  
Exploitation	  in	  Uganda’	  (7	  March	  2013)	  <http://www.industriall-­‐union.org/minimum-­‐wage-­‐
needed-­‐to-­‐push-­‐back-­‐exploitation-­‐in-­‐uganda>.	  	  
331	  Neumark	  and	  Wascher,	  op.cit.	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  many	  different	  studies	  that	  come	  to	  this	  
conclusion.	  	  
332	  See	  e.g.	  S	  Devereux,	  ‘Can	  Minimum	  Wages	  Contribute	  to	  Poverty	  Reduction	  in	  Poor	  
Countries?’	  (2005)	  17	  Journal	  of	  International	  Development	  899-­‐912;	  J	  Dolado	  and	  others,	  ‘The	  
Economic	  Impact	  of	  Minimum	  Wages	  in	  Europe’	  (1996)	  11	  (23)	  Economic	  Policy	  317-­‐372;	  P	  
Dolton,	  CR	  Bondibene	  and	  J	  Wadsworth,	  ‘The	  UK	  National	  Minimum	  Wage	  in	  Retrospect’	  (2010)	  
31(4)	  Fiscal	  Studies	  509-­‐534.	  	  
333	  Neumark	  and	  Wascher,	  op.cit.	  6-­‐7.	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of	  minimum	  wages	  on	  poverty	  and	  income	  inequality;	  although	  it	  does	  not	  deny	  
that	  these	  effects	  can	  be	  important	  as	  well.	  	  
	   In	   line	   with	   what	   was	   explained	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   I	   believe	   that	  
minimum	  wage	   laws	  may	   be	   justified	   as	   a	   means	   to	   curb	   greediness,	   and	   to	  
promote	   generosity	   and	   other-­‐regardingness	   in	   private	   transactions.	  
Employers,	  whose	  aim	  is	  often	  to	  maximize	  their	  profit,	  can	  be	  motivated	  to	  pay	  
their	  employees	  as	  little	  as	  possible,	  even	  if	  they	  could	  pay	  more	  and	  still	  make	  a	  
profit.	  Minimum	  wage	  laws	  prevent	  employers	  from	  doing	  so,	  and	  force	  them	  to	  
pay	  at	  least	  a	  certain	  amount,	  often	  an	  amount	  around	  or	  slightly	  above	  what	  is	  
thought	   to	   be	   the	   minimum	   required	   for	   people	   to	   meet	   their	   basic	   needs,	  
broadly	   construed.	  Such	   laws	   thereby	  prevent	  employers	   from	  greedily	  acting	  
solely	   for	   their	   own	   interests,	   force	   them	   to	   take	   their	   employees’	   needs	   and	  
interests	   into	   account,	   and	   thereby	   force	   them	   to	  perceive	   their	   employees	   as	  
people	  whose	  condition	  is	  morally	  important	  and	  makes	  a	  claim	  on	  them.	  	  
It	  could	  be	  objected	  that	  while	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  do	  force	  employers	  
to	   pay	   higher	  wages,	   they	   do	   not	   really	   reduce	   greed,	   promote	   generosity,	   or	  
force	   employers	   to	   perceive	   their	   employees’	   interests	   as	   making	   a	   claim	   on	  
them.	   After	   all,	   minimum	  wage	   laws	   coerce	   employers	   into	   paying	   minimum	  
wages	   against	   their	   will,	   while	   truly	   acting	   less	   greedily	   involves	   doing	   so	  
voluntarily.	  Moreover,	   it	  might	   be	   argued,	   if	   employers	   do	   genuinely	  want	   to	  
pay	   higher	   wages,	   they	   could	   and	   would	   also	   do	   so	   without	   minimum	   wage	  
laws.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  three	  answers	  to	  this	  objection.	  
	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  all	  employers	  who	  voluntarily	  want	  to	  pay	  low-­‐
skilled	  workers	  a	  reasonable	  wage	  would	  be	  able	  to	  do	  so	  without	  the	  existence	  
of	   minimum	   wage	   laws,	   because	   without	   a	   lower	   limit	   to	   what	   competing	  
companies	  can	  pay	   to	  employees,	  well-­‐meaning	  employers	  may	  not	  be	  able	   to	  
compete	  in	  the	  market	  when	  paying	  reasonable	  wages.	  	  
Second,	  while	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  may	  not	  necessarily	  make	  employers	  
less	   greedy	  or	  more	  other-­‐regarding,	   they	   at	   least	  prevent	   them	   from	  doing	  a	  
certain	  greedy	  act:	  offering	  extremely	  low	  wages.	  This	  might	  not	  change	  or	  say	  
anything	  about	  the	  greediness	  of	  their	  character,	  but,	  as	  explained	  in	  section	  5.1,	  
at	   least	   it	   prevents	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	   their	   greedy	   behaviour	   on	   their	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employees.	   As	   argued	   in	   section	   5.1	   and	   chapter	   4,	   virtues	   are	   not	   only	  
concerned	  with	   the	   character	   of	   the	   virtuous	   actor	   herself,	   but	   are	   relational.	  
What	   it	   is	   to	   act	   virtuously	   or	   to	   fail	   to	   do	   so,	   and	   thus	   what	   it	   is	   to	   act	  
generously	   or	   greedily,	   is	   partly	   defined	   by	   the	   needs	   and	   interests	   of	   other	  
people.	  Curbing	  greediness	  and	  promoting	  generosity	  is	  therefore	  not	  only	  good	  
for	  the	  moral	  development	  of	  a	  greedy	  person,	  but	  also	  for	  other	  people	  around	  
her.	   Even	   if	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   will	   sometimes	   or	   often	   fail	   to	   help	   make	  
employers	   less	   greedy	   and	   more	   concerned	   about	   the	   interests	   of	   their	  
employees,	   they	   will	   at	   least	   help	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   employees	   against	  
greedy	  behaviour.	  	  
Third,	   as	   argued	   in	   section	   5.3.2,	   legally	   regulating	   certain	   virtuous	   or	  
vicious	   acts	   does	   not	   necessarily	   prevent	   people	   from	   making	   voluntary	  
virtuous	  choices,	  and	  may	  even	  aid	  the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  virtue.	  
As	   argued,	   coercively	   imposing	   a	   certain	  moral	   standard	   or	   outlook	   can,	   over	  
time,	   through	  habituation	  and	   internalization,	   lead	  people	   to	  adopt	   this	  moral	  
standard	   or	   outlook	   for	   themselves.	   And	   even	   if	   minimum	  wage	   laws	   do	   not	  
have	  the	  effect	  of	  making	  many	  employers	  want	  to	  pay	  higher	  wages,	  such	  laws	  
do	   send	   a	   message	   to	   society	   in	   general,	   a	   message	   that	   says	   ‘we	   think	   it	   is	  
unacceptable	   to	   pay	   people	   extremely	   low	  wages	   in	   order	   to	  maximize	   one’s	  
own	   wealth’.	   Thereby,	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   can	   help	   to	   create	   or	   sustain	   a	  
certain	   ‘moral	   environment’,	   in	   which	   this	   type	   of	   greedy	   behaviour	   is	  
considered	   reprehensible.	   As	   argued	   in	   section	   5.3.2,	   laws	   help	   to	   create	   and	  
sustain	   a	   social	   framework	   of	   understandings	   and	   expectations	   about	   which	  
type	  of	  behaviour	  can	  be	  reasonably	  expected	  of	  people,	  and	  about	  which	  type	  
of	   behaviour	   is	   unacceptable.	   Such	   a	   framework,	   in	   turn,	   influences	   people’s	  
willingness	   to	  voluntarily	   live	  up	   to	   the	   standards	  of	  what	   is	   considered	  good	  
and	   unacceptable	   behaviour.	   Minimum	   wage	   laws	   give	   out	   the	   message	   that	  
greedy	  behaviour,	   and	  with	   it	   the	  neglect	   of	   other	  people’s	   interests	   for	   one’s	  
own	  wealth	  maximization,	  is	  unacceptable;	  or	  at	  least	  a	  certain	  level	  and	  type	  of	  
greedy	   behaviour,	   between	   employers	   and	   employees.	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	  
minimum	  wage	  laws,	  by	  themselves,	  will	  be	  sufficient	  to	  create	  a	  societal	  moral	  
environment	   that	   rejects	   greed	   and	   promotes	   other-­‐regardingness.	   Yet	   they	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may	  help	   in	  creating	  or	  sustaining	  such	  an	  environment,	   together	  with	  certain	  
other	   laws,	   such	   as	   legal	   caps	   on	   bonuses	   for	   executive	   officers	   and	   legal	  
measures	  to	  curb	  executives'	  pay,	  which	  have	  been	  increasingly	  called	  for	   in	  a	  
number	  of	  Western	   countries	   in	   the	  past	   decade.334	  The	   extent	   to	  which	   such	  
laws	  will	  really	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  helping	  to	  create	  a	  societal	  moral	  framework	  
in	   which	   (a	   certain	   level	   of)	   greediness	   is	   widely	   rejected,	   and	   of	   reducing	  
greediness	   and	   encouraging	   other-­‐regardingness,	   will	   arguably	   differ	   from	  
country	   to	   country.	   Yet	   as	   was	   discussed	   in	   section	   5.3.2,	   it	   is	   a	   plausible	  
assumption	  that	  such	  laws	  can	  play	  a	  role	  in	  doing	  so	  in	  many	  societies,	  and	  that	  
this	  may	  serve	  as	  one	  justification	  for	  such	  laws.	  
	  
Another	  possible	  objection	  is	  that	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  do	  not	  necessarily	  curb	  
greediness	  because	  minimum	  wages	  are	  generally	  still	  quite	  low,	  which	  means	  
that	   it	  might	   still	   be	   considered	   greedy	   to	   pay	   the	   legally	   required	  minimum	  
wage	  when	  one	  is	  able	  to	  pay	  more.	  This	  may	  well	  be	  true.	  But	  as	  explained	  in	  
the	   previous	   chapter,	   greediness,	   like	   generosity,	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   degree,	   and	  
there	   will	   usually	   not	   be	   clear	   cut-­‐off	   points	   between	   what	   it	   means	   to	   act	  
greedily,	  act	  non-­‐greedily	  but	  not	  generously	  either,	  and	  act	  generously.	  It	  was	  
also	   explained	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   that	   people	  will	   inevitably	   disagree	   on	  
exactly	  which	   offers	   are	   greedy,	   but	   that,	   other	   things	   being	   equal,	   it	   is	  more	  
greedy	  to	  refuse	  to	  benefit	  another	  the	  more	  the	  other	  needs	  it,	  and	  the	  more	  we	  
can	   afford	   to	   do	   so.	   Minimum	   wage	   laws	   usually	   force	   employers	   to	   pay	  
employees	  a	  level	  of	  wages	  that	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  needed	  to	  cover	  only	  the	  most	  
essential	  needs,	  however	  construed.	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  one	  may	  think	  that	  this	  
is	  not	  enough	  to	  prevent	  all	  levels	  of	  greed,	  and	  that	  some	  might	  still	  consider	  it	  
greedy	  not	  to	  offer	  more	  than	  what	  is	  required	  for	  basic	  needs	  when	  one	  is	  able	  
to	  do	  so.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  laws	  at	  least	  prevent	  employers	  to	  act	  what	  might	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334	  Think,	  for	  example,	  of	  the	  recent	  EU	  agreement	  on	  a	  cap	  on	  bankers’	  bonuses	  (see	  e.g.	  J	  
O’Donnell	  and	  R	  Emmott,	  ‘Isolated	  Britain	  Fails	  to	  Avert	  EU	  Bank	  Bonus	  Cap’	  Reuters	  (5	  March	  
2013)	  <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/05/uk-­‐eu-­‐bonus-­‐idUKBRE92400F20130305>,	  
or	  the	  recent	  approval	  by	  voters	  in	  Switzerland	  of	  legal	  measures	  to	  curb	  executives’	  pay	  and	  
ban	  ‘golden	  handshakes’	  (see	  e.g.	  K	  Willsher	  and	  P	  Inman,	  ‘Voters	  in	  Swiss	  Referendum	  Back	  
Curbs	  on	  Executives’	  Pay	  and	  Bonuses’	  The	  Guardian	  (3	  March	  2013)	  
<www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/03/swiss-­‐referendum-­‐executive-­‐pay>.	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be	  seen	  as	  extremely	  greedy,	  by	  even	  refusing	   to	  offer	  people	  enough	  to	  cover	  
their	   basic	   needs.	   This	  may	   still	   leave	   room	   for	   greediness	   on	   some	   people’s	  
view	  if	  employers	  can	  easily	  pay	  more	  than	  the	  minimum	  wage,	  but	   it	  at	   least	  
rules	  out	  high	  levels	  of	  greediness—wage	  offers	  that	  most	  people	  can	  agree	  on	  
are	  greedily	  low.	  	  
	   It	   might	   also	   be	   objected	   that	   my	   argument	   appears	   to	   assume	   that	  
employers	  can	  often	  easily	  pay	  higher	  wages,	  but	  simply	  do	  not	  want	  to	  do	  so	  
for	  their	  own	  gain.	  Yet	   in	  reality,	   it	  may	  be	  objected,	  employers	  are	  frequently	  
unable	   to	   pay	   their	   employees	   more	   without	   making	   a	   loss,	   because	   their	  
competitors	  also	  offer	  low	  wages,	  or	  because	  consumers	  are	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  a	  
higher	   price.	   In	   those	   cases	   minimum	   wages	   do	   not	   curb	   greediness	   and	  
promote	  other-­‐regardingness,	  it	  may	  be	  argued,	  but	  merely	  prevent	  companies	  
and	  jobs	  from	  existing.	  	  
The	   economic	   argument	   that	   minimum	   wages	   may	   lead	   to	   job	   losses	  
when	  employers	   are	   simply	  not	   able	   to	  offer	  higher	  wages	   is	   a	   valid	  practical	  
objection	   against	   minimum	   wages,	   which	   should	   be	   weighed	   against	   the	  
benefits	   of	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   on	   any	   view	   of	   what	   these	   benefits	   are.	   A	  
different	   issue	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   in	   such	   situations,	   minimum	   wages	   do	   not	  
prevent	  greedy	  behaviour	  or	  promote	  other-­‐regardingness,	  because	  employers	  
are	  not	   greedy,	   but	   simply	  unable	   to	  pay	  more.	  With	   regard	   to	   this	   objection,	  
three	  things	  should	  be	  noted.	  	  
First,	   we	   cannot	   assume	   that	   employers	   in	   such	   a	   situation	  would	   not	  
have	   acted	   greedily	   if	   they	   had	   been	   able	   to.	   They	   simply	   did	   not	   have	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   choose	   to	  act	  greedily,	  non-­‐greedily	  or	  generously.	  Most	   likely,	  
some	   of	   them	  would	   have	   acted	   greedily	   if	   given	   the	   opportunity,	   and	   others	  
would	  not.	  Second,	  if	  the	  fact	  that	  competitors	  offer	  low	  wages	  is	  what	  makes	  it	  
impossible	  for	  certain	  employers	  to	  offer	  higher	  wages	  even	  though	  they	  want	  
to,	  then	  this	  problem	  will	  be	  solved	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  minimum	  wage	  laws,	  
which	   will	   force	   the	   competitors	   to	   increase	   their	   wages.	   Third,	   if	   it	   is	  
impossible	  for	  certain	  employers	  to	  offer	  higher	  wages	  because	  consumers	  are	  
not	  willing	  to	  pay	  more	  for	  their	  goods,	  then	  this	  may,	  at	  least	  in	  certain	  cases,	  
also	   be	   construed	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   greediness:	   greediness	   on	   the	   part	   of	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consumers.	   Consumers	   typically,	   and	   understandably,	  want	   to	   pay	   as	   little	   as	  
possible	  for	  the	  goods	  they	  buy.	  Yet	  if	  consumers	  try	  to	  pay	  as	  little	  as	  possible	  
for	   a	   good	   while	   they	   are	   able	   to	   pay	   more,	   irrespective	   of	   serious	   negative	  
consequences	  on	  other	  people,	  this	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness	  as	  well.	  Think,	  for	  
example,	  of	  consumers	  who	  knowingly	  buy	  sweatshop	  products	  from	  a	  certain	  
developing	  country	  while	  they	  could	  easily	  afford	  to	  buy	  fair	  trade	  alternatives	  
from	   the	   same	   country.	   If	   greediness	   means,	   as	   I	   have	   argued,	   wanting	   to	  
maximize	   one’s	   own	  wealth,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   one	  has	   enough,	   and	  
irrespective	   of	   the	   negative	   consequences	   on	   others,	   then	   this	   is	   greedy	  
behaviour	  too.	  Minimum	  wage	  laws	  send	  out	  the	  message	  that	  it	  is	  unacceptable	  
to	  pay	  extremely	   low	  wages	  to	  employees	   for	  one’s	  own	  wealth	  maximization,	  
and	  this	  is	  not	  just	  directed	  at	  employers,	  but	  at	  consumers	  as	  well.	  	  
Finally,	   as	   noted	   before,	   the	   analysis	   in	   this	   section	   should	   not	   be	  
understood	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   argue	   for	   the	   introduction	   or	   preservation	   of	  
minimum	  wage	  laws.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  and	  what	  level	  of	  minimum	  
wages	   are	   desirable	   in	   a	   specific	   society,	   other	   factors	   should	   be	   taken	   into	  
account	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  the	   importance	  we	  want	  to	  attach	  to	  people’s	  right	   to	  
autonomy	  and	  freedom	  of	  contract,	  and	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  on	  
poverty	   and	   job	   creation	   in	   that	   particular	   society.	   Such	   possible	   negative	  
effects	   of	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   should	   be	   balanced	   against	   the	   arguments	   in	  
favour,	  and	  this	  assessment	  may	  yield	  different	  results	  in	  different	  societies.	  My	  
point	  is	  that	  one	  of	  the	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  minimum	  wages	  is	  that	  they	  can	  
provide	   a	   means	   to	   help	   prevent	   a	   certain	   level	   of	   greediness	   in	   labour	  
transactions,	  and	  force	  employers	  and	  consumers	  to	  act	  more	  other-­‐regarding;	  
and	   that	   they	   thereby	   protect	   employees	   against	   greedy	   behaviour,	   and,	  
perhaps,	   help	   to	   create	   a	   societal	   moral	   framework	   in	   which	   people	   are	  
encouraged	  to	  be	  more	  other-­‐regarding	  in	  their	  private	  economic	  transactions.	  	  
	   	  
In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	  will	   illustrate	  my	  view	  of	   exploitation	  and	   its	   relation	   to	  
law	  with	  a	  second	  example	  of	  legal	  regulation	  aimed	  at	  restricting	  transactions	  
that	  are	  often	  regarded	  exploitative:	  payday	  loan	  regulation.	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5.4.2	  Payday	  loan	  regulation	  	  
Payday	  loans	  are	  also	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  payday	  advances,	  cash-­‐advance	  
loans,	  or	  deferred-­‐deposit	   loans.335	  They	  are	  relatively	  small,	  short-­‐term,	  high-­‐
interest	   loans,	   which	   are	   usually	   expected	   to	   be	   repaid	   when	   the	   borrower	  
receives	  her	  next	  wage	  or	  other	  regular	  income.	  Some	  major	  banks	  offer	  or	  help	  
finance	   payday	   loans,336	   but	   the	   majority	   of	   payday	   lenders	   in	   Western	  
countries	  are	  non-­‐bank	  firms,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  part	  of	   large	  national	  payday	  
loan	  chains.	  When	  payday	  loans	  were	  first	  introduced,	  borrowers	  acquired	  the	  
loan	  by	  physically	  going	  to	  a	  payday	   loan	  shop,	  and	  providing	  the	  shop	  with	  a	  
post-­‐dated	  cheque	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  loan,	  plus	  a	  fee.337	  The	  borrower	  would	  
then	  commit	  to	  returning	  to	  the	  shop	  to	  repay	  the	  loan	  in	  full	  by	  an	  agreed	  date,	  
typically	  within	  two	  weeks	  or	  less.	  If	  she	  failed	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  lender	  would	  cash	  
the	  cheque	  with	  the	  extra	  fees	  at	  the	  borrower’s	  bank.	  Nowadays,	  payday	  loans	  
can	  also	  easily	  be	  acquired	  on	  the	  internet,	  and	  most	  payday	  lenders	  no	  longer	  
work	   with	   cheques,	   but	   require	   borrowers	   to	   sign	   contracts	   that	   allow	   the	  
lender	   to	   electronically	   debit	   their	   bank	   account	   for	   the	   loan,	   interest,	   and	  
possible	  fees	  or	  other	  extra	  costs.	  The	  payday	  loan	  market	  has	  grown	  rapidly	  in	  
many	  Western	  countries	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s,	  and	  in	  some	  of	  them	  
continues	   to	   do	   so.338	   Nonetheless,	   there	   is	   much	   opposition	   against	   payday	  
loans.	   This	   is	   partly	   because	   of	   illegal	   or	   deceptive	   practices	   by	   some	   payday	  
lenders,	  such	  as	  coercive	  methods	  of	  debt	  collection,	  or	  misrepresentation	  of	  the	  
true	   costs	   of	   a	   loan.	   Yet	   even	   payday	   loan	   companies	   that	   do	   not	   engage	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335	  C	  Johnson,	  ‘America’s	  First	  Consumer	  Financial	  Watchdog	  is	  on	  a	  Leash:	  Can	  the	  CFPB	  Use	  Its	  
Authority	  to	  Declare	  Payday-­‐Loan	  Practices	  Unfair,	  Abusive,	  and	  Deceptive?’	  (2012)	  61	  Catholic	  
University	  Law	  Review	  381-­‐428,	  387.	  
336	  See	  Johnson,	  op.cit.	  385-­‐386.	  
337	  Johnson,	  op.cit.	  388-­‐389.	  
338	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  trading	  estimates	  that	  the	  total	  turnover	  from	  
payday	  loans	  in	  2011/2012	  was	  around	  £860	  million,	  a	  significant	  increase	  from	  around	  £220	  
million	  in	  2009/2010.	  (See	  ‘Payday	  Lending	  Compliance	  Review,	  Annexe	  A	  -­‐	  Quantitative	  
Findings’	  (2013)	  2	  <http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/credit/payday-­‐lenders-­‐compliance-­‐
review/#.UT4Ey9GgZCU>)	  In	  the	  US,	  estimates	  suggest	  that	  the	  number	  of	  payday	  lending	  
stores	  (excluding	  online	  stores)	  has	  risen	  from	  around	  2,000	  in	  1996	  to	  around	  20,000	  in	  2010	  
(see	  N	  Bianchi,	  ‘Profiting	  from	  Poverty:	  How	  Payday	  Lenders	  Strip	  Wealth	  from	  the	  Working-­‐
Poor	  for	  Record	  Profits’,	  Report	  National	  People’s	  Action	  (January	  2012)	  <http://npa-­‐
us.org/profiting-­‐from-­‐poverty-­‐report>),	  and	  that	  around	  ten	  million	  households	  use	  payday	  
loans	  every	  year	  (PM	  Skiba,	  ‘Regulation	  of	  Payday	  Loans:	  Misguided?’	  (2012)	  69	  Washington	  &	  
Lee	  Law	  Review	  1023-­‐1050,	  1024).	  
	   213	  
criminal	  or	  misleading	  practices	  receive	  much	  criticism,	  mainly	  because	  payday	  
loans	  are	  one	  of	  the	  most	  expensive	  forms	  of	  credit	  that	  consumers	  can	  legally	  
acquire.339	   The	   interest	   rates	   asked,	  when	   converted	   to	   annual	   interest	   rates,	  
are	   usually	   several	   hundred	   percent,	   sometimes	   even	   exceeding	   a	   thousand	  
percent.340	  Even	  more	  problematic,	  perhaps,	  are	   the	  costs	  of	  rollovers.	  Payday	  
companies	   generally	   charge	   high	   fees	   for	   extending	   a	   loan	   to	   another	   period.	  
They	  also	  usually	  do	  not	  allow	  borrowers	  to	  repay	  part	  of	  their	  loan,	  but	  require	  
full	  payment	  of	  the	  entire	  sum	  at	  once.	  This	  means	  that	  when	  a	  borrower	  cannot	  
repay	   the	   full	   loan	   on	   the	   agreed	   date,	   many	   payday	   loan	   lenders	   will	  
automatically	  extend	  the	  loan	  for	  another	  period,	  obliging	  the	  borrower	  to	  pay	  
the	   high	   rollover	   fees,	   on	   top	   of	   the	   extra	   interest	   and	   the	   interest	   from	   the	  
previous	  loan	  period.	  The	  increased	  costs	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  vicious	  circle	  where	  the	  
borrower	  has	  even	  more	  difficulty	   to	  repay	  the	   loan,	  which	  may	  prompt	  more	  
automatic	   rollovers	   and	   more	   extra	   fees	   and	   interest,	   etcetera.	   Moreover,	  
research	  shows	  that	  rollovers	  are	  not	  an	  exception,	  but	  occur	  very	  often,341	  and	  
critics	   argue	   that	   the	   policy	   of	   many	   payday	   loan	   companies	   is	   specifically	  
designed	  to	  earn	  large	  profits	  from	  rollovers.342	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  borrowers	  end	  
up	   having	   to	   pay	   the	   payday	   loan	   company	   an	   amount	   that	   is	   several	   times	  
higher	  than	  the	  amount	  they	  originally	  borrowed.343	  One	  payday	  loan	  customer	  
in	   the	   US,	   for	   example,	   borrowed	   $300	   from	   a	   payday	   loan	   company,	   but	  
eventually	   had	   to	   pay	   $1800	   in	   fees.344	   Because	   of	   these	   dangers,	   several	  
countries	   have	   adopted	   legislation	   that	   restricts	   payday	   loan	   practices.	   This	  
legislation	   varies	  widely	   between	   countries	   and	   states,	   and	   includes,	   amongst	  
others,	   interest	  rate	  ceilings,345	   limitations	  on	  rollovers,346	  restrictions	  on	   loan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1024.	  
340	  See	  e.g.	  MA	  Stegman	  and	  R	  Faris,	  ‘Payday	  Lending:	  A	  Business	  Model	  that	  Encourages	  
Chronic	  Borrowing’	  (2003)	  17	  Economic	  Development	  Quarterly	  8-­‐32,	  20,	  table	  6.	  
341	  For	  example,	  the	  UK	  Office	  of	  Fair	  Trading	  found	  that	  28	  percent	  of	  the	  loans	  in	  2011/12	  had	  
been	  rolled	  over	  at	  least	  once,	  and	  that	  these	  loans	  accounted	  for	  almost	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  
companies’	  total	  revenue	  (see	  ‘Payday	  Lending	  Compliance	  Review’	  Annexe	  A,	  op.cit.	  4)	  See	  also	  
e.g.	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1032;	  Stegman	  and	  Faris,	  op.cit.	  
342	  See	  e.g.	  Stegman	  and	  Faris,	  op.cit.	  
343	  Johnson,	  op.cit.	  392-­‐394;	  Stegman	  and	  Faris,	  op.cit.	  13.	  
344	  MA	  Satz,	  ‘How	  the	  Payday	  Predator	  Hides	  Among	  Us:	  The	  Predatory	  Nature	  of	  the	  Payday	  
Loan	  Industry	  and	  Its	  Use	  of	  Consumer	  Arbitration	  to	  Further	  Discriminatory	  Lending	  Practices’	  
(2011)	  20(1)	  Temple	  Political	  &	  Civil	  Rights	  Law	  Review	  123-­‐158,	  132.	  	  
345	  E.g.	  in	  Australia,	  Canada,	  France,	  Italy,	  Israel,	  the	  Netherlands,	  and	  31	  states	  in	  the	  US.	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duration,347	  and	   total	  bans	  on	  payday	   lending.348	  Some	  other	  countries	  do	  not	  
have	  such	  restrictions	  at	  the	  moment,	  but	  are	  considering	  tightening	  regulation	  
of	  payday	  lending	  in	  the	  near	  future.349	  	  
As	   with	   minimum	   wage	   laws,	   many	   of	   the	   arguments	   in	   favour	   and	  
against	   payday	   loan	   regulation	   mirror	   the	   arguments	   about	   exploitation	   that	  
have	  been	  discussed	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Critics	   of	   legal	   restrictions	   say	   that	   people	  
who	  use	  payday	  loans	  voluntarily	  choose	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  that	  while	  they	  do	  have	  
to	  pay	  high	   interest	   rates,	   they	  often	  need	   the	   loan	   to	  prevent	   an	   even	  bigger	  
loss	   or	   even	   more	   serious	   financial	   consequences,	   such	   as	   utility	   shutoffs	   or	  
overdraft	   fees.350	  Banning	  payday	   loans	  will	  make	  those	  people	  worse	  off,	   it	   is	  
argued,	   because	   it	   takes	   away	   the	  best	   option	   available	   to	   them,	   expensive	   as	  
that	  option	  may	  be.	  Opponents	  of	  restrictions	  on	  payday	  lending	  also	  argue	  that	  
many	  people	  who	  use	  payday	  loans	  are	  rejected	  by	  banks	  for	  alternative	  ways	  
of	   acquiring	   credit,	   and	   that	   banning	   payday	   loans	   may	   therefore	   condemn	  
those	   people	   to	   turn	   to	   illegitimate	   credit	   providers,	   such	   as	   felonious	   loan	  
sharks.351	  Another	  argument	  says	  that	  the	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  fees	  asked	  by	  
payday	   lenders	   reflect	   the	   high	   risk	   involved	   with	   those	   loans,352	   since	   they	  
cater	   for	   people	   with	   bad	   creditworthiness.	   Finally,	   some	   opponents	   of	   legal	  
limitations	  on	  payday	  loans	  say	  that	  while	  payday	  lending	  may	  work	  out	  costly	  
for	   particular	   people	  who	   do	   not	  manage	   to	   pay	   back	   their	   loans	   in	   time,	   for	  
other	  people	   they	  do	  bring	  benefits,	  and	  research	  shows	  mixed	  evidence	  as	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  E.g	  in	  all	  but	  four	  states	  in	  the	  US.	  See	  table	  2	  in	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1048.	  
347	  E.g.	  in	  Australia.	  
348	  E.g	  in	  fourteen	  states	  in	  the	  US.	  See	  table	  2	  in	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1048.	  
349	  In	  the	  UK,	  for	  instance,	  the	  payday	  lending	  sector	  is	  currently	  regulated	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Fair	  
Trading	  (OFT),	  and	  faces	  no	  restrictions	  on	  interest	  rates,	  loan	  duration,	  or	  rollovers.	  However,	  
in	  March	  2013,	  the	  UK	  government	  proposed	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  code	  of	  practice	  for	  the	  payday	  
lending	  sector,	  and	  potential	  restrictions	  on	  advertising.	  More	  importantly,	  it	  announced	  its	  
intention	  to	  transfer	  the	  regulation	  of	  consumer	  credit	  to	  the	  new	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority	  
(FCA)	  in	  April	  2014,	  which	  will	  be	  given	  more	  powers	  than	  the	  OFT,	  including	  the	  power	  to	  
introduce	  restrictions	  on	  interest	  rates	  or	  rollovers	  (see	  HM	  Treasury	  United	  Kingdom,	  ‘A	  New	  
Approach	  to	  Financial	  Regulation:	  Transferring	  Consumer	  Credit	  Regulation	  to	  the	  Financial	  
Conduct	  Authority’	  (Consultation	  document,	  March	  2013)	  <http://www.hm-­‐
treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_transferring_consumer_credit_regulation_to_fca.pdf>.	  
350	  See	  e.g.	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1044-­‐1045;	  WM	  Webster,	  ‘Payday	  Loan	  Prohibitions:	  Protecting	  
Financially	  Challenged	  Consumers	  or	  Pushing	  Them	  over	  the	  Edge?’	  (2012)	  69	  Washington	  &	  
Lee	  Law	  Review	  1051-­‐1092.	  
351	  CA	  Cicconi,	  ‘A	  Role	  for	  Payday	  Lenders’	  (2006)	  123	  Banking	  Law	  Journal	  235-­‐248,	  236.	  
352	  Cicconi,	  op.cit.	  235.	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the	  overall	  welfare	  effects	  of	  allowing	  payday	  lending	  in	  a	  society,	  which	  means	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  payday	  loans	  are	  welfare	  reducing	  on	  net.353	  	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  supporters	  of	  payday	  loan	  regulation	  argue	  that	  
payday	   loans	  are	  predatory,	  usurious	  and	  exploitative.354	  They	  object	   that	   the	  
interest	   rates	   and	   fees	   are	   unfairly	   high,355	   or	   that	   payday	   lenders	   are	   taking	  
advantage	  of	   and	   increasing	   injustice	  by	  making	  people	  who	  are	  already	  poor	  
even	  poorer.356	  They	  criticize	  payday	  lenders	  for	  taking	  advantage	  of	  people	  in	  a	  
vulnerable	   position;	   people	   who	   are	   poor,	   and	   often	   in	   urgent	   need	   for	  
money.357	  Some	  also	  object	  that	  because	  of	  borrowers’	  urgent	  need	  for	  money,	  
and	  because	   they	  usually	   cannot	  acquire	  money	  anywhere	  else,	   they	   feel	   they	  
have	  no	  other	  choice	  than	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  very	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  fees.358	  	  
	   These	   arguments	   against	   payday	   lending	   correspond	   well	   to	   the	  
arguments	  about	  exploitation	  that	  I	  described	  in	  chapters	  two	  and	  three	  of	  this	  
thesis,	  which	  say	  that	  exploitation	  is	  wrong	  because	  of	  a	  moral	  duty	  not	  to	  take	  
advantage	  of	  people’s	  vulnerability	  or	  need,	  or	  because	  of	  a	  problem	  of	  consent,	  
injustice,	   or	   unfairness.	   I	   have	   argued,	   however,	   that	   these	   arguments	   cannot	  
justify	   a	   duty	   not	   to	   exploit	   and	   cannot	   adequately	   explain	   the	   wrong	   in	  
consensual	   exploitation.	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   can	  
instead	  better	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness.	  Consequently,	  on	  my	  view,	  one	  
argument	  in	  support	  of	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  payday	  lending	  is	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  
curb	   a	   greedy	   practice,	   and	   thereby	   to	   promote	   other-­‐regardingness	   in	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353	  See	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1041-­‐1042	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  different	  studies	  on	  the	  welfare	  effects	  of	  
banning	  or	  allowing	  payday	  lending.	  
354	  See	  e.g.	  K	  O’Sullivan,	  ‘Scottish	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  Issues	  ‘Exploitation’	  Warning	  over	  
Payday	  Loans	  Companies’	  Holyrood,	  18	  December	  2012	  
(http://www.holyrood.com/2012/12/scottish-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐commission-­‐issues-­‐exploitation-­‐
warning-­‐over-­‐payday-­‐loans-­‐companies/);	  L	  Sherriff,	  ‘Payday	  Lenders	  Are	  Exploiting	  Vulnerable	  
Students,	  Warns	  NUS'	  Pete	  Mercer’,	  Huffington	  Post	  (10	  December	  2012)	  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/12/10/payday-­‐lenders-­‐exploit-­‐students-­‐warn-­‐
nus_n_2270008.html>.	  
355	  See	  e.g.	  PL	  Hayes,	  ‘A	  Noose	  Around	  the	  Neck:	  Preventing	  Abusive	  Payday	  Lending	  Practices	  
and	  Promoting	  Lower	  Cost	  Alternatives’	  (2009)	  35(3)	  William	  Mitchell	  Law	  Review	  1134-­‐1161;	  
and	  Johnson,	  op.cit.	  	  
356	  See	  NS	  Bailey,	  ‘Predatory	  Lending:	  The	  New	  Face	  of	  Economic	  Injustice’	  (2005)	  32	  (3)	  
Human	  Rights	  14-­‐16.	  
357	  See	  e.g.	  Bianchi,	  op.cit.;	  and	  End	  the	  Payday	  Trap	  Campaign,	  ‘Credit	  Enhancements	  Bill	  a	  ‘Win’	  
for	  Payday	  Lenders’	  (27	  June	  2012)	  
<http://debttrap.org.au/?s=exploit&submit.x=0&submit.y=0&submit=Go>.	  
358	  See	  Satz,	  op.cit.	  133.	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transactions.	   Payday	   lenders	   try	   to	   earn	   a	   lot	   of	   money	   by	   charging	  
extraordinary	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  fees	  to	  people	  who	  feel	  they	  are	  in	  urgent	  
need	  of	  money,	   sometimes	   so	  much	   that	   customers	  become	  debt	   trapped	  and	  
ultimately	  have	  to	  repay	  the	  lenders	  an	  amount	  that	  is	  several	  times	  more	  than	  
the	   amount	   they	   actually	   borrowed.	   Moreover,	   many	   payday	   companies’	  
policies	  seem	  specifically	  designed	  to	  make	  large	  profits	  from	  such	  debt-­‐trapped	  
customers.	   Payday	   loan	   companies	   therefore	   act	   greedily,	   on	   the	   definition	   of	  
greediness	  set	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter:	  they	  try	  to	  acquire	  as	  much	  money	  
as	  possible	  for	  themselves,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  serious	  negative	  consequences	  on	  
others.	  And	  this	  means,	  as	  argued	  in	  chapter	  4,	  that	  payday	  lenders	  show	  a	  lack	  
of	   care	  and	   concern	   for	  other	  people’s	  wellbeing,	   and	   fail	   to	  perceive	   them	  as	  
people	  whose	  wellbeing	  is	  morally	  important,	  or	  fail	  to	  let	  themselves	  be	  moved	  
by	   their	   wellbeing.	   On	   the	   view	   of	   exploitation	   defended	   in	   this	   thesis,	   then,	  
payday	   loan	  regulation,	  whether	  outright	  bans	  or	   limits	  on	   interest	  rates,	   fees,	  
or	  rollovers,	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  means	  to	  curb	  such	  greedy	  behaviour.	  
	   Of	   course,	   other	   considerations	   come	   into	   play	   as	   well	   when	   deciding	  
whether	   to	   legally	   limit	   payday	   lending,	   and	   in	   what	   way.	   One	   factor	   that	  
policymakers	   will	   probably	   want	   to	   take	   into	   account	   is	   the	   overall	   welfare	  
effects	   for	   low-­‐income	   groups	   in	   society.	   Research	   on	   these	   effects	   shows	   no	  
consensus,	  however,359	  and	  such	  effects	  may	  be	  different	  in	  different	  countries,	  
and	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  different	  for	  different	  types	  of	  restrictions.360	  My	  claim	  is	  
that	   irrespective	  of	   these	   considerations,	   there	   is	   a	   separate	   argument	   for	   the	  
legal	   regulation	   of	   payday	   loans	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   exploitative	   character	   of	  
these	  loans.	  And	  this	  exploitative	  character,	  I	  argue,	  lies	  in	  the	  greediness	  that	  is	  
inherent	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   enriching	   oneself	   by	   charging	   exorbitant	   interest	  
rates	  and	  fees	  to	  people	  who	  are	  already	  in	  a	  dire	  situation,	  and	  thereby	  the	  lack	  
of	   regard	   shown	   for	   those	   people’s	   wellbeing.	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	   this	  
argument	   should	   necessarily	   outweigh	   the	   practical	   argument	   about	   the	   net	  
welfare	  effects	  of	  payday	  loan	  restrictions,	  but	  merely	  that	  it	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1041-­‐1042.	  
360	  Many	  economists	  oppose	  outright	  bans,	  but	  do	  support	  prohibitions	  on	  rollovers	  or	  interest	  
rate	  caps.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Skiba,	  op.cit.	  1041-­‐1042;	  MA	  Stegman,	  ‘Payday	  Lending’	  (2007)	  
21(1)	  The	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives	  169-­‐190.	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can	   also	  be	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   the	  overall	   assessment	  of	   the	  desirability	   of	  
certain	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  payday	  lending.	  
	  
The	   possible	   objections	   that	   were	   mentioned	   in	   the	   discussion	   of	   minimum	  
wage	  laws	  could	  apply	  to	  my	  discussion	  of	  payday	  loan	  regulation	  as	  well.	  For	  
one	  thing,	  it	  is	  probably	  doubtful	  that	  restricting	  payday	  loan	  practices	  will	  have	  
the	   effect	   of	   making	   many	   payday	   loan	   company	   owners	   truly	   less	   greedy.	  
Nevertheless,	  as	  was	  explained	  in	  section	  5.1	  and	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  minimum	  
wages,	   such	   restrictions	   will	   at	   least	   prevent	   payday	   lenders	   from	   acting	  
(extremely)	  greedily	  towards	  their	  customers	  and	  from	  showing	  no	  regard	  for	  
their	   customers’	   wellbeing,	   and	   thereby	   they	   at	   least	   protect	   borrowers’	  
interests	  against	  greedy	  practices	  of	  payday	  lenders.	  Moreover,	  legislation	  that	  
restricts	   certain	   payday	   loan	   practices	   sends	   out	   the	   message	   that	   certain	  
greedy	  behaviour	   is	  deemed	  unacceptable	  or	   reproachable.	  As	  a	   consequence,	  
such	   laws	  may	  play	  a	   role	   in	   supporting	  a	   societal	  moral	   framework	   in	  which	  
(extreme)	   greediness	   in	   commercial	   transactions	   is	   widely	   considered	  
unacceptable	  and,	  thereby,	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  regard	  for	  other	  people’s	  interests	  
is	  promoted.	  	  
Another	  possible	  objection	  is	  that	  payday	  loan	  restrictions	  such	  as	  caps	  
on	  interest	  rates	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  curb	  greediness,	  because	  these	  caps	  are	  
often	   still	   quite	   high.	   Hence,	   it	   may	   be	   thought,	   payday	   lenders	   who	   ask	   an	  
interest	  rate	  that	   is	  below	  the	  cap,	  but	  who	  could	  easily	  ask	  even	  less,	  are	  still	  
acting	  greedily.	  As	  explained	  above,	   this	  may	   indeed	  be	  true	  on	  some	  people’s	  
view	  of	  which	   transactions	   are	   greedy,	   but	   limits	   such	  as	   interest	   caps	  will	   at	  
least	   prevent	   what	   might	   be	   called	   extreme	   greediness,	   and	   prevent	   payday	  
lenders	  from	  charging	  interest	  rates	  that	  most	  people	  see	  as	  greedy.	  
In	  sum,	  as	  with	  minimum	  wage	  laws,	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  payday	  lending	  
may	   curb	   greediness	   and	   promote	   other-­‐regardingness	   in	   at	   least	   two	   ways.	  
First,	   even	   if	   they	  do	  not	  make	  payday	   lenders	   act	   truly	   less	   greedily,	   at	   least	  
they	  coerce	   them	  to	  act	  as	   if	   they	  were	  not	   (extremely)	  greedy,	  by	  preventing	  
them,	   for	   instance,	   from	   charging	   extremely	   high	   fees	   or	   interest.	   Thereby,	  
although	  they	  may	  not	  benefit	  the	  character	  or	  virtuousness	  of	  payday	  lenders,	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legal	   restrictions	   will	   at	   least	   protect	   borrowers’	   interests	   from	   some	   of	   the	  
negative	   effects	   of	   payday	   lenders’	   greediness.	   Second,	   legal	   restrictions	   on	  
payday	   loans	  give	  out	   the	  message	  that	  greedy	  behaviour,	  or	  at	   least	  a	  certain	  
level	  of	  greedy	  behaviour,	  is	  considered	  unacceptable	  or	  abhorrent	  in	  a	  society.	  
Those	  laws	  may	  thereby	  help	  to	  sustain	  or	  create	  a	  societal	  moral	  framework	  in	  
which	  (extreme)	  greediness	   is	  seen	  as	  unacceptable,	  and	  more	  generosity	  and	  
regard	  for	  others’	  interests	  promoted,	  as	  was	  explained	  in	  section	  5.3.2.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  addressed	  the	  second	  of	  the	  two	  main	  research	  questions	  
of	  this	  thesis:	  if	  I	  am	  right	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  
as	  greediness,	  and	  a	   failure	  of	   the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  what	   implications	  may	  
this	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   certain	   transactions	   that	   are	   regarded	  
exploitative	   in	   present-­‐day	   liberal	   societies?	   I	   argued	   that	   legal	   restriction	   of	  
exploitative	  transactions	  can	  be	  justified	  as	  a	  means	  to	  curb	  greediness,	  and	  to	  
promote	   ‘other-­‐regardingness’:	   an	   accurate	   perception	   of,	   responsiveness	   to,	  
and	  motivation	  to	  advance,	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  people	  in	  society.	  I	  also	  argued	  
that	   this	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   important	   aim	   for	   societies	   on	   several	   different	  
political	   theories.	  Next,	   I	  discussed	  the	  possible	  objection	  that	   law	  should	  only	  
be	   used	   to	   regulate	   right	   and	   wrong	   actions,	   and	   not	   to	   promote	   ‘good’	   or	  
virtuous	   behaviour.	   I	   argued	   that	   we	   cannot	   justify	   making	   an	   absolute	  
distinction	  between	  ‘arguments	  for	  the	  right’	  and	  ‘arguments	  for	  the	  good’	  when	  
deciding	  which	   laws	  are	  desirable,	  and	  that,	   instead,	   the	  desirability	  of	  certain	  
laws,	  including	  anti-­‐exploitation	  laws,	  has	  to	  be	  decided	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  
weighing	  all	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  I	  illustrated	  my	  arguments	  with	  
two	   examples	   of	   laws	   that	   are	   used	   to	   restrict	   transactions	   that	   are	   often	  
considered	   exploitative:	   minimum	   wage	   laws	   and	   payday	   loan	   regulation.	   I	  
argued	  that	  those	  laws	  force	  employers	  and	  payday	  lenders	  to	  act	  less	  greedily,	  
even	   if	   they	  may	  not	  always	  make	  them	  truly	   less	  greedy,	  and	  that	   those	   laws	  
thereby	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   employees	   and	   borrowers	   against	   greedy	  
behaviour.	  Moreover,	  I	  argued,	  minimum	  wage	  laws	  and	  payday	  loan	  laws	  give	  
out	   the	   message	   that	   certain	   (extremely)	   greedy	   behaviour	   in	   one’s	   private	  
economic	  transactions	  is	  considered	  unacceptable	  or	  reproachable	  in	  a	  society.	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Thereby	  they	  may	  help	  to	  create	  or	  sustain	  a	  societal	  moral	  framework	  in	  which	  
such	   greediness	   and	   lack	   of	   regard	   for	   other	   people’s	   interests	   is	   generally	  
considered	   reproachable.	   And	   such	   a	   framework,	   I	   have	   shown,	   might	   help	  
restrain	   greediness,	   and	   support	   the	   development	   and	   maintenance	   of	   the	  
virtue	  of	  generosity	  and	  of	  other-­‐regardingness.	  	  
Throughout,	  my	  goal	  has	  not	  been	   to	  necessarily	  argue	   for	   introducing,	  
broadening	   or	   maintaining	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws.	   Instead,	   my	   starting	   point	  
was	   the	   fact	   that	   there	  are	   laws,	   and	   calls	   for	   laws,	  which	   restrict	   consensual	  
transactions	   that	   are	   deemed	   exploitative,	   and	   that	   these	   laws	   are	   partly	  
justified	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  transactions	  are	  exploitative.	  My	  question	  has	  
been:	  given	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  given	  that	  I	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  
the	  wrong	  in	  consensual	  exploitation	  is	  greediness,	  how	  should	  this	  justification	  
be	   understood,	   and	   is	   it	   an	   acceptable	   justification	   for	   legal	   restrictions	   in	   a	  
liberal	   society?	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   goal	   of	   curbing	   exploitation—and	   thus	  
curbing	   greediness	   and	   promoting	   other-­‐regardingness—can	   be	   a	   valid	  
justification	   for	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws	   in	   liberal	   societies,	   but	   have	   also	  
acknowledged	   that	  whether	  a	  particular	   society	   should	   indeed	   introduce	   such	  
laws	  depends	  on	  many	  other	  factors	  and	  arguments	  as	  well.	  	  
	  
The	   next	   and	   last	   chapter	   summarizes	   the	   arguments	   and	   conclusions	   of	   the	  
thesis.	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CHAPTER	  6	  –	  CONCLUSION	  
	  
This	   short	   concluding	   chapter	   consists	  of	   two	  parts.	  The	   first	   section	  gives	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  different	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  thesis,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  
connected.	  The	  second	  section	  contains	  some	  final	  reflections	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  
the	  thesis.	  	  
	  
6.1	  Overview	  arguments	  of	  the	  thesis	  
	  
This	  thesis	  was	  inspired	  by	  two	  facts.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  many	  present-­‐
day	   liberal	   societies,	   there	   exist	   (calls	   for)	   laws	   that	   restrict	   consensual	  
transactions	  because	  those	  transactions	  are	  considered	  exploitative.	  Think,	   for	  
example,	   of	   laws	   that	   restrict	   working	   hours,	   minimum	   wages,	   maximum	  
interest	   rates,	   maximum	   rent,	   and	   price	   gouging.	   The	   second	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  
while	   there	   is	   general	   agreement	   that	   ‘exploiting’	   means	   taking	   wrongful	  
advantage	  of	  someone,	  within	  the	  fields	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy	  there	  
are	   currently	   several	   competing	   views	   of	   what	   makes	   exploitation	   morally	  
wrong	  (and	  thus	  of	  what	  exploitation	  is)	  in	  the	  case	  of	  consensual	  transactions.	  
Yet	  different	  answers	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  ‘consensual	  exploitation’	  involves	  
will	   have	  different	   implications	   for	   the	   type	   of	   transactions	   against	  which	   the	  
charge	  of	  exploitation	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  argument,	  and	  for	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
the	  charge	  of	  exploitation	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  legal	  limitations	  on	  
those	   transactions.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   thesis	   has	   therefore	   been	   to	   analyse	   the	  
question	  of	  why	  so-­‐called	   ‘consensual	  exploitation’	   in	  commercial	   transactions	  
is	  morally	  wrong,	   in	  order	  to	  determine	  which	   implications	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  
question	  may	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	   voluntary	   transactions	   that	   are	  
seen	   as	   exploitative	   in	   present-­‐day	   liberal	   societies.	   The	   thesis	   thus	   had	   two	  
main	  research	  questions:	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1. What	  is	  wrong	  with	  consensual	  exploitation?	  
2. What	   implications	   may	   the	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   have	   for	   the	   legal	  
restriction	   of	   voluntary	   transactions	   that	   are	   regarded	   exploitative	   in	  
present-­‐day	  liberal	  societies?	  
	  
Chapters	  2,	  3,	  and	  4	  addressed	  the	  first	  research	  question:	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  
consensual	  exploitation?	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  distinguished	   five	   competing	  views	  
that	   exist	   in	   the	   present-­‐day	   philosophical	   debate	   on	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
consensual	  exploitation,	  and	  argued	  that	  none	  of	  the	  five	  views	  can	  successfully	  
answer	   the	   question.	   First,	   what	   was	   called	   the	   vulnerability	   account	   of	  
exploitation	   was	   discussed:	   the	   view	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	  
exploiters	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  others.	   It	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  
fact	   that	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability	   is	   indeed	   a	  
feature	   of	   all	   exploitative	   transactions,	   but	   that	   this	   feature	   does	   not	   in	   itself	  
explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  because	  we	  can	  also	  take	  advantage	  of	  
someone’s	  vulnerability	  without	  exploiting	  her.	  We	  thus	  have	  to	  explain,	  it	  was	  
argued,	   why	   taking	   advantage	   of	   someone’s	   vulnerability	   is	   wrong	   in	   certain	  
situations,	  or	  in	  certain	  ways.	  	  
	   Next,	   the	   thesis	   discussed	   what	   was	   called	   the	   consent	   account	   of	  
exploitation:	   the	   view	   that	   consensual	   exploitation	   is	  wrong	   because	   it	   is	   not	  
truly	  consensual.	  Since	  exploitees’	  bad	  circumstances	  leave	  them	  with	  no	  better	  
choice	  than	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  exploitative	  offer,	  the	  argument	  is,	  they	  are	  forced	  
by	  their	  circumstances	  to	  consent,	  and	  their	  consent	  cannot	  be	  considered	  valid	  
or	   voluntary.	   This	   argument	  was	   rejected	   because	   it	   implies	   that	   everyone	   is	  
always	   forced	   by	   their	   circumstances,	   and	   that	   no	   one	   can	   ever	  make	   a	   valid	  
choice.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  desirableness	  of	  
the	   options	   available	   to	   a	   person,	   and	  whether	   that	   person	   is	   free	   to	  make	   a	  
valid	   choice	   between	   those	   options.	   It	   was	   said	   that	   while	   there	   may	   be	  
something	   morally	   problematic	   about	   the	   circumstances	   in	   which	   exploited	  
people	   find	  themselves,	  and	  about	  the	  options	  available	  to	  them,	  this	  does	  not	  
automatically	  make	  their	  consent	  invalid	  or	  involuntary.	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   The	   third	   understanding	   of	   exploitation	   that	  was	   discussed	  was	   called	  
the	   needs	   account,	   which	   says	   that	   exploitation	   is	   wrong	   because	   we	   have	   a	  
moral	   duty	   to	   help	   people	  who	   cannot	  meet	   their	   basic	   needs,	   and	   exploiters	  
neglect	  this	  duty.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  even	  if	  we	  could	  justify	  an	  individual	  duty	  
to	  help	  others	   in	  need	  with	  whom	  we	  engage	   in	  a	  commercial	   transaction,	   the	  
demands	  of	   this	  duty	  are	  not	   related	   to	   the	  particularities	  of	   the	   transactions,	  
and	   thus	   to	   whether	   and	   when	   we	   find	   transactions	   exploitative.	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   it	   was	   argued,	   this	   account	   of	   exploitation	   cannot	   satisfactorily	  
explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation,	  and	  we	  can	  exploit	  people	  who	  have	  a	  
basic	  need	  to	  be	  met	  while	  meeting	  this	  need,	  we	  can	  exploit	  people	  who	  do	  not	  
have	  a	  basic	  need	  to	  be	  met,	  and	  we	  can	  engage	  in	  a	  non-­‐exploitative	  transaction	  
with	  someone	  in	  need	  while	  not	  satisfying	  our	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  her	  to	  meet	  
her	  basic	  needs.	  	  
	   The	   fourth	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	   exploitation,	  
which	  was	   called	   the	   injustice	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   says	   that	   the	  wrong	   in	  
exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   injustice:	   exploiters	   take	   advantage	   of	   previous	  
injustice	  and/or	   they	   fail	   to	  apply	   the	  principles	  of	  distributive	   justice	   in	   their	  
private	  transactions.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  taking	  advantage	  of	  previous	  injustices	  
is	   not	   necessarily	   wrong	   or	   exploitative.	   It	   was	   further	   argued	   that	   even	   if	  
people	   ought	   to	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	   distributive	   justice	   in	   their	   private	  
transactions,	   as	  with	   the	   needs	   account	   of	   exploitation,	   the	   demands	   of	   these	  
principles	  would	   not	   be	   related	   to	   the	   particularities	   of	   the	   transactions,	   and	  
therefore	  to	  whether	  and	  when	  we	  find	  transactions	  exploitative.	  Hence,	  it	  was	  
said,	  the	  injustice	  understanding	  of	  exploitation	  cannot	  adequately	  explain	  what	  
is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  We	  can	  engage	  in	  exploitative	  transactions	  without	  
taking	  advantage	  of	  injustice	  or	  increasing	  injustice;	  and	  we	  can	  engage	  in	  non-­‐
exploitative	   transactions	   with	   people	   in	   unjust	   circumstances	   while	   taking	  
advantage	   of	   their	   injustice,	   or	   while	   failing	   to	   apply	   the	   principles	   of	  
distributive	  justice.	  	  
	   The	   fifth	  and	  final	  understanding	  of	  exploitation	  that	  was	  distinguished	  
was	   called	   the	   unfairness	   account	   of	   exploitation.	   It	   says	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	  
consensual	   exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   the	   unfair	   division	   of	   benefits	   and	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burdens,	  or	  in	  short,	  the	  unfairness	  of	  the	  price	  asked	  or	  offered.	  It	  was	  argued	  
that	   while	   the	   fairness	   understanding	   gives	   an	   accurate	   description	   of	   which	  
transactions	   strike	   people	   as	   exploitative,	   it	   does	   not	   explain	   why	   they	   are	  
morally	  wrong,	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  actually	  answer	  the	  question	  of	  what	  is	  
wrong	  with	  exploitation.	  This	  is	  so,	  it	  was	  argued,	  because	  the	  term	  unfairness	  
is	   itself	   ‘morally	   empty’,	   and	   in	   order	   to	   explain	  why	   a	   certain	   transaction	   is	  
unfair,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  why	  one	  morally	  ought	  to	  pay	  a	  higher	  or	  ask	  a	  lower	  
price,	   one	   has	   to	   appeal	   to	   further	   moral	   principles	   or	   arguments.	   Likely	  
arguments,	   it	  was	   shown,	  are	   that	  exploiters	  ought	   to	  offer	  or	  ask	  a	  higher	  or	  
lower	   price	   because	   they	   should	   not	   take	   advantage	   of	   vulnerable	   people,	   of	  
people	  with	  no	  better	  option	  but	   to	  consent,	  of	  people	   in	  need,	  or	  of	   injustice.	  
However,	  it	  was	  argued,	  these	  are	  exactly	  the	  arguments	  used	  by	  the	  other	  four	  
accounts	  of	  exploitation;	  arguments	  which	  were	  shown	  unable	   to	  explain	  why	  
we	   ought	   not	   to	   exploit	   people	   and	   to	   justify	  what	   is	  wrong	  with	   consensual	  
exploitation.	  They	  are	   therefore	  also	  unable	   to	   justify	  why	  exploiters	  ought	   to	  
offer	  or	  ask	  a	  higher	  or	  lower	  price.	  That	  is:	  why	  exploiters	  act	  unfairly.	  It	  was	  
concluded	  that,	  looking	  at	  all	  the	  discussed	  theories	  of	  exploitation,	  it	  might	  be	  
impossible	   to	   justify	   a	   moral	   duty	   not	   to	   exploit.	   Instead,	   it	   was	   argued,	   the	  
wrong	  in	  consensual	  exploitation	  can	  better	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  the	  violation	  
of	  some	  moral	  duty,	  but	  as	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue.	  
	   This	  argument	  was	  spelled	  out	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  4.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  
the	  wrong	   in	  exploitation	   is	  greediness,	  a	   failure	  of	   the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	   It	  
was	  argued	   that	  virtues	  play	  a	   large	   role	   in	  people’s	  everyday	  moral	   thinking,	  
and	  that,	  on	  a	  theoretical	  level,	  they	  are	  considered	  important	  not	  only	  in	  virtue	  
ethics,	  but	  also	  in	  some	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  approaches.	  Next,	  it	  
was	  explained	  that	  generosity	  involves	  voluntarily	  giving	  something	  to	  another	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   promoting	   the	   other’s	   interests,	   wellbeing	   or	   happiness.	  
Greediness,	   in	   contrast,	   was	   described	   as	   an	   excessive	   desire	   for	   money	   or	  
wealth,	  which	  also	  implies	  an	  excessive	  self-­‐concern	  or	  self-­‐aggrandizement.	  As	  
such,	   it	  was	  said,	  greediness	   is	  a	  vice	  that	   is	  directly	  opposed	  to	  generosity,	   in	  
that	  it	  involves	  trying	  to	  acquire	  or	  keep	  a	  lot	  of	  wealth	  for	  oneself,	  irrespective	  
of	   negative	   consequences	   for	   others,	   and,	   thereby,	   showing	   no	   or	   limited	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concern	  for	  the	  interests	  or	  wellbeing	  of	  others.	  Such	  greediness,	  it	  was	  argued,	  
is	   exactly	   what	   exploiters	   display.	   Exploiters	   try	   to	   get	   a	   large	   amount	   of	  
personal	  benefit	  out	  of	  a	  situation	  or	  transaction,	  and	  leave	  little	  benefit	  left	  for	  
the	  other	  party,	  or	  make	  the	  other	  party	  pay	  a	  lot.	  And	  they	  do	  so	  even	  though	  
they	   could	   afford	   leaving	   the	   other	   party	  more	   and	   still	   keep	   enough	   left	   for	  
themselves,	   and	   even	   though	   they	   know	   that	   the	   other	   party	   needs	   or	  would	  
like	  to	  receive	  or	  keep	  more	  benefit.	  The	  wrong	  in	  exploitation,	  it	  was	  argued,	  is	  
therefore	  a	  matter	  of	  greediness,	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity.	  
It	  was	  argued	  that	  virtues	  and	  vices,	  including	  generosity	  and	  greed,	  are	  
context-­‐dependent,	   and	   that	   whether	   someone’s	   behaviour	   in	   a	   commercial	  
transaction	  counts	  as	  greedy	  depends	  on	  several	  factors,	  most	  importantly	  the	  
wealth	   and	   needs	   of	   both	   parties.	   It	   was	   further	   emphasized	   that	   the	  
virtuousness	  or	  viciousness	  of	  an	  act	  does	  not	  solely	  depend	  on	  the	  act,	  but	  also	  
on	   a	   person’s	   motives	   for	   performing	   that	   act,	   and	   her	   emotions	   and	  
perceptions.	   What	   exploiters	   do	   wrong,	   it	   was	   argued,	   lies	   consequently	   not	  
merely	  in	  their	  actions,	  but	  also	  in	  their	  selfish	  motive,	  in	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  
person	  with	  whom	  they	  interact	  and	  in	  their	  emotional	  responses	  to	  another’s	  
condition.	   Exploiters	   either	   do	   not	   truly	   perceive	   the	   exploitees’	   condition,	  
needs	  or	  interests,	  or	  they	  do	  perceive	  it	  rationally,	  but	  are	  indifferent	  to	  it,	  and	  
fail	  to	  let	  themselves	  be	  moved	  by	  the	  other’s	  condition	  to	  actually	  give	  up	  some	  
of	  their	  own	  wealth.	  	  
	   Chapter	   5	   returned	   to	   the	   second	   research	   question	   set	   out	   in	   the	  
beginning	   of	   the	   thesis,	   and	   asked:	   if	   I	   am	   right	   that	   the	  wrong	   in	   consensual	  
exploitation	  can	  best	  be	  understood	  as	  greediness,	  and	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  
generosity,	   what	   implications	   may	   this	   have	   for	   the	   legal	   restriction	   of	  
consensual	   transactions	   that	   are	   considered	   exploitative	   in	   liberal	   societies?	  
More	   specifically,	   the	   chapter	   considered:	   if	   the	   wrong	   in	   consensual	  
exploitation	  is	  greediness,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  use	  this	  wrong	  as	  a	  justification	  
for	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  
can	   this	  wrong	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   such	   restrictions	   in	   liberal	   societies?	   It	  was	  
argued	   that	   since	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   greediness	   and	   a	  
failure	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  generosity,	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  exploitative	  transactions	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may	  be	  justified	  both	  as	  a	  means	  to	  curb	  certain	  greedy	  acts,	  and,	  thereby,	  as	  a	  
means	   to	   promote	   a	   certain	   ‘other-­‐regardingness’	   that	   is	   part	   of	   the	   virtue	   of	  
generosity:	  an	  accurate	  moral	  perception	  of	  others,	  emotional	  responsiveness	  to	  
the	  condition	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  motivation	  to	  promote	  others’	  interests.	  It	  was	  
further	  argued	   that	   this	   can	  be	   considered	  an	   important	  good	   for	   societies	  on	  
many	   different	   political	   theories,	   even	   liberal	   ones.	   Next,	   a	   likely	   possible	  
objection	  was	  indicated,	  which	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  law	  should	  only	  be	  used	  to	  
regulate	   ‘right’	   and	   ‘wrong’	   actions,	   and	   not	   to	   promote	   virtuous	   behaviour.	  
Three	  versions	  of	  this	  argument	  were	  discussed	  and	  rejected,	  and	  it	  was	  argued	  
that	  while	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  be	  hesitant	  about	  allowing	  too	  much	  state	  
interference,	   we	   cannot	   justify	   making	   an	   absolute	   distinction	   between	  
‘arguments	   for	   the	   right’	   and	   ‘arguments	   for	   the	   good’	   when	   debating	   which	  
types	   of	   regulation	   to	   allow.	   It	   was	   concluded	   that	   whether	   a	   particular	   law	  
based	   on	   virtue	   arguments	   is	   desirable,	   including	   anti-­‐exploitation	   laws,	  
consequently	   has	   to	   be	   decided	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	   comparing	   all	   the	  
advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  It	  was	  also	  concluded	  that	  while	  true	  virtuous	  or	  
moral	   behaviour	   requires	   voluntary	   choice,	   laws	   that	   regulate	   virtuous	   or	  
vicious	   acts	   do	   not	   necessarily	   prevent	   people	   from	  making	   voluntary	   moral	  
choices,	  and	  might	  even	  help	  the	  development	  of	  virtue.	  The	  thesis’	  arguments	  
about	   exploitation	   and	   the	   law	   were	   illustrated	   with	   two	   examples	   of	   legal	  
restrictions	  on	  consensual	  transactions	  that	  are	  widely	  considered	  exploitative:	  
minimum	  wage	  laws	  and	  legal	  regulation	  of	  payday	  loans.	  	  
	   Throughout,	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   thesis	   has	   not	   been	   to	   argue	   for	   the	  
introduction	  or	   extension	  of	   legal	   restrictions	  on	   consensual	   transactions	   that	  
are	   seen	   as	   exploitative.	   Nor	   has	   the	   thesis	   assumed	   from	   the	   outset	   that	  
something	   is	   undeniably	   wrong	  with	   consensual	   transactions	   that	   are	   widely	  
regarded	   exploitative,	   such	   as	   sweatshop	   work,	   high	   interest	   loans,	   or	   price	  
gouging.	  Instead,	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  thesis	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  all	  present-­‐
day	   liberal	   societies,	   there	   are	   (calls	   for)	   laws	   that	   restrict	   consensual	  
commercial	   transactions	   that	  are	  at	   least	  partly	  based	  on	   the	   claim	   that	   those	  
transactions	   are	   exploitative.	   Given	   this	   fact,	   the	   thesis	   aimed	   (a)	   to	   analyse	  
what,	   if	   anything,	   is	   wrong	   with	   such	   transactions—what	   makes	   them	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exploitative—and	   thereby	   to	   identify	   what	   it	   actually	   means	   to	   justify	   legal	  
restrictions	  on	  those	  transactions	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  exploitative;	  and	  
(b)	  to	  consider	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  justification	  is	  an	  acceptable	  ground	  for	  legal	  
restrictions	   on	   consensual	   transactions	   in	   a	   liberal	   society.	   The	   thesis	   has	  
argued	   that	   the	  widely	   shared	   feeling	   that	   something	   is	  wrong	  with	  what	   are	  
called	   consensual	   exploitative	   transactions,	   can	   best	   be	   accounted	   for	   by	   not	  
referring	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  some	  moral	  duty,	  but	  to	  greediness,	  a	  failure	  of	  virtue;	  
and	   it	   has	   further	   argued	   that	   this	  wrong	   can,	   in	  principle,	   be	  used	   as	   a	   valid	  
argument	  for	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  consensual	  exploitative	  transactions	  in	  liberal	  
societies.	  	  
	  
6.2	  Final	  reflections	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  has	  analysed	  the	  concept	  of	  exploitation,	  but	  it	  has	  looked	  at	  a	  rather	  
specific	   meaning	   of	   the	   term.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   thesis	   has	   only	   focused	   on	  
transactions	  in	  which	  the	  good	  transacted	  is	  itself	  not	  considered	  controversial.	  
It	  should	  be	  remembered,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  thesis,	  such	  as	  
that	   greediness	   is	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation,	   do	   not	   necessarily	   apply	   to	  
allegedly	   exploitative	   transactions	   in	   which	   the	   good	   sold	   is	   seen	   as	  
controversial,	   such	   as	   prostitution,	   the	   sale	   of	   body	   parts,	   or	   commercial	  
surrogacy.	  	  
	   Second,	   the	   thesis	   has	   only	   analysed	   exploitation	   as	   a	   relationship	  
between	   individuals,	   and	   not	   as	   a	   systematic	   phenomenon.	   In	   other	  words,	   it	  
has	   only	   looked	   at	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	   exploitation	   to	   condemn	   individual	  
transactions,	  and	  not	   to	   the	  use	  of	   the	   term	  to	  condemn	  the	  working	  of	  entire	  
societies	  or	  economic	   systems.	  The	  conclusions	  of	   this	   thesis	  do	   therefore	  not	  
necessarily	  imply	  anything	  for	  the	  latter	  use	  of	  the	  term,	  such	  as	  claims	  that	  the	  
difference	   in	  wealth	  between	  developing	  countries	  and	  developed	  countries	   is	  
wrong	  because	  it	  is	  unjust,	  and	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  those	  countries	  is	  
therefore	   exploitative.	   As	   said	   in	   the	   thesis,	   I	   recognize	   that	   such	   overall	  
differences	  in	  wealth	  may	  indeed	  be	  unjust,	  and	  that	  one	  might	  want	  to	  call	  the	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relationship	   between	   such	   countries	   exploitative.	   Moreover,	   I	   also	   recognize	  
that	   such	   macro	   injustice	   can	   contribute	   to	   making	   exploitation	   between	  
individuals	  possible.	  Still,	  as	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  argue	  in	  this	  thesis,	  such	  background	  
injustice	   does	   not	   itself	   explain	   why	   individuals	   act	   wrongly	   in	   individual	  
transactions	   that	  are	  called	  exploitative,	  and	   it	   is	   that	  question	  that	   this	   thesis	  
has	  focused	  on.	  	  
Third,	   the	   thesis	   has	   only	   analysed	   consensual	   exploitation,	   and	   the	  
conclusions	  of	  the	  thesis	  do	  therefore	  not	  necessarily	  apply	  to	  transactions	  that	  
are	  called	  exploitative	  because	  a	  person	   takes	  advantage	  of	   someone	  by	  using	  
coercion,	  deception,	  a	  lack	  of	  sufficient	  information,	  and	  so	  on.	  Nevertheless,	   it	  
might	  be	  possible	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   cases	  of	   coercive	  or	  deceptive	   exploitation,	  
exploiters	  act	  greedily	  as	  well.	  After	  all,	  greediness	  was	  described	  in	  this	  thesis	  
as	   trying	   to	   get	   a	   large	   and	   excessive	   benefit	   for	   oneself	   irrespective	   of	   the	  
negative	  consequences	  on	  others,	  and	  as	  thereby	  involving	  selfish	  motives	  and	  
emotions,	   and	   an	   inaccurate	   perception	   of	   or	   lack	   of	   regard	   for	   other	   people.	  
And	  it	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  this	   is	   indeed	  happening	  in	  coercive	  or	  deceptive	  
exploitative	   transactions.	   It	   is	   likely	   that	   in	   coercive	  or	  deceptive	  exploitation,	  
the	   greediness	   of	   the	   exploiter’s	   behaviour	  will	   be	   considered	   a	  minor	  moral	  
wrong	   compared	   to	   the	   harm	   that	   the	   coercion	   or	   deception	   inflict	   on	   the	  
exploitee’s	   autonomy	   and	   wellbeing,	   but	   that	   does	   not	   change	   the	   fact	   that	  
greediness	  is	  involved	  as	  well.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  thesis	  has	  not	  focused	  on	  such	  
non-­‐consensual	  exploitation,	  and	  much	  more	  would	  need	  to	  be	  said	  to	  properly	  
substantiate	   the	   idea	   that	   greediness	   is	   part	   of	   non-­‐consensual	   exploitative	  
transactions	  as	  well,	  and	  even	  more	  about	  what,	  if	  anything,	  this	  might	  mean	  for	  
the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  such	  transactions.	  	  
	   Fourth,	   this	   thesis	   has	   only	   focused	   on	   exploitation	   in	   commercial	  
transactions,	   and	   it	   should	   be	   kept	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   thesis’	   conclusions,	   both	  
about	   that	   the	   wrong	   in	   exploitation	   is	   greediness,	   and	   about	   the	   legal	  
regulation	   of	   exploitative	   transactions,	   do	   not	   necessarily	   pertain	   to	   claims	   of	  
exploitation	  in	  personal	  relations.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  what	  is	  wrong	  
with	   exploitation	   in	   personal	   relationships	   is	   similar	   to	   what	   is	   wrong	   with	  
exploitation	   in	  commercial	   transactions.	  Greediness	   involves,	  as	  said,	   trying	  to	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keep	   or	   acquire	   a	   large	   benefit	   for	   oneself	   irrespective	   of	   the	   negative	  
consequences	   on	   others,	   and	   entails	   selfish	   motives	   and	   emotions,	   and	   an	  
inaccurate	  perception	  of	  or	  regard	  for	  other	  people.	  It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  this	  
is	   also	  what	   is	   happening	   in	   exploitation	   in	   personal	   relationships.	   Think,	   for	  
instance,	  of	  one	  of	  the	  examples	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  1:	  A	  couple	  would	  like	  to	  
have	  children	  together,	  and	  the	  man	  knows	  that	  his	  partner	  would	  rather	  not	  do	  
the	  childcare	  alone,	  but	  that	  she	  dislikes	  even	  more	  not	  to	  have	  children	  at	  all,	  or	  
to	   find	   a	   new	   partner.	   The	   man	   therefore	   proposes	   to	   have	   children	   on	   the	  
condition	   that	  his	  partner	  will	  do	  all	   the	  childcare.	   It	  might	  be	   thought	   that	   in	  
this	  example	  the	  man	  is	  also	  acting	  greedily,	  because	  he	  tries	  to	  extract	  a	  large	  
benefit	   for	   himself	   irrespective	   of	   the	   negative	   consequences	   for	   his	   partner,	  
and	   he	   has	   selfish	   motives	   and	   emotions	   and	   shows	   little	   regard	   for	   the	  
interests	   of	   his	   partner.	   The	   difference	   between	   commercial	   transactions	   and	  
personal	  relationships	  is	  that	  people	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  care	  more	  about	  people	  
close	   to	   them	   than	   about	   relative	   strangers	   with	   whom	   they	   engage	   in	  
commercial	   transactions.	   Trying	   to	   extract	   a	   large	   benefit	   for	   oneself	  
irrespective	   of	   negative	   consequences	   on	   another	   might	   for	   that	   reason	   be	  
considered	   even	   worse	   in	   a	   personal	   relationship	   than	   in	   a	   commercial	  
transaction.	   After	   all,	  while	  we	  may	  be	   expected	   to	   take	   others’	   interests	   into	  
account	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  a	  commercial	  relationship,	  in	  a	  personal	  relationship	  
in	  which	  we	  claim	  to	  care	  about	  someone,	  this	  is	  arguably	  even	  more	  so.	  Hence,	  
it	  might	   be	   thought,	   the	  wrong	   in	   the	   example	   of	   the	   couple	  wanting	   to	   have	  
children,	   as	   in	   all	   cases	  of	   greediness,	   is	  not	  merely	   the	  man’s	   greedy	  act,	   but	  
also	   what	   this	   act	   seems	   to	   reveal	   about	   the	   man’s	   emotions	   towards	   and	  
perception	  of	  his	  partner:	  that	  he	  does	  not	  care	  as	  much	  about	  the	  happiness	  or	  
wellbeing	  of	  his	  partner	  as	  about	  his	  own	  ease	  of	   living,	  and	  that	  he	  perceives	  
her	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  his	  ease	  of	  living.	  Still,	  as	  said	  before,	  this	  thesis	  has	  not	  
focused	  on	  exploitation	  in	  personal	  relationships,	  and	  much	  more	  work	  would	  
need	  to	  be	  done	  to	  substantiate	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  wrong	  in	  personal	  exploitation	  
might	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  greediness.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  main	  original	  contributions	  to	  knowledge	  of	  this	  thesis	  have	  
been	  its	  outlining	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  existing	  non-­‐Marxist	  philosophical	  debate	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on	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  exploitation;	  and	  its	  formulation	  of	  a	  new	  account	  of	  the	  
wrong	   in	   exploitation,	   and	   the	   possible	   consequences	   of	   this	   account	   for	   the	  
legal	  restriction	  of	  exploitative	  transactions.	  As	  such,	  the	  thesis	  has	  consisted	  to	  
a	  large	  extent	  of	  a	  relatively	  abstract	  theoretical	  investigation.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
concept	   of	   exploitation	   is	   used	   frequently	   in	   everyday	   discussions	   and	   public	  
debates	   about	  many	  different	   types	   of	   topical	   social	   issues.	   These	   include	  not	  
only	   debates	   about	   whether	   the	   minimum	   wage	   should	   be	   increased361	   or	  
whether	  regulation	  of	  payday	   loans	  should	  be	   tightened	  or	   loosened,	  but	  also,	  
for	   instance,	   debates	   about	  Western	   companies	   that	   contract	  with	   sweatshop	  
factories	   in	   developing	   countries,362	   unpaid	   internships363	   and	   extortionate	  
rents.364	  Therefore,	   I	   hope	  with	   this	   thesis	   to	  have	   contributed	  not	   just	   to	   the	  
philosophical	  debate	  on	  consensual	  exploitation,	  but	  also,	  thereby,	  to	  debates	  on	  
such	  topical	  social	  issues.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361	  See	  e.g.	  N	  Morris,	  ‘Government	  Rejects	  'Freeze'	  Calls	  and	  Raises	  National	  Minimum	  Wage	  by	  




362	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Rafi	  Atal,	  ‘The	  Bangladesh	  Factory	  Tragedy	  and	  the	  Moralists	  of	  Sweatshop	  
Economics’	  The	  Guardian	  (29	  April	  2013)	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/29/bangladesh-­‐factory-­‐tragedy-­‐
sweatshop-­‐economics>;	  K	  Bashin,	  ‘American	  Apparel	  CEO	  Dov	  Charney	  On	  Bangladesh:	  Start	  
Making	  Clothing	  In	  A	  Human	  Way’	  Huffington	  Post	  (14	  May	  2013)	  
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/11/dov-­‐charney-­‐
bangladesh_n_3253763.html?utm_hp_ref=business>.	  
363	  See	  e.g	  V	  Barhat,	  ‘Unpaid	  Internships:	  Avoiding	  Exploitation	  and	  Lawsuits	  ’	  Toronto	  Star	  (13	  
May	  2013)	  <http://www.thestar.com/business/small_business/people/2013/05/13/unpaid-­‐
internships-­‐-­‐avoiding-­‐exploitation-­‐and-­‐lawsuits.html>;	  O	  Gibson	  and	  P	  Walker	  ‘Football	  Clubs	  
Accused	  of	  Exploiting	  Unpaid	  Interns’	  The	  Guardian	  (12	  April	  2013)	  
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2013/apr/12/football-­‐clubs-­‐accused-­‐exploiting-­‐unpaid-­‐
interns>.	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